Kabanata Kabanata 358 · 第358章

The life of the nations is not contained in the lives of a few men, for

the connection between those men and the nations has not been found.

The theory that this connection is based on the transference of the

collective will of a people to certain historical personages is an

hypothesis unconfirmed by the experience of history.

The theory of the transference of the collective will of the people to

historic persons may perhaps explain much in the domain of jurisprudence

and be essential for its purposes, but in its application to history, as

soon as revolutions, conquests, or civil wars occur—that is, as soon as

history begins—that theory explains nothing.

The theory seems irrefutable just because the act of transference of the

people’s will cannot be verified, for it never occurred.

Whatever happens and whoever may stand at the head of affairs, the

theory can always say that such and such a person took the lead because

the collective will was transferred to him.

The replies this theory gives to historical questions are like the

replies of a man who, watching the movements of a herd of cattle and

paying no attention to the varying quality of the pasturage in different

parts of the field, or to the driving of the herdsman, should attribute

the direction the herd takes to what animal happens to be at its head.

“The herd goes in that direction because the animal in front leads

it and the collective will of all the other animals is vested in that

leader.” This is what historians of the first class say—those who assume

the unconditional transference of the people’s will.

“If the animals leading the herd change, this happens because the

collective will of all the animals is transferred from one leader to

another, according to whether the animal is or is not leading them in

the direction selected by the whole herd.” Such is the reply historians

who assume that the collective will of the people is delegated to

rulers under conditions which they regard as known. (With this method

of observation it often happens that the observer, influenced by the

direction he himself prefers, regards those as leaders who, owing to the

people’s change of direction, are no longer in front, but on one side,

or even in the rear.)

“If the animals in front are continually changing and the direction of

the whole herd is constantly altered, this is because in order to follow

a given direction the animals transfer their will to the animals that

have attracted our attention, and to study the movements of the herd

we must watch the movements of all the prominent animals moving on all

sides of the herd.” So say the third class of historians who regard all

historical persons, from monarchs to journalists, as the expression of

their age.

The theory of the transference of the will of the people to historic

persons is merely a paraphrase—a restatement of the question in other

words.

What causes historical events? Power. What is power? Power is the

collective will of the people transferred to one person. Under what

condition is the will of the people delegated to one person? On

condition that that person expresses the will of the whole people. That

is, power is power: in other words, power is a word the meaning of which

we do not understand.

If the realm of human knowledge were confined to abstract reasoning,

then having subjected to criticism the explanation of “power” that

juridical science gives us, humanity would conclude that power is merely

a word and has no real existence. But to understand phenomena man

has, besides abstract reasoning, experience by which he verifies his

reflections. And experience tells us that power is not merely a word but

an actually existing phenomenon.

Not to speak of the fact that no description of the collective activity

of men can do without the conception of power, the existence of power is

proved both by history and by observing contemporary events.

Whenever an event occurs a man appears or men appear, by whose will the

event seems to have taken place. Napoleon III issues a decree and the

French go to Mexico. The King of Prussia and Bismarck issue decrees and

an army enters Bohemia. Napoleon I issues a decree and an army enters

Russia. Alexander I gives a command and the French submit to the

Bourbons. Experience shows us that whatever event occurs it is always

related to the will of one or of several men who have decreed it.

The historians, in accord with the old habit of acknowledging divine

intervention in human affairs, want to see the cause of events in

the expression of the will of someone endowed with power, but that

supposition is not confirmed either by reason or by experience.

On the one side reflection shows that the expression of a man’s will—his

words—are only part of the general activity expressed in an event,

as for instance in a war or a revolution, and so without assuming an

incomprehensible, supernatural force—a miracle—one cannot admit that

words can be the immediate cause of the movements of millions of men.

On the other hand, even if we admitted that words could be the cause

of events, history shows that the expression of the will of historical

personages does not in most cases produce any effect, that is to say,

their commands are often not executed, and sometimes the very opposite

of what they order occurs.

Without admitting divine intervention in the affairs of humanity we

cannot regard “power” as the cause of events.

Power, from the standpoint of experience, is merely the relation that

exists between the expression of someone’s will and the execution of

that will by others.

To explain the conditions of that relationship we must first establish a

conception of the expression of will, referring it to man and not to the

Deity.

If the Deity issues a command, expresses His will, as ancient history

tells us, the expression of that will is independent of time and is not

caused by anything, for the Divinity is not controlled by an event. But

speaking of commands that are the expression of the will of men acting

in time and in relation to one another, to explain the connection of

commands with events we must restore: (1) the condition of all that

takes place: the continuity of movement in time both of the events and

of the person who commands, and (2) the inevitability of the connection

between the person commanding and those who execute his command.