Kabanata Kabanata 42 · 第42章

On November 1 Kutúzov had received, through a spy, news that the army

he commanded was in an almost hopeless position. The spy reported that

the French, after crossing the bridge at Vienna, were advancing in

immense force upon Kutúzov’s line of communication with the troops

that were arriving from Russia. If Kutúzov decided to remain at Krems,

Napoleon’s army of one hundred and fifty thousand men would cut him

off completely and surround his exhausted army of forty thousand, and he

would find himself in the position of Mack at Ulm. If Kutúzov decided

to abandon the road connecting him with the troops arriving from Russia,

he would have to march with no road into unknown parts of the Bohemian

mountains, defending himself against superior forces of the enemy and

abandoning all hope of a junction with Buxhöwden. If Kutúzov decided

to retreat along the road from Krems to Olmütz, to unite with the

troops arriving from Russia, he risked being forestalled on that road

by the French who had crossed the Vienna bridge, and encumbered by his

baggage and transport, having to accept battle on the march against an

enemy three times as strong, who would hem him in from two sides.

Kutúzov chose this latter course.

The French, the spy reported, having crossed the Vienna bridge, were

advancing by forced marches toward Znaim, which lay sixty-six miles

off on the line of Kutúzov’s retreat. If he reached Znaim before the

French, there would be great hope of saving the army; to let the

French forestall him at Znaim meant the exposure of his whole army to a

disgrace such as that of Ulm, or to utter destruction. But to forestall

the French with his whole army was impossible. The road for the French

from Vienna to Znaim was shorter and better than the road for the

Russians from Krems to Znaim.

The night he received the news, Kutúzov sent Bagratión’s vanguard,

four thousand strong, to the right across the hills from the Krems-Znaim

to the Vienna-Znaim road. Bagratión was to make this march without

resting, and to halt facing Vienna with Znaim to his rear, and if he

succeeded in forestalling the French he was to delay them as long as

possible. Kutúzov himself with all his transport took the road to

Znaim.

Marching thirty miles that stormy night across roadless hills, with his

hungry, ill-shod soldiers, and losing a third of his men as stragglers

by the way, Bagratión came out on the Vienna-Znaim road at Hollabrünn

a few hours ahead of the French who were approaching Hollabrünn from

Vienna. Kutúzov with his transport had still to march for some days

before he could reach Znaim. Hence Bagratión with his four thousand

hungry, exhausted men would have to detain for days the whole enemy army

that came upon him at Hollabrünn, which was clearly impossible. But

a freak of fate made the impossible possible. The success of the trick

that had placed the Vienna bridge in the hands of the French without

a fight led Murat to try to deceive Kutúzov in a similar way. Meeting

Bagratión’s weak detachment on the Znaim road he supposed it to be

Kutúzov’s whole army. To be able to crush it absolutely he awaited

the arrival of the rest of the troops who were on their way from Vienna,

and with this object offered a three days’ truce on condition that

both armies should remain in position without moving. Murat declared

that negotiations for peace were already proceeding, and that he

therefore offered this truce to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. Count

Nostitz, the Austrian general occupying the advanced posts, believed

Murat’s emissary and retired, leaving Bagratión’s division

exposed. Another emissary rode to the Russian line to announce the peace

negotiations and to offer the Russian army the three days’ truce.

Bagratión replied that he was not authorized either to accept or refuse

a truce and sent his adjutant to Kutúzov to report the offer he had

received.

A truce was Kutúzov’s sole chance of gaining time, giving

Bagratión’s exhausted troops some rest, and letting the transport and

heavy convoys (whose movements were concealed from the French) advance

if but one stage nearer Znaim. The offer of a truce gave the only, and

a quite unexpected, chance of saving the army. On receiving the news

he immediately dispatched Adjutant General Wintzingerode, who was in

attendance on him, to the enemy camp. Wintzingerode was not merely

to agree to the truce but also to offer terms of capitulation, and

meanwhile Kutúzov sent his adjutants back to hasten to the utmost the

movements of the baggage trains of the entire army along the Krems-Znaim

road. Bagratión’s exhausted and hungry detachment, which alone

covered this movement of the transport and of the whole army, had to

remain stationary in face of an enemy eight times as strong as itself.

Kutúzov’s expectations that the proposals of capitulation (which were

in no way binding) might give time for part of the transport to pass,

and also that Murat’s mistake would very soon be discovered, proved

correct. As soon as Bonaparte (who was at Schönbrunn, sixteen miles

from Hollabrünn) received Murat’s dispatch with the proposal of a

truce and a capitulation, he detected a ruse and wrote the following

letter to Murat:

Schönbrunn, 25th Brumaire, 1805,

at eight o’clock in the morning

To PRINCE MURAT,

I cannot find words to express to you my displeasure. You command only

my advance guard, and have no right to arrange an armistice without my

order. You are causing me to lose the fruits of a campaign. Break

the armistice immediately and march on the enemy. Inform him that the

general who signed that capitulation had no right to do so, and that no

one but the Emperor of Russia has that right.

If, however, the Emperor of Russia ratifies that convention, I will

ratify it; but it is only a trick. March on, destroy the Russian

army.... You are in a position to seize its baggage and artillery.

The Russian Emperor’s aide-de-camp is an impostor. Officers are

nothing when they have no powers; this one had none.... The Austrians

let themselves be tricked at the crossing of the Vienna bridge, you are

letting yourself be tricked by an aide-de-camp of the Emperor.

NAPOLEON

Bonaparte’s adjutant rode full gallop with this menacing letter to

Murat. Bonaparte himself, not trusting to his generals, moved with all

the Guards to the field of battle, afraid of letting a ready victim

escape, and Bagratión’s four thousand men merrily lighted campfires,

dried and warmed themselves, cooked their porridge for the first time

for three days, and not one of them knew or imagined what was in store

for him.