الفصل الفصل 297 · 第297章

From the time he received this news to the end of the campaign all

Kutúzov’s activity was directed toward restraining his troops, by

authority, by guile, and by entreaty, from useless attacks,

maneuvers, or encounters with the perishing enemy. Dokhtúrov went to

Málo-Yaroslávets, but Kutúzov lingered with the main army and gave

orders for the evacuation of Kalúga—a retreat beyond which town seemed

to him quite possible.

Everywhere Kutúzov retreated, but the enemy without waiting for his

retreat fled in the opposite direction.

Napoleon’s historians describe to us his skilled maneuvers at Tarútino

and Málo-Yaroslávets, and make conjectures as to what would have

happened had Napoleon been in time to penetrate into the rich southern

provinces.

But not to speak of the fact that nothing prevented him from advancing

into those southern provinces (for the Russian army did not bar his

way), the historians forget that nothing could have saved his army, for

then already it bore within itself the germs of inevitable ruin. How

could that army—which had found abundant supplies in Moscow and had

trampled them underfoot instead of keeping them, and on arriving at

Smolénsk had looted provisions instead of storing them—how could that

army recuperate in Kalúga province, which was inhabited by Russians such

as those who lived in Moscow, and where fire had the same property of

consuming what was set ablaze?

That army could not recover anywhere. Since the battle of Borodinó

and the pillage of Moscow it had borne within itself, as it were, the

chemical elements of dissolution.

The members of what had once been an army—Napoleon himself and all his

soldiers--fled without knowing whither, each concerned only to make his

escape as quickly as possible from this position, of the hopelessness of

which they were all more or less vaguely conscious.

So it came about that at the council at Málo-Yaroslávets, when the

generals pretending to confer together expressed various opinions, all

mouths were closed by the opinion uttered by the simple-minded soldier

Mouton who, speaking last, said what they all felt: that the one thing

needful was to get away as quickly as possible; and no one, not

even Napoleon, could say anything against that truth which they all

recognized.

But though they all realized that it was necessary to get away, there

still remained a feeling of shame at admitting that they must flee. An

external shock was needed to overcome that shame, and this shock came in

due time. It was what the French called “le hourra de l’Empereur.”

The day after the council at Málo-Yaroslávets Napoleon rode out early in

the morning amid the lines of his army with his suite of marshals and

an escort, on the pretext of inspecting the army and the scene of the

previous and of the impending battle. Some Cossacks on the prowl for

booty fell in with the Emperor and very nearly captured him. If the

Cossacks did not capture Napoleon then, what saved him was the very

thing that was destroying the French army, the booty on which the

Cossacks fell. Here as at Tarútino they went after plunder, leaving the

men. Disregarding Napoleon they rushed after the plunder and Napoleon

managed to escape.

When les enfants du Don might so easily have taken the Emperor himself

in the midst of his army, it was clear that there was nothing for it but

to fly as fast as possible along the nearest, familiar road. Napoleon

with his forty-year-old stomach understood that hint, not feeling his

former agility and boldness, and under the influence of the fright

the Cossacks had given him he at once agreed with Mouton and issued

orders—as the historians tell us—to retreat by the Smolénsk road.

That Napoleon agreed with Mouton, and that the army retreated, does

not prove that Napoleon caused it to retreat, but that the forces which

influenced the whole army and directed it along the Mozháysk (that is,

the Smolénsk) road acted simultaneously on him also.