德国故事· Bab 1

Bab Bab 1 · 德国故事

CHAPTER 1

The period of Roman history on which we now enter is, like so many that

had preceded it, a period of revolt, directly aimed against the existing

conditions of society and, through the means taken to satisfy the fresh

wants and to alleviate the suddenly realised, if not suddenly created,

miseries of the time, indirectly affecting the structure of the body

politic. The difference between the social movement of the present and

that of the past may be justly described as one of degree, in so far as

there was not a single element of discontent visible in the revolution

commencing with the Gracchi and ending with Caesar that had not been

present in the earlier epochs of social and political agitation. The

burden of military service, the curse of debt, the poverty of an

agrarian proletariate, the hunger for land, the striving of the artisan

and the merchant after better conditions of labour and of trade--the

separate cries of discontent that find their unison in a protest against

the monopoly of office and the narrow or selfish rule of a dominant

class, and thus gain a significance as much political as social--all

these plaints had filled the air at the time when Caius Licinius near

the middle of the fourth century, and Appius Claudius at its close,

evolved their projects of reform. The cycle of a nation's history can

indeed never be broken as long as the character of the nation remains

the same. And the average Roman of the middle of the second century

before our era[1] was in all essential particulars the Roman of the

times of Appius and of Licinius, or even of the epoch when the ten

commissioners had published the Tables which were to stamp its perpetual

character on Roman law. He was in his business relations either

oppressor or oppressed, either hammer or anvil. In his private life he

was an individualist whose sympathies were limited to the narrow circle

of his dependants; he was a trader and a financier whose humanitarian

instincts were subordinated to a code of purely commercial morality, and

who valued equity chiefly because it presented the line of least

resistance and facilitated the conduct of his industrial operations.

Like all individualists, he was something of an anarchist, filled with

the idea, which appeared on every page of the record of his ancestors

and the history of his State, that self-help was the divinely given

means of securing right, that true social order was the issue of

conflicting claims pushed to their breaking point until a temporary

compromise was agreed on by the weary combatants; but he was hampered in

his democratic leanings by the knowledge that democracy is the fruit of

individual self-restraint and subordination to the common

will--qualities of which he could not boast and symbols of a prize which

he would not have cared to attain at the expense of his peculiar ideas

of personal freedom--and he was forced, in consequence of this

abnegation, to submit to an executive government as strong, one might

almost say as tyrannous, as any which a Republic has ever displayed--a

government which was a product of the restless spirit of self-assertion

and self-aggrandisement which the Roman felt in himself, and therefore

had sufficient reason to suspect in others.

The Roman was the same; but his environment had changed more startlingly

during the last fifty or sixty years than in all the centuries that had

preceded them in the history of the Republic. The conquest of Italy had,

it Is true, given to his city much that was new and fruitful in the

domains of religion, of art, of commerce and of law. Bat these

accretions merely entailed the fuller realisation of a tendency which

had been marked from the earliest stage of Republican history--the

tendency to fit isolated elements in the marvellous discoveries made by

the heaven-gifted race of the Greeks into a framework that was

thoroughly national and Roman. Ideas had been borrowed, and these ideas

certainly resulted in increased efficiency and therefore in increased

wealth. But the gross material of Hellenism, whether as realised in

intellectual ideas or (the prize that appealed more immediately to the

practical Roman with his concrete mind) in tangible things, had not been

seized as a whole as the reward of victory: and no great attempt had

been made in former ages to assimilate the one or to enjoy the other.

The nature of the material rewards which had been secured by the epochs

of Italian conquest had indeed made such assimilation or enjoyment

impossible. They would have been practicable only in a state which

possessed a fairly complete urban life; and the effect of the wars which

Rome waged with her neighbours in the peninsula had been to make the

life of the average citizen more purely agricultural than it had been in

the early Republic, perhaps even in the epoch of the Kings. The course

of a nation's political, social and intellectual history is determined

very largely by the methods which it adopts for its own expansion at the

inevitable moment when its original limits are found to be too narrow to

satisfy even the most modest needs of a growing population. The method

chosen will depend chiefly on geographical circumstances and on the

military characteristics of the people which are indissolubly connected

with these. When the city of Old Greece began to feel the strength of

its growing manhood, and the developing hunger which was both the sign

and the source of that strength, it looked askance at the mountain line

which cut it off from the inland regions, it turned hopeful eyes on the

sea that sparkled along its coasts; it manned its ships and sent its

restless youth to a new and distant home which was but a replica of the

old. The results of this maritime adventure were the glories of urban

life and the all-embracing sweep of Hellenism. The progress of Roman

enterprise had been very different. Following the example of all

conquering Italian peoples,[2] and especially of the Sabellian invaders

whose movements immediately preceded their own, the Romans adopted the

course of inland expansion, and such urban unity as they had possessed

was dissipated over the vast tract of territory on which the legions

were settled, or to which the noble sent his armed retainers, nominally

to keep the land as the public domain of Rome, in reality to hold it for

himself and his descendants. At a given moment (which is as clearly

marked in Roman as in Hellenic history) the possibility of such

expansion ceased, and the necessity for its cessation was as fully

exhibited in the policy of the government as in the tastes of the

people. No Latin colony had been planted later than the year 181, no

Roman colony later than 157,[3] and the senate showed no inclination to

renew schemes for the further assignment of territory amongst the

people. There were many reasons for this indifference to colonial

enterprise. In the first place, although colonisation had always been a

relief to the proletariate and one of the means regularly adopted by

those in power for assuaging its dangerous discontent, yet the

government had always regarded the social aspect of this method of

expansion as subservient to the strategic.[4] This strategic motive no

longer existed, and a short-sighted policy, which looked to the present,

not to the future, to men of the existing generation and not to their

sons, may easily have held that a colony, which was not needed for the

protection of the district in which it was settled, injuriously affected

the fighting-strength of Rome. The maritime colonies which had been

established from the end of the great Latin war down to the close of the

second struggle with Carthage claimed, at least in many cases, exemption

from military service,[5] and a tradition of this kind tends to linger

when its justification is a thing of the past. But, even if such a view

could be repudiated by the government, it was certain that the levy

became a more serious business the greater the number of communities on

which the recruiting commander had to call, and it was equally manifest

that the veteran who had just been given an allotment on which to

establish his household gods might be inclined to give a tardy response

to the call to arms. The Latin colony seemed a still greater anachronism

than the military colony of citizens. The member of such a community,

although the state which he entered enjoyed large privileges of

autonomy, ceased to be a Roman citizen in respect to political rights,

and even at a time when self-government had been valued almost more than

citizenship, the government had only been able to carry out its project

of pushing these half-independent settlements into the heart of Italy by

threatening with a pecuniary penalty the soldier who preferred his

rights as a citizen to the benefits which he might receive as an

emigrant.[6] Now that the great wars had brought their dubious but at

least potential profits to every member of the Roman community, and the

gulf between the full citizens and the members of the allied communities

was ever widening, it was more than doubtful whether a member of the

former class, however desperate his plight, would readily condescend to

enroll himself amongst the latter. But, even apart from these

considerations, it must have seemed very questionable to any one, who

held the traditional view that colonisation should subserve the purposes

of the State, whether the landless citizen of the time could be trusted

to fulfil his duties as an emigrant. As early as the year 186 the consul

Spurius Postumius, while making a judicial tour in Italy, had found to

his surprise that colonies on both the Italian coasts, Sipontum on the

Upper, and Buxentum on the Lower Sea, had been abandoned by their

inhabitants: and a new levy had to be set on foot to replace the

faithless emigrants who had vanished into space.[7] As time went on the

risk of such desertion became greater, partly from the growing

difficulty of maintaining an adequate living on the land, partly from

the fact that the more energetic spirits, on whom alone the hopes of

permanent settlement could depend, found a readier avenue to wealth and

a more tempting sphere for the exercise of manly qualities in the

attractions of a campaign that seemed to promise plunder and glory,

especially when these prizes were accompanied by no exorbitant amount of

suffering or toil. Thus when it had become known that Scipio Africanus

would accompany his brother in the expedition against Antiochus, five

thousand veterans, both citizens and allies, who had served their full

time under the command of the former, offered their voluntary services

to the departing consul,[8] and nineteen' years later the experience

which had been gained of the wealth that might be reaped from a campaign

in Macedonia and Asia drew many willing recruits to the legions which

were to be engaged in the struggle with Perseus.[9] The

semi-professional soldier was in fact springing up, the man of a spirit

adventurous and restless such as did not promise contentment with the

small interests and small rewards of life in an Italian outpost. But, if

the days of formal colonisation were over, why might not the concurrent

system be adopted of dividing conquered lands amongst poorer citizens

without the establishment of a new political settlement or any strict

limitation of the number of the recipients? This 'viritane' assignation

had always run parallel to that which assumed the form of colonisation;

it merely required the existence of land capable of distribution, and

the allotments granted might be considered merely a means of affording

relief to the poorer members of existing municipalities. The system was

supposed to have existed from the times of the Kings; it was believed to

have formed the basis of the first agrarian law, that of Spurius Cassius

in 486;[10] it had been employed after the conquest of the Volscians in

the fourth century and that of the Sabines in the third;[11] it had

animated the agrarian legislation of Flaminius when in 232 he romanised

the _ager Gallicus_ south of Ariminum without planting a single colony

in this region;[12] and a date preceding the Gracchan legislation by

only forty years had seen the resumption of the method, when some Gallic

and Ligurian land, held to be the spoil of war and declared to be

unoccupied, had been parcelled out into allotments, of ten _jugera_ to

Roman citizens and of three to members of the Latin name.[13] But to the

government of the period with which we are concerned the continued

pursuance of such a course, if it suggested itself at all, appealed in

the light of a policy that was unfamiliar, difficult and objectionable.

It is probable that this method of assignment, even in its later phases,

had been tinctured with the belief that, like the colony, it secured a

system of military control over the occupied district: and that the

purely social object of land-distribution, if it had been advanced at

all, was considered to be characteristic rather of the demagogue than

the statesman. From a strategic point of view such a measure was

unnecessary; from an economic, it assumed, not only a craving for

allotments amongst the poorer class, of which there was perhaps little

evidence, but a belief, which must have been held to be sanguine in the

extreme, that these paupers, when provided for, would prove to be

efficient farmers capable of maintaining a position which many of them

had already lost. Again, if such an assignment was to be made, it should

be made on land immediately after it had passed from the possession of

the enemy to that of Rome; if time had elapsed since the date of

annexation, it was almost certain that claims of some kind had been

asserted over the territory, and shadowy as these claims might be, the

Roman law had, in the interest of the State itself, always tended to

recognise a _de facto_ as a _de jure_ right. The claims of the allies

and the municipalities had also to be considered; for assignments to

Roman citizens on an extensive scale would inevitably lead to difficult

questions about the rights which many of these townships actually

possessed to much of the territory whose revenue they enjoyed. If the

allies and the municipal towns did not suffer, the loss must fall on the

Roman State itself, which derived one of its chief sources of stable and

permanent revenue--the source which was supposed to meet the claims for

Italian administration[14]--from its domains in Italy, on the

contractors who collected this revenue, and on the Enterprising

capitalists who had put their wealth and energy into the waste places to

which they had been invited by the government, and who had given these

devastated territories much of the value which they now possessed.

Lastly, these enterprising possessors were strongly represented in the

senate; the leading members of the nobility had embarked on a new system

of agriculture, the results of which were inimical to the interest of

the small farmer, and the conditions of which would be undermined by a

vast system of distribution such as could alone suffice to satisfy the

pauper proletariate. The feeling that a future agrarian law was useless

from an economic and dangerous from a political point of view, was

strengthened by the conviction that its proposal would initiate a war

amongst classes, that its failure would exasperate the commons and that

its success would inflict heavy pecuniary damage on the guardians of

the State.

Thus the simple system of territorial expansion, which had continued in

an uninterrupted course from the earliest days of conquest, might be now

held to be closed for ever. From the point of view of the Italian

neighbours of Rome it was indeed ample time that such a closing period

should be reached. If we possessed a map of Italy which showed the

relative proportions of land in Italy and Cisalpine Gaul which had been

seized by Rome or left to the native cities or tribes, we should

probably find that the possessions of the conquering State, whether

occupied by colonies, absorbed by the gift of citizenship, or held as

public domain, amounted to nearly one half of the territory of the whole

peninsula.[15] The extension of such progress was clearly impossible

unless war were to be provoked with the Confederacy which furnished so

large a proportion of the fighting strength of Rome; but, if it was

confessed that extension on the old lines was now beyond reach of

attainment and yet it was agreed that the existing resources of Italy

did not furnish an adequate livelihood to the majority of the citizens

of Rome, but two methods of expansion could be thought of as practicable

in the future. One was agrarian assignation at the expense either of the

State or of the richer classes or of both; the other was enterprise

beyond the sea. But neither of these seemed to deserve government

intervention, or regulation by a scheme which would satisfy either

immediate or future wants. The one was repudiated, as we have already

shown, on account of its novelty, its danger and its inconvenience; the

other seemed emphatically a matter for private enterprise and above all

for private capital. It could never be available for the very poor

unless it assumed the form of colonisation, and the senate looked on

transmarine colonisation with the eye of prejudice.[16] It took a

different view of the enterprise of the foreign speculator and merchant;

this it regarded with an air of easy indifference. Their wealth was a

pillar on which the State might lean in times of emergency, but, until

the disastrous effects of commercial enterprise on foreign policy were

more clearly seen, it was considered to be no business of the government

either to help or to hinder the wealthy and enterprising Roman in his

dealings with the peoples of the subject or protected lands.

Rome, if by this name we mean the great majority of Roman citizens, was

for the first time for centuries in a situation in which all movement

and all progress seemed to be denied. The force of the community seemed

to have spent itself for the time; as a force proceeding from the whole

community it had perhaps spent itself for ever. A section of the

nominally sovereign people might yet be welded into a mighty instrument

that would carry victory to the ends of the earth, and open new channels

of enterprise both for the men who guided their movements and for

themselves. But for the moment the State was thrown back upon itself; it

held that an end had been attained, and the attainment naturally

suggested a pause, a long survey of the results which had been reached

by these long years of struggle with the hydra-headed enemy abroad. The

close of the third Macedonian war is said by a contemporary to have

brought with it a restful sense of security such as Rome could not have

felt for centuries.[17] Such a security gave scope to the rich to enjoy

the material advantages which their power had acquired; but it also gave

scope to the poor to reflect on the strange harvest which the conquest

of the great powers of the world had brought to the men whose stubborn

patience had secured the peace which they were given neither the means

nor the leisure to enjoy. The men who evaded or had completed their

service in the legions lacked the means, although they had the leisure;

the men who still obeyed the summons to arms lacked both, unless the

respite between prolonged campaigns could be called leisure, or the

booty, hardly won and quickly squandered, could be described as means.

Even after Carthage had been destroyed Rome, though doubly safe, was

still busy enough with her legions; the government of Spain was one

protracted war, and proconsuls were still striving to win triumphs for

themselves by improving on their predecessors' work.[18] But such war

could not absorb the energy or stimulate the interest of the people as a

whole. The reaction which had so often followed a successful campaign,

when the discipline of the camp had been shaken off and the duties of

the soldier were replaced by the wants of the citizen, was renewed on a

scale infinitely larger than before--a scale proportioned to the

magnitude of the strain which had been removed and the greatness of the

wants which had been revived. The cries for reform may have been of the

old familiar type but their increased intensity and variety may almost

be held to have given them a difference of quality. There is a stage at

which a difference of degree seems to amount to one of kind: and this

stage seems certainly to have been reached in the social problems

presented by the times. In the old days of the struggle between the

orders the question of privilege had sometimes overshadowed the purely

economic issue, and although a close scrutiny of those days of turmoil

shows that the dominant note in the conflict was often a mere pretext

meant to serve the personal ambition of the champions of the Plebs, yet

the appearance rather than the reality of an issue imposes on the

imagination of the mob, and political emancipation had been thought a

boon even when hard facts had shown that its greater prizes had fallen

to a small and selfish minority. Now, however, there could be no

illusion. There was nothing but material wants on one side, there was

nothing but material power on the other. The intellectual claims which

might be advanced to justify a monopoly of office and of wealth, could

be met by an intellectual superiority on the part of a demagogue

clamouring for confiscation. The ultimate basis of the life of the State

was for the first time to be laid bare and subjected to a merciless

scrutiny; it remained to be seen which of the two great forces of

society would prevail; the force of habit which had so often blinded the

Roman to his real needs; or the force of want which, because it so

seldom won a victory over his innate conservatism, was wont, when that

victory had been won, to sweep him farther on the path of reckless and

inconsistent reform than it would have carried a race better endowed

with the gift of testing at every stage of progress the ends and needs

of the social organism considered as a whole.

An analysis of social discontent at any period of history must take the

form of an examination of the wants engendered by the age, and of the

adequacy or inadequacy of their means of satisfaction. If we turn our

attention first to the forces of society which were in possession of the

fortress and were to be the object of attack, we shall find that the

ruling desires which animated these men of wealth and influence were

chiefly the product of the new cosmopolitan culture which the victorious

city had begun to absorb in the days when conquest and diplomacy had

first been carried across the seas. To this she fell a willing victim

when the conquered peoples, bending before the rude force which had but

substituted a new suzerainty for an old and had scarcely touched their

inner life, began to display before the eyes of their astonished

conquerors the material comfort and the spiritual charm which, in the

case of the contact of a potent but narrow civilisation with one that is

superbly elastic and strong in the very elegance of its physical

debility, can always turn defeat into victory. But the student who

begins his investigation of the new Roman life with the study of Roman

society as it existed in the latter half of the second century before

our era, cannot venture to gather up the threads of the purely

intellectual and moral influences which were created by the new

Hellenistic civilisation. He feels that he is only at the beginning of a

process, that he lacks material for his picture, that the illustrative

matter which he might employ is to be found mainly in the literary

records of a later age, and that his use of this matter would but

involve him in the historical sins of anticipation and anachronism. Of

some phases of the war between the old spirit and the new we shall find

occasion to speak; but the culminating point attained by the blend of

Greek with Roman elements is the only one which is clearly visible to

modern eyes. This point, however, was reached at the earliest only in

the second half of the next century. It was only then that the fusion of

the seemingly discordant elements gave birth to the new "Romanism,"

which was to be the ruling civilisation of Italy and the Western

provinces and, in virtue of the completeness of the amalgamation and the

novelty of the product, was itself to be contrasted and to live for

centuries in friendly rivalry with the more uncompromising Hellenism of

Eastern lands. But some of the economic effects of the new influences

claim our immediate attention, for we are engaged in the study of the

beginnings of an economic revolution, and an analysis must therefore be

attempted of some of the most pressing needs and some of the keenest

desires which were awakened by Hellenism, either in the purer dress

which old Greece had given it or in the more gorgeous raiment which it

had assumed during its sojourn in the East.

A tendency to treat the city as the home, the country only as a means of

refreshment and a sphere of elegant retirement during that portion of

the year when the excitement of the urban season, its business and its

pleasure, were suspended, began to be a marked feature of the life of

the upper classes. The man of affairs and the man of high finance were

both compelled to have their domicile in the town, and, if agriculture

was still the staple or the supplement of their wealth, the needs of the

estate had to be left to the supervision of the resident bailiff.[19]

This concentration of the upper classes in the city necessarily entailed

a great advance in the price and rental of house property within the

walls. It is true that the reckless prices paid for houses, especially

for country villas, by the grandees and millionaires of the next

generation,[20] had not yet been reached; but the indications with which

we are furnished of the general rise of prices for everything in Rome

that could be deemed desirable by a cultivated taste,[21] show that the

better class of house property must already have yielded large returns,

whether it were sold or let, and we know that poor scions of the

nobility, if business or pleasure induced them to spend a portion of the

year in Rome, had soon to climb the stairs of flats or lodgings.[22] The

pressure for room led to the piling of storey on storey. On The roof of

old houses new chambers were raised, which could be reached by an

outside stair, and either served to accommodate the increased retinue of

the town establishment or were let to strangers who possessed no

dwelling of their own;[23] the still larger lodging-houses or "islands,"

which derived their name from their lofty isolation from neighbouring

buildings,[24] continued to spring up, and even private houses soon came

to attain a height which had to be restrained by the intervention of the

law. An ex-consul and augur was called on by the censors of 125 to

explain the magnitude of a villa which he had raised, and the altitude

of the structure exposed him not only to the strictures of the guardians

of morals but to a fine imposed by a public court.[25] Great changes

were effected in the interior structure of the houses of the

wealthy--changes excused by a pardonable desire for greater comfort and

rendered necessary both by the growing formality of life and the large

increase in the numbers of the resident household, but tending, when

once adopted, to draw the father of the family into that most useless

type of extravagance which takes the form of a craze for building. The

Hall or Atrium had once been practically the house. It opened on the

street. It contained the family bed and the kitchen fire. The smoke

passed through a hole in the roof and begrimed the family portraits that

looked down on the members of the household gathered round the hearth

for their common meal. The Hall was the chief bedroom, the kitchen, the

dining-room and the reception room, and it was also the only avenue from

the street to the small courtyard at the back. The houses of the great

had hitherto differed from those of the poor chiefly in dimensions and

but very slightly in structure. The home of the wealthy patrician had

simply been on a larger scale of primitive discomfort; and if his large

parlour built of timber could accommodate a vast host of clients, the

bed and the cooking pots were still visible to every visitor. The chief

of the early innovations had been merely a low portico, borrowed from

the Greeks by the Etruscans and transmitted by them to Rome, which ran

round the courtyard, was divided into little cells and chambers, and

served to accommodate the servants of the house.[26] But now fashion

dictated that the doorway should not front the street but should be

parted from it by a vestibule, in which the early callers gathered

before they were admitted to the hall of audience. The floor of the

Atrium was no longer the common passage to the regions at the back, but

a special corridor lying either on one or on both sides of the Hall[27]

led past the Study or Tablinum, immediately behind it, to the inner

court beyond. Even the sanctity of the nuptial couch could not continue

to give it the publicity which was irksome to the taste of an age which

had acquired notions of the dignity of seclusion, of the comfort that

was to be found in retirement, and of the convenience of separating the

chambers that were used for public from those which were employed for

merely private purposes. The chief bedrooms were shifted to the back,

and the sides of the courtyard were no longer the exclusive abode of the

dependants of the household. The common hearth could no longer serve as

the sphere of the culinary operations of an expensive cook with his

retinue of menials; the cooking fire was removed to one of the rooms

near the back-gate of the house, which finally became an ample kitchen

replete with all the imported means of satisfying the growing luxury of

the table; and the member of the family loitering in the hall, or the

visitor admitted through its portals, was spared the annoyances of

strong smells and pungent smoke. The Roman family also discovered the

discomfort of dining in a large and scantily furnished room, not too

well lit and accessible to the intrusions of the chance domestic and the

caller. It was deemed preferable to take the common meal in a light and

airy upper chamber, and the new type of Coenaculum satisfied at once the

desire for personal comfort and for that specialisation in the use of

apartments which is one of the chief signs of an advancing material

civilisation. The great hall had become the show-room of the house, but

even for this purpose its dimensions proved too small. Such was the

quantity of curios and works of art collected by the conquering or

travelled Roman that greater space was needed for the exhibition of

their rarity or splendour. This space was gained by the removal from the

Atrium of all the domestic obstacles with which it had once been

cumbered. It might now be made slightly smaller in its proportion to the

rest of the house and yet appear far more ample than before. The space

by which its sides were diminished could now be utilised for the

building of two wings or Alae, which served the threefold purpose of

lighting the hall from the sides, of displaying to better advantage, as

an oblong chamber always does, the works of art which the lord of the

mansion or his butler[28] displayed to visitor or client, and lastly of

serving as a gallery for the family portraits, which were finally

removed from the Atrium, to be seen to greater advantage and in a better

light on the walls of the wings. These now displayed the family tree

through painted lines which connected the little shrines holding the

inscribed _imagines_ of the great ancestors of the house.[29] It is also

possible that the Alae served as rooms for more private audiences than

were possible in the Atrium.[30] From the early morning crowd which

thronged the hall individuals or groups might have been detached by the

butler, and led to the presence of the great statesman or pleader who

paced the floor in the retirement of one of these long side-galleries.

[31] Business of a yet more private kind was transacted in the still

greater security of the Tablinum, the archive room and study of the

house. Here were kept, not only the family records and the family

accounts, but such of the official registers and papers as a magistrate

needed to have at hand during his year of office.[32] The domestic

transaction of official business was very large at Rome, for the State

had given its administrators not even the skeleton of a civil service,

and it was in this room that the consul locked himself up with his

quaestor and his scribes, as it was here that, as a good head of the

family and a careful business man, he carefully perused the record of

income and expenditure, of gains and losses, with his skilled Greek

accountant.

The whole tendency of the reforms in domestic architecture was to

differentiate between the public and private life of the man of business

or affairs. His public activity was confined to the forepart of the

house; his repose, his domestic joys, and his private pleasures were

indulged in the buildings which lay behind the Atrium and its wings. As

each of the departments of life became more ambitious, the sphere for

the exercise of the one became more magnificent, and that which fostered

the other the scene of a more perfect, because more quiet, luxury. The

Atrium was soon to become a palatial hall adorned with marble

colonnades;[33] the small yard with its humble portico at the back was

to be transformed into the Greek Peristyle, a court open to the sky and

surrounded by columns, which enclosed a greenery of shrubs and trees and

an atmosphere cooled and freshened by the constant play of fountains.

The final form of the Roman house was an admirable type of the new

civilisation. It was Roman and yet Greek[34]--Roman in the grand front

that it, presented to the world, Greek in the quiet background of

thought and sentiment.

The growing splendour of the house demanded a number and variety in its

human servitors that had not been dreamed of in a simpler age. The slave

of the farm, with his hard hands and weather-beaten visage, could no

longer be brought by his elegant master to the town and exhibited to a

fastidious society as the type of servant that ministered to his daily

needs. The urban and rustic family were now kept wholly distinct; it was

only when some child of marked grace and beauty was born on the farm,

that it was transferred to the mansion as containing a promise that

would be wasted on rustic toil.[35] In every part of the establishment

the taste and wealth of the owner might be tested by the courtliness and

beauty of its living instruments. The chained dog at the gate had been

replaced by a human janitor, often himself in chains.[36] The visitor,

when he had passed the porter, was received by the butler in the hall,

and admitted to the master's presence by a series of footmen and ushers,

the show servants of the fore-part of the house, men of the impassive

dignity and obsequious repose that servitude but strengthens in the

Oriental mind.[37] In the penetralia of the household each need created

by the growing ideal of comfort and refinement required its separate

band of ministers. The body of the bather was rubbed and perfumed by

experts in the art; the service of the table was in the hands of men who

had made catering and the preparation of delicate viands the sole

business of their lives. The possession of a cook, who could answer to

the highest expectations of the age, was a prize beyond the reach of all

but the most wealthy; for such an expert the sum of four talents had to

be paid;[38] he was the prize of the millionaire, and families of more

moderate means, if they wished a banquet to be elegantly served, were

forced to hire the temporary services of an accomplished artist.[39] The

housekeeper,[40] who supervised the resources of the pantry, guided the

destinies of the dinner in concert with the _chef_; and each had under

him a crowd of assistants of varied names and carefully differentiated

functions.[41] The business of the outer world demanded another class of

servitors. There were special valets charged with the functions of

taking notes and invitations to their masters' friends; there was the

valued attendant of quick eye and ready memory, an incredibly rich

store-house of names and gossip, an impartial observer of the ways and

weaknesses of every class, who could inform his master of the name and

attributes of the approaching stranger. There were the lackeys who

formed the nucleus of the attendant retinue of clients for the man when

he walked abroad, the boys of exquisite form with slender limbs and

innocent faces, who were the attendant spirits of the lady as she passed

in her litter down the street. The muscles of the stouter slaves now

offered facilities for easy journeying that had been before unknown. The

Roman official need not sit his horse during the hot hours of the day as

he passed through the hamlets of Italy, and the grinning rustic could

ask, as he watched the solemn and noiseless transit of the bearers,

whether the carefully drawn curtains did not conceal a corpse.[42]

The internal luxury of the household was as fully exhibited in lifeless

objects as in living things. Rooms were scented with fragrant perfumes

and hung with tapestries of great price and varied bloom. Tables were

set with works of silver, ivory and other precious material, wrought

with the most delicate skill. Wine of moderate flavour was despised;

Falernian and Chian were the only brands that the true connoisseur would

deem worthy of his taste. A nice discrimination was made in the

qualities of the rarer kinds of fish, and other delicacies of the table

were sought in proportion to the difficulty of their attainment. The

fashions of dress followed the tendency of the age; the rarity of the

material, its fineness of texture, the ease which it gave to the body,

were the objects chiefly sought. Young men were seen in the Forum in

robes of a material as soft as that worn by women and almost transparent

in its thinness. Since all these instruments of pleasure, and the luxury

that appealed to ambition even more keenly than to taste, were pursued

with a ruinous competition, prices were forced up to an incredible

degree. An amphora of Falernian wine cost one hundred denarii, a jar of

Pontic salt-fish four hundred; a young Roman would often give a talent

for a favourite, and boys who ranked in the highest class for beauty of

face and elegance of form fetched even a higher price than this.[43] Few

could have been inclined to contradict Cato when he said in the

senate-house that Rome was the only city in the world where a jar of

preserved fish from the Black Sea cost more than a yoke of oxen, and a

boy-favourite fetched a higher price than a yeoman's farm.[44] One of

the great objects of social ambition was to have a heavier service of

silver-plate than was possessed by any of one's neighbours. In the good

old days,--days not so long past, but severed from the present by a gulf

that circumstances had made deeper than the years--the Roman had had an

official rather than a personal pride in the silver which he could

display before the respectful eyes of the distinguished foreigner who

was the guest of the State; and the Carthaginian envoys had been struck

by the similarity between the silver services which appeared at the

tables of their various hosts. The experience led them to a higher

estimate of Roman brotherhood than of Roman wealth, and the silver-plate

that had done such varied duty was at least responsible for a moral

triumph.[45] Only a few years before the commencement of the first war

with Carthage Rufinus a consular had been expelled from the senate for

having ten pounds of the wrought metal in his keeping,[46] and Scipio

Aemilianus, a man of the present age, but an adherent of the older

school, left but thirty-two pounds' weight to his heir. Less than forty

years later the younger Livius Drusus was known to be in possession of

plate that weighed ten thousand pounds,[47] and the accretions to the

primitive hoard which must have been made by but two or three members of

this family may serve as an index of the extent to which this particular

form of the passion for display had influenced the minds and practice of

the better-class Romans of the day.

There were other objects, valued for their intrinsic worth as much as

for the distinction conveyed by their possession, which attracted the

ambition and strained the revenues of the fashionable man. Works of art

must once have been cheap on the Roman market; for, even if we refuse to

credit the story of Mummius' estimate of the prize which fallen Corinth

had delivered into his hands,[48] yet the transhipment of cargoes of the

priceless treasures to Rome is at least an historic fact, and the

Gracchi must themselves have seen the trains of wagons bearing their

precious freight along the Via Sacra to the Capitol. The spoils of the

generous conqueror were lent to adorn the triumphs, the public buildings

and even the private houses, of others; but much that had been yielded

by Corinth had become the property neither of the general nor of the

State. Polybius had seen the Roman legionaries playing at draughts on

the Dionysus of Aristeides and many another famous canvas which had been

torn from its place and thrown as a carpet upon the ground;[49] but many

a camp follower must have had a better estimate of the material value of

the paintings of the Hellenic masters, and the cupidity of the Roman

collector must often have been satisfied at no great cost to his

resources. The extent to which a returning army could disseminate its

acquired tastes and distribute its captured goods had been shown some

forty years before the fall of Corinth when Manlius brought his legions

back from the first exploration of the rich cities of Asia. Things and

names, of which the Roman had never dreamed, soon gratified the eye and

struck the ear with a familiar sound. He learnt to love the bronze

couches meant for the dining hall, the slender side tables with the

strange foreign name, the delicate tissues woven to form the hangings of

the bed or litter, the notes struck from the psalter and the harp by the

fingers of the dancing-women of the East.[50] This was the first

irruption of the efflorescent luxury of Eastern Hellenism; but some

five-and-twenty years before this date Rome had received her first

experience of the purer taste of the Greek genius in the West. The whole

series of the acts of artistic vandalism which marked the footsteps of

the conquering state could be traced back to the measures taken by

Claudius Marcellus after the fall of Syracuse. The systematic plunder of

works of art was for the first time given an official sanction, and the

public edifices of Rome were by no means the sole beneficiaries of this

new interpretation of the rights of war. Much of the valuable plunder

had found its way into private houses,[51] to stimulate the envious

cupidity of many a future governor who, cursed with the taste of a

collector and unblessed by the opportunity of a war, would make subtle

raids on the artistic treasures of his province a secret article of his

administration. When the ruling classes of a nation have been

familiarised for the larger part of a century with the easy acquisition

of the best material treasures of the world, things that have once

seemed luxuries come to fill an easy place in the category of accepted

wants. But the sudden supply has stopped; the market value, which

plunder has destroyed or lessened, has risen to its normal level;

another burden has been added to life, there is one further stimulus to

wealth and, so pressing is the social need, that the means to its

satisfaction are not likely to be too diligently scrutinised before they

are adopted.

More pardonable were the tastes that were associated with the more

purely intellectual elements in Hellenic culture--with the influence

which the Greek rhetor or philosopher exercised in his converse with the

stern but receptive minds of Rome, the love of books, the new lessons

which were to be taught as to the rhythmic flow of language and the

rhythmic movement of the limbs. The Greek adventurer was one of the most

striking features of the epoch which immediately followed the close of

the great wars. Later thinkers, generally of the resentfully national,

academic and pseudo-historical type, who repudiated the amenities of

life which they continued to enjoy, and cherished the pleasing fiction

of the exemplary _mores_ of the ancient times, could see little in him

but a source of unmixed evil;[52] and indeed the Oriental Greek of the

commoner type, let loose upon the society of the poorer quarters, or

worming his way into the confidence of some rich but uneducated master,

must often have been the vehicle of lessons that would better have been

unlearnt. But Italy also saw the advent of the best professors of the

age, golden-mouthed men who spoke in the language of poetry, rhetoric

and philosophy, and who turned from the wearisome competition of their

own circles and the barren fields of their former labours to find a

flattering attention, a pleasing dignity, and the means of enjoying a

full, peaceful and leisured life in the homes of Roman aristocrats,

thirsting for knowledge and thirsting still more for the mastery of the

unrivalled forms in which their own deeds might be preserved and through

which their own political and forensic triumphs might be won. Soon towns

of Italy--especially those of the Hellenic South--would be vying with

each other to grant the freedom of their cities and other honours in

their gift to a young emigrant poet who hailed from Antioch, and members

of the noblest houses would be competing for the honour of his

friendship and for the privilege of receiving him under their roof.[53]

The stream of Greek learning was broad and strong;[54] it bore on its

bosom every man and woman who aimed at a reputation for elegance, for

wit or for the deadly thrust in verbal fence which played so large a

part in the game of politics; every one that refused to float was either

an outcast from the best society, or was striving to win an eccentric

reputation for national obscurantism and its imaginary accompaniment of

honest rustic strength.

Acquaintance with professors and poets led to a knowledge of books; and

it was as necessary to store the latter as the former under the

fashionable roof. The first private library in Rome was established by

Aemilius Paulus, when he brought home the books that had belonged to the

vanquished Perseus;[55] and it became as much a feature of conquest

amongst the highly cultured to bring home a goodly store of literature

as to gather objects of art which might merely please the sensuous taste

and touch only the outer surface of the mind.[56]

But it was deemed by no means desirable to limit the influences of the

new culture to the minds of the mature. There was, indeed, a school of

cautious Hellenists that might have preferred this view, and would at

any rate have exercised a careful discrimination between those elements

of the Greek training which would strengthen the young mind by giving it

a wider range of vision and a new gallery of noble lives and those which

would lead to mere display, to effeminacy, nay (who could tell?) to

positive depravity. But this could not be the point of view of society

as a whole. If the elegant Roman was to be half a Greek, he must learn

during the tender and impressionable age to move his limbs and modulate

his voice in true Hellenic wise. Hence the picture which Scipio

Aemilianus, sane Hellenist and stout Roman, gazed at with astonished

eyes and described in the vigorous and uncompromising language suited to

a former censor. "I was told," he said, "that free-born boys and girls

went to a dancing school and moved amidst disreputable professors of the

art. I could not bring my mind to believe it; but I was taken to such a

school myself, and Good Heavens! What did I see there! More than fifty

boys and girls, one of them, I am ashamed to say, the son of a candidate

for office, a boy wearing the golden boss, a lad not less than twelve

years of age. He was jingling a pair of castanets and dancing a step

which an immodest slave could not dance with decency." [57] Such might

have been the reflections of a puritan had he entered a modern

dancing-academy. We may be permitted to question the immorality of the

exhibition thus displayed, but there can be no doubt as to the social

ambition which it reveals--an ambition which would be perpetuated

throughout the whole of the life of the boy with the castanets, which

would lead him to set a high value on the polish of everything he called

his own--a polish determined by certain rigid external standards and to

be attained at any hazard, whether by the ruinous concealment of honest

poverty, or the struggle for affluence even by the most

questionable means.

But the burdens on the wealth of the great were by no means limited to

those imposed by merely social canons. Political life at Rome had always

been expensive in so far as office was unpaid and its tenure implied

leisure and a considerable degree of neglect of his own domestic

concerns in the patriot who was willing to accept it. But the State had

lately taken on itself to increase the financial expenditure which was

due to the people without professing to meet the bill from the public

funds. The 'State' at Rome did not mean what it would have meant in such

a context amongst the peoples of the Hellenic world. It did not mean

that the masses were preying on the richer classes, but that the richer

classes were preying on themselves; and this particular form of

voluntary self-sacrifice amongst the influential families in the senate

was equivalent to the confession that Rome was ceasing to be an

Aristocracy and becoming an Oligarchy, was voluntarily placing the

claims of wealth on a par with those of birth and merit, or rather was

insisting that the latter should not be valid unless they were

accompanied by the former. The chief sign of the confession that

political advancement might be purchased from the people in a legitimate

way, was the adoption of a rule, which was established about the time of

the First Punic War, that the cost of the public games should not be

defrayed exclusively by the treasury.[58] It was seldom that the people

could be brought to contribute to the expenses of the exhibitor by

subscriptions collected from amongst themselves;[59] they were the

recipients, not the givers of the feast, and the actual donors knew that

the exhibition was a contest for favour, that reputations were being won

or lost on the merits of the show, and that the successful competitor

was laying up a store-house of gratitude which would materially aid his

ascent to the highest prizes in the State. The personal cost, if it

could not be wholly realised on the existing patrimony of the

magistrate, must be assisted by gifts from friends, by loans from

money-lenders at exorbitant rates of interest and, worst but readiest of

all methods, by contributions, nominally voluntary but really enforced,

from the Italian allies and the provincials. As early as the year 180

the senate had been forced to frame a strong resolution against the

extravagance that implied oppression;[60] but the resolution was really

a criticism of the new methods of government; the roots of the evil (the

burden on the magistracy, the increase in the number of the regularly

recurring festivals) they neither cared nor ventured to remove. The

aedileship was the particular magistracy which was saddled with this

expenditure on account of its traditional connection with the conduct of

the public games; and although it was neither in its curule nor plebeian

form an obligatory step in the scale of the magistracies, yet, as it was

held before the praetorship and the consulship, it was manifest that the

brilliant display given to the people by the occupant of this office

might render fruitless the efforts of a less wealthy competitor who had

shunned its burdens.[61] The games were given jointly by the respective

pairs of colleagues,[62] the _Ludi Romani_ being under the guidance of

the curule,[63] the _Ludi Plebeii_ under that of the plebeian

aediles.[64] Had these remained the only annual shows, the cost to the

exhibitor, although great, would have been limited, But other festivals,

which had once been occasional, had lately been made permanent. The

games to Ceres (_Cerialia_), the remote origins of which may have dated

back to the time of the monarchy, first appear as fully established in

the year 202;[65] the festival to Flora (_Floralia_) dates from but 238

B.C.,[66] but probably did not become annual until 173;[67] while the

games to the Great Mother (_Megalesia_) followed by thirteen years the

invitation and hospitable reception of that Phrygian goddess by the

Romans, and became a regular feature in their calendar in 191.[68] This

increase in the amenities of the people, every item of which falls

within a term of fifty years, is a remarkable feature of the age which

followed Rome's assumption of imperial power. It proved that the Roman

was willing to bend his austere religion to the purposes of

gratification, when he could afford the luxury, that the enjoyment of

this luxury was considered a happy means of keeping the people in good

temper with itself and its rulers, and that the cost of providing it was

considered, not merely as compatible with the traditions of the existing

regime, but as a means of strengthening those traditions by closing the

gates of office to the poor.

The types of spectacle, in which the masses took most delight, were also

new and expensive creations. These types were chiefly furnished by the

gladiatorial shows and the hunting of wild beasts. Even the former and

earlier amusement had had a history of little more than a hundred years.

It was believed to be a relic of that realistic view of the after life

which lingered in Italy long after it had passed from the more spiritual

civilisation of the Greeks. The men who put each other to the sword

before the eyes of the sorrowing crowd were held to be the retinue which

passed with the dead chieftain beyond the grave, and it was from the

sombre rites of the Etruscans that this custom of ceremonial slaying was

believed to have been transferred to Rome. The first year of the First

Punic War witnessed the earliest combat that accompanied a Roman

funeral,[69] and, although secular enjoyment rapidly took the place of

grim funereal appreciation, and the religious belief that underlay the

spectacle may soon have passed away, neither the State nor the relatives

were supposed to have done due honour to the illustrious dead if his own

decease were not followed by the death-struggle of champions from the

rival gladiatorial schools, and men who aspired to a decent funeral made

due provision for such combats in their wills. The Roman magistrate

bowed to the prevalent taste, and displays of gladiators became one of

the most familiar features of the aediles' shows. Military sentiment was

in its favour, for it was believed to harden the nerves of the race that

had sprung from the loins of the god of war,[70] and humane sentiment

has never in any age been shocked at the contemporary barbarities which

it tolerates or enjoys. But a certain element of coarseness in the

sport, and perhaps the very fact that it was of native Italian growth,

might have given it a short shrift, had the cultured classes really

possessed the power of regulating the amusements of the public. Leaders

of society would have preferred the Greek _Agon_ with its graceful

wrestling and its contests in the finer arts. But the Roman public would

not be hellenised in this particular, and showed their mood when a

musical exhibition was attempted at the triumph of Lucius Anicius Gallus

in 167. The audience insisted that the performers should drop their

instruments and box with one another.[71] This, although not the best,

was yet a more tolerable type of what a contest of skill should be. It

was natural, therefore, that the professional fighting man should become

a far more inevitable condition of social and political success than the

hunter or the race-horse has ever been with us. Some enterprising

members of the nobility soon came to prefer ownership to the hire system

and started schools of their own in which the _lanista_ was merely the

trainer. A stranger element was soon added to the possessions of a Roman

noble by the growing craze for the combats of wild beasts. The first

recorded "hunt" of the kind was that given in 186 by Marcus Fulvius at

the close of the Aetolian war when lions and panthers were exhibited to

the wondering gaze of the people.[72] Seventeen years later two curule

aediles furnished sixty-three African lions and forty bears and

elephants for the Circensian games.[73] These menageries eventually

became a public danger and the curule aedile (himself one of the chief

offenders) was forced to frame an edict specifying the compensation for

damage that might be committed by wild beasts in their transit through

Italy or their residence within the towns.[74] The obligation of wealth

to supply luxuries for the poor--a splendid feature of ancient

civilisation in which it has ever taken precedence of that of the modern

world--was recognised with the utmost frankness in the Rome of the day;

but it was an obligation that had passed the limits at which it could be

cheerfully performed as the duty of the patriot or the patron; it had

reached a stage when its demoralising effects, both to giver and to

receiver, were patent to every seeing eye, but when criticism of its

vices could be met by the conclusive rejoinder that it was a vital

necessity of the existing political situation.[75]

The review which we have given of the enormous expenditure created by

the social and political appetites of the day leads up to the

consideration of two questions which, though seldom formulated or faced

in their naked form, were ever present in the minds of the classes who

were forced to deem themselves either the most responsible authors, or

the most illustrious victims, of the existing standards both of politics

and society. These questions were "Could the exhausting drain be

stopped?" and "If it could not, how was it to be supplied?" A city in a

state of high fever will always produce the would-be doctor; but the

curious fact about the Rome of this and other days is that the doctor

was so often the patient in another form. Just as in the government of

the provinces the scandals of individual rule were often met by the

severest legislation proceeding from the very body which had produced

the evil-doers, so when remedies were suggested for the social evils of

the city, the senate, in spite of its tendency to individual

transgression, generally displayed the possession of a collective

conscience. The men who formulated the standard of purity and

self-restraint might be few in number; but, except they displayed the

irritating activity and the uncompromising methods of a Cato, they

generally secured the support of their peers, and the sterner the

censor, the more gladly was he hailed as an ornament to the order. This

guardian of morals still issued his edicts against delicacies of the

table, foreign perfumes and expensive houses;[76] as late as the year

169 people would hastily put out their lights when it was reported that

Tiberius Sempronius Graccus was coming up the street on his return from

supper, lest they should fall under the suspicion of untimely

revelry,[77] and the sporadic activity of the censorship will find ample

illustration in the future chapters of our work. Degradation from the

various orders of the State was still a consequence of its

animadversions; but a milder, more universal and probably far more

efficacious check on luxury--the system, pursued by Cato, of adopting an

excessive rating for articles of value[78] and thus of shifting the

incidence of taxation from the artisan and farmer to the shoulders of

the richest class[79]--had been taken out of its hands by the complete

cessation of direct imposts after the Third Macedonian War.[80]

Meanwhile sumptuary laws continued to be promulgated from the Rostra and

accepted by the people. All that are known to have been initiated or to

have been considered valid after the close of the great wars have but

one object--an attack on the expenses of the table, a form of sensuous

enjoyment which, on account of the ease and barbaric abundance with

which wealth may vaunt itself in this domain, was particularly in vogue

amongst the upper classes in Rome. Other forms of extravagance seem for

the time to have been left untouched by legislation, for the Oppian law

which had been due to the strain of the Second Punic War had been

repealed after a fierce struggle in 193, and the Roman ladies might now

adorn themselves with more than half an ounce of gold, wear robes of

divers colours and ride in their carriages through any street they

pleased.[81] The first enactment which attempted to control the

wastefulness of the table was an Orchian law of 181, limiting the number

of guests that might be invited to entertainments. Cato was consistent

in opposing the passing of the measure and in resisting its repeal. He

recognised a futile law when he saw it, but he did not wish this

futility to be admitted.[82] Twenty years later[83] a Fannian law grew

out of a decree of the senate which had enjoined that the chief men

(_principes_) of the State should take an oath before the consuls not to

exceed a certain limit of expense in the banquets given at the

Megalesian Games. Strengthened with a measure which prescribed more

harassing details than the Orchian law. The new enactment actually

determined the value and nature of the eatables whose consumption was

allowed. It permitted one hundred asses to be spent on the days of the

Roman Games, the Plebeian Games and the Saturnalia, thirty asses on

certain other festival occasions, and but ten asses (less than twice the

daily pay of a Roman soldier) on every other meal throughout the year;

it forbade the serving of any fowl but a single hen, and that not

fattened; it enjoined the exclusive consumption of native wine.[84] This

enactment was strengthened eighteen years later by a Didian law, which

included in the threatened penalties not only the giver of the feast

which violated the prescribed limits, but also the guests who were

present at such a banquet. It also compelled or induced the Italian

allies to accept the provisions of the Fannian law[85]--an unusual step

which may show the belief that a luxury similar to that of Rome was

weakening the resources of the confederacy, on whose strength the

leading state was so dependent, or which may have been induced by the

knowledge that members of the Roman nobility were taking holiday trips

to country towns, to enjoy the delights which were prohibited at home

and to waste their money on Italian caterers.[86]

The frequency of such legislation, which we shall find renewed once

again before the epoch of the reforms of Sulla[87] seems to prove its

ineffectiveness,[88] and indeed the standard of comfort which it desired

to enjoin was wholly incompatible with the circumstances of the age. The

desire to produce uniformity[89] of standard had always been an end of

Roman as of Greek sumptuary regulation, but what type of uniformity

could be looked for in a community where the extremes of wealth and

poverty were beginning to be so strongly marked, where capital was

accumulating in the hands of the great noble and the great trader and

being wholly withdrawn from those of the free-born peasant and artisan?

The restriction of useless consumption was indeed favourable to the more

productive employment of capital; but we shall soon see that this

productive use, which had as its object the deterioration of land by

pasturage and the purchase of servile labour, was as detrimental to the

free citizen as the most reckless extravagance could have been. There is

no question, however, that both the sumptuary laws and the censorian

ordinances of the period did attempt to attain an economic as well as a

social end; and, however mistaken their methods may have been, they

showed some appreciation of the industrial evils of the time. The

provision of the Fannian law in favour of native wines suggests the

desire to help the small cultivator who had substituted vine-growing for

the cultivation of cereals, and foreshadows the protective legislation

of the Ciceronian period.[90] Much of this legislation, too, was

animated by the "mercantile" theory that a State is impoverished by the

export of the precious metals to foreign lands[91]--a view which found

expression in a definite enactment of an earlier period which had

forbidden gold or silver to be paid to the Celtic tribes in the north of

Italy in exchange for the wares or slaves which they sold to Roman

merchants.[92]

Another series of laws aimed at securing the purity of an electorate

exposed to the danger of corruption by the overwhelming influence of

wealth. Laws against bribery, unknown in an earlier period,[93] become

painfully frequent from the date at which Rome came into contact with

the riches of the East. Six years after the close of the great Asiatic

campaign the people were asked, on the authority of the senate, to

sanction more than one act which was directed against the undue

influence exercised at elections;[94] in 166 fresh scandals called for

the consideration of the Council of State;[95] and the year 159 saw the

birth of another enactment.[96] Yet the capital penalty, which seems to

have been the consequence of the transgression of at least one of these

laws,[97] did not deter candidates from staking their citizenship on

their success. The still-surviving custom of clientship made the object

of largesses difficult to establish, and the secrecy of the ballot,

which had been introduced for elections in 139, made it impossible to

prove that the suspicious gift had been effective and thus to construct

a convincing case against the donor.

The moral control exercised by the magistrate and the sumptuary or

criminal ordinances expressed in acts of Parliament might serve as

temporary palliatives to certain pronounced evils of the moment; but

they were powerless to check the extravagance of an expenditure which

was sanctioned by custom and in some respects actually enforced by law.

One of the greatest of the practical needs of the new Roman was to

increase his income in every way that might be deemed legitimate by a

society which, even in its best days, had never been overscrupulous in

its exploitation of the poor and had been wont to illustrate the

sanctity of contract by visible examples of grinding oppression. The

nature and intensity of the race for wealth differed with the needs of

the anxious spendthrift; and in respect both to needs and to means of

satisfaction the upper middle class was in a far more favourable

position than its noble governors. It could spend its unfettered

energies in the pursuit of the profits which might be derived from

public contracts, trade, banking and money-lending, while it was not

forced to submit to the drain created by the canvass for office and the

exorbitant demands made by the electorate on the pecuniary resources of

the candidate. The brilliancy of the life of the mercantile class, with

its careless luxury and easy indifference to expenditure, set a standard

for the nobility which was at once galling and degrading. They were

induced to apply the measure of wealth even to members of their own

order, and regarded it as inevitable that any one of their peers, whose

patrimony had dwindled, should fill but a subordinate place both in

politics and society;[98] while the means which they were sometimes

forced to adopt in order to vie with the wealth of the successful

contractor and promoter were, if hardly less sound from a moral point of

view, at least far more questionable from a purely legal standpoint.

A fraction of the present wealth which was in the possession of some of

the leading families of the nobility may have been purely adventitious,

the result of the lucky accident of command and conquest amidst a

wealthy and pliant people. The spoils of war were, it is true, not for

the general but for the State; yet he exercised great discretionary

power in dealing with the movable objects, which in the case of Hellenic

or Asiatic conquest formed one of the richest elements in the prize, and

the average commander is not likely to have displayed the self-restraint

and public spirit of the destroyer of Corinth. Public and military

opinion would permit the victor to retain an ample share of the fruits

of his prowess, and this would be increased by a type of contribution to

which he had a peculiar and unquestioned claim. This consisted in the

honorary offerings made by states, who found themselves at the feet of

the victor and were eager to attract his pity and to enlist on their

behalf his influence with the Roman government. Instances of such

offerings are the hundred and fourteen golden crowns which were borne in

the triumph of Titus Quinctius Flamininus,[99] those of two hundred and

twelve pounds' weight shown in the triumph of Manlius,[100] and the

great golden wreath of one hundred and fifty pounds which had been

presented by the Ambraciots to Nobilior.[101] But the time had not yet

been reached when the general on a campaign, or even the governor of a

district which was merely disturbed by border raids, could calmly demand

hard cash as the equivalent of the precious metal wrought into this

useless form, and when the "coronary gold" was to be one of the regular

perquisites of any Roman governor who claimed to have achieved military

success.[102] Nor is it likely that the triumphant general of this

period melted down the offerings which he might dedicate in temples or

reserve for the gallery of his house, and we must conclude that the few

members of the nobility who had conducted the great campaigns were but

slightly enriched by the offerings which helpless peoples had laid at

their feet. It would be almost truer to say that the great influx of the

precious metals had increased the difficulties of their position; for,

if the gold or silver took the form of artistic work which remained in

their possession, it but exaggerated the ideal to which their standard

of life was expected to conform; and if it assumed the shape of the

enormous amount of specie which was poured into the coffers of the State

or distributed amongst the legionaries, its chief effects were the

heightening of prices and a showy appearance of a vast increase of

wealth which corresponded to no real increase in production.

But, whatever the effects of the metallic prizes of the great campaigns,

these prizes could neither have benefited the members of the nobility as

a whole nor, in the days of comparative peace which had followed the

long epoch of war with wealthy powers, could they be contemplated as a

permanent source of future capital or income. When the representative of

the official caste looked round for modes of fruitful investment which

might increase his revenues, his chances at first sight appeared to be

limited by legal restrictions which expressed the supposed principles of

his class. A Clodian law enacted at the beginning of the Second Punic

War had provided that no senator or senator's son should own a ship of a

burden greater than three hundred amphorae. The intention of the measure

was to prohibit members of the governing class from taking part in

foreign trade, as carriers, as manufacturers, or as participants in the

great business of the contract for corn which placed provincial grain on

the Roman market; and the ships of small tonnage which they were allowed

to retain were intended to furnish them merely with the power of

transporting to a convenient market the produce of their own estates in

Italy.[103] The restriction was not imposed in a self-regarding spirit;

it was odious to the nobility, and, as it was supported by Flaminius,

must have been popular with the masses, who were blind to the fact that

the restriction of a senator's energies to agriculture would be

infinitely more disastrous to the well-being of the average citizen than

the expenditure of those energies in trade. The restriction may have

received the support of the growing merchant class, who were perhaps

pleased to be rid of the competition of powerful rivals, and it

certainly served, externally at least, to mark the distinction between

the man of large industrial enterprises and the man whose official rank

was supported by landed wealth--a distinction which, in the shape of the

contrast drawn between knights and senators, appears at every turn in

the history of the later Republic. But, whatever the immediate motives

for the passing of the measure, a great and healthy principle lay behind

it. It was the principle that considerations of foreign policy should

not be directly controlled or hampered by questions of trade, that the

policy of the State should not become the sport of the selfish vagaries

of capital. The spirit thus expressed was directly inimical to the

interests of the merchant, the contractor and the tax-farmer. How

inimical it was could not yet be clearly seen; for the transmarine

interests of Rome had not at the time attained a development which

invited the mastery of conquered lands by the Roman capitalist. But,

whether this Clodian law created or merely formulated the antithesis

between land and trade, between Italian and provincial profits, it is

yet certain that this antithesis was one of the most powerful of the

animating factors of Roman history for the better part of the two

centuries which were to follow the enactment. It produced the conflict

between a policy of restricted enterprise, pursued for the good of the

State and the subject, and a policy of expansion which obeyed the

interests of capital, between a policy of cautious protection and that

madness of imperialism which is ever associated with barbarism,

brigandage or trade.

But, if we inquire whether this enactment attained its ostensible object

of completely shutting out senators from the profits of any enterprise

that could properly be described as commercial, we shall find an

affirmative answer to be more than dubious. The law was a dead letter

when Cicero indicted Verres,[104] but its demise may have been reached

through a long and slow process of decline. But, even if the provisions

of the law had been adhered to throughout the period which we are

considering, the avenue to wealth derived from business intercourse with

the provinces would not necessarily have been closed to the official

class. We shall soon see that the companies which were formed for

undertaking the state-contracts probably permitted shares to be held by

individuals who never appeared in the registered list of partners at

all, and we know that to hold a share in a great public concern was

considered one of the methods of business which did not subject the

participant to the taint of a vulgar commercialism.[105] And, if the

senator chose to indulge more directly in the profits of transmarine

commerce, to what extent was he really hindered by the provisions of the

law? He might not own a ship of burden, but his freedmen might sail to

any port on the largest vessels, and who could object if the returns

which the dependant owed his lord were drawn from the profits of

commerce? Again there was no prohibition against loans on bottomry, and

Cato had increased his wealth by becoming through his freedman a member

of a maritime company, each partner in which had but a limited liability

and the prospect of enormous gains.[106] The example of this energetic

money-getter also illustrates many ways in which the nobleman of

business tastes could increase his profits without extending his

enterprises far from the capital. It was possible to exploit the growing

taste in country villas, in streams and lakes and natural woods; to buy

a likely spot for a small price, let it at a good rental, or sell it at

a larger price. The ownership of house property within the town, which

grew eventually into the monopoly of whole blocks and streets by such a

man as Crassus,[107] was in every way consistent with the possession of

senatorial rank. It was even possible to be a slave-dealer without loss

of dignity, at least if one transacted the sordid details of the

business through a slave. The young and promising boy required but a

year's training in the arts to enable the careful buyer to make a large

profit by his sale.[108] Yet such methods must have been regarded by the

nobility as a whole as merely subsidiary means of increasing their

patrimony: and, in spite of the fact that Cato took the view that

agriculture should be an amusement rather than a business,[109] there

can be no doubt that the staple of the wealth of the official class was

still to be found in the acres of Italy. It was not, however, the wealth

of the moderate homestead which was to be won from a careful tillage of

the fields; it was the wealth which, as we shall soon see, was

associated with the slave-capitalist, the overseer, a foreign method of

cultivation on the model of the grand plantation-systems of the East,

and a belief in the superior value of pasturage to tillage which was to

turn many a populous and fertile plain into a wilderness of danger and

desolation.

But, strive as he would, there was many a nobleman who found that his

expenditure could not be met by dabbling in trade where others plunged,

or by the revenues yielded by the large tracts of Italian soil over

which he claimed exclusive powers. The playwright of the age has figured

Indigence as the daughter of Luxury;[110] and a still more terrible

child was to be born in the Avarice which sprang from the useless

cravings and fierce competitions of the time.[111] The desire to get and

to hold had ever been a Roman vice; but, it had also been the unvarying

assumption of the Roman State, and the conviction of the Roman

official--a conviction so deeply seated and spontaneous as to form no

ground for self-congratulation that the lust for acquisition should

limit itself to the domain of private right, and never cross the rigid

barrier which divided that domain from the sphere of wealth and power

which the city had committed to its servant as a solemn trust. The

better sort of overseer was often found in the crabbed man of

business--a Cato, for example--who would never waive a right of his own

and protected those of his dependants with similar tenacity and passion.

The honour which prevailed in the commercial code at home was considered

so much a matter of course in all dealings with the foreign world, that

the State scorned to scrutinise the expenditure of its ministers and was

spared the disgrace of a system of public audit. Even in this age, which

is regarded by the ancient historians as marking the beginning of the

decline in public virtue, Polybius could contrast the attitude of

suspicion towards the guardians of the State, which was the

characteristic of the official life of his own unhappy country, with the

well-founded confidence which Rome reposed in the honour of her

ministers, and could tell the world that "if but a talent of money were

entrusted to a magistrate of a Greek state, ten auditors, as many seals

and twice as many witnesses are required for the security of the bond;

yet even so faith is not observed; while the Roman in an official or

diplomatic post, who handles vast sums of money, adheres to his duty

through the mere moral obligation of the oath which he has sworn"; that

"amongst the Romans the corrupt official is as rare a portent as is the

financier with clean hands amongst other peoples".[112] When the elder

Africanus tore up the account books of his brother--books which recorded

the passage of eighteen thousand talents from an Asiatic king to a Roman

general and from him to the Roman State[113]--he was imparting a lesson

in confidence, which was immediately accepted by the senate and people.

And it seems that, so far as the expenditure of public moneys was

concerned, this confidence continued to be justified. It is true that

Cato had furiously impugned the honour of commanders in the matter of

the distribution of the prizes of war amongst the soldiers and had drawn

a bitter contrast between private and official thieves. "The former," he

said, "pass their lives in thongs and iron fetters, the latter in purple

and gold." [114] But there were no fixed rules of practice which guided

such a distribution, and a commander, otherwise honest, might feel no

qualms of conscience in exercising a selective taste on his own behalf.

On the other hand, deliberate misappropriation of the public funds seems

to have been seldom suspected or at least seldom made the subject of

judicial cognisance, and for many years after a standing court was

established for the trial of extortion no similar tribunal was thought

necessary for the crime of peculation.[115] Apart from the long,

tortuous and ineffective trial of the Scipios,[116] no question of the

kind is known to have been raised since Manius Acilius Glabrio, the

conqueror of Antiochus and the Aetolians, competed for the censorship.

Then a story, based on the existence of the indubitable wealth which he

was employing with a lavish hand to win the favour of the people, was

raked up against him by some jealous members of the nobility. It was

professed that some money and booty, found in the camp of the king, had

never been exhibited in the triumph nor deposited in the treasury. The

evidence of legates and military tribunes was invited, and Cato, himself

a competitor for the censorship, was ready to testify that gold and

silver vases, which he had seen in the captured camp, had not been

visible in the triumphal procession. Glabrio waived his candidature, but

the people were unwilling to convict and the prosecution was

abandoned.[117] Here again we are confronted by the old temptation of

curio-hunting, which, the nobility deemed indecent in so "new" a man as

Glabrio; the evidence of Cato--the only testimony which proved

dangerous--did not establish the charge that money due to the State had

been intercepted by a Roman consul.

But the regard for the property of the State was unfortunately not

extended to the property of its clients. Even before the provinces had

yielded a prey rendered easy by distance and irresponsibility, Italian

cities had been forced to complain of the violence and rapacity of Roman

commanders quartered in their neighbourhood,[118] and the passive

silence with which the Praenestines bore the immoderate requisitions of

a consul, was a fatal guarantee of impunity which threatened to alter

for ever the relations of these free allies to the protecting

power.[119] But provincial commands offered greater temptations and a

far more favourable field for capricious tyranny; for here the exactions

of the governor were neither repudiated by an oath of office nor at

first even forbidden by the sanctions of a law. Requisitions could be

made to meet the needs of the moment, and these needs were naturally

interpreted to suit the cravings and the tastes of the governor of the

moment.[120] Cato not only cut down the expenses that had been

arbitrarily imposed on the unhappy natives of Sardinia,[121] but seems

to have been the author of a definite law which fixed a limit to such

requisitions in the future.[122] But it was easier to frame an ordinance

than to guarantee its observation, and, at a time when the surrounding

world was seething with war, the regulations made for a peaceful

province could not touch the actions of a victorious commander who was

following up the results of conquest. Complaints began to pour in on

every hand--from the Ambraciots of Greece, the Cenomani of Gaul[123]

--and the senate did its best, either by its own cognisance or by the

creation of a commission of investigation, to meet the claims of the

dependent peoples. A kind of rude justice was the result, but it was

much too rude to meet an evil which was soon seen to be developing into

a trade of systematic oppression. A novel step was taken when in 171

delegates from the two Spains appeared in the Curia to complain of the

avarice and insolence of their Roman governors. A praetor was

commissioned to choose from the senatorial order five of such judges as

were wont to be selected for the settlement of international disputes

(_recuperatores_), to sit in judgment on each of the indicted

governors,[124] and the germ of a regular court for what had now become

a regular offence was thus developed. The further and more shameful

confession, that the court should be permanent and interpret a definite

statute, was soon made, and the Calpurnian law of 149[125]was the first

of that long series of enactments for extortion which mark the futility

of corrective measures in the face of a weak system of legal, and a

still weaker system of moral, control. Trials for extortion soon became

the plaything of politics, the favourite arena for the exercise of the

energies of a young and rising politician, the favourite weapon with

which old family feuds might be at once revenged and perpetuated. They

were soon destined to gain a still greater significance as furnishing

the criteria of the methods of administration which the State was

expected to employ, as determining the respective rights of the

administrator and the capitalist to guide the destinies of the

inhabitants of a dependent district. Their manifold political

significance destroys our confidence in their judgments, and we can

seldom tell whether the acquittal or the condemnation which these courts

pronounced was justified on the evidence adduced. But there can be no

question of the evil that lay behind this legislative and judicial

activity. The motive which led men to assume administrative posts abroad

was in many cases thoroughly selfish and mean,--the desire to acquire

wealth as rapidly as was consistent with keeping on the safe side of a

not very exacting law. No motive of this kind can ever be universal in a

political society, and in Rome we cannot even pronounce it to be

general. Power and distinction attracted the Roman as much as wealth,

and some governors were saved from temptation by the colossal fortunes

which they already possessed. But how early it had begun to operate in

the minds of many is shown by the eagerness which, as we shall see, was

soon to be displayed by rival consuls for the conduct of a war that

might give the victor a prolonged control over the rich cities which had

belonged to the kingdom of Pergamon, if it is not proved by the strange

unwillingness which magistrates had long before exhibited to assume some

commands which had been entrusted to their charge.[126]

A suspicion of another type of abuse of power, more degrading though not

necessarily more harmful than the plunder of subjects, had begun to be

raised in the minds of the people and the government. It was held that a

Roman might be found who would sell the supposed interests of his

country to a foreign potentate, or at any rate accept a present which

might or might not influence his judgment, A commissioner to Illyria had

been suspected of pocketing money offered him by the potentates of that

district in 171,[127] and the first hint was given of that shattering of

public confidence in the integrity of diplomatists which wrought such

havoc in the foreign politics of the period which forms the immediate

subject of our work. The system of the Protectorate, which Rome had so

widely adopted, with its secret diplomatic dealings and its hidden

conferences with kings, offered greater facilities for secret

enrichment, and greater security for the enjoyment of the acquired

wealth, even than the plunder of a province. The proof of the committal

of the act was difficult, in most cases impossible. We must be content

to chronicle the suspicion of its growing frequency, and the suspicion

is terrible enough. If the custom of wringing wealth from subjects and

selling support to potentates continued to prevail, the stage might soon

be reached at which it could be said, with that element of exaggeration

which lends emphasis to a truth, that a small group of men were drawing

revenues from every nation in the world.[128]

Such were the sources of wealth that lay open to men, to whom commerce

was officially barred and who were supposed to have no direct interest

in financial operations. Far ampler spheres of pecuniary enrichment,

more uniformly legal if sometimes as oppressive, were open to the class

of men who by this time had been recognised as forming a kind of second

order in the State. The citizens who had been proved by the returns at

the census to have a certain amount of realisable capital at their

disposal--a class of citizens that ranged from the possessors of a

moderate patrimony, such as society might employ as a line of

demarcation between an upper and a lower middle class, to the

controllers of the most gigantic fortunes--had been welded into a body

possessing considerable social and political solidarity. This solidarity

had been attained chiefly through the community of interest derived from

the similar methods of pecuniary investment which they employed, but

also through the circumstance (slight in itself but significant in an

ancient society which ever tended to fall into grades) that all the

members of this class could describe themselves by the courtesy title of

"Knights"--a description justified by the right which they possessed of

serving on their own horses with the Roman cavalry instead of sharing

the foot-service of the legionary. A common designation was not

inappropriate to men who were in a certain sense public servants and

formed in a very real sense a branch of the administration. The knight

might have many avocations; he might be a money-lender, a banker, a

large importer; but he was preeminently a farmer of the taxes. His

position in the former cases was simply that of an individual, who might

or might not be temporarily associated with others; his position in the

latter case meant that he was a member of a powerful and permanent

corporation, one which served a government from which it might wring

great profits or at whose hands it might suffer heavy loss--a government

to be helped in its distress, to be fought when its demands were

overbearing, to be encouraged when its measures seemed progressive, to

be hindered when they seemed reactionary from a commercial point of

view. A group of individuals or private firms could never have attained

the consistency of organisation, or maintained the uniformity of policy,

which was displayed by these societies of revenue-collectors; even a

company must have a long life before it can attain strength and

confidence sufficient to act in a spirited manner in opposition to the

State; and it seems certain that these societies were wholly exempted

from the paralysing principle which the Roman law applied to

partnership--a principle which dictated that every partnership should be

dissolved by the death or retirement of one of the associates.[129] The

State, which possessed no civil service of its own worthy of the name,

had taken pains to secure permanent organisations of private

share-holders which should satisfy its needs, to give them something of

an official character, and to secure to each one of them as a result of

its permanence an individual strength which, in spite of the theory that

the taxes and the public works were put up to auction, may have secured

to some of these companies a practical monopoly of a definite sphere of

operations. But a company, at Rome as elsewhere, is powerful in

proportion to the breadth of its basis. A small ring of capitalists may

tyrannise over society as long as they confine themselves to securing a

monopoly over private enterprises, and as long as the law permits them

to exercise this autocratic power without control; but such a ring is

far less capable of meeting the arbitrary dictation of an aristocratic

body of landholders, such as the senate, or of encountering the

resentful opposition of a nominally all-powerful body of consumers, such

as the Comitia, than a corporation which has struck its roots deeply in

society by the wide distribution of its shares. We know from the

positive assurance of a skilled observer of Roman life that the number

of citizens who had an interest in these companies was particularly

large.[130] This observer emphasises the fact in order to illustrate the

dependence of a large section of society on the will of the senate,

which possessed the power of controlling the terms of the agreements

both for the public works which it placed in the hands of contractors

and for the sources of production which it put out to lease;[131] but it

is equally obvious that the large size of the number of shareholders

must have exercised a profoundly modifying influence on the arbitrary

authority of a body such as the senate which governed chiefly through

deference to public opinion; and we know that, in the last resort, an

appeal could be made to the sovereign assembly, if a magistrate could be

found bold enough to carry to that quarter a proposal that had been

discountenanced by the senate.[132] In such crises the strength of the

companies depended mainly on the number of individual interests that

were at stake; the shareholder is more likely to appear at such

gatherings than the man who is not profoundly affected by the issue, and

it is very seldom that the average consumer has insight enough to see,

or energy enough to resist, the sufferings and inconveniences which

spring from the machinations of capital. It may have been possible at

times to pack a legislative assembly with men who had some financial

interest, however slight, in a dispute arising from a contract calling

for decision; and the time was soon to come when such questions of

detail would give place to far larger questions of policy, when the

issues springing from a line of foreign activity which had been taken by

the government might be debated in the cold and glittering light of the

golden stakes the loss or gain of which depended upon the policy

pursued. Nor could it have been easy even for the experienced eye to see

from the survey of such a gathering that it represented the army of

capital. Research has rendered it probable that the companies of the

time were composed of an outer as well as of an inner circle; that the

mass of shareholders differed from those who were the promoters,

managers and active agents in the concern, that the liability of the

former at least was limited and that their shares, whether small or

great, were transmissible and subject to the fluctuations of the

market.[133] But, even if we do not believe that this distinction

between _socii_ and _participes_ was legally elaborated, yet there were

probably means by which members of the outside public could enter into

business relations with the recognised partners in one of these concerns

to share its profits and its losses.[134] The freedman, who had invested

his small savings in the business of an enterprising patron, would

attach the same mercantile value to his own vote in the assembly as

would be given to his suffrage in the senate by some noble peer, who had

bartered the independence of his judgment for the acquisition of more

rapid profits than could be drawn from land.

The farmers of the revenue fell into three broad classes. First there

were the contractors for the creation, maintenance and repair of the

public works possessed or projected by the State, such as roads,

aqueducts, bridges, temples and other public buildings. Gigantic profits

were not possible in such an enterprise, if the censors and their

advisers acted with knowledge, impartiality and discretion; for the

lowest possible tender was obtained for such contracts and the results

might be repudiated if inspection proved them to be unsatisfactory.

Secondly there were the companies which leased sources of production

that were owned by the State such as fisheries, salt-works, mines and

forest land. In some particular cases even arable land had been dealt

with in this way, and the confiscated territories of Capua and Corinth

were let on long leases to _publicani_. Thirdly there were the

societies, which did not themselves acquire leases but acted as true

intermediaries between the State and individuals[135] who paid it

revenue whether as occupants of its territory, or as making use of sites

which it claimed to control, or as owing dues which had been prescribed

by agreement or by law. These classes of debtors to the State with whom

the middlemen came into contact may be illustrated respectively by the

occupants of the domain land of Italy, the ship-masters who touched at

ports, and the provincials such as those of Sicily or Sardinia who were

burdened with the payment of a tithe of the produce of their lands.[136]

If we consider separately the characteristics of the three classes of

state-farmers, we find that the first and the second are both direct

employers of labour, the third reaping only indirect profits from the

production controlled by others. It was in this respect, as employers of

labour, that the societies of the time were free from the anxieties and

restrictions that beset the modern employment of capital. Except in the

rare case where the contractors had leased arable land and sublet it to

its original occupants,--the treatment which seems to have been adopted

for the Campanian territory[137]--there can be no question that the

work which they controlled was done mainly by the hands of slaves. They

were therefore exempt from the annoyance and expense which might be

caused by the competition and the organised resistance of free labour.

The slaves employed in many of these industries must have been highly

skilled; for many of these spheres of wealth which the State had

delegated to contractors required peculiar industrial appliances and

unusual knowledge in the foremen and leading artificers. The weakness of

slave-labour,--its lack of intelligence and spirit--could not have been

so keenly felt as it was on the great agricultural estates, which

offered employment chiefly for the unskilled; and the difficulties that

might arise from the lack of strength or interest, from the possession

of hands that were either feeble or inert, were probably overcome in the

same uncompromising manner in the workshop of the contractor and on the

domains of the landed gentry. The maxim that an aged slave should be

sold could not have been peculiar to the dabbler in agriculture, and the

_ergastulum_ with its chained gangs must have been as familiar to the

manufacturer as to the landed proprietor.[138] As to the promoters and

the shareholders of these companies, it could not be expected that they

should trace in imagination, or tremble as they traced, the heartless,

perhaps inhuman, means by which the regular returns on their capital

were secured.[139] Nor is it probable that the government of this period

took any great care to supervise the conditions of the work or the lot

of the workman. The partner desired quick and great returns, the State

large rents and small tenders. The remorseless drain on human energy,

the waste of human life, and the practical abeyance of free labour which

was flooding the towns with idlers, were ideas which, if they ever

arose, were probably kept in the background by a government which was

generally in financial difficulties, and by individuals animated by all

the fierce commercial competition of the age.

The desire of contractors and lessees for larger profits naturally took

the form of an eagerness to extend their sphere of operations. Every

advance in the Roman sphere of military occupation implied the making of

new roads, bridges and aqueducts; every extension of this sphere was

likely to be followed by the confiscation of certain territories, which

the State would declare to be public domains and hand over to the

company that would guarantee the payment of the largest revenue. But the

sordid imperialism which animated the contractor and lessee must have

been as nothing to that which fed the dreams of the true

state-middleman, the individual who intervened between the taxpayer and

the State, the producer and the consumer. Conquest would mean fresh

lines of coast and frontier, on which would be set the toil-houses of

the collectors with their local directors and their active "families" of

freedmen and slaves. It might even mean that a more prolific source of

revenue would be handed over to the care of the publican. The spectacle

of the method in which the land-tax was assessed and collected in Sicily

and Sardinia may have already inspired the hope that the next instance

of provincial organisation might see greater justice done to the

capitalists of Rome. When Sicily had been brought under Roman sway, the

aloofness of the government from financial interests, as well as its

innate conservatism, justified by the success of Italian organisation,

which dictated the view that local institutions should not be lightly

changed, had led it to accept the methods for the taxation of land which

it found prevalent in the island at the time of its annexation. The

methods implied assessment by local officials and collection by local

companies or states.[140] It is true that neither consequence entirely

excluded the enterprise of the Roman capitalists; they had crossed the

Straits of Messina on many a private enterprise and had settled in such

large numbers in the business centres of the island that the charter

given to the Sicilian cities after the first servile war made detailed

provision for the settlement of suits between Romans and natives.[141]

It was not to be expected that they should refrain from joining in, or

competing with, the local companies who bid for the Sicilian tithes, nor

was such association or competition forbidden by the law. But the

scattered groups of capitalists who came into contact with the Sicilian

yeomen did not possess the official character and the official influence

of the great companies of Italy. No association, however powerful, could

boast a monopoly of the main source of revenue in the island. But what

they had done was an index of what they might do, if another opportunity

and a more complaisant government could be found. Any individual or any

party which could promise the knights the unquestioned control of the

revenues of a new province would be sure of their heartiest sympathy

and support.

And it would be worth the while of any individual or party which

ventured to frame a programme traversing the lines of political

orthodoxy, to bid for the co-operation of this class. For recent history

had shown that the thorough organisation of capital, encouraged by the

State to rid itself of a tiresome burden in times of peace and to secure

itself a support in times of need, might become, as it pleased, a

bulwark or a menace to the government which had created it. The useful

monster had begun to develop a self-consciousness of his own. He had his

amiable, even his patriotic moments; but his activity might be

accompanied by the grim demand for a price which his nominal master was

not prepared to pay. The darkest and the brightest aspects of the

commercial spirit had been in turn exhibited during the Second Punic

War. On the one hand we find an organised band of publicans attempting

to break up an assembly before which a fraudulent contractor and wrecker

was to be tried;[142] on the other, we find them meeting the shock of

Cannae with the offer of a large loan to the beggared treasury, lent

without guarantee and on the bare word of a ruined government that it

should be met when there was money to meet it.[143] Other companies came

forward to put their hands to the public works, even the most necessary

of which had been suspended by the misery of the war, and told the

bankrupt State that they would ask for their payment when the struggle

had completely closed.[144] A noble spectacle! and if the positions of

employer and employed had been reversed only in such crises and in such

a way, no harm could come of the memory either of the obligation or the

service. But the strength shown by this beneficence sometimes exhibited

itself in unpleasant forms and led to unpleasant consequences. The

censorships of Cato and of Gracchus had been fierce struggles of

conservative officialdom against the growing influence and (as these

magistrates held) the swelling insolence of the public companies; and in

both cases the associations had sought and found assistance, either from

a sympathetic party within the senate, or from the people. Cato's

regulations had been reversed and their vigorous author had been

threatened with a tribunician prosecution before the Comitia;[145] while

Gracchus and his colleague had actually been impeached before a popular

court.[146] The reckless employment of servile labour by the companies

that farmed the property of the State had already proved a danger to

public security. The society which had purchased from the censors the

right of gathering pitch from the Bruttian forest of Sila had filled the

neighbourhood with bands of fierce and uncontrolled dependants, chiefly

slaves, but partly men of free birth who may have been drawn from the

desperate Bruttians whom Rome had driven from their homes. The

consequences were deeds of violence and murder, which called for the

intervention of the senate, and the consuls had been appointed as a

special commission to inquire into the outrages.[147] Nor were

complaints limited to Italy; provincial abuses had already called for

drastic remedies. A proof that this was the case is to be found in the

striking fact that on the renewed settlement of Macedonia in 167 it was

actually decreed that the working of the mines in that country, at least

on the extended scale which would have required a system of contract,

should be given up. It was considered dangerous to entrust it to native

companies, and as to the Roman-their mere presence in the country would

mean the surrender of all guarantees of the rule of public law or of the

enjoyment of liberty by the provincials.[148] The State still preferred

the embarrassments of poverty to those of overbearing wealth; its choice

proved its weakness; but even the element of strength displayed in the

surrender might soon be missed, if capital obtained a wider influence

and a more definite political recognition. As things were, these

organisations of capital were but just becoming conscious of their

strength and had by no means reached even the prime of their vigour. The

opening up of the riches of the East were required to develop the

gigantic manhood which should dwarf the petty figure of the agricultural

wealth of Italy.

Had the state-contractors stood alone, or had not they engaged in varied

enterprises for which their official character offered a favourable

point of vantage, the numbers and influence of the individuals who had

embarked their capital in commercial enterprise would have been far

smaller than they actually were. But, in addition to the publican, we

must take account of the business man (_negotiator_) who lent money on

interest or exercised the profession of a banker. Such men had pecuniary

interests which knew no geographical limits, and in all broad questions

of policy were likely to side with the state-contractor.[149] The

money-lender (_fenerator_) represented one of the earliest, most

familiar and most courted forms of Roman enterprise--one whose intrinsic

attractions for the grasping Roman mind had resisted every effort of the

legislature by engaging in its support the wealthiest landowner as well

as the smallest usurer. It is true that a taint clung to the trade--a

taint which was not merely a product of the mistaken economic conception

of the nature of the profits made by the lender, but was the more

immediate outcome of social misery and the fulminations of the

legislature. Cato points to the fact that the Roman law had stamped the

usurer as a greater curse to society than the common thief, and makes

the dishonesty of loans on interest a sufficient ground for declining a

form of investment that was at once safe and profitable.[150] Usury, he

had also maintained, was a form of homicide.[151] But to the majority of

minds this feeling of dishonour had always been purely external and

superficial. The proceedings were not repugnant to the finer sense if

they were not made the object of a life-long profession and not

blatantly exhibited to the eyes of the public. A taint clung to the

money-lender who sat in an office in the Forum, and handed his loans or

received his interest over the counter;[152] it was not felt by the

capitalist who stood behind this small dealer, by the nobleman whose

agent lent seed-corn to the neighbouring yeomen, by the investor in the

state-contracts who perhaps hardly realised that his profits represented

but an indirect form of usury. But, whatever restrictions public opinion

may have imposed on the money-lender as a dealer in Rome and with

Romans, such restrictions were not likely to be felt by the man who had

the capital and the enterprise to carry his financial operations beyond

the sea. Not only was he dealing with provincials or foreigners, but he

was dealing on a scale so grand that the magnitude of the business

almost concealed its shame. Cities and kings were now to be the

recipients of loans and, if the lender occupied a political position

that seemed inconsistent with the profession of a usurer, his

personality might be successfully concealed under the name of some local

agent, who was adequately rewarded for the obloquy which he incurred in

the eyes of the native populations, and the embarrassing conflicts with

the Roman government which were sometimes entailed by an excess of zeal.

Cato had swept both principals and agents out of his province of

Sardinia;[153] but he was a man who courted hostility, and he lived

before the age when the enmity of capital would prove the certain ruin

of the governor and a source of probable danger to the senate. In the

operations of the money-lender we find the most universal link between

the Forum and the provinces. There was no country so poor that it might

not be successfully exploited, and indeed exploitation was often

conditioned by simplicity of character, lack of familiarity with the

developed systems of finance, and the lack of thrift which amongst

peoples of low culture is the source of their constant need. The

employment of capital for this purpose was always far in advance of the

limits of Roman dominion. A protectorate might be in the grasp of a

group of private individuals long before it was absorbed into the

empire, the extension of the frontiers was conditioned by considerations

of pecuniary, not of political safety, and the government might at any

moment be forced into a war to protect the interests of capitalists

whom, in its collective capacity as a government, it regarded as the

greatest foes of its dominion.

A more beneficent employment of capital was illustrated by the

profession of banking which, like most of the arts which exhibit the

highest refinement of the practical intellect, had been given to the

Romans by the Greeks.[154] It had penetrated from Magna Graecia to

Latium and from Latium to Rome, and had been fully established in the

city by the time of the Second Punic War.[155] The strangers, who had

introduced an art which so greatly facilitated the conduct of business

transactions, had been welcomed by the government, and were encouraged

to ply their calling in the shops rented from the State on the north and

south sides of the Forum. These _argentarii_ satisfied the two needs of

the exchange of foreign money, and of advances in cash on easier terms

than could be gained from the professional or secret usurer, to citizens

of every grade[156] who did not wish, or found it difficult, to turn

their real property into gold. Similar functions were at a somewhat

later period usurped by the money-testers (_nummularii_), who perhaps

entered Rome shortly after the issue of the first native silver coinage,

and competed with the earlier-established bankers in most of the

branches of their trade.[157] Ultimately there was no department of

business connected with the transference and circulation of money which

the joint profession did not embrace. Its representatives were concerned

with the purchase and sale of coin, and the equalisation of home with

foreign rates of exchange; they lent on credit, gave security for

others' loans, and received money on deposit; they acted as

intermediaries between creditors and debtors in the most distant places

and gave their travelling customers circular notes on associated houses

in foreign lands; they were equally ready to dissipate by auction an

estate that had become the property of a congress of creditors or a

number of legatees. Their carefully kept books improved even the

methodical habits of the Romans in the matter of business entries, and

introduced the form of "contract by ledger" (_litterarum obligatio_),

which greatly facilitated business operations on an extended scale by

substituting the written record of obligation for other bonds more

difficult to conclude and more easy to evade.

The business life of Rome was in every way worthy of her position as an

imperial city, and her business centre was becoming the greatest

exchange of the commercial world of the day. The forum still drew its

largest crowds to listen to the voice of the lawyer or the orator; but

these attractions were occasional and the constant throng that any day

might witness was drawn thither by the enticements supplied by the

spirit of adventure, the thirst for news and the strain of business

life. The comic poet has drawn for us a picture of the shifting crowd

and its chief elements, good and bad, honest and dishonest. He has shown

us the man who mingles pleasure with his business, lingering under the

Basilica in extremely doubtful company; there too is a certain class of

business men giving or accepting verbal bonds. In the lower part of the

Forum stroll the lords of the exchange, rich and of high repute; under

the old shops on the north sit the bankers, giving and receiving loans

on interest.[158]

The Forum has become in common language the symbol of all the ups and

downs of business life,[159] and the moralist of later times could refer

all students, who wish to master the lore of the quest and investment of

money, to the excellent men who have their station by the temple of

Janus.[160] The aspect of the market place had altered greatly to meet

the growing needs. Great Basilicae--sheltered promenades which probably

derived their names from the Royal Courts of the Hellenic East--had

lately been erected. Two of the earliest, the Porcian and Sempronian,

had been raised on the site of business premises which had been bought

up for the purpose,[161] and were meant to serve the purposes of a

market and an exchange.[162] Their sheltering roofs were soon employed

to accommodate the courts of justice, but it was the business not the

legal life of Rome that called these grand edifices into existence.

The financial activity which centred in the Forum was a consequence, not

merely of the contract-system encouraged by the State and of the

business of the banker and the money-lender, but of the great foreign

trade which supplied the wants and luxuries of Italy and Rome. This was

an import trade concerned partly with the supply of corn for a nation

that could no longer feed itself, partly with the supply of luxuries

from the East and of more necessary products, including instruments of

production, from the West. The Eastern trade touched the Euxine Sea at

Dioscurias, Asia Minor chiefly at Ephesus and Apamea, and Egypt at

Alexandria. It brought Pontic fish, Hellenic wines, the spices and

medicaments of Asia and of the Eastern coast of Africa, and countless

other articles, chiefly of the type which creates the need to which it

ministers. More robust products were supplied by the West through the

trade-routes which came down to Gades, Genua and Aquileia. Hither were

brought slaves, cattle, horses and dogs; linen, canvas and wool; timber

for ships and houses, and raw metal for the manufacture of implements

and works of art. Neither in East nor West was the product brought by

the producer to the consumer. In accordance with the more recent

tendencies of Hellenistic trade, great emporia had grown up in which the

goods were stored, until they were exported by the local dealers or

sought by the wholesale merchant from an Italian port. As the Tyrrhenian

Sea became the radius of the trade of the world, Puteoli became the

greatest staple to which this commerce centred; thence the goods which

were destined for Rome were conveyed to Ostia by water or by land, and

taken by ships which drew no depth of water up the Tiber to the

city.[163] But it must not be supposed that this trade was first

controlled by Romans and Italians when it touched the shores of Italy.

Groups of citizens and allies were to be found in the great staples of

the world, receiving the products as they were brought down from the

interior and supplying the shipping by which they were transferred to

Rome.[164] They were not manufacturers, but intermediaries who reaped a

larger profit from the carrying trade than could be gained by any form

of production in their native land. The Roman and Italian trader was to

be inferior only to the money-lender as a stimulus and a stumbling-block

to the imperial government; he was, like the latter, to be a cause of

annexation and a fire-brand of war, and serves as an almost equal

illustration of the truth that a government which does not control the

operations of capital is likely to become their instrument.[165]

If we descend from the aristocracy of trade to its poorer

representatives, we find that time had wrought great changes in the lot

of the smaller manufacturer and artisan. It is true that the old

trade-gilds of Rome, which tradition carried back to the days of Numa,

still maintained their existence. The goldsmiths, coppersmiths,

builders, dyers, leather-workers, tanners and potters[166] still held

their regular meetings and celebrated their regular games. But it is

questionable whether even at this period their collegiate life was not

rather concerned with ceremonial than with business, whether they did

not gather more frequently to discuss the prospects of their social and

religious functions than to consider the rules and methods of their

trades. We shall soon see these gilds of artificers a great political

power in the State--one that often alarmed the government and sometimes

paralysed its control of the streets of Rome. But their political

activity was connected with ceremonial rather than with trade; it was as

religious associations that they supported the demagogue of the moment

and disturbed the peace of the city. They made war against any

aristocratic abuse that was dangled for the moment before their eyes;

but they undertook no consistent campaign against the dominance of

capital. Their activity was that of the radical caucus, not of the

trade-union. But, if even their industrial character had been fully

maintained and trade interests had occupied more of their attention than

street processions and political agitation, they could never have posed

as the representatives of the interests of the free-born sons of Rome.

The class of freedmen was freely admitted to their ranks, and the

freedman was from an economic point of view the greatest enemy of the

pure-blooded Italian. We shall also see that the freedman was usually

not an independent agent in the conduct of the trade which he professed.

He owed duties to his patron which limited his industrial activity and

rendered a whole-hearted co-operation with his brother-workers

impossible. It is questionable whether any gild organisation could have

stood the shock of the immense development of industrial activity of

which the more fortunate classes at Rome were now reaping the fruits.

The trades represented by Numa's colleges would at best have formed a

mere framework for a maze of instruments which formed the complex

mechanism needed to satisfy the voracious wants of the new society. The

gold-smithery of early times was now complicated by the arts of chasing

and engraving on precious stones; the primitive builder, if he were

still to ply his trade with profit, must associate it with the skill of

the men who made the stuccoed ceilings, the mosaic pavements, the

painted walls. The leather-worker must have learnt to make many a kind

of fashionable shoe, and the dyer to work in violet, scarlet or saffron,

in any shade or colour to which fashion had given a temporary vogue.

Tailoring had become a fine art, and the movable decorations of houses

demanded a host of skilled workmen, each of whom was devoted to the

speciality which he professed. It would seem as though the very

weaknesses of society might have benefited the lower middle class, and

the siftings of the harvest given by the spoils of empire might have

more than supplied the needs of a parasitic proletariate. It is an

unquestioned fact that the growing luxury of the times did benefit trade

with that doubtful benefit which accompanies the diversion of capital

from purposes of permanent utility to objects of aesthetic admiration or

temporary display; but it is an equally unquestioned fact that this

unhealthy nutriment did not strengthen to any appreciable extent such of

the lower classes as could boast pure Roman blood. The military

conscription, to which the more prosperous of these classes were

exposed, was inimical to the constant pursuit of that technical skill

which alone could enable its possessor to hold the market against freer

competitors. Such of the freedmen and the slaves as were trained to

these pursuits--men who would not have been so trained had they not

possessed higher artistic perception and greater deftness in execution

than their fellows--were wholly freed from the military burden which

absorbed much of the leisure, and blunted much of the skill, possessed

by their free-born rivals. The competition of slaves must have been

still more cruel in the country districts and near the smaller country

towns than in the capital itself. At Rome the limitations of space must

have hindered the development of home-industries in the houses of the

nobles, and, although it is probable that much that was manufactured by

the slaves of the country estate was regularly supplied to the urban

villa, yet for the purchase of articles of immediate use or of goods

which showed the highest qualities of workmanship the aristocratic

proprietor must have been dependent on the competition of the Roman

market. But the rustic villa might be perfectly self-supporting, and the

village artificer must have looked in vain for orders from the spacious

mansion, which, once a dwelling-house or farm, had become a factory as

well. Both in town and country the practice of manumission was

paralysing the energies of the free-born man who attempted to follow a

profitable profession. The frequency of the gift of liberty to slaves is

one of the brightest aspects of the system of servitude as practised by

the Romans; but its very beneficence is an illustration of the

aristocrat's contempt for the proletariate; for, where the ideal of

citizenship is high, manumission--at least of such a kind as shall give

political rights, or any trading privileges, equivalent to those of the

free citizen--is infrequent. In the Rome of this period, however, the

liberation of a slave showed something more than a mere negative neglect

of the interests of the citizen. The gift of freedom was often granted

by the master in an interested, if not in a wholly selfish, spirit. He

was freed from the duty of supporting his slave while he retained his

services as a freedman. The performance of these services was, it is

true, not a legal condition of manumission; but it was the result of the

agreement between master and slave on which the latter had attained his

freedom. The nobleman who had granted liberty to his son's tutor, his

own doctor or his barber, might still bargain to be healed, shaved or

have his children instructed free of expense. The bargain was just in so

far as the master was losing services for which he had originally paid,

and juster still when the freedman set up business on the _peculium_

which his master had allowed him to acquire during the days of his

servitude. But the contracting parties were on an unequal footing, and

the burden enforced by the manumittor was at times so intolerable that

towards the close of the second century the praetor was forced to

intervene and set limits to the personal service which might be expected

from the gratitude of the liberated slave.[167] The performance of such

gratuitous services necessarily diminished the demand for the labour of

the free man who attempted to practise the pursuit of an art which

required skill and was dependent for its returns on the custom of the

wealthier classes; and even such needs as could not be met by the

gratuitous services of freedmen or the purchased labour of slaves, were

often supplied, not by the labour of the free-born Roman, but by that of

the immigrant _peregrinus_. The foreigner naturally reproduced the arts

of his own country in a form more perfect than could be acquired by the

Roman or Italian, and as Rome had acquired foreign wants it was

inevitable that they should be mainly supplied by foreign hands. We

cannot say that most of the new developments in trade and manufacture

had slipped from the hands of the free citizens; it would be truer to

maintain that they had never been grasped by them at all. And, worse

than this, we must admit that there was little effort to attain them.

Both the cause and the consequence of the monopoly of trade and

manufacture of a petty kind by freedmen and foreigners is to be found in

the contempt felt by the free-born Roman for the "sordid and illiberal

sources of livelihood." [168] This prejudice was reflected in public law,

for any one who exercised a trade or profession was debarred from office

at Rome.[169] As the magistracy had become the monopoly of a class, the

prejudice might have been little more than one of the working principles

of an aristocratic government, had not the arts which supplied the

amenities of life actually tended to drift into the hands of the

non-citizen or the man of defective citizenship. The most abject Roman

could in his misery console himself with the thought that the hands,

which should only touch the plough and the sword, had never been stained

by trade. His ideal was that of the nobleman in his palace. It differed

in degree but not in kind. It centred round the Forum, the battlefield

and the farm.

For even the most lofty aristocrat would have exempted agriculture from

the ban of labour;[170] and, if the man of free birth could still have

toiled productively on his holding, his contempt for the rabble which

supplied the wants of his richer fellow-citizens in the towns would have

been justified on material, if not on moral, grounds. He would have held

the real sources of wealth which had made the empire possible and still

maintained the actual rulers of that empire. Italian agriculture was

still the basis of the brilliant life of Rome. Had it not been so, the

epoch of revolution could not have been ushered in by an agrarian law.

Had the interest in the land been small, no fierce attack would have

been made and no encroachment stoutly resisted. We are at the

commencement of the epoch of the dominance of trade, but we have not

quitted the epoch of the supremacy of the landed interest.

The vital question connected with agriculture was not that of its

failure or success, but that of the individuals who did the work and

shared the profits. The labourer, the soil, the market stand in such

close relations to one another that it is possible for older types of

cultivation and tenure to be a failure while newer types are a brilliant

success. But an economic success may be a social failure. Thus it was

with the greater part of the Italian soil of the day which had passed

into Roman hands. Efficiency was secured by accumulation and the smaller

holdings were falling into decay.

A problem so complex as that of a change in tenure and in the type of

productive activity employed on the soil is not likely to yield to the

analysis of any modern historian who deals with the events of the

ancient world. He is often uncertain whether he is describing causes or

symptoms, whether the primary evil was purely economic or mainly social,

whether diminished activity was the result of poverty and decreasing

numbers, or whether pauperism and diminution of population were the

effects of a weakened nerve for labour and of a standard of comfort so

feverishly high that it declined the hard life of the fields and induced

its possessors to refuse to propagate their kind. But social and

economic evils react so constantly on one another that the question of

the priority of the one to the other is not always of primary

importance. A picture has been conjured up by the slight sketches of

ancient historians and the more prolonged laments of ancient writers on

agriculture, which gives us broad outlines that we must accept as true,

although we may refuse to join in the belief that these outlines

represent an unmixed and almost incurable evil. These writers even

attempt to assign causes, which convince by their probability, although

there is often a suspicion that the ultimate and elusive truth has not

been grasped.

The two great symptoms which immediately impress our imagination are a

decline, real or apparent, in the numbers of the free population of

Rome, and the introduction of new methods of agriculture which entailed

a diminution in the class of freehold proprietors who had held estates

of small or moderate size. The evidence for an actual decline of the

population must be gathered exclusively from the Roman census

lists.[171] At first sight these seem to tell a startling tale. At the

date of the outbreak of the First Punic War (265 B.C.) the roll of Roman

citizens had been given as 382,284,[172] at a census held but three

years before the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus (136 B.C.) the numbers

presented by the list were 307,833.[173] In 129 years the burgess roll

had shrunk by nearly 75,000 heads of the population. The shrinkage had

not always been steadily progressive; sometimes there is a sudden drop

which tells of the terrible ravages of war. But the return of peace

brought no upward movement that was long maintained. In the interval of

comparative rest which followed the Third Macedonian War the census

rolls showed a decrease of about 13,000 in ten Years.[174] Seven years

later 2,000 more have disappeared,[175] and a slight increase at the

next _lustrum_ is followed by another drop of about 14,000.[176] The

needs of Rome had increased, and the means for meeting them were

dwindling year by year. This must be admitted, however we interpret the

meaning of these returns. A hasty generalisation might lead us to infer

that a wholesale diminution was taking place in the population of Rome

and Italy. The returns may add weight to other evidence which points

this way; but, taken by themselves, they afford no warrant for such a

conclusion. The census lists were concerned, not only purely with Roman

citizens, but purely with Roman citizens of a certain type. It is

practically certain that they reproduce only the effective fighting

strength of Rome,[177] and take no account of those citizens whose

property did not entitle them to be placed amongst the _classes_.[178]

But, if it is not necessary to believe that an actual diminution of

population is attested by these declining numbers, the conclusion which

they do exhibit is hardly less serious from an economic and political

point of view. They show that portions of the well-to-do classes were

ceasing to possess the property which entitled them to entrance into the

regular army, and that the ranks of the poorer proletariate were being

swelled by their impoverishment. It is possible that such impoverishment

may have been welcomed as a boon by the wearied veterans of Rome and

their descendants. It meant exemption from the heavier burdens of

military service, and, if it went further still, it implied immunity

from the tribute as long as direct taxes were collected from Roman

citizens.[179] As long as service remained a burden on wealth, however

moderate, there could have been little inducement to the man of small

means to struggle up to a standard of moderately increased pecuniary

comfort, which would certainly be marred and might be lost by the

personal inconvenience of the levy.

The decline in the numbers of the wealthier classes is thus attested by

the census rolls. But indications can also be given which afford a

slight probability that there was a positive diminution in the free

population of Rome and perhaps of Italy. The carnage of the Hannibalic

war may easily be overemphasised as a source of positive decline. Such

losses are rapidly made good when war is followed by the normal

industrial conditions which success, or even failure, may bring. But, as

we shall soon see reason for believing that these industrial conditions

were not wholly resumed in Italy, the Second Punic War may be regarded

as having produced a gap in the population which was never entirely

refilled. We find evidences of tracts of country which were not annexed

by the rich but could not be repeopled by the poor. The policy pursued

by the decaying Empire of settling foreign colonists on Italian soil had

already occurred to the statesmen of Rome in the infancy of her imperial

expansion. In 180 B.C. 40,000 Ligurians belonging to the Apuanian people

were dragged from their homes with their wives and children and settled

on some public land of Rome which lay in the territory of the Samnites.

The consuls were commissioned to divide up the land in allotments, and

money was voted to the colonists to defray the expense of stocking their

new farms.[180] Although the leading motive for this transference was

the preservation of peace amongst the Ligurian tribes, yet it is

improbable that the senate would have preferred the stranger to its

kindred had there been an outcry from the landless proletariate to be

allowed to occupy and retain the devastated property of the State.

But moral motives are stronger even than physical forces in checking the

numerical progress of a race. Amongst backward peoples unusual

indulgence and consequent disease may lead to the diminution or even

extinction of the stock; amongst civilised peoples the motives which

attain this result are rather prudential, and are concerned with an

ideal of life which perhaps increases the efficiency of the individual,

but builds up his healthy and pleasurable environment at the expense of

the perpetuity of the race. The fact that the Roman and Italian physique

was not degenerating is abundantly proved by the military history of the

last hundred years of the Republic. This is one of the greatest periods

of conquest in the history of the world. The Italy, whom we are often

inclined to think of as exhausted, could still pour forth her myriads of

valiant sons to the confines marked by the Rhine, the Euphrates and the

Sahara; and the struggle of the civil wars, which followed this

expansion, was the clash of giants. But this vigour was accompanied by

an ideal, whether of irresponsibility or of comfort, which gave rise to

the growing habit of celibacy--a habit which was to stir the eloquence

of many a patriotic statesman and finally lead to the intervention of

the law. When the censor of 131 uttered the memorable exhortation "Since

nature has so ordained that we cannot live comfortably with a wife nor

live at all without one, you should hold the eternal safety of the State

more dear than your own brief pleasure," [181] it is improbable that he

was indulging in conscious cynicism, although there may have been a

trace of conscious humour in his words. He was simply bending to the

ideal of the people whom he saw, or imagined to be, before him. The

ideal was not necessarily bad, as one that was concerned with individual

life. It implied thrift, forethought, comfort--even efficiency of a

kind, for the unmarried man was a more likely recruit than the father of

a family. But it sacrificed too much--the future to the present; it

ignored the undemonstrable duty which a man owes to the permanent idea

of the State through working for a future which he shall never see. It

rested partly on a conviction of security; but that feeling of security

was the most perilous sign of all.

The practice of celibacy generally leads to irregular attachments

between the sexes. In a society ignorant of slavery, such attachments,

as giving rise to social inconveniences far greater than those of

marriage, are usually shunned on prudential grounds even where moral

motives are of no avail. But the existence in Italy of a large class of

female dependants, absolutely outside the social circle of the citizen

body, rendered the attachment of the master to his slave girl or to his

freedwoman fatally easy and unembarrassing. It was unfortunately as

attractive as it was easy. Amidst the mass of servile humanity that had

drifted to Italy from most of the quarters of the world there was

scarcely a type that might not reproduce some strange and wonderful

beauty. And the charm of manner might be secured as readily as that of

face and form. The Hellenic East must often have exhibited in its women

that union of wit, grace and supple tact which made even its men so

irresistible to their Roman masters. The courtesans of the capital,

whether of high or low estate,[182] are from the point of view which we

are considering not nearly so important as the permanent mistress or

"concubine" of the man who might dwell in any part of Italy. It was the

latter, not the former, that was the true substitute for the wife. There

is reason to believe that it was about this period that "concubinage"

became an institution which was more than tolerated by society.[183] The

relation which it implied between the man and his companion, who was

generally one of his freedwomen, was sufficiently honourable. It

excluded the idea of union with any other woman, whether by marriage or

temporary association; it might be more durable than actual wedlock, for

facilities for divorce were rapidly breaking the permanence of the

latter bond; it might satisfy the juristic condition of "marital

affection" quite as fully as the type of union to which law or religion

gave its blessing. But it differed from marriage in one point of vital

importance for the welfare of the State. Children might be the issue of

_concubinatus_, but they were not looked on as its end. Such unions were

not formed _liberum quaerendorum causa_.

The decline, or at least the stationary character, of the population may

thus be shown to be partly the result of a cause at once social and

economic; for this particular social evil was the result of the economic

experiment of the extended use of slavery as a means of production. This

extension was itself partly the result of the accidents of war and

conquest, and in fact, throughout this picture of the change which was

passing over Italy, we can never free ourselves from the spectres of

militarism and hegemony. But an investigation of the more purely

economic aspects of the industrial life of the period affords a clear

revelation of the fact that the effects of war and conquest were merely

the foundation, accidentally presented, of a new method of production,

which was the result of deliberate design and to some extent of a

conscious imitation of systems which had in turn built up the colossal

wealth, and assisted the political decay, of older civilisations with

which Rome was now brought into contact. The new ideal was that of the

large plantation or _latifundium_ supervised by skilled overseers,

worked by gangs of slaves with carefully differentiated duties, guided

by scientific rules which the hoary experience of Asia and Carthage had

devised, but, in unskilled Roman hands, perhaps directed with a reckless

energy that, keeping in view the vast and speedy returns which could

only be given by richer soils than that of Italy, was as exhaustive of

the capacities of the land as it was prodigal of the human energy that

was so cheaply acquired and so wastefully employed. The East, Carthage

and Sicily had been the successive homes of this system, and the Punic

ideal reached Rome just at the moment when the tendency of the free

peasantry to quit their holdings as unprofitable, or to sell them to pay

their debts, opened the way for the organisation of husbandry on the

grand Carthaginian model.[184] The opportunity was naturally seized with

the utmost eagerness by men whose wants were increasing, whose incomes

must be made to keep pace with these wants, and whose wealth must

inevitably be dependent mainly on the produce of the soil. Yet we have

no warrant for accusing the members of the Roman nobility of a

deliberate plan of campaign stimulated by conscious greed and

selfishness. For a time they may not have known what they were doing.

Land was falling in and they bought it up; domains belonging to the

State were so unworked as to be falling into the condition of rank

jungle and pestilent morass. They cleared and improved this land with a

view to their own profit and the profit of the State. Free labour was

unattainable or, when attained, embarrassing. They therefore bought

their labour in the cheapest market, this market being the product of

the wars and slave-raids of the time. They acted, in fact, as every

enlightened capitalist would act under similar circumstances. It seemed

an age of the revival of agriculture, not of its decay. The official

class was filled with a positive enthusiasm for new and improved

agricultural methods. The great work of the Carthaginian Mago was

translated by order of the senate.[185] Few of the members of that body

would have cared to follow the opening maxim of the great expert, that

if a man meant to settle in the country he should begin by selling his

house in town;[186] the men of affairs did not mean to become gentlemen

farmers, and it was the hope of profitable investment for the purpose of

maintaining their dignity in the capital, not the rustic ideal of the

primitive Roman, that appealed to their souls. But they might have hoped

that most of the golden precepts of the twenty-eight books, which

unfolded every aspect of the science of the management of land, would be

assimilated by the intelligent bailiff, and they may even have been

influenced by a patriotic desire to reveal to the small holder

scientific methods of tillage, which might stave off the ruin that they

deplored as statesmen and exploited as individuals. But the lessons were

thrown away on the small cultivator; they probably presupposed the

possession of capital and labour which were far beyond his reach; and

science may have played but little part even in the accumulations of the

rich, although the remarkable spectacle of small holdings, under the

personal supervision of peasant proprietors, being unable to hold their

own against plantations and ranches managed by bailiffs and worked by

slaves, does suggest that some improved methods of cultivation were

adopted on the larger estates. The rapidity with which the plantation

system spread must have excited the astonishment even of its promoters.

Etruria, in spite of the fact that three colonies of Roman citizens had

lately been founded within its borders,[187] soon showed one continuous

series of great domains stretching from town to town, with scarcely a

village to break the monotonous expanse of its self-tilled plains.

Little more than forty years had elapsed since the final settlement of

the last Roman colony of Luna when a young Roman noble, travelling along

the Etruscan roads, strained his eyes in vain to find a free labourer,

whether cultivator or shepherd.[188] In this part of Italy it is

probable that Roman enterprise was not the sole, or even the main, cause

of the wreckage of the country folk. The territory had always been

subject to local influences of an aristocratic kind; but the Etruscan

nobles had stayed their hand as long as a free people might help them to

regain their independence.[189] Now subjection had crushed all other

ambition but that of gain and personal splendour, while the ravages of

the Hannibalic war had made the peasantry an easy victim of the

wholesale purchaser. Farther south, in Bruttii and Apulia, the hand of

Rome had co-operated with the scourge of war to produce a like result.

The confiscations effected in the former district as a punishment for

its treasonable relations with Hannibal, the suitability of the latter

for grazing purposes, which had early made it the largest tract of land

in Italy patrolled by the shepherd slave,[190] had swept village and

cultivator away, and left through whole day's journeys but vast

stretches of pasture between the decaying towns.

For barrenness and desolation were often the results of the new and

improved system of management. There were tracts of country which could

not produce cereals of an abundance and quality capable of competing

with the corn imported from the provinces; but even on territories where

crops could be reared productively, it was tempting to substitute for

the arduous processes of sowing and reaping the cheaper and easier

industry of the pasturage of flocks. We do not know the extent to which

arable land in fair condition was deliberately turned into pasturage;

but we can imagine many cases in which the land recently acquired by

capitalists, whether from the State or from smaller holders, was in such

a condition, either from an initial lack of cultivation or from neglect

or from the ravages of war, that the new proprietor may well have shrunk

from the doubtful enterprise of sinking his capital in the soil, for the

purpose of testing its productive qualities. In such cases it was

tempting to treat the great domain as a sheep-walk or cattle-ranch. The

initial expenses of preparation were small, the labour to be employed

was reduced to a minimum, the returns in proportion to the expenses were

probably far larger than could be gained from corn, even when grown

under the most favourable conditions. The great difficulty in the way of

cattle-rearing on a large scale in earlier times had been the treatment

of the flocks and herds during the winter months. The necessity for

providing stalls and fodder for this period must have caused the

proprietor to limit the heads of cattle which he cared to possess. But

this constraint had vanished at once when a stretch of warm coast-line

could be found, on which the flocks could pasture without feeling the

rigour of the winter season. Conversely, the cattle-rearer who possessed

the advantage of such a line of coast would feel his difficulties

beginning when the summer months approached. The plains of the Campagna

and Apulia could have been good neither for man nor beast during the

torrid season. The full condition which freed a grazier from all

embarrassment and rendered him careless of limiting the size of his

flocks, was the combined possession of pastures by the sea for winter

use, and of glades in the hills for pasturage in summer.[191] Neither

the men of the hills nor the men of the plains, as long as they formed

independent communities, could become graziers on an extensive scale,

and it has been pointed out that even a Greek settlement of the extent

of Sybaris had been forced to import its wool from the Black Sea through

Miletus.[192] But when Rome had won the Apennines and extended her

influence over the coast, there were no limits to the extent to which

cattle rearing could be carried.[193] It became perhaps the most

gigantic enterprise connected with the soil of Italy. Its cheapness and

efficiency appealed to every practical mind. Cato, who had a sentimental

attachment to agriculture, was bound in honesty to reply to the question

"What is the best manner of investment?" by the words "Good pasturage."

To the question as to the second-best means he answered "Tolerable

pasturage." When asked to declare the third, he replied "Bad pasturage."

To ploughing he would assign only the fourth place in the descending

Scale.[194] Bruttii and Apulia were the chief homes of the ranch and the

fold. The Lucanian conquest of the former country must, even at a time

preceding the Roman domination, have formed a connection between the

mountains and the plains, and pasturage on a large scale in the mountain

glades of the Bruttian territory may have been an inheritance rather

than a creation of the Romans; but the ruin caused in this district by

the Second Punic War, the annexation to the State of large tracts of

rebel land,[195] and the reduction of large portions of the population

to the miserable serf-like condition of _dediticii_,[196] must have

offered the capitalists opportunities which they could not otherwise

have secured; and both here and in Apulia the tendency to extend the

grazing system to its utmost limits must have advanced with terrible

rapidity since the close of the Hannibalic war. It was the East coast of

Southern Italy that was chiefly surrendered to this new form of

industry, and we may observe a somewhat sharp distinction between the

pastoral activity of these regions and the agricultural life which still

continued, although on a diminished scale, in the Western

districts.[197]

We have already made occasional reference to the accidents on which the

new industrial methods that created the _latifundia_ were designedly

based. It is now necessary to examine these accidents in greater detail,

if only for the purpose of preparing the ground for a future estimate of

the efficacy of the remedies suggested by statesmen for a condition of

things which, however naturally and even honestly created, was

deplorable both on social and political grounds. The causes which had

led to the change from one form of tenure and cultivation to another of

a widely different kind required to be carefully probed, if the

Herculean task of a reversion to the earlier system was to be attempted.

The men who essayed the task had unquestionably a more perfect knowledge

of the causes of the change than can ever be possessed by the student of

to-day; but criticism is easier than action, and if it is not to become

shamelessly facile, every constraining element in the complicated

problem which is at all recoverable (all those elements so clearly seen

by the hard-headed and honest Roman reformers, but known by them to

possess an invulnerability that we have forgotten) must be examined by

the historian in the blundering analysis which is all that is permitted

by his imperfect information, and still more imperfect realisation, of

the temporary forces that are the millstones of a scheme of reform.

The havoc wrought by the Hannibalic invasion[198] had caused even

greater damage to the land than to the people. The latter had been

thinned but the former had been wasted, and in some cases wasted, as

events proved, almost beyond repair. The devastation had been especially

great in Southern Italy, the nations of which had clung to the Punic

invader to the end. But such results of war are transitory in the

extreme, if the numbers and energy of the people who resume possession

of their wrecked homes are not exhausted, and if the conditions of

production and sale are as favourable after the calamity as they were

before. The amount of wealth which an enemy can injure, lies on the mere

surface of the soil, and is an insignificant fraction of that which is

stored in the bosom of the earth, or guaranteed by a favourable

commercial situation and access to the sea. Carthage could pay her war

indemnity and, in the course of half a century, affright Cato by her

teeming wealth and fertility. Her people had resumed their old habits,

bent wholeheartedly to the only life they loved, and the prizes of a

crowded haven and bursting granaries were the result. If a nation does

not recover from such a blow, there must be some permanent defect in its

economic life or some fatal flaw in its administrative system. The

devastation caused by war merely accelerates the process of decay by

creating a temporary impoverishment, which reveals the severity of the

preceding struggle for existence and renders hopeless its resumption.

Certainly the great war of which Italy had been the theatre did mark

such an epoch in the history of its agricultural life. A lack of

productivity began to be manifested, for which, however, subsequent

economic causes were mainly responsible. The lack of intensity, which is

a characteristic of slave labour, lessened the returns, while the

secondary importance attached to the manuring of the fields was a

vicious principle inherent in the agricultural precepts of the

time.[199] But it is probable that from this epoch there were large

tracts of land the renewed cultivation of which was never attempted; and

these were soon increased by domains which yielded insufficient returns

and were gradually abandoned. The Italian peasant had ever had a hard

fight with the insalubrity of his soil. Fever has always been the

dreaded goddess of the environs of Rome. But constant labour and

effective drainage had kept the scourge at bay, until the evil moment

came when the time of the peasant was absorbed, and his energy spent, in

the toils of constant war, when his land was swallowed up in the vast

estates that had rapid profits as their end and careless slaves as their

cultivators. Then, the moist fields gave out their native pestilence,

and malaria reigned unchecked over the fairest portion of the Italian

plain.[200]

One of the leading economic causes, which had led to the failure of a

certain class of the Italian peasant-proprietors, was the competition to

which they were exposed from the provinces. Rome herself had begun to

rely for the subsistence of her increasing population on corn imported

from abroad, and many of the large coast-towns may have been forced to

follow her example. The corn-producing powers of the Mediterranean lands

had now definitely shifted from the regions of the East and North to

those of the South.[201] Greece, which had been barely able to feed

itself during the most flourishing period of its history, could not

under any circumstances have possessed an importance as a country of

export for Italy; but the economic evils which had fallen on this

unhappy land are worthy of observation, as presenting a forecast of the

fate which was in store for Rome. The decline in population, which could

be attributed neither to war nor pestilence, the growing celibacy and

childlessness of its sparse inhabitants,[202] must have been due to an

agricultural revolution similar to that which was gradually being

effected on Italian soil. The plantation system and the wholesale

employment of slave labour must have swept across the Aegean from their

homes in Asia Minor. Here their existence is sufficiently attested by

the servile rising which was to assume, shortly after the tribunate of

Tiberius Gracchus, the pretended form of a dynastic war; and the

troubles which always attended the collection of the Asiatic tithes, in

the days when a Roman province had been established in those regions,

give no favourable impression of the agricultural prosperity of the

countries which lay between the Taurus and the sea. As far south as

Sicily there was evidence of exhaustion of the land, and of unnatural

conditions of production, which excluded the mass of the free

inhabitants from participation both in labour and profits. But even

Sicily had learned from Carthage the evil lesson that Greece had

acquired from Asia; the plantation system had made vast strides in the

island, and the condition of the _aratores_, whether free-holders or

lessees, was not what it had been in the days of Diocles and Timoleon.

The growing economic dependence of Rome on Sicily was by no means wholly

due to any exceptional productive capacities in the latter, but was

mainly the result of proximity, and of administrative relations which

enabled the government and the speculator in corn to draw definite and

certain supplies of grain from the Sicilian cultivators. This was true

also, although to a smaller degree, of Sardinia. But Sicily and Sardinia

do mark the beginning of the Southern zone of lands which were capable

of filling the markets of the Western world. It was the Northern coast

of Africa which rose supreme as the grain-producer of the time. In the

Carthaginian territory the natural absence of an agricultural peasantry

amidst a commercial folk, and the elaboration of a definite science of

agriculture, had neutralised the ill effects which accompanied the

plantation system amongst other peoples less business-like and

scientific; the cultivators had shown no signs of unrest and the soil no

traces of exhaustion. It has been inferred with some probability that

the hostility of Cato, the friend of agriculture and of the Italian

yeoman, to the flourishing Punic state was directed to some extent by

the fear that the grain of Africa might one day drive from the market

the produce of the Italian fields;[203] and, if this view entered into

the calculations which produced the final Punic War, the very

short-sightedness of the policy which destroyed a state only to give its

lands to African cities and potentates or to Roman speculators, who

might continue the methods of the extinct community, is only too

characteristic of that type of economic jealousy which destroys an

accidental product and leaves the true cause of offence unassailed. The

destruction of Carthage had, as a matter of fact, aggravated the danger;

for the first use which Masinissa of Numidia made of the vast power with

which Rome had entrusted him, was an attempt to civilise his people by

turning them into cultivators;[204] and the virgin soil of the great

country which stretched from the new boundaries of Carthage to the

confines of the Moors, was soon reckoned amongst the competing elements

which the Roman agriculturist had to fear.

But the force of circumstances caused the Sicilian and Sardinian

cultivator to be the most formidable of his immediate competitors. The

facility of transport from Sicily to Rome rendered that island superior

as a granary to even the more productive portions of the Italian

mainland. Sicily could never have revealed the marvellous fertility of

the valley of the Po, where a bushel and a half of wheat could be

purchased for five pence half-penny, and the same quantity of barley was

sold for half this price;[205] but it was easier to get Sicilian corn to

Rome by sea than to get Gallic corn to Rome by land; and the system of

taxation and requisitions which had grown out of the provincial

organisation of the island, rendered it peculiarly easy to place great

masses of corn on the Roman market at very short notice. Occasionally

the Roman government enforced a sale of corn from the province

(_frumentum emptum_),[206] a reasonable price being paid for the grain

thus demanded for the city or the army; but this was almost the only

case in which the government intervened to regulate supplies. In the

ordinary course of things the right to collect the tithes of the

province was purchased by public companies, who paid money, not grain,

into the Roman treasury, and these companies placed their corn on the

market as best they could. The operations of the speculators in grain

doubtless disturbed the price at times. But yet the certainty, the

abundance and the facilities for transport of this supply were such as

practically to shut out from competition in the Roman market all but the

most favourably situated districts of Italy. Their chance of competition

depended mainly on their accidental possession of a good road, or their

neighbourhood to the sea or to a navigable river.[207] The larger

proprietors in any part of Italy must have possessed greater facilities

for carrying their grain to a good market than were enjoyed by the

smaller holders. The Clodian law on trade permitted senators to own

sea-going ships of a certain tonnage; they could, therefore, export

their own produce without any dependence on the middle-man, while the

smaller cultivators would have been obliged to pay freight, or could

only have avoided such payment by forming shipping-companies amongst

themselves. But such combination was not to be looked for amongst a

peasant class, barely conscious even of the external symptoms of the

great revolution which was dragging them to ruin, and perhaps almost

wholly oblivious of its cause.

It required less penetration to fathom the second of the great reasons

for the accumulation of landed property in the hands of the few; for

this cause had been before the eyes of the Roman world, and had been

expounded by the lips of Roman statesmen, for generations or, if we

credit a certain class of traditions,[208] even for centuries. This

cause of the growing monopoly of the land by the few was the system of

possession which the State had encouraged, for the purpose of securing

the use and cultivation of its public domain. The policy of the State

seems to have changed from time to time with reference to its treatment

of this particular portion of its property, which it valued as the most

secure of its assets and one that served, besides its financial end, the

desirable purpose of assisting it to maintain the influence of Rome

throughout almost every part of Italy. When conquered domain had first

been declared "public," the government had been indifferent to the type

of occupier which served it by squatting on this territory and

reclaiming land that had not been divided or sold chiefly because its

condition was too unattractive to invite either of these processes.[209]

It had probably extended its invitation even to Latin allies,[210] and

looked with approval on any member of the burgess body who showed his

enterprise and patriotism by the performance of this great public

service. If the State had a partiality, it was probably for the richer

and more powerful classes of its citizens. They could embrace a greater

quantity of land in their grasp, and so save the trouble which attended

an estimate of the returns of a great number of small holdings; they

possessed more effective means of reclaiming waste or devastated land,

for they had a greater control of capital and labour; lastly, through

their large bands of clients and slaves, they had the means of

efficiently protecting the land which they had occupied, and this must

have been an important consideration at a time when large tracts of the

_ager publicus_ lay amidst foreign territories which were barely

pacified, and were owned by communities that often wavered in their

allegiance to Rome. But, whatever the views of the government, it is

tolerably clear that the original occupiers must have chiefly

represented men of this stamp. These were the days when the urban and

the rustic tribes were sharply divided, as containing respectively the

men of the town and the men of the country, and when there were

comparatively few of the latter folk that did not possess some holding

of their own. It was improbable that a townsman would often venture on

the unfamiliar task of taking up waste land; it was almost as improbable

that a small yeoman would find leisure to add to the unaided labour on

his own holding the toil of working on new and unpromising soil, except

in the cases where some unclaimed portion of the public domain was in

close proximity to his estate.

We may, therefore, infer that from very early times the wealthier

classes had asserted themselves as the chief occupiers of the public

domain. And this condition of things continued to be unchallenged until

a time came[211] when the small holders, yielding to the pressure of

debt and bankruptcy, sought their champions amongst the tribunes of the

Plebs. The absolute control of the public domain by the State, the

absolute insecurity of the tenure of its occupants, furnished an

excellent opportunity for staving off schemes of confiscation and

redistribution of private property, such as had often shaken the

communities of Greece, and even for refusing to tamper with the existing

law of debtor and creditor.[212] It was imagined that bankrupt yeomen

might be relieved by being allowed to settle on the public domain, or

that the resumption or retention of a portion of this domain by the

State might furnish an opportunity for the foundation of fresh colonies,

and a law was passed limiting the amount of the _ager publicus_ that any

individual might possess. The enactment, whatever its immediate results

may have been, proved ineffective as a means of checking the growth of

large possessions. No special commission was appointed to enforce

obedience to its terms, and their execution was neglected by the

ordinary magistrates. The provisions of the law were, indeed, never

forgotten, but as a rule they were remembered only to be evaded. Devious

methods were adopted of holding public land through persons who seemed

to be _bona fide_ possessors in their own right, but were in reality

merely agents of some planter who already held land up to the permitted

limit.[213] Then came the agricultural crisis which followed the Punic

Wars. The small freeholds, mortgaged, deserted or selling for a fraction

of their value, began to fall into the meshes of the vast net which had

spread over the public domain. In some cases actual violence is said to

have been used to the smaller yeomen by their neighbouring tyrants,[214]

and we can readily imagine that, when a holding had been deserted for a

time through stress of war or military service, it might be difficult to

resume possession in the face of effective occupation by the bailiff of

some powerful neighbour. The _latifundium_--acquired, as it was

believed, in many cases by force, fraud and shameless violation of the

law--was becoming the standard unit of cultivation throughout

Italy.[215] When we consider the general social and economic

circumstances of the time, it is possible to imagine that large

properties would have grown in Italy, as in Greece, had Rome never

possessed an inch of public domain; but the occupation of _ager

publicus_ by the rich is very important from two points of view. On the

one hand, it unquestionably accelerated the process of the formation of

vast estates; and a renewed impulse had lately been given to this

process by the huge confiscations in the South of Italy, and perhaps by

the conquest of Cisalpine Gaul; for it is improbable that the domain

possessed by the State in this fertile country had been wholly parcelled

out amongst the colonies of the northern frontier.[216] But on the other

hand, the fact that the kernel of these estates was composed of public

land in excess of the prescribed limit seemed to make resumption by the

State and redistribution to the poor legally possible. The _ager

publicus_, therefore, formed the basis for future agitation and was the

rallying point for supporters and opponents of the proposed methods of

agricultural reform.

But it was not merely the negligence of the State which led to the

crushing of the small man by the great; the positive burdens which the

government was forced to impose by the exigencies of the career of

conquest and hegemony into which Rome had drifted, rendered the former

an almost helpless competitor in the uneven struggle. The conscription

had from early days been a source of impoverishment for the commons and

of opportunity for the rich. The former could obey the summons of the

State only at the risk of pledging his credit, or at least of seeing his

homestead drift into a condition of neglect which would bring the

inevitable day when it could only be rehabilitated by a loan of seed or

money. The lot of the warrior of moderate means was illustrated by the

legend of Regulus. He was believed to have written home to the consuls

asking to be relieved of his command in Africa. The bailiff whom he had

left on his estate of seven _jugera_ was dead, the hired man had stolen

the implements of agriculture and run away; the farm lay desolate and,

were its master not permitted to return, his wife and children would

lack the barest necessaries of existence.[217] The struggle to maintain

a household in the absence of its head was becoming more acute now that

corn-land was ceasing to pay, except under the most favourable

conditions, and now that the demand for conscripts was sometimes heavier

and always more continuous than it had ever been before. Perhaps

one-tenth of the adult male population of Rome was always in the

field;[218] the units came and went, but the men who bore the brunt of

the long campaigns and of garrison duty in the provinces were those to

whom leisure meant life--the yeomen who maintained their place in the

census lists by hardy toil, and who risked their whole subsistence

through the service that had been wrested from them as a reward for a

laborious career. When they ceased to be owners of their land, they

found it difficult to secure places even as labourers on some rich man's

property. The landholder preferred the services of slaves which could

not be interrupted by the call of military duty.[219]

The economic evils consequent on the conscription must have been felt

with hardly less severity by such of the Italian allies as lived in the

regions within which the _latifundia_ were growing up. To these were

added the pecuniary burdens which Rome had been forced to impose during

the Second Punic War. These burdens were for the most part indirect, for

Rome did not tax her Italian _socii_, but they were none the less

severe. Every contingent supplied from an allied community had its

expenses, except that of food during service, defrayed from the treasury

of its own state,[220] and ten continuous years of conscription and

requisition had finally exhausted the loyalty even of Rome's Latin

kindred.[221] It is true that the Italians were partially, although not

wholly, free from the economic struggle between the possessors of the

public land and the small freeholders; but there is no reason for

supposing that those of Western Italy were exempt from the consequences

of the reduction in price that followed the import of corn from abroad,

and the drain on their incomes and services which had been caused by war

could scarcely have fitted them to stand this unexpected trial. Rome's

harsh dealings with the treasonable South, although adopted for

political motives, was almost unquestionably a political blunder. She

confiscated devastated lands, and so perpetuated their devastation. She

left ruined harbours and cities in decay. She crippled her own resources

to add to the pastoral wealth of a handful of her citizens. In the East

of Italy there was a far greater vitality than elsewhere in agriculture

of the older type. The Samnites in their mountains, the Peligni,

Marrucini, Frentani and Vestini between the Apennines and the sea still

kept to the system of small freeholds. Their peasantry had perhaps

always cultivated for consumption rather than for sale; their

inhabitants were rather beyond the reach of the ample supply from the

South; and for these reasons the competition of Sicilian and African

corn did not lead them to desert their fields. They were also less

exposed than the Romans and Latins to the aggressions of the great

_possessor_; for, since they possessed no _commercium_ with Rome, the

annexation of their property by legal means was beyond the reach even of

the ingenious cupidity of the times.[222] The proof of the existence of

the yeoman in these regions is the danger which he caused to Rome. The

spirit which had maintained his economic independence was to aim at a

higher goal, and the struggle for equality of political rights was to

prove to the exclusive city the prowess of that class of peasant

proprietors which she had sacrificed in her own domains.

But, although this sacrifice had been great, we must not be led into the

belief that there was no hope for the agriculturist of moderate means

either in the present or in the future. Even in the present there were

clear indications that estates of moderate size could under careful

cultivation hold their own. The estate of Lucius Manlius, which Cato

sketches in his work on agriculture,[223] was far from rivalling the

great demesnes of the princes of the land. It consisted of 240 _jugera_

devoted to the olive and of 100 _jugera_ reserved for the vine.

Provision was made for a moderate supply of corn and for pasturage for

the cattle that worked upon the fields. But the farm was on the whole a

representative of the new spirit, which saw in the vine and the olive a

paying substitute for the decadent culture of grain. Even on an estate

of this size we note as significant that the permanent and even the

higher personnel of the household (the latter being represented by the

_villici_ and the _villicae_) was composed of slaves; yet hirelings were

needed for the harvest and the corn was grown by cottagers who held

their land on a _metayer_ tenure. But such an estate demanded unusual

capital as well as unusual care. On the tiny holdings, which were all

that the poorest could afford, the scanty returns might be eked out by

labour on the fields of others, for the small allotment did not demand

the undivided energies of its holder.[224] There was besides a class of

_politores_[225] similar to that figured as cultivating the Cornland on

the estate of Manlius, who received in kind a wage on which they could

at least exist. They were nominally _metayer_ tenants who were provided

with the implements of husbandry by their landlord; but the quantity of

grain which they could reserve to their own use was so small, varying as

it did from a ninth to a fifth of the whole of the crop which they had

reaped,[226] that their position was little better than that of the

poorest labourer by the day.[227] The humblest class of freemen might

still make a living in districts where pasturage did not reign supreme.

But it was a living that involved a sacrifice of independence and a

submission to sordid needs that were unworthy of the past ideal of Roman

citizenship. It was a living too that conferred little benefit on the

State; for the day-labourers and the _politores_ could scarcely have

been in the position on the census list which rendered them liable to

the conscription.

If it were possible to lessen the incidence of military service and to

secure land and a small amount of capital for the dispossessed, the

prospects for the future were by no means hopeless. The smaller culture,

especially the cultivation of the vine and the olive, is that to which

portions of Italy are eminently suited. This is especially true of the

great volcanic plain of the West extending from the north of Etruria to

the south of Campania and comprising, besides these territories, the

countries of the Latins, the Sabines, the Volsci and the Hernici. The

lightness and richness of the alluvion of this volcanic soil is almost

as suited to the production of cereals as to that of the vine and the

olive or the growth of vegetables.[228] But, even on the assumption that

corn-growing would not pay, there was nothing to prevent, and everything

to encourage the development of the olive plantation, the vineyard and

the market garden throughout this region. It was a country sown with

towns, and the vast throat of Rome alone would cry for the products of

endless labour. Even Cato can place the vine and the olive before

grazing land and forest trees in the order of productivity,[229] and

before the close of the Republic the government had learnt the lesson

that the salvation of the Italian peasantry depended on the cultivation

of products like these. The conviction is attested by the protective

edict that the culture of neither the vine nor the olive was to be

extended in Transalpine Gaul.[230] Market gardening was also to have a

considerable future, wherever the neighbourhood of the larger towns

created a demand for such supplies.[231] A new method of tenure also

gave opportunities to those whose capital or circumstances did not

enable them to purchase a sufficient quantity of land of their own.

Leaseholds became more frequent, and the _coloni_ thus created[232]

began to take an active share in the agricultural life of Italy. Like

the _villici_, they were a product, of the tendency to live away from

the estate; but they gained ground at the expense of the servile

bailiffs, probably in consequence of their greater trustworthiness and

keener interest in the soil.

But time was needed to effect these changes. For the present the reign

of the capitalist was supreme, and the plantation system was dominant

throughout the greater part of Italy. The most essential ingredient in

this system was the slave,--an alien and a chattel, individually a thing

of little account, but reckoned in his myriads the most powerful factor

in the economic, and therefore in the political, life of the times, the

gravest of the problems that startled the reformer. The soil of Italy

was now peopled with widely varied types, and echoes of strange tongues

from West and East could be heard on every hand. Italy seemed a newly

discovered country, on which the refuse of all lands had been thrown to

become a people that could never be a nation. The home supply of slaves,

so familiar as to seem a product of the land, was becoming a mere trifle

in comparison with the vast masses that were being thrust amongst the

peasantry by war and piracy. At the time of the protest of Tiberius

Gracchus against the dominance of slave labour in the fields scarcely

two generations had elapsed since the great influx had begun. The Second

Punic War had spread to every quarter of the West; Sicily, Sardinia,

Cisalpine Gaul and Spain all yielded their tribute in the form of human

souls that had passed from the victor to the dealer, from the dealer to

the country and the town. Only one generation had passed since a great

wave had swept from Epirus and Northern Greece over the shores of Italy.

In Epirus alone one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners had been

sold.[233] Later still the destruction of Carthage must have cast vast

quantities of agricultural slaves upon the market.[234] Asia too had

yielded up her captives as the result of Roman victories; but the

Oriental visages that might be seen in the streets of Rome or the plains

of Sicily, were less often the gift of regular war than of the piracy

and the systematised slave-hunting of the Eastern Mediterranean. Rome,

who had crushed the rival maritime powers that had attempted, however

imperfectly, to police the sea, had been content with the work of

destruction, and seemed to care nothing for the enterprising buccaneers

who sailed with impunity as far west as Sicily. The pirates had also

made themselves useful to the Oriental powers which still retained their

independence; they had been tolerated, if they had not been employed, by

Cyprus and Egypt when these states were struggling against the Empire of

the Seleucids.[235] But another reason for their immunity was the view

held in the ancient world that slave-hunting was in itself a legitimate

form of enterprise.[236] The pirate might easily be regarded as a mere

trader in human merchandise. As such, he had perhaps been useful to

Carthage;[237] and, as long as he abstained from attacking ports or

nationalities under the protectorate of Rome, there was no reason why

the capitalists in power should frown on the trade by which they

prospered. For the pirates could probably bring better material to the

slave market than was usually won in war.[238] A superior elegance and

culture must often have been found in the helpless victims on whom they

pounced; beauty and education were qualities that had a high marketable

value, and by seizing on people of the better class they were sure of

one of two advantages--either of a ransom furnished by the friends of

the captives, or of a better price paid by the dealer. There was

scarcely a pretence that the traders were mere intermediaries who bought

in a cheap market and sold in a dear. They were known to be raiders as

well, and numbers of the captives exhibited in the mart at Side in

Pamphylia were known to have been freemen up to the moment of the

auction.[239] The facility for capture and the proximity of Delos, the

greatest of the slave markets which connected the East with the West,

rendered the supply enormous; but it was equalled by the demand, and

myriads of captives are said to have been shipped to the island and to

have quitted it in a single day. The ease and rapidity of the business

transacted by the master of a slave-ship became a proverb;[240] and

honest mercantile undertakings with their tardy gains must have seemed

contemptible in comparison with this facile source of wealth.

An abundant supply and quick returns imply reasonable prices; and the

cheapness of the labour supplied by the slave-trade, whether as a

consequence of war or piracy, was at once a necessary condition of the

vitality of the plantation system and a cause of the recklessness and

neglect with which the easily replaced instruments might be used. Cato,

a shrewd man of business, never cared to pay more than fifteen hundred

denarii for his slaves.[241] This must have been the price of the best

type of labourer, of a man probably who was gifted with intelligence as

well as strength. Ordinary unskilled labour must have fetched a far

smaller sum; for the prices which are furnished by the comic poetry of

the day--prices which are as a rule conditioned by the value of personal

services or qualities of a particular kind, by the attractions of sex

and the competition for favours--do not on the average far exceed the

limit fixed by Cato.[242] For common work newly imported slaves were

actually preferred, and purchasers were shy of the _veterator_ who had

seen long service.[243] Employment in the fashionable circles of the

town doubtless enhanced the value of a slave, when he was known to have

been in possession of some peculiar gift, whether it were for cookery,

medicine or literature; but the labours of the country could easily be

drilled into the newest importation, and prices diminished instead of

rising with the advancing age and experience of the rustic slave.[244]

The cheapened labour which was now spread over Italy presented as many

varieties of moral as of physical type, and these came to be well known

to the prospective owner, not because he aimed at being a moral

influence, but because he objected to being worried by the vagaries of

an eccentric type. Sardinians were always for sale, not because they

were specially abundant, but because they showed an indocility that

rendered them a sorry possession.[245] The passive Oriental, the

Spaniard fierce and proud, required different methods of management and

inspired different precautions; yet experience soon proved that the

hellenised sons of the East had a better capacity for organising revolt

than their fellow-sufferers from the North and West, and much of the

harshness of Roman slavery was prompted by the panic which is the

nemesis of the man who deals in human lives. But more of it was due to

the indifference which springs from familiarity, and from the cold

practical spirit in which the Roman always tended to play with the pawns

of his business game, even when they were freemen and fellow-citizens. A

man like Cato, who had sense and honesty enough to look after his own

business, elaborated a machine-like system for governing his household,

the aim of which was the maximum of profit with the minimum amount of

humanity which is consistent with the attainment of such an end. The

element of humanity is, however, accidental. There is no conscious

appeal to such a feeling. The slaves seem to be looked on rather as

automata who perform certain mental and physical processes analogous to

those of men. Cato's servants were never to enter another house except

at his bidding or at that of his wife, and were to express utter

ignorance of his domestic history to all inquirers; their life was to

alternate between working and sleeping, and the heavy sleeper was valued

as presumably a peaceful character; little bickerings between the

servants were to be encouraged, for unanimity was a matter for suspicion

and fear; the death sentence pronounced on any one of them by the law

was carried out in the presence of the assembled household, so as to

strike a wholesome terror into the rest. If they wished to propagate

their kind, they must pay for the privilege, and a fixed sum was

demanded from the slave who desired to find a mate amongst his

fellow-servants.[246] The rations were fixed and only raised at the

people's festivals of the Saturnalia and Compitalia;[247] a sick slave

was supposed to need less than his usual share[248]--perhaps an

excellent hygienic maxim, but one scarcely adopted on purely hygienic

grounds. Such a life was an emphatic protest against the indulgence of

the city, the free and careless intercourse which often reversed the

position of master and slave and formed part of the stock-in-trade of

the comedian. Yet, even when the bond between the man of fashion and his

artful Servants had merely a life of pleasure and of mischief as its

end, we Are at least lifted by such relations into a human sphere, and

it is exceedingly questionable whether the warped humanity of the city

did mark so low a level as the brutalised life of the estate over which

Cato's fostering genius was spread. If we develop Cato's methods but a

little, if we admit a little more rigour and a little less

discrimination, we get the dismal barrack-like system of the great

plantations--a barrack, or perhaps a prison, nominally ruled by a

governor who might live a hundred miles away, really under the control

of an anxious and terrified slave, who divided his fears between his

master who wanted money and his servants who wanted freedom. The

_villicus_ had been once the mere intendant of the estate on which his

master lived; he was now sole manager of a vast domain for his absent

lord,[249] sole keeper of the great _ergastulum_ which enclosed at

nightfall the instruments of labour and disgorged them at daybreak over

the fields. The gloomy building in which they were herded for rest and

sleep showed but its roof and a small portion of its walls above the

earth; most of it lay beneath the ground, and the narrow windows were so

high that they could not be reached by the hands of the inmates.[250]

There was no inspection by the government, scarcely any by the

owners.[251] There was no one to tell the secrets of these dens, and if

the unwary traveller were trapped and hidden behind their walls, all

traces of him might be for ever lost.[252] When the slaves were turned

out into the fields, the safety of their drivers was secured by the

chains which bound their limbs, but which were so adjusted as not to

interfere with the movements necessary to their work.[253] Some whose

spirit had been broken might be left unbound, but for the majority bonds

were the only security against escape or vengeance.[254]

There was, however, one type of desperate character who was permitted to

roam at large. This was the guardian of the flocks, who wandered

unrestrained over the mountains during the summer months and along the

prairies in the winter season. These herdsmen formed small bands. It was

reckoned that there should be one for every eighty or hundred sheep and

two for every troop of fifty horses.[255] It was sometimes found

convenient that they should be accompanied by their women who prepared

their meals--women of robust types like the Illyrian dames to whom

child-birth was a mere incident in the daily toils.[256] Such a life of

freedom had its attractions for the slave, but it had its drawbacks too.

The landowner who preferred pasturage to tillage, saved his capital, not

only by the small number of hands which the work demanded, but also by

the niggardly outlay which he expended on these errant serfs. It was not

needful to provide them with the necessaries of life when they could

take them for themselves. When Damophilus of Enna was entreated by his

slaves to give them something better than the rags they wore, his answer

was: "Do travellers then travel naked through the land? Have they

nothing for the man who wants a coat?" [257] Brigandage, in fact, was an

established item In the economic creed of the day.

The desolation of Italy was becoming dangerous, and the master of the

lonely villa barred himself in at nights as though an enemy were at his

gates. On one occasion Scipio Africanus was disturbed in his retreat at

Liternum by a troop of bandits. He placed his armed servants on the roof

and made every preparation for repelling the assault. But the visitors

proved to be pacific. They were the very _elite_ of the fraternity of

brigands and had merely come to do honour to the great man. They sent

back their troops, threw down their arms, laid presents before his door

and departed in joyous mood.[258] The immunity of such bands proved that

a slave revolt might at any moment imperil every life and every dwelling

in some unprotected canton. It was indeed the epoch of peace, when Roman

and Phoenician armies no longer held the field in Italy, that first

suggested the hope of liberation to the slave. Hannibal would have

imperilled his character of a protector of Italian towns had he

encouraged a slave revolt, even if the Phoenician had not shrunk from a

precedent so fatal to his native land. But one of the unexpected results

of the Second Punic War was to kindle a rising in the very heart of

Latium, and it was the African slave, not the African freeman, that

stirred the last relics of the war in Italy. At Setia were guarded the

noble Carthaginians who were a pledge of the fidelity of their state.

These hostages, the sons of merchant princes, were allowed to retain the

dignity of their splendid homes, and a vast retinue of slaves from

Africa attended on their wants. The number of these was swelled by

captive members of the same nationalities whom the people of Setia had

acquired in the recent war.[259] A spirit of camaraderie sprung up

amongst men who understood one another's language and had acquired the

spurious nationality that comes from servitude in the same land. Their

numbers were obvious, the paucity of the native Setians was equally

clear, and no military force was close at hand. They planned to increase

their following by spreading disaffection amongst the servile

populations of the neighbouring country towns, and emissaries were sent

to Norba in the North and Circei in the South. Their project was to wait

for the rapidly approaching games of the Setian folk and to rush on the

unarmed populace as they were gazing at the show; when Setia had been

taken, they meant to seize on Norba and Circei. But there was treason in

their ranks. The urban praetor was roused before dawn by two slaves who

poured the whole tale of the impending massacre into his ear. After a

hasty consultation of the senate he rushed to the threatened district,

gathering recruits as he swept with his legates through the country

side, binding them with the military oath, bidding them arm and follow

him with all speed. A hasty force of about two thousand men was soon

gathered; none knew his destination till he reached the gates of Setia.

The heads of the conspiracy were seized, and such of their followers as

learnt the fact fled incontinently from the town. From this point onward

it was only a matter of hunting down the refugees by patrols sent round

the country districts. Southern Latium was freed from its terror; but it

was soon found that the evil had spread almost to the gates of Rome. A

rumour had spread that Praeneste was to be seized by its slaves, and it

was sufficient to stimulate a praetor to execute nearly five hundred of

the supposed delinquents.[260]

Two years later a rising, which almost became a war, shook the great

plantation lands of Etruria.[261] Its suppression required a legion and

a pitched battle. The leaders were crucified; others of the slaves who

had escaped the carnage were restored to their masters. But these

disturbances, that may have seemed mere sporadic relics of the havoc and

exhaustion left by the Hannibalic war, were only quelled for the moment.

It was soon found that the seeds of insecurity were deeply planted in

the settlement that was called a peace. During the year 185 the

shepherds of Apulia were found to have formed a great society of

plunder, and robbery with violence was of constant occurrence on the

grazing lands and public roads. The praetor who was in command at

Tarentum opened a commission which condemned seven thousand men. Many

were executed, although a large number of the criminals escaped to other

regions.[262]

These movements in Italy were but the symptoms of a spirit that was

spreading over the Mediterranean lands. The rising of the serfs only

just preceded the great awakening of the masses of the freemen.[263]

Both classes were ground down by capital; both would make an effort to

shake the burden from their shoulders; and, as regards the methods of

assertion, it is a matter of little moment whether they took the form of

a national rising against a government or a protectorate, a sanguinary

struggle in the Forum against the dominance of a class, or an attack by

chattels, not yet brutalised by serfdom but full of the traditions and

spirit of freemen, against the cruelty and indifference of their owners.

In one sense the servile movements were more universal, and perhaps

better organised, than those of the men to whom, free birth gave a

nominal superiority. A sympathy for each other's sufferings pervaded the

units of the class who were scattered in distant lands. Sometimes it was

a sympathy based on a sense of nationality, and the Syrian and Cilician

in Asia would feel joy and hope stirring in his heart at the doings of

his brethren who had been deported to the far West. The series of

organised revolts in the Roman provinces and protectorate which commence

shortly after the fall of Carthage and close for the moment with the war

of resistance to the Romans in Asia, forms a single connected chain.

Dangerous risings had to be repressed at the Italian coast towns of

Minturnae and Sinuessa; at the former place four hundred and fifty

slaves were crucified, at the latter four thousand were crushed by a

military force; the mines of Athens, the slave market of Delos,

witnessed similar outbreaks,[264] and we shall find a like wave of

discontent spreading over the serf populations of the countries of the

Mediterranean just before the second great outbreak in Sicily which

darkens the close of the second century. The evil fate which made this

island the theatre of the two greatest of the servile wars is explicable

on many grounds. The opportunity offered by the sense of superiority in

numbers was far ampler here than in any area of Italy of equal size. For

Sicily was a wheat-growing country, and the cultivated plains demanded a

mass of labour which was not needed in more mountainous or less fertile

lands, where pasturage yielded a surer return than the tilling of the

soil. The pasture lands of Sicily were indeed large, but they had not

yet dwarfed the agriculture of the island. The labour of the fields was

in the hands of a vast horde of Asiatics, large numbers of whom may

conceivably have been shipped from Carthage across the narrow sea, when

that great centre of the plantation system had been laid low and the

fair estates of the Punic nobles had been seized and broken up by their

conquerors.[265] In the history of the great Sicilian outbreaks Syrians

and Cilicians meet us at every turn. These Asiatic slaves had different

nationalities and they or their fathers had been citizens of widely

separated towns. But there were bonds other than a common suffering

which produced a keen sense of national union and a consequent feeling

of ideal patriotism in the hearts of all. They were the products of the

common Hellenism of the East; they or their fathers could make a claim

to have been subjects of the great Seleucid monarchy; many, perhaps most

of them, could assert freedom by right of birth and acknowledged slavery

only as a consequence of the accidents of war or piracy. The mysticism

of the Oriental, the political ideal of the Hellene, were interwoven in

their moral nature--a nature perhaps twisted by the brutalism of slavery

to superstition in the one direction, to licence in the other, but none

the less capable of great conceptions and valiant deeds. The moment for

both would come when the prophet had appeared, and the prophet would

surely show himself when the cup of suffering had overflowed.[266]

The masters who worked this human mechanism were driving it at a pace

which must have seemed dangerous to any human being less greedy, vain

and confident than themselves. The wealth of these potentates was

colossal, but it was equalled by their social rivalry and consequent

need of money. A contest in elegance was being fought between the

Siceliot and the Italian.[267] The latter was the glass of fashion, and

the former attempted to rival, first his habits of domestic life and, as

a consequence, the economic methods which rendered these habits

possible. Here too, as in Italy, whole gangs of slaves were purchased

like cattle or sheep; some were weighed down with fetters, others ground

into subordination by the cruel severity of their tasks. All without

exception were branded, and men who had been free citizens in their

native towns, felt the touch of the burning iron and carried the stigma

of slavery to their graves.[268] Food was doled out in miserable

quantities,[269] for the shattered instrument could so easily be

replaced. On the fields one could see little but abject helplessness, a

misery that weakened while it tortured the soul. But in some parts of

Sicily bodily want was combined with a wild daring that was fostered by

the reckless owners, whose greed had overcome all sense of their own

security or that of their fellow-citizens. The treatment of pastoral

slaves which had been adopted by the Roman graziers was imitated

faithfully by the Italians and Siceliots of the island. These slaves

were turned loose with their flocks to find their food and clothing

where and how they could. The youngest and stoutest were chosen for this

hard, wild life: and their physical vigour was still further increased

by their exposure to every kind of weather, by their seldom finding or

needing the shelter of a roof, and by the milk and meat which formed

their staple food. A band of these men presented a terrifying aspect,

suggesting a scattered invasion of some warlike barbarian tribe. Their

bodies were clad in the skins of wolves and boars; slung at their sides

or poised in their hands were clubs, lances and long shepherds' staves.

Each squadron was followed by a pack of large and powerful hounds.

Strength, leisure, need, all suggested brigandage as an integral part of

their profession. At first they murdered the wayfarer who went alone or

with but one companion. Then their courage rose and they concerted

nightly attacks on the villas of the weaker residents. These villas they

stormed and plundered, slaying any one who attempted to bar their way.

As their impunity increased, Sicily became impracticable to travellers

by night, and residence in the country districts became a tempting of

providence. There was violence, brigandage or murder on every hand. The

governors of Sicily occasionally interposed, but they were almost

powerless to check the mischief. The influence of the slave-owners was

such that it was dangerous to inflict an adequate punishment.[270]

The proceedings of these militant shepherds must have opened the eyes of

the mass of the slaves to the possibilities of the position. Secret

meetings began to be held at which the word "revolt" was breathed. An

occasion, a leader, a divine sanction were for the moment lacking. The

first requisite would follow the other two, and these were soon found

combined in the person of Eunus. This man was a Syrian by birth, a

native of Apamea, and he served Antigenes of Enna. He was more than a

believer in the power of the gods to seize on men and make them the

channel of their will; he was a living witness to it in his own person.

At first he saw shadows of superhuman form and heard their voices in his

dreams. Then there were moments when he would be seized with a trance;

he was wrapt in contemplation of some divine being. Then the words of

prophecy would come; they were not his utterance but the bidding of the

great Syrian goddess. Sometimes the words were preceded by a strange

manifestation of supernatural power; smoke, sparks or flame would issue

from his open mouth.[271] The clairvoyance may have been a genuine

mental experience, the thaumaturgy the type of fiction which the best of

_media_ may be tempted to employ; but both won belief from his fellows,

eager for any light in the darkness, and a laughing acceptance from his

master, glad of a novelty that might amuse his leisure. As a matter of

fact, Eunus's predictions sometimes came true. People forgot (as people

will) the instances of their falsification, but applauded them heartily

when they were fulfilled. Eunus was a good enough _medium_ to figure at

a fashionable _seance_. His latest profession was the promise of a

kingdom to himself; it was the Syrian goddess who had held out the

golden prospect. The promise he declared boldly to his master, knowing

perhaps the spirit in which the message would be received. Antigenes was

delighted with his prophet king. He showed him at his own table, and

took him to the banquets given by his friends. There Eunus would be

questioned about his kingdom, and each of the guests would bespeak his

patronage and clemency. His answers as to his future conduct were given

without reserve. He promised a policy of mercy, and the quaint

earnestness of the imposture would dissolve the company in laughter.

Portions of food were handed him from the board, and the donors would

ask that he should remember their kindness when he came into his

kingdom. These were requests which Eunus did not forget.

With such an influence in its centre, Enna seemed destined to be the

spring of the revolt. But there was another reason which rendered it a

likely theatre for a deed of daring. The broad plateau on which the town

was set was thronged with shepherds in the winter season,[272] and some

of the great graziers of Enna owned herds of these bold and lawless men.

Conspicuous amongst these graziers for his wealth, his luxury and his

cruelty was one Damophilus, the man who had formulated the theory that

the shepherd slave should keep himself by robbing others. Damophilus was

a Siceliot, but none of the Roman magnates of the island could have

shown a grander state than that which he maintained. His finely bred

horses, his four-wheeled carriages, his bodyguard of slaves, his

beautiful boys, his crowd of parasites, were known all over the broad

acres and huge pasture lands which he controlled. His town house and

villas displayed chased silverwork, rich carpets of purple dye and a

table of royal elegance. He surpassed Roman luxury in the lavishness of

his expense, Roman pride in his sense of complete independence of

circumstance, and Roman niggardliness and cruelty in his treatment of

his slaves. Satiety had begotten a chronic callousness and even savagery

that showed itself, not merely in the now familiar use of the

_ergastulum_ and the brand, but in arbitrary and cruel punishments which

were part of the programme of almost every day. His wife Megallis,

hardened by the same influences, was the torment of her maidens and of

such domestics as were more immediately under her control. The servants

of this household had one conviction in common--that nothing worse than

their present evils could possibly be their lot.

This is the conviction that inspires acts of frenzy; but the madness of

these slaves was of the orderly, systematic and therefore dangerous

type. They would not act without a divine sanction to their whispered

plans. Some of them approached Eunus and asked him if their enterprise

was permitted by the gods. The prophet first produced the usual

manifestations which attested his inspiration and then replied that the

gods assented, if the plan were taken in hand forthwith. Enna was the

destined place; it was the natural stronghold of the whole island; it

was foredoomed to be the capital of the new race that would rule over

Sicily.[273] Heartened by the belief that Heaven was aiding their

efforts, the leaders then set to work. They secretly released such of

Damophilus's household as were in bonds; they gathered others together,

and soon a band to the number of about four hundred were mustered in a

field in the neighbourhood of Enna. There in the early hours of the

night they offered a sacrifice and swore their solemn compact. They had

gathered everything which could serve as a weapon, and when midnight was

approaching they were ready for the first attempt. They marched swiftly

to the sleeping town and broke its stillness with their cries of

exhortation. Eunus was at their head, fire streaming from his mouth

against the darkness of the night. The streets and houses were

immediately the scene of a pitiless massacre. The maddened slaves did

not even spare the children at the breast; they dragged them from their

mothers' arms and dashed them upon the ground. The women were the

victims of unspeakable insult and outrage.[274] Every slave had his own

wrongs to avenge, for the original assailants had now been joined by a

large number of the domestics of the town. Each of these wreaked his own

peculiar vengeance and then turned to take his share in the

general massacre.

Meanwhile Eunus and his immediate following had learnt news of the

arch-enemy Damophilus, He was known to be staying in his pleasance near

to the city. Thence he and his wife were fetched with every mark of

ignominy, and the unhappy pair were dragged into the town with their

hands bound behind their backs. The masters of the city now mustered in

the theatre for an act of justice; but Damophilus did not lose his wits

even when he scanned that sea of hostile faces and accusing eyes. He

attempted a defence and was listened to in silence--nay, with approval,

for many of his auditors were visibly stirred by his words. But some

bolder spirits were tired of the show or fearful of its issue. Hermeias

and Zeuxis, two of his bitterest enemies, shouted out that he was an

Impostor[275] and rushed upon him. One of the two thrust a sword through

his side, the other smote his head off with an axe. It was then the

women's turn. Megallis's female slaves were given the power to treat her

as they would. They first tortured her, then led her up to a high place

and dashed her to the ground. Eunus avenged his private wrongs by the

death of his own masters, Antigenes and Python. The scene in the theatre

had perhaps revealed more than the desire for a systematised revenge. It

may have shown that there was some sense of justice, of order in the

savage multitude. And indeed vengeance was not wholly indiscriminate.

Eunus concealed and sent secretly away the men who had given him meat

from their tables.[276] Even the whole house of Damophilus did not

perish. There was a daughter, a strange product of such a home, a maiden

with a pure simplicity of character and a heart that melted at the sight

of pain. She had been used to soothe the anguish of those who had been

scourged by her parents and to relieve the necessities of such as were

put in bonds. Hence the abounding love felt for her by the slaves, the

pity that thrilled them when her home was doomed. An escort was selected

to convey her in safety to some relatives at Catana. Its most devoted

member was Hermeias,[277] perhaps the very man whose hands were stained

by her father's blood.

The next step in the progress of the revolt was to form a political and

military organisation that might command the respect of the countless

slaves who were soon to break their bonds in the other districts of

Sicily. Eunus was elected king. His name became Antiochus, his subjects

were "Syrians." [278] It was not the first time that a slave had assumed

the diadem; for was it not being worn for the moment by Diodotus

surnamed Tryphon, the guardian and reputed murderer of Alexander of

Syria?[279] The elevation of Eunus to the throne was due to no belief in

his courage or his generalship. But he was the prophet of the movement,

the cause of its inception, and his very name was considered to be of

good omen for the harmony of his subjects. When he had bound the diadem

on his brow and adopted regal state, he elevated the woman who had been

his companion (a Syrian and an Apamean like himself) to the rank of

queen. He formed a council of such of his followers as were thought to

possess wits above the average, and he set himself to make Enna the

adequate centre of a lengthy war. He put to death all his captives in

Enna who had no skill in fashioning arms; the residue he put in bonds

and set to the task of forging weapons.

Eunus was no warrior, but he had the regal gift of recognising merit.

The soul of the military movement which spread from Enna was

Achaeus,[280] a man pre-eminent both in counsel and in action,[281] one

who did not permit his reason to be mastered by passion and whose anger

was chiefly kindled by the foolish atrocities committed by some of his

followers.[282] Under such a leader the cause rapidly advanced. The

original four hundred had swelled in three days to six thousand; it soon

became ten thousand. As Achaeus advanced, the _ergastula_ were broken

open and each of these prison-houses furnished a new multitude of

recruits.[283] Soon a vast addition to the available forces was effected

by a movement in another part of the island. In the territory of

Agrigentum one Cleon a Cilician suddenly arose as a leader of his

fellows. He was sprung from the regions about Mount Taurus and had been

habituated from his youth to a life of brigandage. In Sicily he was

supposed to be a herdsman of horses. He was also a highwayman who

commanded the roads and was believed to have committed murders of varied

types. When he heard of the success of Eunus, he deemed that the moment

had come for raising a revolt on his own account. He gathered a band of

followers, overwhelmed the city of Agrigentum and ravaged the

surrounding territory.[284]

The terrified Siceliots, and perhaps some of the slaves themselves,

believed that this dual movement might ruin the servile cause. There

were daily expectations that the armies of Eunus and Cleon would meet in

conflict. But such hopes or fears were disappointed. Cleon put himself

absolutely under the authority of Eunus and performed the functions of a

general to a king. The junction of the forces occurred about thirty days

after the outbreak at Enna, and the Cilician brought five thousand men

to the royal standard. The full complement of the slaves when first they

joined battle with the Roman power amounted to twenty thousand men;

before the close of the war their army numbered over sixty

thousand.[285]

The Roman government exhibited its usual slowness in realising the

gravity of the situation; yet it may be excused for believing that it

had only to deal with local tumults such as those which had been so

easily suppressed in Italy. The force of eight thousand men which it put

into the field under the praetor Lucius Hypsaeus may have seemed more

than sufficient. Yet it was routed by the insurgent army, now numbering

twenty thousand men, and in the skirmishes which followed the balance of

success inclined to the rebels. The immediate progress of the struggle

cannot be traced in any detail, but there is a general record of the

storming of Roman camps and the flight of Roman generals.[286]

The theatre of the war was certainly extending at an alarming rate. The

rebels had first controlled the centre and some part of the South

Western portion of the island, the region between Enna and Agrigentum;

but now they had pushed their conquests up to the East, had reached the

coast and had gained possession of Catana and Tauromenium.[287] The

devastation of the conquered districts is said to have been more

terrible than that which followed on the Punic War.[288] But for this

the slaves were not wholly, perhaps not mainly, responsible. The rebel

armies, looking to a settlement in the future when they should enjoy the

fruit of their victories, left the villas standing, their furniture and

stores uninjured, and did no harm to the implements of husbandry. It was

the free peasantry of Sicily that now showed a savage resentment at the

inequality of fortune and of life which severed them from the great

landholders. Under pretext of the servile war[289] they sallied out, and

not only plundered the goods of the conquered, but even set fire to

their villas.

The words of Eunus when, at the beginning of the revolt, he claimed Enna

as the metropolis of the new nation, and the conduct of his followers in

sparing the grandeur and comfort which had fallen into their hands, are

sufficient proofs that the revolted slaves, in spite of their possession

of the seaports of Catana and Tauromenium, had no intention of escaping

from Sicily. Perhaps even if they had willed it, such a course might

have been impossible. They had no fleet of their own; the Cilician

pirates off the coast might have refused to accept such dangerous

passengers and to imperil their reputation as honest members of the

slave trade. And, if the fugitives crossed the sea, what homes had they

to which they could return? To their own cities they were dead, and the

long arm of Rome stretched over her protectorates in the East.[290]

It was therefore with a power which intended a permanent settlement in

Sicily, that the Roman government had to cope. Its sense of the gravity

of the situation was seen in the despatch of consular armies. The first

under Caius Fulvius Flaccus seems to have effected little.[291] The

second under Lucius Calpurnius Piso, the consul of the following year,

laid siege to Enna,[292] and captured a stronghold of the rebels. Eight

thousand of the slaves were slain by the sword, all who could be seized

were nailed to the cross.[293] The crowning victories, and the nominal

pacification of the island, remained for Piso's successor, Publius

Rupilius. He drove the rebels into Tauromenium and sat down before the

city until they were reduced to unspeakable straits by famine. The town

was at length yielded through treachery; Sarapion a Syrian betrayed the

acropolis, and the Roman commander found a multitude of starving men at

his mercy, He was pitiless in his use of victory. The captives were

first tortured, then taken up to a high place and dashed downwards to

the ground. The consul then moved on Enna. The rebels defended their

last stronghold with the utmost courage and persistence. Achaeus seems

to have already fallen, but the brave Cilician leaders still held out

with all the native valour of their race. Cleon made a sortie from the

town and fought heroically until he fell covered with wounds. Cleon's

brother Coma[294] was captured during the siege and brought before

Rupilius, who questioned him about the strength and the plans of the

remaining fugitives. He asked for a moment to collect his thoughts,

covered his head with his cloak, and died of suffocation, in the hands

of his guard and in sight of the general, before a compromising word had

passed his lips. King Eunus was not made of such stern stuff. When Enna,

impregnable in its natural strength, had been taken by treachery, he

fled with his bodyguard of a thousand men to still more precipitous

regions. His companions, knowing that it was impossible to escape their

fate (for Rupilius was already moving) fell on each others swords. But

Eunus could not face this death. He took refuge in a cave, from which he

was dragged with the last poor relics of his splendid court--his cook,

his baker, his bath attendant and his buffoon. The Romans for some

reason spared his life, or at least did not doom him to immediate death.

He was kept a prisoner at Morgantia, where he died shortly afterwards

of disease.

It is said that by the date of the fall of Enna more than twenty

thousand slaves had perished.[295] Even without this slaughter, the

capture of their seaport and their armoury would have been sufficient to

break the back of the revolt.[296] It only remained to scour the country

with picked bands of soldiers for organised resistance to be shattered,

and even for the curse of brigandage to be rooted out for a while. Death

was no longer meted out indiscriminately to the rebels. Such of the

slave-owners as survived would probably have protested against wholesale

crucifixion, and the destruction of all of the fugitives would have

impaired the resources of Sicily. Thus many were spared the cross and

restored to their bonds.[297] The extent to which reorganisation was

needed before the province could resume its normal life, is shown by the

fact that the senate thought it worth while to give Sicily a new

provincial charter. Ten commissioners were sent to assist Rupilius in

the work, which henceforth bore the proconsul's name.[298] The work, as

we know it, was of a conservative character; but it is possible that no

complete charter had ever existed before, and the war may have revealed

defects in the arrangements of Sicily that had heretofore been

unsuspected.

A climax of the type of the servile war in Sicily was perhaps needed to

bring the social problem home to thinking men in Rome. Not that it by

any means sufficed for all who pondered on the public welfare or

laboured at the business of the State. The men who measured happiness by

wealth and empire might still have retained their unshaken confidence in

the Fortune of Rome. Had a Capys of this class arisen, he might have

given a thrilling picture of the immediate future of his city, dark but

grimly national in its emergence from trial to triumph. He might have

seen her conquering arms expanding to the Euphrates and the Rhine, and

undreamed sources of wealth pouring their streams into the treasury or

the coffers of the great. If there was blood in the picture, when had it

been absent from the annals of Rome? Even civil strife and a new Italian

war might be a hard but a necessary price to pay for a strong government

and a grand mission. If an antiquated constitution disappeared in the

course of this glorious expansion, where was the loss?

But there were men in Rome who measured human life by other canons: who

believed that the State existed for the individual at least as much as

the individual for the State: who, even when they were imperialists, saw

with terror the rotten foundations on which the empire rested, and with

indignation the miserable returns that had been made to the men who had

bought it with their blood. To them the brilliant present and the

glorious future were veiled by a screen that showed the ghastly spectres

of commercial imperialism. It showed luxury running riot amongst a

nobility already impoverished and ever more thievishly inclined, a

colossal capitalism clutching at the land and stretching out its

tentacles for every source of profitable trade, the middle class fleeing

from the country districts and ousted from their living in the towns,

and the fair island that was almost a part of their Italian home, its

garden and its granary, in the throes of a great slave war.

CHAPTER 2

A cause never lacks a champion, nor a great cause one whom it may render

great. Failure is in itself no sign of lack of spirit and ability, and

when a vast reform is the product of a mean personality, the individual

becomes glorified by identification with his work. From this point of

view it mattered little who undertook the task of the economic

regeneration of the Roman world. Any senator of respectable antecedents

and moderate ability, who had a stable following amongst the ruling

classes, might have succeeded where Tiberius Gracchus failed; it was a

task in which authority was of more importance than ability, and the

sense that the more numerous or powerful elements of society were united

in the demand for reform, of more value than individual genius or

honesty of purpose. This was the very circumstance that foreshadowed

failure, for the men of wide connections and established fame had shrunk

from an enterprise with which they sympathised in various degrees. In

the proximate history of the Republic there had been three men who

showed an unwavering belief in the Italian farmer and the blessings of

agriculture. These were M. Porcius Cato, P. Cornelius Scipio and Ti.

Sempronius Gracchus. But the influence of Cato's house had become

extinct with its first founder. The elder son, an amiable man and an

accomplished jurist, had not out-lived his father; the second still

survived, but seems to have inherited little of the fighting qualities

of the terrible censor. The traditions of a Roman house needed to be

sustained by the efforts of its existing representative, and the

"newness" of the Porcii might have necessitated generations of vigorous

leaders to make them a power in the land. Scipionic traditions were now

represented by Aemilianus, and the glow of the luminary was reflected in

paler lights, who received their lustre from moving in that charmed

orbit. One of these, the indefatigable henchman Laelius, had risen to

the rank of consul, and stimulated by the vigorous theorisings of his

hellenised environment, he contemplated for a moment the formation of a

plan which should deal with some of the worst evils of the agrarian

question. But he looked at the problem only to start back in affright.

The strength and truculency of the vested interests with which he would

have to deal were too much for a man whose nerve was weakened by

philosophy and experience, and Laelius by his retreat justified, if he

did not gain, the soubriquet which proclaimed his "sapience".[299] But

why was Scipio himself idle? The answer is to be found both in his

temperament and in his circumstances. With all his dash and energy, he

was something of a healthy hedonist. As the chase had delighted him in

his youth, so did war in his manhood. While hating its cruelties, he

gloried in its excitement, and the discipline of the camp was more to

his mind than the turbulence of an assembly. His mind, too, belonged to

that class which finds it almost impossible to emancipate itself from

traditional politics. His vast knowledge of the history of other

civilisations may have taught him, as it taught Polybius, that Rome was

successful because she was unique.[300] Here there was to be no break

with the past, no legislator posing as a demi-god, no obedience to the

cries of the masses who, if they once got loose, might turn and rend the

enlightened few, and reproduce on Italian soil the shocking scenes of

Greek socialistic enterprise. As things were, to be a reformer was to be

a partisan, and Scipio loved the prospect of his probable supporters as

little as that of his probable opponents. The fact of the Empire, too,

must have weighed heavily with a man who was no blind imperialist. Even

though economic reform might create an added efficiency in the army,

Scipio must have known, as Polybius certainly knew, that soldiers are

but pawns in the great game, and that the controlling forces were the

wisdom of the conservative senator, the ambition of the wealthy noble,

and the capital of the enterprising knight. The wisdom of disturbing

their influence, and awakening their resentment, could scarcely appeal

to a mind so perfectly balanced and practical as Scipio's.

Circumstances, too, must have had their share in determining his

quiescence. The Scipios had been a power in Rome in spite of the

nobility. They were used because they were needed, not because they were

loved, and the necessary man was never in much favour with the senate.

Although there was no tie of blood between Aemilianus and the elder

Scipio, they were much alike both in fortune and in temperament. They

had both been called upon to save military situations that were thought

desperate; their reputation had been made by successful war; and though

neither was a mere soldier, they lacked the taste and the patience for

the complicated political game, which alone made a man a power amidst

the noble circles and their immediate dependants at Rome.

But the last generation had seen in Tiberius Gracchus a man whose

political influence had been vast, a noble with but scant respect for

the indefeasible rights of the nobility and as stern as Cato in his

animadversions on the vices of his order, a man whose greatest successes

abroad had been those of diplomacy rather than of war, one who had

established firm connections and a living memory of himself both in West

and East, whose name was known and loved in Spain, Sardinia, Asia and

Egypt. It would have been too much to hope that this honest old

aristocrat would attempt to grapple with the evils which had first

become manifest during his own long lifetime; but it was not unnatural

that people should look to a son of his for succour, especially as this

son represented the blood of the Scipios as well as of the Gracchi. The

marriage of the elderly Gracchus with the young Cornelia had marked the

closing of the feud, personal rather than political, which had long

separated him from the elder Scipio: and a further link between the two

families was subsequently forged by the marriage of Sempronia, a

daughter of Cornelia, to Scipio Aemilianus. The young Tiberius Gracchus

may have been born during one of his father's frequent absences on the

service of the State.[301] Certainly the elder Gracchus could have seen

little of his son during the years of his infancy. But the closing years

of the old man's life seem to have been spent uninterruptedly in Italy,

and Tiberius must have been profoundly influenced by the genial and

stately presence that Rome loved and feared. But he was little more than

a boy when his father died, and the early influences that moulded his

future career seem to have been due mainly to his mother. Cornelia would

have been the typical Roman matron, had she lived a hundred years

earlier; she would then have trained sons for the battlefield, not for

the Forum. As it was, the softening influences of Greek culture had

tempered without impairing her strength of character, had substituted

rational for purely supernatural sanctions, and a wide political outlook

for a rude sense of civic duty. Herself the product of an education such

as ancient civilisations rarely bestowed upon their women, she wrote and

spoke with a purity and grace which led to the belief that her sons had

learnt from her lips and from her pen their first lessons in that

eloquence which swayed the masses and altered the fortunes of Rome.[302]

But her gifts had not impaired her tenderness. Her sons were her

"Jewels," and the successive loss of nine of the children which she had

borne to Gracchus must have made the three that remained doubly dear.

The two boys had a narrow escape from becoming Eastern princes: for the

hand of the widow Cornelia was sought in marriage by the King of

Egypt.[303] Such an alliance with the representative of the two houses

of the Gracchi and the Scipios might easily seem desirable to a

protected king, although the attractions of Cornelia may also have

influenced his choice. She, however, had no aspirations to share the

throne of the Lagidae, and the hellenism of Tiberius and of his younger

brother Caius, though deep and far-reaching, was of a kind less violent

than would have been gained by transportation to Alexandria. They were

trained in rhetoric by Diophanes an exile from Mitylene, and in

philosophy by Blossius of Cumae, a stoic of the school of Antipater of

Tarsus.[304] Many held the belief that Tiberius was spurred to his

political enterprise by the direct exhortation of these teachers; but,

even if their influence was not of this definite kind, there can be

little doubt that the teaching of the two Greeks exercised a powerful

influence on the political cast of his mind. Ideals of Greek liberty,

speeches of Greek statesmen who had come forward as champions of the

oppressed, stories of social ruin averted by the voice and hand of the

heaven-sent legislator, pictures of self-sacrifice and of resigned

submission to a standard of duty--these were lessons that may have been

taught both by rhetorician and philosopher. Nor was the teaching of

history different. In the literary environment in which the Gracchi

moved, ready answers were being given to the most vital questions of

politics and social science. Every one must have felt that the

approaching struggle had a dual aspect, that it was political as well as

social. For social conservatism was entrenched behind a political

rampart: and if reform, neglected by the senate, was to come from the

people, the question had first to be asked, Had the people a legal right

to initiate reform? The historians of that and of the preceding

generation would have answered this question unhesitatingly in the

affirmative. The _de facto_ sovereignty of the senate had not even

received a sanction in contemporary literature, while to that of the

immediate past it was equally unknown. The Roman annalists from the time

of the Second Punic War had revealed the sovereignty of the people as

the basis of the Roman constitution,[305] and the history of the long

struggle of the Plebs for freedom made the protection of the commons the

sole justification of the tribunate. From the lips of Polybius himself

Tiberius may have heard the impression which the Roman polity made on

the mind of the educated Greek: and the fact that this was a Greek

picture did not lessen its validity; for the Greek was moulding the

orthodox history of Rome, and the victims of his genius were the best

Roman intellects of the day. He might have learnt how in this mixed

constitution the people still retained their inalienable rights, how

they elected, ratified, and above all how they punished.[306] He might

have gathered that the identification of the tribunate with the

interests of the nobility was a perversion of its true and vital

function: that the tribune exists but to assist the commons and can be

subject to no authority but the people's will, whether expressed

directly by them or indirectly through his colleagues.[307] The history

of the Punic wars did indeed reveal, in the fate of a Varro or a

Minucius, how popular insubordination might be punished, when its end

was wrong. Polybius's own voice was raised in prophetic warning against

a possible demagogy of the future.[308] But that history showed the

healthy discipline of a healthy people--a people that had vanquished

genius through subordination, a peasant class whose loyalty and tenacity

were as great as those of its leaders, and without whom those leaders

would have been helpless. Where was such a class to be found now? Change

the subject or turn the page, and the Greek statesman and historian

could point to the dreadful reverse of this picture.[309] He could show

a Greek nation, gifted with political genius but doomed to political

decay--a nation whose sons accumulated money, lived in luxury with

little forethought for the future, and refused to beget children for the

State: a nation with a wealthy and cultured upper class, but one that

was literally perishing for the lack of men.[310] Was this the fate in

store for Rome? A temperament that was merely vigorous and keen might

not have been affected by such reflections. One that was merely

contemplative might have regarded them only as a subject for curious

study. But Tiberius's mind ran to neither of these two extremes. He was

a thoughtful and sensitive man of action. Sweet in temper, staid in

deportment, gentle in language, he attracted from his dependants a

loyalty that knew no limits, and from his friends a devotion that did

not even shrink from death on his behalf. Even in his pure and polished

oratory passion revealed itself chiefly in appeals to pity, not in the

harsher forms of invective or of scorn. His mode of life was simple and

restrained, but apparently with none of the pedantic austerity of the

stoic. In an age that was becoming dissolute and frivolous he was moral

and somewhat serious.[311] But his career is not that of the man who

burdens society with the impression that he has a solemn mission to

perform. Such men are rarely taken as seriously as they take themselves;

they do not win aged men of experience to support their cause; the

demeanour that wearies their friends is even likely to be found irksome

by the mob.

Roman society must have seen much promise in his youth, for honours came

early. A seat at the augural board was regarded as a tribute to his

merit rather than his birth;[312] and indeed the Roman aristocrats, who

dispensed such favours, were too clever to be the slaves of a name, when

political manipulation was in question and talent might be diverted to

the true cause. His marriage was a more important determinant in his

career. The bride who was offered him was the daughter of Appius

Claudius Pulcher, a man of consular and censorian rank and now Princeps

of the senate,[313] a clever representative of that brilliant and

eccentric house, that had always kept liberalism alive in Rome. Appius

had already displayed some of the restless individuality of his

ancestors. When the senate had refused him a triumph after a war with

the Salassi, he had celebrated the pageant at his own expense, while his

daughter, a vestal, walked beside the car to keep at bay the importunate

tribune who attempted to drag him off.[314] A similar unconventionality

was manifested in the present betrothal. The story runs that Appius

broached the question to Tiberius at an augural banquet. The proposition

was readily accepted, and Appius in his joy shouted out the news to his

wife as he entered his own front door. The lady was more surprised than

annoyed. "What need for all this haste," she said, "unless indeed you

have found Tiberius Gracchus for our girl?" [315] Appius, hasty as he

was, was probably in this case not the victim of a sudden inspiration.

The restless old man doubtless pined for reform; but he was weighed down

by years, honours and familiarity with the senate. He could not be the

protagonist in the coming struggle; but in Tiberius he saw the man of

the future.

The chances of the time favoured a military even more than a political

career; the chief spheres of influence were the province and the camp,

and it was in these that the earliest distinctions of Tiberius were won.

When a lad of fifteen he had followed his brother-in-law Scipio to

Africa, and had been the first to mount the walls of Carthage in the

vain assault on the fortress of Megara.[316] He had won the approval of

the commander by his discipline and courage, and left general regret

amongst the army when he quitted the camp before the close of the

campaign. But an experience as potent for the future as his first taste

of war, must have been those hours of leisure spent in Scipio's

tent.[317] If contact with the great commander aroused emulation, the

talk on political questions of Scipio and his circle must have inspired

profound reflection. Here he could find aspirations enough; all that was

lacking was a leader to translate them into deeds. The quaestorship, the

first round of the higher official ladder, found him attached to the

consul Mancinus and destined for the ever-turbulent province of Spain.

It was a fortunate chance, for here was the scene of his father's

military and diplomatic triumphs. But the sequel was unexpected. He had

gone to fulfil the duties of a subordinate; he suddenly found himself

performing those of a commander-in-chief or of an accredited

representative of the Roman people. The Numantines would treat only with

a Gracchus, and the treaty that saved Roman lives but not Roman honour

was felt to be really his work. In a moment he was involved in a

political question that agitated the whole of Rome. The Numantine treaty

was the topic of the day. Was it to be accepted or, if repudiated,

should the authors of the disaster, the causes of the breach of faith,

be surrendered in time-honoured fashion to the enemy as an expiation for

the violated pledge? On the first point there was little hesitation; the

senate decided for the nullity of the treaty, and it was likely that

this view would be accepted by the people, if the measures against the

ratifying officials were not made too stringent. For on this point there

was a difference of opinion. The poorer classes, whose sons and brothers

had been saved from death or captivity by the treaty, blamed Mancinus as

the cause of the disaster, but were grateful to Tiberius as the author

of the agreement. Others who had less to lose and could therefore afford

to stand on principle, would have enforced the fullest rigour of the

ancient rules and have delivered up the quaestor and tribunes with the

defaulting general.[318] It was thought that the influence of Scipio,

always great with the agricultural voters, might have availed to save

even Mancinus, nay that, if he would, he might have got the peace

confirmed.[319] But his efforts were believed to have been employed in

favour of Tiberius. The matter ended in an illogical compromise. The

treaty was repudiated, but it was decreed that the general alone should

be surrendered.[320] A breach in an ancient rule of religious law had

been made in favour of Tiberius.

But, in spite of this mark of popular favour, the experience had been

disheartening and its effect was disturbing. Although it is impossible

to subscribe to the opinion of later writers, who, looking at the matter

from a conservative and therefore unfavourable aspect, saw in this early

check the key to Tiberius's future action,[321] yet anger and fear leave

their trace even on the best regulated minds. The senate had torn up his

treaty and placed him for the moment in personal peril. It was to the

people that he owed his salvation. If circumstances were to develop an

opposition party in Rome, he was being pushed more and more into its

ranks. And a coolness seems to have sprung up at this time between him

and the man who had been his great _exemplar_. Tiberius took no counsel

of Scipio before embarking on his great enterprise; support and advice

were sought elsewhere. He may have already tested Scipio's lack of

sympathy with an active propaganda; shame might have kept back the hint

of a plan that might seem to imply a claim to leadership. But it is

possible that there was some feeling of resentment against the warrior

now before Numantia, who had done nothing to save the last Numantine

treaty and the honour of the name of Gracchus.

His reticence could scarcely have been due to ignorance of his own

designs; for his brother Caius left it on record that it was while

journeying northward from Rome on his way to Numantia that Tiberius's

eyes were first fully opened to the magnitude of the malady that cried

aloud for cure.[322] It was in Etruria, the paradise of the capitalist,

that he saw everywhere the imported slave and the barbarian who had

replaced the freeman. It was this sight that first suggested something

like a definite scheme. A further stimulus was soon to be found in

scraps of anonymous writing which appeared on porches, walls and

monuments, praying for his succour and entreating that the public land

should be recovered for the poor.[323] The voiceless Roman people was

seeking its only mode of utterance, a tribune who should be what the

tribune had been of old, the servant of the many not the creature of the

few. To Gracchus's mother his plans could hardly have been veiled. She

is even said to have stimulated a vague craving for action by the

playful remark that she was still known as the mother-in-law of Scipio,

not as the mother of the Gracchi.[324]

But there was need of serious counsel. Gracchus did not mean to be a

mere demagogue, coming before the people with a half-formed plan and

stirring up an agitation which could end merely in some idle resolution.

There were few to whom he could look for advice, but those few were of

the best. Three venerable men, whose deeds and standing were even

greater than their names, were ready with their support. There was the

chief pontiff, P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, the man who was said to

combine in a supreme degree the four great blessings of wealth, birth,

eloquence and legal lore;[325] there was the brother of Crassus, P.

Mucius Scaevola,[326] the greatest lawyer of his age and already

destined to the consulship for the following year; lastly there was

Tiberius's father-in-law, the restless Appius, now eagerly awaiting the

fulfilment of a cherished scheme by the man of his own choice.[327]

Thus fortified, Tiberius Gracchus entered on his tribunate, and

formulated the measure which was to leave large portions of the public

domain open for distribution to the poor. In the popular gatherings with

which he opened his campaign, he dwelt on the nature of the evils which

he proposed to remedy. It was the interest of Italy, not merely of the

Roman proletariate, that was at stake.[328] He pointed out how the

Italian peasantry had dwindled in numbers, and how that portion of it

which still survived had been reduced to a poverty that was irremediable

by their own efforts. He showed that the slave gangs which worked the

vast estates were a menace, not a help, to Rome. They could not be

enlisted for service in the legions; their disaffection to their masters

was notorious; their danger was being proved even now by the horrible

condition of Sicily, the fate of its slave-owning landlords, the long,

difficult and eventful war which had not even yet been brought to a

close.[329] Sometimes the language of passion replaced that of reason in

his harangues to the crowds that pressed round the Rostra. "The beasts

that prowl about Italy have holes and lurking-places where they may make

their beds. You who fight and die for Italy enjoy but the blessings of

air and light. These alone are your heritage. Homeless, unsettled, you

wander to and fro with your wives and children. Our generals are in the

habit of inspiring their soldiers to the combat by exhorting them to

repel the enemy in defence of their tombs and ancestral shrines. The

appeal is idle and false. You cannot point to a paternal altar, you have

no ancestral tomb. No! you fight and die to give wealth and luxury to

others. You are called the masters of the world; yet there is no clod of

earth that you can call your own." [330]

The proposal, which was ushered in by these stirring appeals, seemed at

first sight to be of a moderate and somewhat conservative character. It

professed to be the renewal of an older law, which had limited the

amount of domain land which an individual might possess to five hundred

_jugera_;[331] it professed, that is, to reinforce an injunction which

had been persistently disobeyed, for this enactment restricting

possession had never been repealed. The extent to which a proposal of

this kind is a re-enactment, in the spirit as well as in the letter,

depends entirely on the length of time which has elapsed since the

original proposal has begun to be violated. A political society, which

recognises custom as one of the bases of law, must recognise desuetude

as equally valid. A law, which has not been enforced for centuries,

would, by the common consent of the courts of such nations as favour

progressive legislation, be regarded as no law at all. Again, the age of

an ordinance determines its suitability to present conditions. It may be

justifiable to revive an enactment that is centuries old; but the

revival should not necessarily dignify itself with that name. It must be

regarded as a new departure, unless the circumstances of the old and the

new enactment can be proved to be approximately the same. Our attempts

to judge the Gracchan law by these considerations are baffled by our

ignorance of the real date of the previous enactment, the stringency of

whose measures he wished to renew. If it was the Licinian law of the

middle of the fourth century,[332] this law must have been renewed, or

must still have continued to be observed, at a period not very long

anterior to the Gracchan proposal; for Cato could point his argument

against the declaration of war with Rhodes by an appeal to a provision

attributed to this measure[333]--an appeal which would have been

pointless, had the provision fallen into that oblivion which persistent

neglect of an enactment must bring to all but the professed students of

law. We can at least assert that the charge against Gracchus of reviving

an enactment so hoary with age as to be absurdly obsolete, is not one of

the charges to be found even in those literary records which were most

unfriendly to his legislation.[334]

The general principle of the measure was, therefore, the limitation to

five hundred _jugera_ of the amount of public land that could be

"possessed" by an individual. The very definition of the tenure

immediately exempted large portions of the State's domain from the

operation of this rule.[335] The Campanian land was leased by the State

to individuals, not merely possessed by them as the result of an

occupation permitted by the government; it, therefore, fell outside the

scope of the measure;[336] but, as it was technically public land and

its ownership was vested in the State, it would have been hazardous to

presume its exemption; it seems, therefore, to have been specifically

excluded from the operation of the bill, and a similar exception was

probably made in favour of many other tracts of territory held under a

similar tenure.[337] Either Gracchus declined to touch any interest that

could properly describe itself as "vested," even though it took merely

the form of a leasehold, or he valued the secure and abundant revenue

which flowed into the coffers of the State from these domains. There

were other lands strictly "public" where the claim of the holders was

still stronger, and where dispossession without the fullest compensation

must have been regarded as mere robbery. We know from later legislation

that respect was had to such lands as the Trientabula, estates which had

been granted by the Roman government at a quit rent to its creditors, as

security for that portion of a national debt which had never been

repaid. It is less certain what happened in the case of lands of which

the usufruct alone had been granted to communities of Roman citizens or

Latin colonists. Ownership in this case still remained vested in the

Roman people, and if the right of usufruct had been granted by law, it

could be removed by law. In the case of Latin communities, however, it

was probably guaranteed by treaty, which no mere law could touch: and so

similar were the conditions of Roman and Latin communities in this

particular, that it is probable that the land whose use was conferred on

whole communities by these ancient grants, was wholly spared by the

Gracchan legislation. In the case of those commons which were possessed

by groups of villagers for the purposes of pasturage (_ager

compascuus_),[338] it is not likely that the group was regarded as the

unit: and therefore, even in the case of such an aggregate possessing

over five hundred _jugera_, their occupation was probably left

undisturbed.

All other possessors must vacate the land which exceeded the prescribed

limit. Such an ordinance would have been harsh, had no compensation been

allowed, and Gracchus proposed certain amends for the loss sustained. In

the first place, the five hundred _jugera_ retained by each possessor

were to be increased by half as much again for each son that he might

possess: although it seems that the amount retained was not to exceed

one thousand _jugera_.[339] Secondly, the land so secured to existing

possessors was not to be held on a merely precarious tenure, and was not

to be burdened by the payment of dues to the State; even if ownership

was not vested in its holders, they were guaranteed gratuitous

undisturbed possession in perpetuity.[340] Thirdly, the bill as

originally drafted even suggested some monetary compensation for the

land surrendered.[341] This compensation was probably based on a

valuation of stock, buildings, and recent permanent improvements, which

were to be found on the territory now reverting to the State. It must

have applied for the most part only to arable land, and practically

amounted to a purchase by the State of items to which it could lay no

legal claim; for it was the soil alone, not the buildings on the soil,

over which its lordship could properly be asserted.

The object of reclaiming the public land was its future distribution

amongst needy citizens. This distribution might have taken either of two

forms. Fresh colonies might have been planted, or the acquired land

might merely be assigned to settlers who were to belong to the existing

political organisations. It was the latter method of simple assignation

that Gracchus chose. There was felt to be no particular need for new

political creations; for the pacification of Italy seemed to be

accomplished, and the new farming class would perform their duty to the

State equally well as members of the territory of Rome or of that of the

existing municipia and coloniae of Roman citizens. There is some

evidence that the new proprietors were not all to be attached to the

city of Rome itself, but that many, perhaps most, were to be attributed

to the existing colonies and municipia, in the neighbourhood of which

their allotments lay.[342] The size of the new allotments which Gracchus

projected is not known; it probably varied with the needs and status of

the occupier, perhaps with the quality of the land, and there is some

indication that the maximum was fixed at thirty _jugera_.[343] This is

an amount that compares favourably with the two, three, seven or ten

_jugera_ of similar assignments in earlier times, and is at once a proof

of the decrease in the value of land--a decrease which had contributed

to the formation of the large estates--and of the large amount of

territory which was expected to be reclaimed by the provisions of the

new measure. The allotments thus assigned were not, however, to be the

freehold property of their recipients. They were, indeed, heritable and

to be held on a perfectly secure tenure by the assignees and their

descendants; but a revenue was to be paid to the State for their use:

and they were to be inalienable--the latter provision being a desperate

expedient to check the land-hunger of the capitalist, and to save the

new settlers from obedience to the economic tendencies of the

times.[344]

It is doubtful whether the social object of Gracchus could have been

fully accomplished, had he confined his attention wholly to the existing

citizens of Rome. The area of economic distress was wider than the

citizen body, and it was the salvation of Italy as a whole that Gracchus

had at heart.[345] There is much reason for supposing that some of the

Italian allies were to be recipients of the benefits of the

measure.[346] In earlier assignations the Latins had not been excluded,

and it is probable that at least these, whether members of old

communities or of colonies, were intended to have some share in the

distribution. There could be no legal hindrance to such participation.

With respect to rights in land, the Latins were already on a level with

Roman citizens, and their exclusion from the new allotments would have

been due to a mere political prejudice which is not characteristic

either of Gracchus or his plans.

The ineffectiveness of laws at Rome was due chiefly to the apathy of the

executive authority. Gracchus saw clearly that his measure would, like

other social efforts of the past, become a mere pious resolution, if its

execution were entrusted to the ordinary officials of the State.[347]

But a special commission, which should effectually carry out the work

which he contemplated, must be of a very unusual kind. The magnitude of

the task, and the impossibility of assigning any precise limit of time

to its completion, made it essential that the Triumvirate which he

established should bear the appearance of a regular but extraordinary

magistracy of the State. The three commissioners created by the bill

were to be elected annually by the Comitia of the Tribes.[348]

Re-election of the same individuals was possible, and the new magistracy

was to come to an end only with the completion of its work. Its

occupants, perhaps, possessed the Imperium from the date of the first

institution of the office; they certainly exercised it from the moment

when, as we shall see, their functions of assignment were supplemented

by the addition of judicial powers. Gracchus was doubtless led to this

new creation purely by the needs of his measure; but he showed to later

politicians the possibility of creating a new and powerful magistracy

under the guise of an agrarian law.

Such was the measure that seemed to its proposer a reasonable and

equitable means of remedying a grave injustice and restoring rather than

giving rights to the poor. He might, if he would, have insisted on

simple restitution. Had he pressed the letter of the law, not an atom of

the public domain need have been left to its present occupiers. The

possessor had no rights against the State; he held on sufferance, and

technically he might be supposed to be always waiting for his summons to

ejectment. To give such people something over and above the limit that

the laws had so long prescribed, to give them further a security of

tenure for the land retained which amounted almost to complete

ownership--were not these unexpected concessions that should be received

with gratitude? And even up to the eve of the polling the murmurs of the

opposition were sometimes met by appeals to its nobler sentiments. The

rich, said Gracchus, if they had the interests of Italy, its future

hopes and its unborn generations at heart, should make this land a free

gift to the State; they were vexing themselves about small issues and

refusing to face the greater problems of the day.[349]

But personal interests can never seem small, and the average man is more

concerned with the present than with the future. The opposition was

growing in volume day by day, and the murmurs were rising into shrieks.

The class immediately threatened must have been numerically small; but

they made up in combination and influence what they lacked in numbers.

It was always easy to startle the solid commercial world of Rome by the

cry of "confiscation". A movement in this direction might have no

limits; the socialistic device of a "re-division of land," which had so

often thrown the Greek commonwealths into a ferment, was being imported

into Roman politics. All the forces of respectability should be allied

against this sinister innovation. It is probable that many who

propagated these views honestly believed that they exactly fitted the

facts of the case. The possessors did indeed know that they were not

owners. They were reminded of the fact whenever they purchased the right

of occupation from a previous possessor, for such a title could not pass

by mancipation; or whenever they sued for the recovery of an estate from

which they had been ejected, for they could not make the plea before the

praetor that the land was theirs "according to the right of the

Quirites," but could rely only on the equitable assistance of the

magistrate tendered through the use of the possessory interdicts; or,

more frequently still, whenever they paid their dues to the Publicanus,

that disinterested middle-man, who had no object in compromising with

the possessors, and could seldom have allowed an acre of land to escape

his watchful eye. But, in spite of these reminders, there was an

impression that the tenure was perfectly secure, and that the State

would never again re-assert its lordship in the extreme form of

dispensing entirely with its clients. Gracchus might talk of

compensation, but was there any guarantee that it would be adequate,

and, even supposing material compensation to be possible, what solace

was that to outraged feelings? Ancestral homes, and even ancestral

tombs, were not grouped on one part of a domain, so that they could be

saved by an owner when he retained his five hundred _jugera_; they were

scattered all over the broad acres. Estates that technically belonged to

a single man, and were therefore subject to the operation of the law,

had practically ceased to confer any benefit on the owner, and were

pledged to other purposes. They had been divided as the _peculia_ of his

sons, they had been promised as the dowry of his daughters. Again those

former laws may have rightly forbidden the occupation of more than a

certain proportion of land; but much of the soil now in possession had

not been occupied by its present inhabitant; he had bought the right to

be there in hard cash from the former tenant. And think of the invested

capital! Dowries had been swallowed up in the soil, and the Gracchan law

was confiscating personal as well as real property, taking the wife's

fortune as well as the husband's. Nay, if the history of the public land

were traced, could it not be shown that such value as it now possessed

had been given it by its occupiers or their ancestors? The land was not

assigned in early times, simply because it was not worth assignation. It

was land that had been reclaimed for use, and of this use the authors of

its value were now to be deprived.[350]

Such was the plaint of the land-holders, one not devoid of equity and,

therefore, awakening a response in the minds of timid and sober business

men, who were as yet unaffected by the danger. But some of these found

their own personal interests at stake. So good had the tenure seemed,

that it had been accepted as security for debt,[351] and the Gracchan

attack united for once the usually hostile ranks of mortgagers and

mortgagees. The alarm spread from Rome to the outlying municipalities.

[352] Even in the city itself a very imperfect view of the scope of the

bill was probably taken by the proletariate. We may imagine the

distorted form in which it reached the ears of the occupants of the

country towns. "Was it true that the land which had been given them in

usufruct was to be taken away?" was the type of question asked in the

municipia and in the colonies, whether Roman or Latin. The needier

members of these towns received the news with very different feelings.

They had every chance of sharing in the local division of the spoils,

and their voices swelled the chorus of approval with which the poorer

classes everywhere received the Gracchan law. Amidst this proletariate

certain catch-words--well-remembered fragments of Gracchus's speeches--

had begun to be the familiar currency of the day. "The numberless

campaigns through which this land has been won," "The iniquity of

exclusion from what is really the property of the State," "The disgrace

of employing the treacherous slave in place of the free-born citizen"--

such was the type of remark with which the Roman working-man or idler

now entertained his fellow. All Roman Italy was in a blaze, and there

must have been a sense of insecurity and anxiety even in those allied

towns whose interest in Roman domain-land was remote. Might not State

interests be as lightly violated as individual interests by a sovereign

people: and was not the example of Rome almost as perilous as her action?

The opponents of Gracchus had no illusions as to the numerical strength

which he could summon to his aid. If the battle were fought to a finish

in the Comitia, there could be no doubt as to his triumphant victory.

Open opposition could serve no purpose except to show what a remnant it

was that was opposing the people's wishes. But there was a means of at

least delaying the danger, of staving off the attack as long as Gracchus

remained tribune, perhaps of giving the people an opportunity of

recovering completely from their delirium. When the college of tribunes

moved as a united body, its force was irresistible; but now, as often

before, there was some division in its ranks. It was not likely that ten

men, drawn from the order of the nobility, should view with equal favour

such a radical proposal as that of Tiberius Gracchus. But the popular

feeling was so strong that for a time even the unsympathetic members of

the board hesitated to protest, and no colleague of Tiberius is known to

have opposed the movement in its initial stages. Even the man who was

subsequently won over to the capitalist interest hesitated long before

taking the formidable step: It was believed, however, that the hesitancy

of Marcus Octavius was due more to his personal regard for Tiberius than

to respect for the people's wishes.[353] The tribune who was to scotch

the obnoxious measure was an excellent instrument for a dignified

opposition. He was grave and discreet, a personal friend and intimate of

Tiberius.[354] It is true that he was a large holder on the public

domain, and that he would suffer by the operation of the new agrarian

law. But it was fitting that the landlord class should be represented by

a landlord, and, if there had been the least suspicion of sordid

motives, it would have been removed by Octavius's refusal to accept

private compensation for himself from the slender means of Tiberius

Gracchus.[355] The offer itself reads like an insult, but it was

probably made in a moment of passionate and unreflecting fervour.

Neither the profferer nor the refuser could have regarded it in the

light of a bribe. Even when the veto had been pronounced, the daily

contest between the two tribunes in the Forum never became a scene of

unseemly recrimination. The war of words revolved round the question of

principle. Both disputants were at white heat; yet not a word was said

by either which conveyed a reflection on character or motive.[356]

These debates followed the first abortive meeting of the Assembly. As

the decisive moment approached, streams of country folk had poured into

Rome to register their votes in favour of the measure.[357] The Contio

had given way to the Comitia, the people had been ready to divide, and

Gracchus had ordered his scribe to read aloud the words of the bill.

Octavius had bidden the scribe to be silent;[358] the vast meeting had

melted away, and all the labours of the reformer seemed to have been in

vain. To accept a temporary defeat under such circumstances was in

accordance with the constitutional spirit of the times. The veto was a

mode of encouraging reflection; it might yield to a prolonged campaign,

but it was regarded as a barrier against a hasty popular impulse which,

if unchecked, might prove ruinous to some portion of the community.

Gracchus, however, knew perfectly well that it was now being used in the

interest of a small minority, and he held the rights which it protected

to be non-existent; he believed the question of agrarian reform to be

bound up with his own personality, and its postponement to be equivalent

to its extinction; he had no intention of allowing his own political

life to be a failure, and, instead of discarding his weapons of attack,

he made them more formidable than before. Perhaps in obedience to

popular outcries, he redrafted his bill in a form which rendered it more

drastic and less equitable.[359] It is possible that some of the

_douceurs_ given to the possessors by his original proposal were not

really in accordance with his own judgment. They were meant to disarm

opposition. Now that opposition had not been disarmed, they could be

removed without danger. The stricter measure had the same chance of

success or failure as the less severe. We do not know the nature of the

changes which were now introduced; but it is possible that the pecuniary

compensation offered for improvements on the land to be resumed was

either abolished or rendered less adequate than before.

But even the form of the law was unimportant in comparison with the

question of the method by which the new opposition was to be met. The

veto, if persisted in by Octavius, would suspend the agrarian measure

during the whole of Tiberius's year of office. It could only be

countered by a device which would make government so impossible that the

opposition would be forced to come to terms. The means were to be found

in the prohibitive power of the tribunes, that right, which flowed from

their _major potestas_, of forbidding under threat of penalties the

action of all other magistrates. It was now rarely used except at the

bidding of the senate and for certain specified purposes. It had become,

in fact, little more than the means of enforcing obedience to a

temporary suspension of business life decreed by the government. But

recent events suggested a train of associations that brought back to

mind the great political struggles of the past, and recalled the mode in

which Licinius and Sextius had for five years sustained their anarchical

edict for the purpose of the emancipation of the Plebs. The difference

between the conditions of life in primitive Rome and in the cosmopolitan

capital of to-day did not appeal to Tiberius. The Justitium was as

legitimate a method of political warfare as the Intercessio. He issued

an edict which forbade all the other magistracies to perform their

official functions until the voting on the agrarian law should be

carried through; he placed his own seals on the doors of the temple of

Saturn to prevent the quaestors from making payments to the treasury or

withdrawing money from it; he forbade the praetors to sit in the courts

of justice and announced that he would exact a fine from those who

disobeyed. The magistrates obeyed the edict, and most of the active life

of the State was in suspense.[360] The fact of their obedience showed

the overwhelming power which Tiberius now had behind him; for an

ill-supported tribune, who adopted such an obsolete method of warfare,

would have been unable to enforce his decrees and would merely have

appeared ridiculous. The opponents of the law were now genuinely

alarmed. Those who would be the chief sufferers put on garments of

mourning, and paced the silent Forum with gloom and despair written on

their faces, as though they were the innocent victims of a great wrong.

But, while they took this overt means of stirring the commiseration of

the crowd, it was whispered that the last treacherous device for

averting the danger was being tried. The cause would perish with the

demagogue, and Tiberius might be secretly removed. Confidence in this

view was strengthened when it was known that the tribune carried a

dagger concealed about his person.[361]

An attempt was now made to discover whether the pressure had been

sufficient and whether the veto would be repeated. Gracchus again

summoned the assembly, the reading of the bill was again commenced and

again stopped at the instance of Octavius.[362] This second

disappointment nearly led to open riot. The vast crowd did not

immediately disperse; it felt its great physical strength and the utter

weakness of the regular organs of government. There were ominous signs

of an appeal to force, when two men of consular rank, Manlius and

Fulvius,[363] intervened as peacemakers. They threw themselves at the

feet of Tiberius, they clasped his hands, they besought him with tears

to pause before he committed himself to an act of violence. Tiberius was

not insensible to the appeal. The immediate future was dark enough, and

the entreaties of these revered men had saved an awkward situation. He

asked them what they held that he should do. They answered that they

were not equal to advise on a matter of such vast import; but that there

was the senate. Why not submit the whole matter to the judgment of the

great council of the State? Tiberius's own attitude to this proposal may

have been influenced by the fact that it was addressed to his colleagues

as well as to himself,[364] and that they apparently thought it a

reasonable means of relieving the present situation. It is difficult to

believe that the man who had never taken the senate into his confidence

over so vital a matter as the agrarian law, could have had much hope of

its sympathy now. But his conviction of the inherent reasonableness of

his proposal,[365] of his own power of stating the case convincingly,

and his knowledge that the senate usually did yield at a crisis, that

its government was only possible because it consistently kept its finger

on the pulse of popular opinion, may have directed his acceptance of its

advice. Immediate resort was had to the Curia. The business of the house

must have been immediately suspended to listen to a statement of the

merits of the agrarian measure, and to a description of the political

situation which it had created. When the debate began, it was obvious

that there was nothing but humiliation in store for the leaders of the

popular movement. The capitalist class was represented by an

overwhelming majority; carping protests and riddling criticism were

heard on every side, and Tiberius probably had never been told so many

home truths in his life. It was useless to prolong the discussion, and

Tiberius was glad to get into the open air of the Forum again. He had

formed his resolution, and now made a proposal which, if carried

through, might remove the deadlock by means that might be construed as

legitimate. The new device was nothing less than the removal of his

colleague Octavius from office. He announced that at the next meeting of

the Assembly two questions would be put before the Plebs, the acceptance

of the law and the continuance by Octavius of his tenure of the

tribunate.[366] The latter question was to be raised on the general

issue whether a tribune who acted contrary to the interests of the

people was to continue in office. At the appointed time[367] Octavius's

constancy was again tested, and he again stood firm. Tiberius broke out

into one of his emotional outbursts, seizing his colleague's hands,

entreating him to do this great favour to the people, reminding him that

their claims were just, were nothing in proportion to their toils and

dangers. When this appeal had been rejected, Tiberius summed up the

impossibility of the situation in terms which contained a condemnation

of the whole growth and structure of the Roman constitution. It was not

in human power, he said, to prevent open war between magistrates of

equal authority who were at variance on the gravest matters of

state;[368] the only way which he saw of securing peace was the

deposition of one of them from office. He did not care in the present

instance which it was. The people would be the arbiter. Let his own

deposition be proposed by Octavius; he would walk quietly away into a

private station, if this were the will of the citizens. The man who

spoke thus had more completely emancipated himself from Roman formulae

than any Roman of the past. To Octavius it must have seemed a mere

outburst of Greek demagogism. The offer too was an eminently safe one to

make under the circumstances. On no grounds could it be accepted. At

this point the proceedings were adjourned to allow Octavius time for

deliberation.

On the following day Gracchus announced that the question of deposition

would be taken first, and a fresh and equally vain appeal was made to

the feelings of the unshaken Octavius.[369] The question was then put,

not as a vague and general resolution, but as a determinate motion that

Octavius be deprived of the tribunate. The thirty-five tribes voted, and

when the votes of seventeen had been handed up and proclaimed,[370] and

the voice of but one was Lacking to make Octavius a private citizen,

Tiberius as the presiding tribune stopped for a moment the machinery of

the election. He again showed himself as a revolutionist unfortunate in

the possession of a political and personal conscience. The people were

witnessing a more passionate scene than ever, one that may appear as the

last effort of reconciliation between the two social forces that were to

meet in terrible conflict. Gracchus's arms were round his opponent's

neck; broken appeals fell from his lips--the old one that he should not

break the heart of the people: the new one that he should not cause his

own degradation, and leave a bitter memory in the mind of the author of

his fall. Observers saw that Octavius's heart was touched; his eyes were

filled with tears, and for some time he kept a troubled silence. But he

soon remembered his duty and his pledge. Tiberius might do with him what

he would. Gracchus called the gods to witness that he would willingly

have saved his colleague from dishonour, and ordered the resumption of

the announcement of the votes. The bill became law and Octavius was

stripped of his office. It was probably because he declined to recognise

the legality of the act that he still lingered on the Rostra. One of the

tribunician _viatores_, a freedman of Gracchus, was commanded to fetch

him down. When he reached the ground, a rush was made at him by the mob;

but his supporters rallied round him, and Tiberius himself rushed from

the Rostra to prevent the act of violence. Soon he was lost in the crowd

and hurried unobserved from the tumult.[371] His place in the

tribunician college was filled up by the immediate election of one

Quintus Mummius.[372]

The members of the assembly that deposed Octavius may have been the

spectators and authors of a new precedent in Roman history, one that was

often followed in the closing years of the Republic, but one that may

have received no direct sanction from the records of the past. The

abrogation of the imperium of a proconsul had indeed been known,[373]

but the deposition of a city magistrate during his year of office seems

to have been a hitherto untried experiment. We cannot on this ground

alone pronounce it to have been illegal; for an act never attempted

before may have perfect legal validity, as the first occasion on which a

legitimate deduction has been made from admitted principles of the

constitution. It had always been allowed that under certain

circumstances (chiefly the neglect of the proper formalities of

election) a magistrate might be invited to abdicate his office; but the

fact of this invitation is itself an evidence for the absence of any

legal power of suspension. Tradition, however, often supplemented the

defects of historical evidence, and one, perhaps the older, tale of the

removal of the first consul Collatinus stated that it was effected by a

popular measure introduced by his colleague.[374] This story was a

fragment of that tradition of popular sovereignty which animated the

historical literature of the age of the Gracchi: and one deduction from

that theory may well have seemed to be that the sovereign people could

change its ministers as it pleased. It was a deduction, however, that

was not drawn even in the best period of democratic Athens; it ran

wholly counter to the Roman conception of the magistracy as an authority

co-ordinate with the people and one that, if not divinely appointed,

received at least something of a sacred character from the fact of

investiture with office. Even the prosecution of a magistrate for the

gravest crime, although technically permissible during his year of

office, had as a rule been relegated to the time when he again became a

private citizen; the tribunician college, in particular, had generally

thrown its protecting shield around its offending members, and had thus

sustained its own dignity and that of the people. But, even if it be

supposed that the sovereign could, at any moment and without any of the

due formalities, proclaim itself a competent court of justice, and even

though removal from office might be improperly represented as a

punishment, there was the question of the offence to be considered. No

crime known to the law had been charged against Octavius. In the

exercise of his admitted right, or, as he might have expressed it, of

his sacred duty, he had offended against the will of a majority. The

analogy of the criminal law was from this point of view hopeless, and

was therefore not pressed on this occasion. From another point of view

it was not quite so remote. The tumultuous popular assemblages that had,

on the bidding of a prosecuting tribune, often condemned commanders for

vague offences hardly formulated in any particular law, scarcely

differed, except in the fact that no previous magisterial inquiry had

been conducted, from the meeting that deposed Octavius. The gulf that

lies between proceedings in a parliament and proceedings in a court of

law, was far less in Rome than it would have been in those Hellenic

communities that possessed a developed system of criminal judicature.

If criminal analogies failed, a purely political ground of defence must

be adduced. This could hardly be based on considerations of abstract

justice, although, as we shall see, an attempt was made by Tiberius

Gracchus to give it even this foundation. Could it be based on

convenience? Obviously, as Gracchus saw, his act was the only effective

means of removing a deadlock created by a constitution which knew only

magistrates and people and had effectively crippled both. So far, it

might be defended on grounds of temporary necessity. But an act of this

kind could not die. To what consequences might not its repetition lead?

Imagine a less serious question, a less representative assembly. Think

of the possibility of a few hundred desperate members of the

proletariate gathering on the Capitoline hill and deposing a tribune who

represented the interests of the vast outlying population of Rome. This

is a consequence which, it is true, was not realised in the future. But

that was only because the tribunate was more than Gracchus conceived it,

and was too strong in tradition and associations of sanctity to be

broken even by his attack. The scruples which troubled him most arose

from the suspicion that the sacred office itself might have been held to

suffer by the deposition of Octavius, and it was to a repudiation of

this view that he subsequently devoted the larger part of his systematic

defence of his action.

At the same meeting at which Octavius was deposed, the agrarian bill was

for the first time read without interruption to the people and

immediately became law. Shortly after, the election of the commissioners

was proceeded with and resulted in the appointment of Tiberius Gracchus

himself, of his father-in-law Appius Claudius and of Gracchus's younger

brother Caius.[375] It was perhaps natural that the people should pin

their faith on the family of their champion; but it could hardly have

increased the confidence of the community as a whole in the wisdom with

which this delicate task would be executed, to find that it was

entrusted to a family party, one of which was a mere boy; and the

mistrust must have been increased when, somewhat later in the course of

the year, the thorny questions which immediately encompassed the task of

distribution led to the introduction by Tiberius of another law, which

gave judicial power to the triumvirs, for the purpose of determining

what was public land and what was private.[376] The fortunes of the

richer classes seemed now to be entrusted to one man, who combined in

his own person the tribunician power and the imperium, whose

jurisdiction must have seriously infringed that of the regular courts,

and who was assisted in issuing his probably inappellable decrees by a

father-in-law and a younger brother. But, although effective protest was

impossible, the senate showed its resentment by acts that might appear

petty and spiteful, did we not remember that they were the only means

open to this body of passing a vote of censure on the recent

proceedings. The senate controlled every item of the expenditure; and

when the commissioners appealed to it for their expenses, it refused a

tent and fixed the limit of supplies at a denarius and a half a day. The

instigator of this decree was the ex-consul Scipio Nasica, a heavy loser

by the agrarian law, a man of strong and passionate temper who was every

day becoming a more infuriated opponent of Tiberius Gracchus.[377]

Meanwhile the latter had celebrated a peaceful triumph which far

eclipsed the military pageants of the imperators of the past. The

country people, before they returned to their farms, had escorted him to

his house; they had hailed him as a greater than Romulus, as the

founder, not of a city nor of a nation, but of all the peoples of

Italy.[378] It is true that his escort was only the poor, rude mob.

Stately nobles and clanking soldiers were not to be seen in the

procession. But they were better away. This was the true apotheosis of a

real demagogism. And the suspicion of the masses was as readily fired as

their enthusiasm. A friend of Tiberius died suddenly and ugly marks were

seen upon the body. There was a cry of poison; the bier was caught up on

the shoulders of the crowd and borne to the place of burning. A vast

throng stood by to see the corpse consumed, and the ineffectiveness of

the flames was held a thorough confirmation of the truth of their

suspicions.[379] It remained to see how far this protective energy would

serve to save their favourite when the day of reckoning came.

Tiberius could hardly have shared in the general elation. To make

promises was one thing, to fulfil them another. Everything depended on

the effectiveness of the execution of the agrarian scheme; and, although

the mechanism for distribution was excellent, some of the material

necessary for its successful fulfilment was sadly lacking. There were

candidates enough for land, and there was sufficient land for the

candidates. But whence were the means for starting these penniless

people on their new road to virtue and prosperity to be derived? To give

an ardent settler thirty _jugera_ of soil and to withhold from him the

means of sowing his first crop or of making his first effort to turn

pasture into arable land, was both useless and cruel; and we may imagine

that the evicted possessors had not left their relinquished estates in a

very enviable condition. The doors of the Aerarium were closed, for its

key was in the hands of the senate; and Gracchus had to cast an anxious

eye around for means for satisfying the needs of his clients.

The opportunity was presented when the Roman people came into the

unexpected inheritance of Attalus the Third, king of Pergamon. The

testament was brought to Rome by Eudemus the Pergamene, whose first

business was with the senate. But, when Eudemus arrived in the city, he

saw a state of things which must have made him doubt whether the senate

was any longer the true director of the State. It sat passive and

sullen, while an energetic _prostates_ of the Greek type was doing what

he liked with the land of Italy. No sane ambassador could have refused

to neglect Gracchus, and it is practically certain that Eudemus

approached him. This fact we may believe, even if we do not accept the

version that the envoy had taken the precaution of bringing in his

luggage a purple robe and a diadem, as symbols that might be necessary

for a fitting recognition of Tiberius's future position.[380] It is also

possible that suspicion of the rule of senators and capitalists may also

have prompted the Greek to attempt to discover whether a more tolerable

settlement might not be gained for his country through the leader of the

popular party.[381] We cannot say whether Gracchus ever contemplated a

policy with respect to the province as a whole. His mind was probably

full of his immediate needs. He saw in the treasures of Attalus more

than an equivalent for the revenues enclosed in the locked Aerarium, and

he announced his intention of promulgating a plebiscite that the money

left by the king should be assigned to the settlers provided for by his

agrarian law.[382] It is possible that he contemplated the application

of the future revenues of the kingdom of Pergamon to this or some

similar purpose; and it was perhaps partly for this reason, partly in

answer to the objection that the treasure could not be appropriated

without a senatorial decree, that he announced the novel doctrine that

it was no business of the senate to decide the fate of the cities which

had belonged to the Attalid monarchy, and that he himself would prepare

for the people a measure dealing with this question.[383]

This was the fiercest challenge that he had yet flung to the senate.

There might be a difference of opinion as to the right of a magistrate

to put a question to the people without the guidance of a senatorial

decree; the assignment of land was unquestionably a popular right in so

far as it required ratification by the commons; even the deposition of

Octavius was a matter for the people and would avenge itself. But there

were two senatorial rights--the one usurped, the other created--whose

validity had never been questioned. These were the control of finance

and the direction of provincial administration. Were the possibility

once admitted that these might be dealt with in the Comitia, the

magistrates would cease to be ministers of the senate; for it was

chiefly through a system of judicious prize-giving that the senate

attached to itself the loyalty of the official class. There was perhaps

less fear of what Gracchus himself might do than of the spectre which he

was raising for the future. For in Roman history the events of the past

made those of the future; there were few isolated phenomena in its

development.

From this time the attacks of individual senators on Gracchus became

more vehement and direct. They proceeded from men of the highest rank. A

certain Pompeius, in whom we may probably see an ex-consul and a future

censor, was not ashamed of raising the spectre of a coming monarchy by

reference to the story of the sceptre and the purple robe, and is said

to have vowed to impeach Gracchus as soon as his year of magistracy had

expired;[384] the ex-consul Quintus Caecilius Metellus, of Macedonian

fame, reproached Tiberius with his rabble escort. He compared the

demeanour of the father and the son. In the censorship of the former the

citizens used to quench their lights at night, as they saw him pass up

the street to his house, that they might impress the censorial mind with

the ideas of early hours and orderly conduct; now the son of this man

might be seen returning home amidst the blaze of torches, held in the

stout arms of a defiant body-guard drawn from the neediest classes.[385]

These arrows may have Missed the mark; the one that hit was winged by an

aged senator, Titus Annius Luscus, who had held the consulship twenty

years before. His wit is said to have been better established than his

character. He excelled in that form of ready altercation, of impaling

his opponent on the horns of a dilemma by means of some innocent

question, which, both in the courts and the senate, was often more

effective than the power of continuous oratory. He now challenged

Tiberius to a wager (_sponsio_), such as in the public life of Rome was

often employed to settle a disputed point of honour or of fact, to

determine the question whether he had dishonoured a colleague, who was

holy in virtue of his office and had been made sacrosanct by the laws.

The proposal was received by the senators with loud cries of

acclamation. A glance at Tiberius would probably have shown that Annius

had found the weak spot, not merely in his defensive armour, but in his

very soul. The deposition of Octavius was proving a very nemesis; it was

a democratic act that was in the highest degree undemocratic, an

assertion and yet a gross violation of popular liberty.[386] The

superstitious masses were in the habit of washing their hands and

purifying their bodies before they entered into the presence of a

tribune.[387] Might there not be a thrill of awe and repentance when the

idea was brought home to them that this holy temple had been violated:

and must not this be followed by a sense of repugnance to the man who

had prompted them to the unhallowed deed? Tiberius sprang to his feet,

quitted the senate-house and summoned the people. The majesty of the

tribunate in his person had been outraged by Annius. He must answer for

his words. The aged senator appeared before the crowd; he knew his

disadvantage if the ordinary weapons of comitial strife were employed.

In power of words and in repute with the masses he stood far behind

Tiberius. But his presence of mind did not desert him. Might he ask a

few questions before the regular proceedings began? The request was

allowed and there was a dead silence. "Now suppose," said Annius, "you,

Tiberius, were to wish to cover me with shame and abuse, and suppose I

were to call on one of your colleagues for help, and he were to come up

here to offer me his assistance, and suppose further that this were to

excite your displeasure, would you deprive that colleague of yours of

his office?" To answer that question in the affirmative was to admit

that the tribunician power was dead; to answer it in the negative was to

invite the retort that the _auxilium_ was only one form of the

_intercessio_. The quick-witted southern crowd must have seen the

difficulty at once, and Tiberius himself, usually so ready and bold in

speech, could not face the dilemma. He remained silent and dismissed the

assembly.[388]

But matters could not remain as they were. This new aspect of Octavius's

deposition was the talk of the town, and there were many troubled

consciences amongst the members of his own following. Something must be

done to quiet them; he must raise the question himself. The situation

had indeed changed rapidly. Tiberius Gracchus was on his defence. Never

did his power of special pleading appear to greater advantage than in

the speech which followed. He had the gift which makes the mighty

Radical, of diving down and seizing some fundamental truth of political

science, and then employing it with merciless logic for the illustration

or refutation of the practice of the present. The central idea here was

one gathered from the political science of the Greeks. The good of the

community is the only test of the rightness of an institution. It is

justified if it secures that end, unjustified if it does not: or, to use

the language of religion, holy in the one case, devoid of sanctity in

the other. And an institution is not a mere abstraction; we must judge

it by its use. We must, therefore, say that when it obeys the common

interest, it is right: when it ceases to obey it, it is wrong. But the

right must be preserved and the wrong plucked out. So Gracchus

maintained that the tribune was holy and sacrosanct because he had been

sanctified to the people's service and was the people's head. If then he

change his character and do the people wrong, cutting down its strength

and silencing its voice as expressed through the suffrage, he has

deprived himself of his office, for he has ceased to conform to the

terms on which he received it. Should we leave a tribune alone who was

pulling down the Capitolium or burning the docks? And yet a tribune who

did these things would remain a tribune, though a bad one. It is only

when a tribune is destroying the power of the people that he is no

longer a tribune at all. The laws give the tribune the power to arrest

the consul. It is a power given against a man elected by the people; for

consul and tribune are equally mandataries of the people. Shall not then

the people have the right of depriving the tribune of his authority,

when he uses this authority in a way prejudicial to the interests of the

giver? What does the history of the past teach us? Can anything have

been more powerful or more sacred than the ancient monarchy of Rome? The

Imperium of the king was unlimited, the highest priestly offices were

his. Yet the city expelled Tarquin for his crimes. The tyranny of a

single man was alone sufficient to bring to an end a government which

had its roots in the most distant past, which had presided over the very

birth of the city. And, if sanctity alone is to be the ground of

immunity, what are we to think of the punishment of a vestal virgin? Is

there anything in Rome more holy and awe-inspiring than the maidens who

tend and guard the eternal flame? Yet their sin is visited by the most

horrible of deaths. They hold their sacrosanct character through the

gods; they lose it, therefore, when they sin against the gods. Should

the same not be true of the tribune? It is on account of the people that

he is sacred; he cannot retain this divine character when he wrongs the

people; he is a man engaged in destroying the very power which is the

source of his strength. If the tribunate can justly be gained by a

favourable vote of the majority of the tribes, can it not with greater

justice be taken away by an adverse vote of all of them? Again, what

should be the limits of our action in dealing with sacred things? Does

sanctity mean immobility? By no means. What are more holy and inviolable

than things dedicated to the gods? Yet this character does not prevent

the people from handling, moving, transferring them as it pleases. In

the case of the tribunate, it is the office, not the man, that is

inviolable; it may be treated as an object of dedication and transferred

to another. The practice of our own State proves that the office is not

inviolable in the sense of being inalienable, for its holders have often

forsworn it and asked to be divested of it.[389]

The strongest part of this utterance was that which dealt with the

sacred character of office; it was a mere emanation from the performance

of certain functions; the protection, not the reality, of the thing.

Gracchus might have added that even a treaty might under certain

circumstances be legitimately broken. The weakest, from a Roman

standpoint or indeed from that of any stable political society, was the

identification of the permanent and temporary character of an

institution, the assumption that a meeting of the people was the people,

that a tribune was the tribune. How far the speech was convincing we do

not know; it certainly did not relieve Tiberius of his embarrassments,

which were now thickening around him.

Tiberius's success had been mainly due to the country voters. It is true

that he had a large following in the city; but this was numerically

inferior to a mass of urban folk, whose attitude was either indifferent

or hostile. They were indifferent in so far as they did not want

agrarian assignments, and hostile in so far as they were clients of the

noble houses which opposed Tiberius's policy. This urban party was now

in the ascendant, for the country voters had scattered to their

homes.[390] The situation demanded that he should work steadily for two

objects, re-election to the tribunate and the support of the city

voters. If, in addition to this support, he could hold out hopes that

would attract the great capitalists to his side, his position would be

impregnable. Hence in his speeches he began to throw out hints of a new

and wide programme of legislation.[391] There was first the military

grievance. Recent regulations, by the large decrease which they made in

the property qualifications required for service,[392] had increased the

liability to the conscription of the manufacturing and trading classes

of Rome. Gracchus proposed that the period of service should be

shortened--his suggestion probably being, not that the years of

liability to service (the seventeenth to the forty-sixth) should be

lessened, but that within these years a limited number of campaigns

should be agreed on, which should form the maximum amount of active

service for every citizen.[393] Two other proposals dealt with the

question of criminal jurisdiction. The first allowed an appeal to the

people from the decision of _judices_. The form in which this proposal

is stated by our authority, would lead us to suppose that the courts to

be rendered appellable were those constituted under standing laws. The

chief of these _quaestiones_ or _judicia publica_ was the court which

tried cases for extortion, established in the first instance by a Lex

Calpurnia, and possibly reconstituted before this epoch by a Junian

law.[394] A permanent court for the trial of murder may also have

existed at this time.[395] The judges of these standing commissions were

drawn from the senatorial order; and Gracchus, therefore, by suggesting

an appeal from their judgment to the people, was attacking a senatorial

monopoly of the most important jurisdiction, and perhaps reflecting on

the conduct of senatorial _judices_, as displayed especially in relation

to the grievances of distressed provincials. But it is probable that he

also meant to strike a blow at a more extraordinary prerogative claimed

by the senate, and to deny the right of that body to establish special

commissions which could decide without appeal on the life and fortunes

of Roman citizens.[396] So far his proposals, whether based on a

conviction of their general utility or not, were a bid for the support

of the average citizen. But when he declared that the qualification for

the criminal judges of the time could not be allowed to stand, and that

these judges should be taken either from a joint panel of senators and

knights, or from the senate increased by the addition of a number of

members of the equestrian order equal to its present strength, he was

holding out a bait to the wealthy middle class, who were perhaps already

beginning to feel senatorial jurisdiction in provincial matters irksome

and disadvantageous to their interests. We are told by one authority

that Gracchus's eyes even ranged beyond the citizen body and that he

contemplated the possibility of the gift of citizenship to the whole of

Italy.[397] This was not in itself a measure likely to aid in his

salvation by the people; if it was not a disinterested effort of

far-sighted genius, it may have been due to the gathering storm which

his experience showed him the agrarian commission would soon be forced

to meet.[398] Certainly, if all these schemes are rightly attributed to

Tiberius Gracchus, it was he more than any man who projected the great

programme of reform that the future had in store.

Unfortunately for Gracchus the time was short for nursing a new

constituency or spreading a new ideal. The time for the tribunician

elections was approaching, an active canvass was being carried on by the

candidates, and the aggrieved landowners were throwing the whole weight

of their influence into the opposite scale.[399] Wild rumours of his

plans were being circulated. The family clique that filled the agrarian

commission was to snatch at other offices; Gracchus's brother, a youth

still unqualified even for the quaestorship,[400] was to be thrust into

the tribunate, and his father-in-law Appius was destined for the

consulate.[401] Rome was to be ruled by a dynasty, and the tyranny of

the commission was to extend to every department of the State. Gracchus

felt that the city-combination against him was too strong, and sent an

earnest summons to his supporters in the country. But practical needs

were stronger than gratitude; the farmers were busy with their harvest;

and it was plain that on this occasion the man of the street was to have

the decisive voice. The result showed that even he was not unmoved by

Gracchus's services, and by his last appeal that a life risked on behalf

of the people should be protected by a renewed investiture with the

tribunate.[402]

The day of the election arrived and the votes were taken. When they came

to be read out, it was found that the two first tribes had given their

voice for Gracchus. Then there was a sudden uproar. The votes were going

against the landlords; a legal protest must be made. Men rose in the

assembly, and shouted out that immediate re-election to the tribunate

was forbidden by the law. They were probably both right and wrong in

their protest, as men so often were who ventured to make a definite

assertion about the fluid public law of Rome. There was apparently no

enactment forbidding the iteration of this office, and appointment to

the tribunate must have been governed by custom. But recent custom seems

to have been emphatically opposed to immediate re-election, and the

appeal was justified on grounds of public practice.[403] It would

probably have been disregarded, had the Gracchan supporters been in an

overwhelming majority, or Gracchus's colleagues unanimous in their

support. But the people were divided, and the president was not

enthusiastic enough in the cause to risk his future impeachment.

Rubrius, to whom the lot had assigned the conduct of the proceedings on

that day, hesitated as to the course which he ought to follow. A bolder

spirit Mummius, the man who had been made by the deposition of Octavius,

asked that the conduct of the assembly should be handed over to him.

Rubrius, glad to escape the difficulty, willingly yielded his place; but

now the other members of the college interposed. The forms of the

Comitia were being violated; a president could not be chosen without the

use of the lot. The resignation of Rubrius must be followed by another

appeal to sortition. The point of order raised, as usual, a heated

discussion; the tribunes gathered on the Rostra to argue the matter out.

Nothing could be gained by keeping the people as the spectators of such

a scene, and Gracchus succeeded in getting the proceedings adjourned to

the following day.[404]

The situation was becoming more desperate; for each delay was a triumph

for the opposition, and could only strengthen the belief in the

illegality of Gracchus's claim. He now resorted to the last device of

the Roman; he ceased to be a protector and became a suppliant. Although

still a magistrate, he assumed the garb of mourning, and with humbled

and tearful mien begged the help of individuals in the market

place.[405]

He led his son by the hand; his children and their mother were to be

wards of the people, for he had despaired of his own life. Many were

touched; to some the tribunate of Gracchus seemed like a rift in a dark

cloud of oppression which would close around them at his fall, and their

hearts sank at the thought of a renewed triumph of the nobility. Others

were moved chiefly by the fears and sufferings of Gracchus. Cries of

sympathy and defiance were raised in answer to his tears, and a large

crowd escorted him to his house at nightfall and bade him be confident

of their support on the following day. During his appeals he had hinted

at the fear of a nocturnal attack by his foes: and this led many to form

an encampment round his house and to remain as its vigilant defenders

throughout the night.[406]

Before day-break he was up and engaged in hasty colloquy with his

friends. The fear of force was certainly present; and definite plans may

have been now made for its repulsion. Some even believed that a signal

for battle was agreed on by Gracchus, if matters should come to that

extreme.[407] With a true Roman's scruples he took the omens before he

left his house. They presaged ill. The keeper of the sacred chickens,

which Gracchus's Imperium now permitted him to consult, could get

nothing from the birds, even though he shook the cage. Only one of the

fowls advanced, and even that would not touch the food. And the unsought

omens were as evil as those invited. Snakes were found to have hatched a

brood in his helmet, his foot stumbled on the threshold with such

violence that blood flowed from his sandal; he had hardly advanced on

his way when crows were seen struggling on his left, and the true object

of the sign was pointed when a stone, dislodged by one of them from a

roof, fell at his own feet. This concourse of ill-luck frightened his

boldest comrades; but his old teacher, Blossius of Cumae, vehemently

urged the prosecution of the task. Was a son of Gracchus, the grandson

of Africanus, chief minister of the Roman people,[408] to be deterred by

a crow from listening to the summons of the citizens? If the disgrace of

his absence amused his enemies, they would keep their laughter to

themselves. They would use that absence seriously, to denounce him to

the people as a king who was already aping the luxury of the tyrant. As

Blossius spoke, men were seen running from the direction of the Capitol;

they came up, they bade him press on, as all was going well. And, in

fact, it seemed as if all might turn out brightly. The Capitoline

temple, and the level area before it, which was to be the scene of the

voting, were filled with his supporters. A hearty cheer greeted him as

he appeared, and a phalanx closed round him to prevent the approach of

any hostile element. Shortly after the proceedings began, the senate was

summoned by the consul to meet in the temple of Fides.[409] A few yards

of sloping ground was all that now separated the two hostile camps.[410]

The interval for reflection had strengthened the belief of some of the

tribunes that Gracchus's candidature was illegal, and they were ready to

support the renewed protests of the rich. The election, however, began;

for the faithful Mummius was now presiding, and he proceeded to call on

the tribes to vote. But the business of filing into their separate

compartments, always complicated, was now impossible. The fringe of the

crowd was in a continual uproar; from its extremities the opponents of

the measure were wedging their way in. As his supporters squared their

shoulders, the whole mass rocked and swayed. There was no hope of

eliciting a decision from this scuffling and pushing throng. Every

moment brought the assembly nearer to open riot. Suddenly a man was seen

at some distance from Tiberius gesticulating with his hand as though he

had something to impart. He was recognised as Fulvius Flaccus, a

senator, a man perhaps already known as a sympathiser with schemes of

reform. Gracchus asked the crowd immediately around him to give way a

little, and Fulvius fought his way up to the tribune. His news was that

in the sitting of the senate the rich proprietors had asked the consul

to use force, that he had declined, and that now they were preparing on

their own motion to slay Tiberius. For this purpose they had collected a

large band of armed slaves and retainers.[411] Tiberius immediately

imparted the news to his friends. Preparations for defence were hastily

made: an improvised body-guard was formed; togas were girt up, and the

staves of the lictors were broken into fragments to serve as clubs. The

Gracchans more distant from the centre of the scene were meanwhile

marvelling at the strange preparations of which they caught but

glimpses, and could be seen asking eager questions as to their meaning.

To reach these distant supporters by his voice was impossible; Tiberius

could but touch his forehead with his hand to indicate that his life was

in danger. Immediately a shout went up from the opposite side "Tiberius

is asking for the diadem," and eager messengers sped with the news to

the senate.[412] There was probably a knowledge that physical support

for their cause would be found in that quarter, and the exodus of these

excited capitalists was apparently assisted by an onslaught from the

mob. A regular tumult was brewing, and the tribunes, instead of striving

to preserve order, or staying to interpose their sacred persons between

the enraged combatants, fled incontinently from the spot. Their fear was

natural, for by remaining they might seem to be identifying themselves

with a cause that was either lost or lawless. With the tribunes vanished

the last trace of legality. The priests closed the temple to keep its

precincts from the mob. The more timorous of the crowd fled in wild

disorder, spreading wilder rumours. Tiberius was deposing the remaining

tribunes from office; he was appointing himself to a further tribunate

without the formalities of election.[413]

Meanwhile the senate was deliberating in the temple of Fides. In the old

days their deliberations might have resulted in the appointment of a

dictator, and one of the historians who has handed down the record of

these facts marvels that this was not the case now.[414] But the

dictatorship had been weakened by submission to the appeal, and long

before it became extinct had lost its significance as a means of

repressing sedition within the city. The Roman constitution had now no

mechanism for declaring a state of siege or martial law. From one point

of view the extinction of the dictatorship was to be regretted. The

nomination of this magistrate would have involved at least a day's

delay;[415] some further time would have been necessary before he had

collected round him a sufficient force in a city which had neither

police nor soldiers. Had it been decided to appoint a dictator, the

outrages of the next hour could never have occurred. As things were, it

seemed as though the senate had to choose between impotence and murder.

There was indeed another way. Such was the respect for members of the

senatorial order, that a deputation of that body, headed by the consul,

would probably have led to the dispersal of the mob. But passions were

inflamed and it was no time for peaceful counsels. The advocate of

summary measures was the impetuous Nasica. He urged the consul to save

the city and to put down the tyrant. He demanded that the sense of the

house should be taken as to whether extreme measures were now necessary.

Even at this time a tradition may have existed that a magic formula by

which the senate advised the magistrates "to see to it that the State

took no harm," [416] could justify any act of violence in an emergency.

The sense of the house was with Nasica, but a resolution could not be

framed unless the consul put the question. The answer of Scaevola was

that of a lawyer. He would commence no act of violence, he would put to

death no citizen uncondemned. If, however, the people, through the

persuasion or compulsion of Tiberius, should come to any illegal

decision, he would see that such a resolution was not observed. Nasica

sprang to his feet. "The consul is betraying the city; those who wish

the salvation of the laws, follow me." [417] With this he drew the hem

of his toga over his head,[418] and rushed from the door in the

direction of the Capitoline temple. He was followed by a crowd of

senators, all wrapping the folds of their togas round their left arms.

Outside the door they were joined by their retainers armed with clubs

and staves.[419]

Meanwhile the proceedings in the Area Capitolii had been becoming

somewhat less turbulent. The turmoil had quieted down with the exclusion

of the more violent members of the opposition. Gracchus had called a

Contio, for the purpose, it was said, of encouraging his supporters and

asserting his own constancy and defiance of senatorial authority. The

gathering had become a mere partisan mass meeting, such as had often

been seen in the course of the current year, and the herald was crying

"Silence," [420] when suddenly the men on the outskirts of the throng

fell back to right and left. A long line of senators had been seen

hastening up the hill. A deputation from the fathers had come. That must

have been the first impression: and the crowd fell back before its

masters. But in a moment it was seen that the masters had come to

chastise, not to plead. With set faces and blazing eyes Nasica and his

following threw themselves on the yielding mass. The unarmed senators

snatched at the first weapons that lay to hand, the fragments of the

shattered furniture of the meeting, severed planks and legs of benches,

while their retinue pressed on with clubs and sticks. The whole column

made straight for Tiberius and his improvised body-guard. Resistance was

hopeless, and the tribune and his friends turned to flee. But the idea

of restoring order occupied but a small place in the minds of the

maddened senators, The accumulated bitterness of a year found its outlet

in one moment of glorious vengeance. The fathers were behaving like a

Greek street mob of the lowest type which had turned against an

oppressive oligarchy. They were clubbing the Gracchans to death.

Tiberius was in flight when some one seized his toga. He slipped it off

and fled, clad only in his tunic, when he stumbled over a prostrate body

and fell. As he rose, a rain of blows descended on his head.[421] The

man who was seen to strike the first blow is said to have been Publius

Saturius, one of his own colleagues. The glory of his death was

vehemently disputed; one Rufus, since he could not claim the first blow,

is said to have boasted of being the author of the second. Tiberius is

said to have fallen by the very doors of the Capitoline temple, not far

from the statues of the Kings.[422] The number of his adherents that

perished was over three hundred, and it was noted that not one of these

was slain by the sword.[423] Their bodies were thrown into the

Tiber--not by the mob but by the magistrates; the hand of an aedile

committed that of Tiberius to the stream.[424]

The murder of a young man, who was still under thirty at the time of his

death,[425] and the slaughter of a few hundreds of his adherents, may

not seem to be an act of very great significance in the history of a

mighty empire. Yet ancient historians regarded the event as

epoch-marking, as the turning point in the history of Rome, as the

beginning of the period of the civil wars.[426] To justify this

conclusion it is not enough to point to the fact that this was the first

blood shed in civic discord since the age of the Kings;[427] for it

might also have been the last. Though the vendetta is a natural

outgrowth of Italian soil, yet masses of men are seldom, like

individuals, animated solely by the spirit of revenge. The blood of the

innocent is a good battle-cry in politics, but it is little more; it is

far from being the mere pretext, but it is equally far from being the

true cause, of future revolution. Familiarity with the use of force in

civic strife is also a fatal cause of its perpetuation; but familiarity

implies its renewed employment: it can hardly be the result of the first

experiment in murder. The repetition of this ghastly phenomenon in Roman

politics can only be accounted for by the belief that the Gracchan

_emeute_ was of its very nature an event that could not be isolated:

that Gracchus was a pioneer in a hostile country, and that his opponents

preserved all their inherent weakness after the first abortive

manifestation of their pretended strength. A bad government may be

securely entrenched. The senate, whether good or bad, had no defences at

all. Its weakness had in the old days been its pride. It ruled by

influencing opinion. Now that it had ceased to influence, it ruled by

initiating a riot in the streets. It had no military support except such

as was given it by friendly magistrates, and this was a dangerous weapon

which it hesitated to use. To ignore militarism was to be at the mercy

of the demagogue of the street, to admit it was found subsequently to be

equivalent to being at the mercy of the demagogue of the camp. In either

case authority must be maintained at the cost of civil war. But the

material helplessness of the senate was only one factor in the problem.

More fatal flaws were its lack of insight to discover that there were

new problems to be faced, and lack of courage in facing them. This moral

helplessness was due partly to the selfishness of individuals, but

partly also to the fixity of political tradition. In spite of the

brilliancy and culture of some of its members, the senate in its

corporate capacity showed the possession of a narrow heart and an

inexpansive intelligence. Its sympathies were limited to a class; it

learnt its new lessons slowly and did not see their bearing on the

studies of the future. Imperialism abroad and social contentment at home

might be preserved by the old methods which had worked so well in the

past. But to the mind of the masses the past did not exist, and to the

mind of the reformer it had buried its dead. The career of Tiberius

Gracchus was the first sign of a great awakening; and if we regard it as

illogical, and indeed impossible, to pause here and estimate the

character of his reforms, it is because the more finished work of his

brother was the completion of his efforts and followed them as

inexorably as the daylight follows the dawn.

CHAPTER 3

The attitude of the senate after the fall of Gracchus was not that of a

combatant who had emerged secure from the throes of a great crisis. A

less experienced victor would have dwelt on the magnitude of the

movement and been guilty of an attempt at its sudden reversal. But the

government pretended that there had been no revolution, merely an

_emeute_. The wicked authors of the sedition must be punished; but the

Gracchan legislation might remain untouched. More than one motive

probably contributed to shape this view. In the first place, the

traditional policy of Rome regarded reaction as equivalent to

revolution. A rash move should be stopped in its inception; but, had it

gone a little way and yielded fruit in the shape of some permanent

organisation, it would be well to accept and, if possible, to weaken

this product; it would be the height of rashness to attempt its

destruction. The recognition of the _fait accompli_ had built up the

Roman Empire, and the dreaded consequences had not come. Why should not

the same be true of a new twist in domestic policy? Secondly, the

opposition of the senate to Gracchus's reforms was based far more

decidedly on political than on economic grounds. The frenzy which seized

the fathers during the closing act of the tribune's life, was excited by

his comprehensive onslaught on their monopoly of provincial, fiscal and

judicial administration. His attempt to annex their lands had aroused

the resentment of individuals, but not the hatred of a corporation. The

individual was always lost in the senate, and the wrongs of the

landowner could be ignored for the moment and their remedy left to time,

if political prudence dictated a middle course. Again, reflection may

have suggested the thought whether these wrongs were after all so great

or so irremediable. The pastoral wealth of Italy was much; but it was

little compared with the possibilities of enterprise in the provinces.

Might not the bait of an agrarian law, whose chances of success were

doubtful and whose operation might in time be impeded by craftily

devised legislation, lull the people into an acceptance of that

senatorial control of the foreign world, which had been so scandalously

threatened by Gracchus? There was a danger in the very raising of this

question; there was further danger in its renewal. A party cry seldom

becomes extinct; but its successful revival demands the sense of some

tangible grievance. To remove the grievance was to silence the

demagogue; what the people wanted was comfort and not power. And lastly,

the senate was not wholly composed of selfish or aggrieved land-holders.

Amongst the sternest upholders of its traditions there were probably

many who were immensely relieved that the troublesome land question had

received some approach to a solution. There are always men hide-bound by

convention and unwilling to move hand or foot in aid of a remedial

measure, who are yet profoundly grateful to the agitator whom they

revile, and profoundly thankful that the antics which they deem

grotesque, have saved themselves from responsibility and their country

from a danger.

It was with such mixed feelings that the senate viewed the Gracchan

_debacle_. It was impossible, however, to accept the situation in its

entirety; for to recognise the whole of Gracchus's career as legitimate

was to set a dangerous precedent for the future. The large army of the

respectable, the bulwark of senatorial power, had not been sufficiently

alarmed. It was necessary to emphasise the fact that there had been an

outrageous sedition on the part of the lower classes. With this object

the senate commanded that the new consuls Popillius and Rupilius should

sit as a criminal commission for the purpose of investigating the

circumstances of the outbreak.[428] The commission was empowered to

impose any sentence, and it is practically certain that it judged

without appeal. The consuls, as usual, exercised their own discretion in

the choice of assessors. The extreme party was represented by Nasica.

Laelius, who also occupied a place on the judgment-seat, might have been

regarded as a moderate;[429] although, as popular sedition and not the

agrarian question was on its trial, there is no reason to suppose that a

member of the Scipionic circle would be less severe than any of his

colleagues in his animadversions on the wretched underlings of the

Gracchan movement whom it was his duty to convict of crime. It was in

fact the street cohort of Tiberius, men whose voices, torches and sticks

had so long insulted the feelings of respectable citizens, that seems to

have been now visited with the penalties for high treason; for no

illustrious name is found amongst the victims of the commission. On some

the ban of interdiction was pronounced, on others the death penalty was

summarily inflicted. Amongst the slain was Diophanes the rhetor; and one

Caius Villius, by some mysterious effort of interpretation which baffles

our analysis, was doomed to the parricide's death of the serpent and the

sack.[430] Blossius of Cumae was also arraigned, and his answer to the

commission was subsequently regarded as expressing the deepest villainy

and the most exalted devotion. His only defence was his attachment to

Gracchus, which made the tribune's word his law. "But what," said

Laelius "if he had willed that you should fire the Capitol?" "That would

never have been the will of Gracchus," was the reply, "but had he willed

it, I should have obeyed".[431] Blossius escaped the immediate danger,

but his fears soon led him to leave Rome, and now an exile from his

adopted as well as from his parent state, he could find no hope but in

the fortunes of Aristonicus, who was bravely battling with the Romans in

Asia. On the collapse of that prince's power he put himself to

death.[432]

The government may have succeeded in its immediate object of proving

itself an effective policeman. The sense of order may have been

satisfied, and the spirit of turbulence, if it existed, may have been

for the moment cowed. But the memory of the central act of the ghastly

tragedy on the Capitoline hill could not be so easily obliterated, and

the chief actor was everywhere received with lowered brows and

ill-omened cries.[433] It was superstition as well as hatred that

sharpened the popular feeling against Nasica. A man was walking the

streets of Rome whose hands were stained by a tribune's blood. He

polluted the city wherein he dwelt and the presence of all who met him.

The convenient theory that a mere street riot had been suppressed might

have been accepted but for the awkward fact that the sanctity of the

tribunate had been trodden under foot by its would-be vindicators. A

prosecution of Nasica was threatened; and in such a case might not the

arguments that vindicated Octavius be the doom of the accused? Popular

hatred finds a convenient focus in a single man; it is easier to loathe

an individual than a group. But for this very reason the removal of the

individual may appease the resentment that the group deserves. Nasica

was an embarrassment to the senate and he might prove a convenient

scapegoat. It was desirable that he should be at once rewarded and

removed; and the opportunity for an honourable banishment was easily

found. The impending war with Aristonicus necessitated the sending of a

commission to Asia, and Nasica was included amongst the five members of

this embassy.[434] There was honour in the possession of such a post and

wealth to be gained by its tenure; but the aristocracy had eventually to

pay a still higher price for keeping Nasica beyond the borders of Italy.

When the chief pontificate was vacated by the fall of Crassus in 130

B.C., the refugee was invested with the office so ardently sought by the

nobles of Rome.[435] He was forced to be contented with this shadow of a

splendid prize, for he was destined never to exercise the high functions

of his office in the city. He seems never to have left Asia and, after a

restless change of residence, he died near the city of Pergamon.[436]

The permanence of the land commission was the most important result of

the senate's determination to detach the political from the economic

consequences of the Gracchan movement.[437] But they tolerated rather

than accepted it. Had they wished to make it their own, every nerve

would have been strained to secure the three places at the annual

elections for men who represented the true spirit of the nobility. But

there was every reason for allowing the people's representatives to

continue the people's work. The commission was an experiment, and the

government did not wish to participate in possible failure; a seasonable

opportunity might arise for suspending or neutralising its activities,

and the senate did not wish to reverse its own work; whether success or

failure attended its operations, the task of the commissioners was sure

to arouse fears and excite odium, especially amongst the Italian allies;

and the nobility were less inclined to excite such sentiments than to

turn them to account. So the people were allowed year after year to

perpetuate the Gracchan clique and to replace its members by avowed

sympathisers with programmes of reform. Tiberius's place was filled by

Crassus, whose daughter Licinia was wedded to Caius Gracchus.[438] Two

places were soon vacated by the fall of Crassus in Asia and the death of

Appius Claudius. They were filled by Marcus Fulvius Flaccus and Gaius

Papirius Carbo.[439] The Former had already proved his sympathy with

Gracchus, the latter had Just brought to an end an agitating tribunate,

which had produced a successful ballot law and an abortive attempt to

render the tribune re-eligible. The personnel of the commission was,

therefore, a guarantee of its good faith. Its energy was on a level with

its earnestness. The task of annexing and distributing the domain land

was strenuously undertaken, and other officials, on whom fell the purely

routine function of enforcing the new limit of occupation, seem to have

been equally faithful to their work. Even the consul Popillius, one of

the presidents of the commission that tried the Gracchan rioters, has

left a record of his activity in the words that he was "the first to

expel shepherds from their domains and install farmers in their

stead".[440] The boundary stones of the commissioners still survive to

mark the care with which they defined the limits of occupied land and of

the new allotments; and the great increase in the census roll between

the years 131 and 125 B.C. finds its best explanation in the steady

increase of small landholders effected by the agrarian law. In the

former year the register had shown rather less than 319,000 citizens; in

the latter the number had risen to somewhat more than 394,000.[441] If

this increase of nearly 76,000 referred to the whole citizen body, it

would be difficult to connect it with the work of the commission, except

on the hypothesis that numerous vagrants, who did not as a rule appear

at the census, now presented themselves for assessment; but, when it is

remembered that the published census list of Rome merely contained the

returns of her effective military strength, and that this consisted

merely of the _assidui_, it is clear that a measure which elevated large

portions of the _capite censi_ to the position of yeoman farmers must

have had the effect of increasing the numbers on the register; and this

sudden leap in the census roll may thus be attributed to the successful

working of the new agrarian scheme.[442] A result such as this could not

have been wholly transitory; in tracing the agrarian legislation of the

post-Gracchan period we shall indeed find the trial of experiments which

prove that no final solution of the land question had been reached; we

shall see the renewal of the process of land absorption which again led

to the formation of gigantic estates; but these tendencies may merely

mark the inevitable weeding-out of the weaker of the Gracchan colonists;

they do not prove that the sturdier folk failed to justify the scheme,

to work their new holdings at a profit, and to hand them down to their

posterity. It is true that the landless proletariate of the city

continued steadily to increase; but the causes which lead to the

plethora of an imperial capital are too numerous to permit us to explain

this increase by the single hypothesis of a renewed depopulation of the

country districts.

The distribution of allotments, however, represented but the simpler

element of the scheme. The really arduous task was to determine in any

given case what land could with justice be distributed. The judicial

powers of the triumvirs were taxed to the utmost to determine what land

was public, and what was private. The possessors would at times make no

accurate profession of their tenure; such as were made probably in many

cases aroused distrust. Information was invited from third parties, and

straightway the land courts were the scene of harrowing litigation.[443]

It could at times be vaguely ascertained that, while a portion of some

great domain was held on occupation from the State, some other portion

had been acquired by purchase; but what particular part of the estate

was held on either tenure was undiscoverable, for titles had been lost,

or, when preserved, did not furnish conclusive evidence of the justice

of the original transfer. Even the ascertainment of the fact that a

tract of land had once belonged to the State was no conclusive proof

that the State could still claim rights of ownership; for some of it had

in early times been assigned in allotments, and no historical record

survived to prove where the assignment had ended and the permission of

occupation had begun. The holders of private estates had for purposes of

convenience worked the public land immediately adjoining their own

grounds, the original landmarks had been swept away, and, although they

had paid their dues for the possession of so many acres, it was

impossible to say with precision which those acres were. The present

condition of the land was no index; for some of the possessors had

raised their portion of the public domain to as high a pitch of

cultivation as their original patrimonies: and, as the commissioners

were naturally anxious to secure arable land in good condition for the

new settlers, the original occupiers sometimes found themselves in the

enjoyment of marsh or swamp or barren soil,[444] which remained the sole

relics of their splendid possessions. The judgments of the court were

dissolving ancestral ties, destroying homesteads, and causing the

transference of household gods to distant dwellings. Such are the

inevitable results of an attempt to pry into ancient titles, and to

investigate claims the basis of which lies even a few decades from the

period of the inquisition.

But, while these consequences were unfortunate, they were not likely to

produce political complications so long as the grievances were confined

to members of the citizen body. The vested interests which had been

ignored in the passing of the measure might be brushed aside in its

execution. Had the territory of Italy belonged to Rome, there would have

been much grumbling but no resistance; for effective resistance required

a shadow of legal right. But beyond the citizen body lay groups of

states which were interested in varying degrees in the execution of the

agrarian measure: and their grievances, whether legitimate or not,

raised embarrassing questions of public law. The municipalities composed

of Roman citizens or of half-burgesses had, as we saw, been alarmed at

the introduction of the measure, perhaps through a misunderstanding of

its import and from a suspicion that the land which had been given them

in usufruct was to be resumed. Possibly the proceedings of the

commission may have done something to justify this fear, for the limits

of this land possessed by corporate bodies had probably become very

ill-defined in the course of years. But, although a corporate was

stronger than an individual interest and rested on some public

guarantee, the complaints of these townships, composed as they were of

burgesses, were merely part of the civic question, and must have been

negligible in comparison with the protests of the federate cities of

Italy and the Latins. We cannot determine what grounds the Italian Socii

had either for fear or protest. It is not certain that land had been

assigned to them in usufruct,[445] and such portions of their conquered

territories as had been restored to them by the Roman State were their

own property. But, whether the territories which they conceived to be

threatened were owned or possessed by these communities, such ownership

or possession was guaranteed to them by a sworn treaty, and it is

inconceivable that the Gracchan legislation, the strongest and the

weakest point of which was its strict legality, should have openly

violated federative rights. When, however, we consider the way in which

the public land of Rome ran in and out of the territories of these

allied communities, it is not wonderful that doubts should exist as to

the line of demarcation between state territories and the Roman domain.

Vexed questions of boundaries might everywhere be raised, and the

government of an Italian community would probably find as much

difficulty as a private possessor in furnishing documentary evidence of

title. The fears of the Latin communities are far more comprehensible,

and it was probably in these centres that the Italian revolt against the

proceedings of the commission chiefly originated. The interests of the

Latins in this matter were almost precisely similar to those of the

Romans: and this identity of view arose from a similarity of status. The

Latin colonies had had their territories assigned by Roman

commissioners: and it is probable, although it cannot be proved, that

doubts arose as to the legitimate extent of these assignments in

relation to the neighbouring public land. Many of these territories may

have grown mysteriously at the expense of Rome in districts far removed

from the capital: and in Gaul especially encroachments on the Roman

domain by municipalities or individuals of the Latin colonies most

recently established may have been suspected. But the Latin community

had another interest in the question, which bore a still closer

resemblance to that shown by the Roman burgesses. As the individual

Latin might be a recipient of the favour of the commissioners, so he

might be the victim of their legal claims. The fact that he shared the

right of commerce with Rome and could acquire and sue for land by Roman

forms, makes it practically certain that he could be a possessor of the

Roman domain. So eager had been the government in early times to see

waste land reclaimed and defended, that it could hardly have failed to

welcome the enterprising Latin who crossed his borders, threw his

energies into the cultivation of the public land, and paid the required

dues. Many of the wealthier members of Latin communities may thus have

been liable to the fate of the ejected possessors of Rome; but even

those amongst them whose possessions did not exceed the prescribed limit

of five hundred _jugera_, may have believed that their claims would

receive, or had received, too little attention from the Roman

commission, while the difficulties resulting from the fusion of public

and private land in the same estates may have been as great in these

communities as they were in the territory of Rome. Such grievances

presented no feature of singularity; they were common to Italy, and one

might have thought that a Latin protest would have been weaker than a

Roman. But there was one vital point of difference between the two. The

Roman could appeal only as an individual; the Latin appealed as a member

of a federate state. He did not pause to consider that his grievance was

due to his being half a Roman and enjoying Roman rights. The truth that

a suzerain cannot treat her subjects as badly as she treats her citizens

may be morally, but is not legally, a paradox. The subjects have a

collective voice, the citizens have ceased to have one when their own

government has turned against them. The position of these Latins,

illogical as it may have been, was strengthened by the extreme length to

which Rome had carried her principle of non-interference in ail dealings

with federate allies. The Roman Comitia did not legislate for such

states, no Roman magistrate had jurisdiction in their internal concerns.

By a false analogy it could easily be argued that no Roman commission

should be allowed to disturb their peaceful agricultural relations and

to produce a social revolution within their borders. The allies now

sought a champion for their cause, since the constitution supplied no

mechanism for the direct expression of Italian grievances. The

complaints of individual cities had in the past been borne to the senate

and voiced by the Roman patrons of these towns. Now that a champion for

the confederacy was needed, a common patron had to be created. He was

immediately found in Scipio Aemilianus.[446]

The choice was inevitable and was dictated by three potent

considerations. There was the dignity of the man, recently raised to its

greatest height by the capture of Numantia; there was his known

detachment from the recent Gracchan policy and his forcibly expressed

dislike of the means by which it had been carried through; there was the

further conviction based on his recent utterances that he had little

liking for the Roman proletariate. The news of Gracchus's fall had been

brought to Scipio in the camp before Numantia; his epitaph on the

murdered tribune was that which the stern Hellenic goddess of justice

and truth breathes over the slain Aegisthus:--

So perish all who do the like again.[447]

To Scipio Gracchus's undertaking must have seemed an act of impudent

folly, its conduct must have appeared something worse than madness. In

all probability it was not the agrarian movement which roused his

righteous horror, but the gross violation of the constitution which

seemed to him to be involved in the inception and consequences of the

plan. Of all political temperaments that of the Moderate is the least

forgiving, just because it is the most timorous. He sees the gulf that

yawns at his own feet, he lacks the courage to take the leap, and sets

up his own halting attitude, of which he is secretly ashamed, as the

correct demeanour for all sensible and patriotic men. The Conservative

can appreciate the efforts of the Radical, for each is ennobled by the

pursuit of the impossible; but the man of half measures and

indeterminate aims, while contemning both, will find the reaction from

violent change a more potent sentiment even than his disgust at corrupt

immobility. Probably Scipio had never entertained such a respect for the

Roman constitution as during those busy days in camp, when the incidents

of the blockade were varied by messages describing the wild proceedings

of his brother-in-law at Rome. Yet Scipio must have known that an

unreformed government could give him nothing corresponding to his

half-shaped ideals of a happy peasantry, a disciplined and effective

soldiery, an uncorrupt administration that would deal honestly and

gently with the provincials. His own position was in itself a strong

condemnation of the powers at Rome. They were relying for military

efficiency on a single man. Why should not they rely for political

efficiency on another? But the latter question did not appeal to Scipio.

To tread the beaten path was not the way to make an army; but it was

good enough for politics.

Scipio did not scorn the honours of a triumph, and the victory of

Numantia was followed by the usual pageant in the streets.[448] He was

unquestionably the foremost man of Rome, and senate and commons hung on

his lips to catch some definite expression of his attitude to recent

events, or to those which were stirring men's minds in the present. They

had not long to wait, for a test was soon presented. When in 131 Carbo

introduced his bill permitting re-election to the tribunate, all the

resources of Scipio's dignified oratory were at the disposal of the

senate, and the coalition of his admirers with the voters whom the

senate could dispose of, was fatal to the chances of the bill.[449] Such

an attitude need not have weakened his popularity; for excellent reasons

could be given, in the interest of popular government itself, against

permitting any magistracy to become continuous, But his political

enemies were on the watch, and in one of the debates on the measure care

was taken that a question should be put, the answer to which must either

identify or compromise him with the new radicalism. Carbo asked him what

he thought about the death of Tiberius Gracchus. Scipio's answer was

cautious but precise; "If Gracchus had formed the intention of seizing

on the administration of the State, he had been justly slain." It was

merely a restatement of the old constitutional theory that one who aimed

at monarchy was by that very fact an outlaw. But the answer,

hypothetical as was its expression, implied a suspicion of Gracchus's

aims. It did not please the crowd; there was a roar of dissent. Then

Scipio lost his temper. The contempt of the soldier for the civilian, of

the Roman for the foreigner, of the man of pure for the man of mixed

blood--a contempt inflamed to passion by the thought that men such as he

were often at the mercy of these wretches--broke through all reserve. "I

have never been frightened by the clamour of the enemy in arms," he

shouted, "shall I be alarmed by your cries, ye step-sons of Italy?" This

reflection on the lineage of his audience naturally aroused another

protest. It was met by the sharp rejoinder, "I brought you in chains to

Rome; you are freed now, but none the more terrible for that!" [450] It

was a humiliating spectacle. The most respected man in Rome was using

the vulgar abuse of the streets to the sovereign people; and the man who

used this language was so blinded by prejudice as not to see that the

blood which he reviled gave the promise of a new race, that the mob

which faced him was not a crowd of Italian peasants, willing victims of

the martinet, that the Asiatic and the Greek, with their sordid clothes

and doubtful occupations, possessed more intelligence than the Roman

members of the Scipionic circle and might one day be the rulers of Rome.

The new race was one of infinite possibilities. It needed guidance, not

abuse. Carbo and his friends must have been delighted with the issue of

their experiment. Scipio had paid the first instalment to that treasury

of hatred, which was soon to prove his ruin and to make his following a

thing of the past.

Such was the position of Scipio when he was approached by the Italians.

His interest in their fortunes was twofold. First he viewed them with a

soldier's eye.[451] They were tending more and more to form the flower

of the Roman armies abroad: and, although in obedience to civic

sentiment he had employed a heavier scourge on the backs of the

auxiliaries than on those of the Roman troops before Numantia,[452] the

chastisement, which he would have doubtless liked to inflict on all, was

but an expression of his interest in their welfare. Next he admired the

type for its own sake. The sturdy peasant class was largely represented

here, and he probably had more faith in its permanence amongst the

federate cities than amongst the needy burgesses whom the commissioners

were attempting to restore to agriculture. He could not have seen the

momentous consequences which would follow from a championship of the

Italian allies against the interests of the urban proletariate; that

such a dualism of interests would lead to increased demands on the part

of the one, to a sullen resistance on the part of the other; that in

this mere attempt to check the supposed iniquities of a too zealous

commission lay the germ of the franchise movement and the Social War.

His protection was a matter of justice and of interest. The allies had

deserved well and should not be robbed; they were the true protectors of

Rome and their loyalty must not be shaken. Scipio, therefore, took their

protest to the senate. He respected the susceptibilities of the people

so far as to utter no explicit word of adverse criticism on the Gracchan

measure; but he dwelt on the difficulties which attended its execution,

and he suggested that the commissioners were burdened with an invidious

task in having to decide the disputed questions connected with the land

which they annexed. By the nature of the case their judgments might

easily appear to the litigants as tinged with prejudice. It would be

better, he suggested, if the functions of jurisdiction were separated

from those of distribution and the former duties given to some other

authority.[453] The senate accepted the suggestion, and its

reasonableness must have appealed even to the people, for the measure

embodying it must have passed the Comitia, which alone could abrogate

the Gracchan law.[454] Possibly some recent judgments of the

commissioners had produced a sense of uneasiness amongst large numbers

of the citizen body, and there may have been a feeling that it would be

to the advantage of all parties if the cause of scandal were removed.

Perhaps none but the inner circle of statesmen could have predicted the

consequences of the change. The decision of the agrarian disputes was

now entrusted to the consuls, who were the usual vehicles of

administrative jurisdiction. The history of the past had proved over and

over again the utter futility of entrusting the administration of an

extraordinary and burdensome department to the regular magistrates. They

were too busy to attend to it, even if they had the will. But in this

case even the will was lacking. Of the two consuls Manius Aquillius was

destined for the war in Asia, and his colleague Caius Sempronius

Tuditanus had no sooner put his hand to the new work than he saw that

the difficulties of adjudication had been by no means the creation of

the commissioners. He answered eagerly to the call of a convenient

Illyrian war and quitted the judgment seat for the less harassing

anxieties of the camp.[455] The functions of the commissioners were

paralysed; they seem now to have reached a limit where every particle of

land for distribution was the subject of dispute, and, as there was no

authority in existence to settle the contested claims, the work of

assignation was brought to a sudden close. The masses of eager

claimants, that still remained unsatisfied, felt that they had been

betrayed; the feeling spread amongst the urban populace, and the name of

Scipio was a word that now awoke suspicion and even execration.[456] It

was not merely the sense of betrayal that aroused this hostile

sentiment; the people charged him with ingratitude. Masses of men, like

individuals, love a _protege_ more than a benefactor. They have a pride

in looking at the colossal figure which they have helped to create. And

had not they in a sense made Scipio? Their love had been quickened by

the sense of danger; they had braved the anger of the nobles to put

power into his hands; they had twice raised him to the consulship in

violation of the constitution. And now what was their reward? He had

deliberately chosen to espouse the cause of the allies and oppose the

interests of the Roman electorate. Scipio's enemies had good material to

work upon. The casual grumblings of the streets were improved on, and

formulated in the openly expressed belief that his real intention was

the repeal of the Sempronian law, and in the more far-fetched suspicion

that he meant to bring a military force to bear on the Roman mob, with

its attendant horrors of street massacre or hardly less bloody

persecution.[457]

The attacks on Scipio were not confined to the informal language of

private intercourse. Hostile magistrates introduced his enemies to the

Rostra, and men like Fulvius Flaccus inveighed bitterly against

him.[458] On the day when one of these attacks was made, Scipio was

defending his position before the people; he had been stung by the

charge of ingratitude, for he retorted it on his accusers; he complained

that an ill return was being made to him for his many services to the

State. In the evening Scipio was escorted from the senate to his house

by a crowd of sympathisers. Besides senators and other Romans the escort

comprised representatives of his new clients, the Latins and the Italian

allies.[459] His mind was full of the speech which he meant to deliver

to the people on the following day. He retired early to his sleeping

chamber and placed his writing tablet beside his bed, that he might fix

the sudden inspirations of his waking hours. When morning dawned, he was

found lying on his couch but with every trace of life extinct. The

family inquisition on the slaves of the household was held as a matter

of course. Their statements were never published to the world, but it

was believed that under torture they had confessed to seeing certain men

introduced stealthily during the night through the back part of the

house; these, they thought, had strangled their master.[460] The reason

which they assigned for their reticence was their fear of the people;

they knew that Scipio's death had not appeased the popular fury, that

the news had been received with joy, and they did not wish by invidious

revelations to become the victims of the people's hate. The fears of the

slaves were subsequently reflected in the minds of those who would have

been willing to push the investigation further. There was ground for

suspicion; for Scipio, although some believed him delicate,[461] had

shown no sign of recent illness. A scrutiny of the body is even said to

have revealed a livid impress near the throat.[462] The investigation

which followed a sudden death within the walls of a Roman household, if

it revealed the suspicion of foul play, was usually the preliminary to a

public inquiry. The duty of revenge was sacred; it appealed to the

family even more than to the public conscience. But there was no one to

raise the cry for retribution. He had no sons, and his family was

represented but by his loveless wife Sempronia. His many friends must

indeed have talked of making the matter public, and perhaps began at

once to give vent to those dark suspicions which down to a late age

clouded the names of so many of the dead man's contemporaries. But the

project is said to have been immediately opposed by representatives of

the popular party;[463] the crime, if crime there was, had been no

vulgar murder; a suspicion that violence had been used was an insult to

the men who had fought him fairly in the political field; a _quaestio_

instituted by the senate might be a mere pretext for a judicial murder;

it might be the ruse by which the nobles sought to compass the death of

the people's new favourite and rising hope, Caius Gracchus. Ultimately

those who believed in the murder and pined to avenge it, were

constrained to admit that it was wiser to avoid a disgraceful political

wrangle over the body of their dead hero. But, for the retreat to be

covered, it must be publicly announced by those who had most authority

to speak, that Scipio had died a natural death. This was accordingly the

line taken by Laelius, when he wrote the funeral oration which Quintus

Fabius Maximus delivered over the body of his uncle;[464] "We cannot

sufficiently mourn this death by disease" were words purposely spoken to

be an index to the official version of the decease. The fear of

political disturbance which veiled the details of the tragedy, also

dictated that the man, whom friends and enemies alike knew to have been

the greatest of his age, should have no public funeral.[465]

The government might well fear a scandalous scene--the Forum with its

lanes and porticoes crowded by a snarling holiday crowd, the laudation

of the speakers interrupted by gibes and howls, the free-fight that

would probably follow the performance of the obsequies.

But suppression means rumour. The mystery was profoundly enjoyed by this

and subsequent ages. Every name that political or domestic circumstances

could conveniently suggest, was brought into connection with Scipio's

death. Caius Gracchus,[466] Fulvius Flaccus,[467] Caius Papirius

Carbo[468] were all indifferently mentioned. Suspicion clung longest to

Carbo, probably as the man who had lately come into the most direct

conflict with his supposed victim; even Carbo's subsequent conversion to

conservatism could not clear his name, and his guilt seems to have been

almost an article of faith amongst the optimates of the Ciceronian

period. But there were other versions which hinted at domestic crime.

Did not Cornelia have an interest in removing the man who was undoing

the work of her son, and might she not have had a willing accomplice in

Scipio's wife Sempronia?[469] It was believed that this marriage of

arrangement had never been sanctioned by love; Sempronia was plain and

childless, and the absence of a husband's affection may have led her to

think only of her duties as a daughter and a sister.[470] People who

were too sane for these extravagances, but were yet unwilling to accept

the prosaic solution of a natural death and give up the pleasant task of

conjecture, suggested that Scipio had found death by his own hand. The

motive assigned was the sense of his inability to keep the promises

which he had made.[471] These promises may have been held to be certain

suggestions for the amelioration of the condition of the Latin and

Italian allies.

But it required no conjecture and no suspicion to emphasise the tragic

nature of Scipio's death. He was but fifty-six; he was by far the

greatest general that Rome could command, a champion who could spring

into the breach when all seemed lost, make an army out of a rabble and

win victory from defeat; he was a great moral force, the scourge of the

new vices, the enemy of the provincial oppressor; he was the greatest

intellectual influence in aristocratic Rome, embellishing the staid

rigour of the ancient Roman with something of the humanism of the Greek;

Xenophon was the author who appealed most strongly to his simple and

manly tastes; and his purity of soul and clearness of intellect were

fitly expressed in the chasteness and elegance of his Latin style. The

modern historian has not to tax his fancy in discovering great qualities

in Scipio; the mind of every unprejudiced contemporary must have echoed

the thought of Laelius, when he wrote in his funeral speech "We cannot

thank the gods enough that they gave to Rome in preference to other

states a man with a heart and intellect like this".[472] But the

dominant feeling amongst thinking men, who had any respect for the

empire and the constitution, was that of panic at the loss. Quintus

Metellus Macedonicus had been his political foe; but when the tidings of

death were brought him, he was like one distraught. "Citizens," he

wailed, "the walls of our city are in ruins." [473] And that a great

breach had been made in the political and military defences of Rome is

again the burden of Laelius's complaint, "He has perished at a time when

a mighty man is needed by you and by all who wish the safety of this

commonwealth." These utterances were not merely a lament for a great

soldier, but the mourning for a man who might have held the balance

between classes and saved a situation that was becoming intolerable. We

cannot say whether any definite means of escape from the brewing storm

was present to Scipio's mind, or, if he had evolved a plan, whether he

was master of the means to render it even a temporary success. Perhaps

he had meddled too little with politics to have acquired the dexterity

requisite for a reconciler. Possibly his pride and his belief in the

aristocracy as an aggregate would have stood in his way. But he was a

man of moderate views who led a middle party, and he attracted the

anxious attention of men who believed that salvation would not come from

either of the extremes. He had once been the favourite of the crowd, and

might be again, he commanded the distant respect of the nobility, and he

had all Italy at his side. Was there likely to be a man whose position

was better suited to a reconciliation of the war of jarring interests?

Perhaps not; but at the time of his death the first steps which he had

taken had only widened the horizon of war. He found a struggle between

the commons and the nobles; he emphasised, although he had not created,

the new struggle between the commons and Italy. His next step would have

been decisive, but this he was not fated to take.

When we turn from the history of the agrarian movement and its

unexpected consequences to other items in the internal fortunes of Rome

during this period, we find that Tiberius Gracchus had left another

legacy to the State. This was the idea of a magistracy which, freed from

the restraint of consulting the senate, should busy itself with

political reform, remove on its own initiative the obstacles which the

constitution threw in the path of its progress, and effect the

regeneration of Rome and even of Italy by means of ordinances elicited

from the people. The social question was here as elsewhere the efficient

cause; but it left results which seemed strangely disproportionate to

their source. The career of Gracchus had shown that the leadership of

the people was encumbered by two weaknesses. These were the packing of

assemblies by dependants of the rich, whose votes were known and whose

voices were therefore under control, and the impossibility of

re-election to office, which rendered a continuity of policy on the part

of the demagogue impossible. It was the business of the tribunate of

Carbo to remove both these hindrances to popular power. His first

proposal was to introduce voting by ballot in the legislative

assemblies;[474] it was one that could not easily be resisted, since the

principle of the ballot had already been recognised in elections, and in

all judicial processes with the exception of trials for treason. These

measures seem to have had the support of the party of moderate reform:

and Scipio and his friends probably offered no resistance to the new

application of the principle. Without their support, and unprovided with

arguments which might excite the fears or jealousy of the people, the

nobility was powerless: and the bill, therefore, easily became law. The

change thus introduced was unquestionably a great one. Hitherto the

country voters had been the most independent; now the members of the

urban proletariate were equally free, and from this time forth the voice

of the city could find an expression uninfluenced by the smiles or

frowns of wealthy patrons. The ballot produced its intended effect more

fully in legislation than in election; its introduction into the latter

sphere caused the nobility to become purchasers instead of directors;

but it was seldom that a law affected individual interests so directly

as to make a bargain for votes desirable. The chief bribery found in the

legislative assemblies was contained in the proposal submitted by the

demagogue.

Carbo's second proposal, that immediate and indefinite re-election to

the tribunate should be permitted, was not recommended on the same

grounds of precedent or reason. The analogies of the Roman constitution

were opposed to it, and the rules against the perpetuity of office which

limited the patrician magistracies, and made even a single re-election

to the consulship illegal,[475] while framed in support of aristocratic

government, had had as their pretext the security of the Republic, and

therefore ostensibly of popular freedom and control. Again, the people

might be reminded that the tribunate was not always a power friendly to

their interests, and that the veto which blocked the expression of their

will might be continued to a second year by the obstinate persistence of

a minority of voters. Excellent arguments of a popular kind could be,

and probably were, employed against the proposal. Certainly the

sentiment which really animated the opposition could have found little

favour with the masses, who ultimately voted for the rejection of the

bill. All adherents of senatorial government must have seen in the

success of the measure the threat of a permanent opposition, the

possibility of the rise of official demagogues of the Greek type,

monarchs in reality though, not in name, the proximity of a Gracchan

movement unhampered by the weakness which had led to Gracchus's fall. It

is easier for an electorate to maintain a principle by the maintenance

of a personality than to show its fervour for a creed by submitting new

and untried exponents to a rigid confession of faith. The senate knew

that causes wax and wane with the men who have formulated them, and it

had always been more afraid of individuals than of masses. Scipio's view

of the Gracchan movement and his acceptance of the cardinal maxims of

existing statecraft, prepare us for the attitude which he assumed on

this occasion. His speech against the measure was believed to have been

decisive in turning the scale. He was supported by his henchmen, and the

faithful Laelius also gave utterance to the protests of the moderates

against the unwelcome innovation. This victory, if decisive, would have

made the career of Caius Gracchus impossible--a career which, while it

fully justified the attitude of the opposition, more than fulfilled the

designs of the advocates of the change. But the triumph was evanescent.

Within the next eight years re-election to the tribunate was rendered

possible under certain circumstances. The successful proposal is said to

have taken the form of permitting any one to be chosen, if the number of

candidates fell short of the ten places which were to be filled.[476]

This arrangement was probably represented as a corollary of the ancient

religious injunction which forbade the outgoing tribunes to leave the

Plebs unprovided with guardians; and this presentment of the case

probably weakened the arguments of the opposition. The aristocratic

party could hardly have misconceived the import of the change. It was

intended that a party which desired the re-election of a tribune should,

by withdrawing some of its candidates at the last moment,[477] qualify

him for reinvestiture with the magistracy.

The party of reform were rightly advised in attempting to secure an

adequate mechanism for the fulfilment of a democratic programme before

they put their wishes into shape. That they were less fortunate in the

proposals that they formulated, was due to the fact that these proposals

were at least as much the result of necessity as of deliberate choice.

The agrarian question was still working its wicked will. It hung like an

incubus round the necks of democrats and forced them into most

undemocratic paths. The legacy left by Scipio had become the burdensome

inheritance of his foes. Italian claims were now the impasse which

stopped the present distribution and the future acquisition of land. The

minds of many were led to inquire whether it might not be possible to

strike a bargain with the allies, and thus began that mischievous

co-operation between a party in Rome and the protected towns in Italy,

which suggested hopes that could not be satisfied, led to open revolt as

the result of the disappointment engendered by failure, and might easily

be interpreted as veiling treasonable designs against the Roman State,

The franchise was to be offered to the Italian towns on condition that

they waived their rights in the public land.[478] The details of the

bargain were probably unknown, even to contemporaries, for the

negotiations demanded secrecy; but it is clear that the arrangements

must have been at once general and complex; for no organisation is

likely to have existed that could bind each Italian township to the

agreement, nor could any town have undertaken to prejudice all the

varying rights of its individual citizens. When the Italians eagerly

accepted the offer, a pledge must have been got from their leading men

that the local governments would not press their claims to the disputed

land as an international question; for it was under this aspect that the

dispute presented the gravest difficulties. The commons of these states

might be comforted by the assurance that, when they had become Roman

citizens, they would themselves be entitled to share in the

assignations. These negotiations, which may have extended over two or

three years, ended by bringing crowds of Italians to Rome. They had no

votes; but the moral influence of their presence was very great. They

could applaud or hiss the speakers in the informal gatherings of the

Contio; it was not impossible that in the last resort they might lend

physical aid to that section of the democrats which had advocated their

cause. It might even have been possible to manufacture votes for some of

these immigrants. A Latin domiciled in Rome always enjoyed a limited

suffrage in the Comitia, and a pretended domicile might easily be

invented for a temporary resident. Nor was it even certain that the

wholly unqualified foreigner might not give a surreptitious vote; for

the president of the assembly was the man interested in the passing of

the bill, and his subordinates might be instructed not to submit the

qualifications of the voters to too strict a scrutiny. It was under

these circumstances that the senate resorted to the device, rare but not

unprecedented, of an alien act. Following its instructions, the tribune

Marcus Junius Pennus introduced a proposal that foreigners should be

excluded from the city.[479] We know nothing of the wording of the act.

It may have made no specific mention of Italians, and its operation was

presumably limited to strangers not domiciled before a certain date.

But, like all similar provisions, it must have contained further

limitations, for it is inconceivable that the foreign trader, engaged in

legitimate business, was hustled summarily from the city. But, however

limited its scope, its end was clear: and the fact that it passed the

Comitia shows that the franchise movement was by no means wholly

popular. A crowd is not so easy of conversion as an individual. Recent

events must have caused large numbers of the urban proletariate to hate

the very name of the Italians, and the idea of sharing the privileges of

empire with the foreigner must already have been distasteful to the

average Roman mind. It was in vain that Caius Gracchus, to whom the

suggestion of his brother was already becoming a precept, tried to

emphasise the political ruin which the spirit of exclusiveness had

brought to cities of the past.[480] The appeal to history and to nobler

motives must have fallen on deaf ears. It is possible, however, that the

personality of the speaker might have been of some avail, had he been

ably supported, and had the people seen all their leaders united on the

question of the day. But there is reason for supposing that serious

differences of opinion existed amongst these leaders as to the wisdom of

the move. Some may have held that the party of reform had merely drifted

in this direction, that the proposal for enfranchisement had never been

considered on its own merits, and that they had no mandate from the

people for purchasing land at this costly price. It may have been at

this time that Carbo first showed his dissatisfaction with the party, of

which he had almost been the accepted leader. If he declined to

accompany his colleagues on this new and untried path, the first step in

his conversion to the party of the optimates betrays no inconsistency

with his former attitude; for he could maintain with justice that the

proposal for enfranchising Italy was not a popular measure either in

spirit or in fact.

It was, therefore, with more than doubtful chances of success that

Fulvius Flaccus, who was consul in the following year, attempted to

bring the question to an issue by an actual proposal of citizenship for

the allies. The details of his scheme of enfranchisement have been very

imperfectly preserved.[481] We are unaware whether, like Caius Gracchus

some three years later, he proposed to endow the Latins with higher

privileges than the other allies: and, although he contemplated the

non-acceptance of Roman citizenship by some of the allied communities,

since he offered these cities the right of appeal to the people as a

substitute for the status which they declined, we do not know whether

his bill granted citizenship at once to all accepting states, or merely

opened a way for a request for this right to come from individual cities

to the Roman people. But it is probable that the bill in some way

asserted the willingness of the people to confer the franchise, and

that, if any other steps were involved in the method of conferment, they

were little more than formal. The fact that the _provocatio_ was

contemplated as a substitute for citizenship is at once a proof that the

old spirit of state life, which viewed absorption as extermination, was

known still to be strong in some of the Italian communes, and that many

of the individual Italians were believed to value the citizenship mainly

as a means of protecting their persons against Roman officialdom. That

the democratic party was strong at the moment when this proposal was

given to the world is shown by the fact that Flaccus filled the

consulship; that it had little sympathy with his scheme is proved by the

isolation of the proposer and by the manner in which the senate was

allowed to intervene. The conferment of the franchise had been proved to

be essentially a popular prerogative;[482] the consultation of the

senate on such a point might be advisable, but was by no means

necessary; for, in spite of the ruling theory that the authority of the

senate should be respected in all matters of legislation, the complex

Roman constitution recognised shades of difference, determined by the

quality of the particular proposal, with respect to the observance of

this rule. The position of Flaccus was legally stronger than that of

Tiberius Gracchus had been. Had he been well supported by men of

influence or by the masses, the senate's judgment might have been set at

naught. But the people were cold, Carbo had probably turned away, and

Caius Gracchus had gone as quaestor to Sardinia. The senate was

emboldened to adopt a firm attitude. They invited the consul to take

them into his confidence. After much delay he entered the senate house;

but a stubborn silence was his only answer to the admonitions and

entreaties of the fathers that he would desist from his purpose.[483]

Flaccus knew the futility of arguing with people who had adopted a

foregone conclusion; he would not even deign to accept a graceful

retreat from an impossible position. The matter must be dropped; but to

withdraw it at the exhortation of the senate, although complimentary to

his peers and perhaps not unpleasing even to the people in their present

humour, would prejudice the chances of the future. In view of better

days it was wiser to shelve than to discard the measure. His attitude

may also have been influenced by pledges made to the allies; to these,

helpless as he was, he would yet be personally faithful. His fidelity

would have been put to a severe test had he remained in Italy; but the

supreme magistrate at Rome had always a refuge from a perplexing

situation. The voice of duty called him abroad,[484] and Flaccus set

forth to shelter Massilia from the Salluvii and to build up the Roman

power in Transalpine Gaul.[485] Perhaps only a few of the leading

democrats had knowledge enough to suspect the terrible consequences that

might be involved in the failure of the proposal for conferring the

franchise. To the senate and the Roman world they must have caused as

much astonishment as alarm. It could never have been dreamed that the

well-knit confederacy, which had known no spontaneous revolt since the

rising of Falerii in the middle of the third century, could again be

disturbed by internal war. Now the very centre of this confederacy, that

loyal nucleus which had been unshaken by the victories of Hannibal, was

to be the scene of an insurrection, the product of hope long deferred,

of expectations recently kindled by injudicious promises, of resentment

at Pennus's success and Flaccus's failure. Fregellae, the town which

assumed the lead in the movement and either through overhaste or faulty

information alone took the fatal step,[486] was a Latin colony which had

been planted by Rome in the territory of the Volsci in the year 328

B.C.[487] The position of the town had ensured its prosperity even

before it fell into the hands of Rome. It lay on the Liris in a rich

vine-growing country, and within that circle of Latin and Campanian

states, which had now become the industrial centre of Italy. It was

itself the centre of the group of Latin colonies that lay as bulwarks of

Rome between the Appian and Latin roads, and had in the Hannibalic war

been chosen as the mouthpiece of the eighteen faithful cities, when

twelve of the Latin states grew weary of their burdens and wavered in

their allegiance.[488] The importance of the city was manifest and of

long-standing, its self-esteem was doubtless great, and it perhaps

considered that its signal services had been inadequately recompensed by

Rome. But its peculiar grievances are unknown, or the particular reasons

which gave Roman citizenship such an excessive value in its eyes. It is

possible that its thriving farmer class had been angered by the agrarian

commission and by undue demands for military service, and, in spite of

the commercial equality with the Romans which they enjoyed in virtue of

their Latin rights, they may have compared their position unfavourably

with that of communities in the neighbourhood which had received the

Roman franchise in full. Towns like Arpinum, Fundi and Formiae had been

admitted to the citizen body without forfeiting their self-government.

Absorption need not now entail the almost penal consequences of the

dissolution of the constitution; while the possession of citizenship

ensured the right of appeal and a full participation in the religious

festivals and the amenities of the capital. It is also possible that, in

the case of a prosperous industrial and agricultural community situated

actually within Latium, the desire for actively participating in the

decisions of the sovereign people may have played its part. But

sentiment probably had in its councils as large a share as reason: and

the fact that this sentiment led to premature action, and that the fall

of the state was due to treason, may lead as to suppose that the Romans

had to deal with a divided people and that one section of the community,

perhaps represented by the upper or official class, although it may have

sympathised with the general desire for the attainment of the franchise,

was by no means prepared to stake the ample fortunes of the town on the

doubtful chance of successful rebellion. A prolonged resistance of the

citizens within their walls might have given the impulse to a general

rising of the Latins. Had Fregellae played the part of a second

Numantia, the Social War might have been anticipated by thirty-five

years. But the advantage to be gained from time was foiled by treason. A

certain Numitorius Pullus betrayed the state to the praetor Lucius

Opimius, who had been sent with an army from Rome. Had Fregellae stood

alone, it might have been spared; but it was felt that some extreme

measure either of concession or of terrorism was necessary to keep

discontent from assuming the same fiery form in other communities. In

the later war with the allies a greater danger was bought off by

concession. But there the disease had run its course; here it was met in

its earliest stage, and the familiar devise of excision was felt to be

the true remedy. The principle of the "awful warning," which Alexander

had applied to Thebes and Rome to Corinth, doomed the greatest of the

Latin cities to destruction. Regardless of the past services of

Fregellae and of the fact that the passion for the franchise was the

most indubitable sign of the loyalty of the town, the government ordered

that the walls of the surrendered city should be razed and that the town

should become a mere open village undistinguished by any civic

privilege.[489] A portion of its territory was during the next year

employed for the foundation of the citizen colony of Fabrateria.[490]

The new settlement was the typical Roman garrison in a disaffected

country. But it proved the weakness of the present regime that such a

crude and antiquated method should have to be employed in the heart of

Latium. Security, however, was perhaps not the sole object of the

foundation. The confiscated land of Fregellae was a boon to a government

sadly in need of popularity at home.

An excellent opportunity was now offered for impressing the people with

the enormity of the offence that had been committed by some of their

leaders, and prosecutions were directed against the men who had been

foremost in support of the movement for extending the franchise. It was

pretended that they had suggested designs as well as kindled hopes. The

fate of the lesser advocates of the Italian cause is unknown; but Caius

Gracchus, against whom an indictment was directed, cleared his name of

all complicity in the movement.[491] The effect of these measures of

suppression was not to improve matters for the future. The allies were

burdened with a new and bitter memory; their friends at Rome were

furnished with a new cause for resentment. If the Roman people continued

selfish and apathetic, a leader might arise who would find the Italians

a better support for his position than the Roman mob. If he did not

arise or if he failed, the sole but certain arbitrament was that of

the sword.

The foreign activity of Rome during this period did not reflect the

troubled spirit of the capital. It was of little moment that petty wars

were being waged in East and West, and that bulletins sometimes brought

news of a general's defeat. Rome was accustomed to these things; and her

efforts were still marked by their usual characteristics of steady

expansion and decorous success. To predicate failure of her foreign

activity for this period is to predicate it for all her history, for

never was an empire more slowly won or more painfully preserved. It is

true that at the commencement of this epoch an imperialist might have

been justified in taking a gloomy view of the situation. In Spain

Numantia was inflicting more injury on Roman prestige than on Roman

power, while the long and harassing slave-war was devastating Sicily.

But these perils were ultimately overcome, and meanwhile circumstances

had led to the first extension of provincial rule over the wealthy East.

The kingdom of Pergamon had long been the mainstay of Rome's influence

in the Orient. Her contact with the other protected princedoms was

distant and fitful; but as long as her mandates could be issued through

this faithful vassal, and he could rely on her whole-hearted support in

making or meeting aggressions, the balance of power in the East was

tolerably secure. It had been necessary to make Eumenes the Second see

that he was wholly in the power of Rome, her vassal and not her ally. He

had been rewarded and strengthened, not for his own deserts, but that he

might be fitted to become the policeman of Western Asia, and it had been

successfully shown that the hand which gave could also take away. The

lesson was learnt by the Pergamene power, and fortunately the dynasty

was too short-lived for a king to arise who should forget the crushing

display of Roman power which had followed the Third Macedonian War, or

for the realisation of that greater danger of a protectorate--a struggle

for the throne which should lead one of the pretenders to appeal to a

national sentiment and embark on a national war. Eumenes at his death

had left a direct successor in the person of his son Attalus, who had

been born to him by his wife Stratonice, the daughter of Ariarathes King

of Cappadocia.[492] But Attalus was a mere boy at the time of his

father's death, and the choice of a guardian was of vital importance for

the fortunes of the monarchy. Every consideration pointed to the uncle

of the heir, and in the strong hands of Attalus the Second the regency

became practically a monarchy.[493] The new ruler was a man of more than

middle age, of sober judgment, and deeply versed in all the mysteries of

kingcraft; for a mutual trust, rare amongst royal brethren in the East,

had led Eumenes to treat him more as a colleague than as a lieutenant.

He had none of the insane ambition which sees in the diadem the good to

which all other blessings may be fitly sacrificed, and had resisted the

invitation of a Roman coterie that he should thrust his suspected

brother from the throne and reign himself as the acknowledged favourite

of Rome. In the case of Attalus familiarity with the suzerain power had

not bred contempt. He had served with Manlius in Galatia[494] and with

Paulus in Macedonia,[495] and had been sent at least five times as envoy

to the capital itself.[496] The change from a private station to a

throne did not alter his conviction that the best interests of his

country would be served by a steady adherence to the power, whose

marvellous development to be the mainspring of Eastern politics was a

miracle which he had witnessed with his own eyes. He had grasped the

essentials of the Roman character sufficiently to see that this was not

one of the temporary waves of conquest that had so often swept over the

unchangeable East and spent their strength in the very violence of their

flow, nor did he commit the error of mistaking self-restraint for

weakness. Monarchs like himself were the necessary substitute for the

dominion which the conquering State had been strong enough to spurn; and

he threw himself zealously into the task of forwarding the designs of

Rome in the dynastic struggles of the neighbouring nations. He helped to

restore Ariarathes the Fifth to his kingdom of Cappadocia,[497] and

appealed to Rome against the aggressions of Prusias the Second of

Bithynia. He was saved by the decisive intervention of the senate, but

not until he had been twice driven within the walls of his capital by

his victorious enemy.[498] His own peace and the interests of Rome were

now secured by his support of Nicomedes, the son of Prusias, who had won

the favour of the Romans and was placed on the throne of his father. He

had even interfered in the succession to the kingdom of the Seleucidae,

when the Romans thought fit to support the pretensions of Alexander

Balas to the throne of Syria.[499] Lastly he had sent assistance to the

Roman armies in the conflict which ended in the final reduction of

Greece.[500] There was no question of his abandoning his regency during

his life-time. Rome could not have found a better instrument, and it was

perhaps in obedience to the wishes of the senate, and certainly in

accordance with their will, that he held the supreme power until his

reign of twenty-one years was closed by his death.[501] Possibly the

qualities of the rightful heir may not have inspired confidence, for a

strong as well as a faithful friend was needed on the throne of

Pergamon. The new ruler, Attalus the Third, threatened only the danger

that springs from weakness; but, had not his rule been ended by an early

death, it is possible that Roman intervention might have been called in

to save the monarchy from the despair of his subjects, to hand it over

to some more worthy vassal, or, in default of a suitable ruler, to

reduce it to the form of a province. The restraint under which Attalus

had lived during his uncle's guardianship, had given him the sense of

impotence that issues in bitterness of temper and reckless suspicion.

The suspicion became a mania when the death of his mother and his

consort created a void in his life which he persisted in believing to be

due to the criminal agency of man. Relatives and friends were now the

immediate victims of his disordered mind,[502] and the carnival of

slaughter was followed by an apathetic indifference to the things of the

outer world. Dooming himself to a sordid seclusion, the king solaced his

gloomy leisure with pursuits that had perhaps become habitual during his

early detachment from affairs. He passed his time in ornamental

gardening, modelling in wax, casting in bronze and working in

metal.[503] His last great object in life was to raise a stately tomb to

his mother Stratonice. It was while he was engaged in this pious task

that exposure to the sun engendered an illness which caused his death.

When the last of the legitimate Attalids had gone to his grave, it was

found that the vacant kingdom had been disposed of by will, and that the

Roman people was the nominated heir.[504] The genuineness of this

document was subsequently disputed by the enemies of Rome, and it was

pronounced to be a forgery perpetrated by Roman diplomats.[505] History

furnishes evidence of the reality of the testament, but none of the

influences under which it was made.[506] It is quite possible that the

last eccentric king was jealous enough to will that he should have no

successor on the throne, and cynical enough to see that it made little

difference whether the actual power of Rome was direct or indirect. It

is equally possible that the idea was suggested by the Romanising party

in his court; although, when we remember the extreme unwillingness that

Rome had ever shown to accept a position of permanent responsibility in

the East, we can hardly imagine the plan to have received the direct

sanction of the senate. It is conceivable, however, that many leading

members of the government were growing doubtful of the success of merely

diplomatic interference with the troubled politics of the East; that

they desired a nearer point of vantage from which to watch the movements

of its turbulent rulers; and that, if consulted on the chances of

success which attended the new departure, they may have given a

favourable reply. It was impossible by the nature of the case to

question the validity of the act. The legatees were far too powerful to

make it possible for their living chattels to raise an effective protest

except by actual rebellion. But, from a legal point of view, a

principality like Pergamon that had grown out of the successful seizure

of a royal estate by its steward some hundred and fifty years before

this time, might easily be regarded as the property of its kings;[507]

and certainly if any heirs outside the royal family were to be admitted

to the bequest, these would naturally be sought in the power, which had

increased its dominions, strengthened its position and made it one of

the great powers of the world. Neglected by Rome the principality would

have become the prey of neighbouring powers; whilst the institution of a

new prince, chosen from some royal house, would, have excited the

jealousy and stimulated the rapacity of the others. The acceptance of

the bequest was inevitable, although by this acceptance Rome was

departing from the beaten track of a carefully chosen policy. It is

hinted that Attalus in his bequest, or the Romans in their acceptance,

stipulated for the freedom of the dominion.[508] This freedom may be

merely a euphemism for provincial rule when contrasted with absolute

despotism; but we may read a truer meaning into the term. Rome had often

guaranteed the liberty of Asiatic cities which she had wrested from

their overlord, she had once divided Macedonia into independent

Republics, she still maintained Achaea in a condition which allowed a

great deal of self-government to many of its towns, and the system of

Roman protectorate melted by insensible degrees into that of provincial

government. It is possible that her treatment of the bequeathed

communities might have been marked by greater liberality than was

actually shown, had not the dominion been immediately convulsed by a war

of independence.

A pretender had appeared from the house of the Attalids. He could show

no legitimate scutcheon; but this was a small matter. If there was a

chance of a national outbreak, it could best be fomented by a son of

Eumenes. Aristonicus was believed to have been born of an Ephesian

concubine of the king.[509] We know nothing of his personality, but the

history of his two years' conflict with the Roman power proves him to

have been no figure-head, but a man of ability, energy and resource. A

strictly national cause was impossible in the kingdom of Pergamon; for

there was little community of sentiment between the Greek coast line and

the barbaric interior. But the commercial prosperity of the one, and the

agricultural horrors of the other, might justify an appeal to interest

based on different grounds. At first Aristonicus tried the sea. Without

venturing at once into any of the great emporia, he raised his standard

at Leucae, a small but strongly defended seaport lying almost midway

between Phocaea and Smyrna, and placed on a promontory just south of the

point where the Hermus issues into its gulf. Some of the leading towns

seem to have answered to his call.[510] But the Ephesians, not content

with mere repudiation, manned a fleet, sailed against him, and inflicted

a severe defeat on his naval force off Cyme.[511] Evidently the

commercial spirit had no liking for his schemes; it saw in the Roman

protectorate the promise of a wider commerce and a broader civic

freedom. Aristonicus moved into the interior, at first perhaps as a

refugee, but soon as a liberator. There were men here desperate enough

to answer to any call, and miserable enough to face any danger. Sicily

had shown that a slave-leader might become a king; Asia was now to prove

that a king might come to his own by heading an army of the

outcasts.[512] The call to freedom met with an eager response, and the

Pergamene prince was soon marching to the coast at the head of "the

citizens of the City of the Sun," the ideal polity which these remnants

of nationalities, without countries and without homes, seem to have made

their own.[513] His success was instantaneous. First the inland towns of

Northern Lydia, Thyatira, and Apollonis, fell into his hands.[514]

Organised resistance was for the moment impossible. There were no Roman

troops in Asia, and the protected kings, to whom Rome had sent an urgent

summons, could not have mustered their forces with sufficient speed to

prevent Aristonicus sweeping towards the south. Here he threatened the

coast line of Ionia and Caria; Colophon and Myndus fell into his power:

he must even have been able to muster something of a fleet; for the

island of Samos was soon joined to his possessions.[515] It is probable

that the co-operation of the slave populations in these various cities

added greatly to his success. His conquests may have been somewhat

sporadic, and there is no reason to suppose that he commanded all the

country included in the wide range of his captured cities and extending

from Thyatira to the coast and from the Gulf of Hermus to that of

Iassus. The forces which he could dispose of seem to have been

sufficiently engaged in holding their southern conquests; there is no

trace of his controlling the country north of Phocaea or of his even

attempting an attack on Pergamon the capital of his kingdom. His army,

however, must have been increasing in dimensions as well as in

experience. Thracian mercenaries were added to his servile bands,[516]

and the movement had assumed dimensions which convinced the Romans that

this was not a tumult but a war. Their earlier efforts were apparently

based on the belief that local forces would be sufficient to stem the

rising. Even after the revolt of Aristonicus was known, they persisted

in the idea that the commission, which would doubtless in any case have

been sent out to inspect the new dependency, was an adequate means of

meeting the emergency. This commission of five,[517] which included

Scipio Nasica, journeyed to Asia only to find that they were attending

on a civil war, not on a judicial dispute, and that the country which

was to be organised required to be conquered. The client kings of

Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia and Pontus, all eager for praise or

for reward, had rallied loyally to the cause of Rome;[518] but the

auxiliary forces that they brought were quite unable to pacify a country

now in the throes of a servile war, and they lacked a commander-in-chief

who would direct a series of ordered operations. Orders were given for

the raising of a regular army, and in accordance with the traditions of

the State this force would be commanded by a consul.

The heads of the State for this year were Lucius Valerius Flaccus and

Publius Licinius Crassus. Each was covetous of the attractive command;

for the Asiatic campaigns of the past had been easy, and there was no

reason to suppose that a pretender who headed a multitude of slaves

would be more difficult to vanquish than a king like Antiochus who had

had at his call all the forces of Asia. The chances of a triumph were

becoming scarcer; here was one that was almost within the commander's

grasp. But there were even greater prizes in store. The happy conqueror

would be the first to touch the treasure of the Attalids, and secure for

the State a prize which had already been the source of political strife;

he would reap for himself and his army a royal harvest from the booty

taken in the field or from the sack of towns, and he would almost

indubitably remain in the conquered country to organise, perhaps to

govern for years, the wealthiest domain that had fallen to the lot of

Rome, and to treat like a king with the monarchs of the protected states

around. These attractions were sufficient to overcome the religious

scruples of both the candidates; for it chanced that both Crassus and

Flaccus were hampered by religious law from assuming a command abroad.

The one was chief pontiff and the other the Flamen of Mars; and, if the

objections were felt or pressed, the obvious candidate for the Asiatic

campaign was Scipio Aemilianus, the only tried general of the time. But

Scipio's chances were small. The nature of the struggle did not seem to

demand extraordinary genius, and Scipio, although necessary in an

emergency, could not be allowed to snatch the legitimate prizes of the

holders of office.[519] So the contest lay between the pontiff and the

priest. The controversy was unequal, for, while the pontiff was the

disciplinary head of the state religion, the Flamen was in matters of

ritual and in the rules appertaining to the observance of religious law

subject to his jurisdiction. Crassus restrained the ardour of his

colleague by announcing that he would impose a fine if the Flamen

neglected his religious duties by quitting the shores of Italy. The

pecuniary penalty was only intended as a means of stating a test case to

be submitted, as similar cases had been twice before,[520] to the

decision of the people. Flaccus entered an appeal against the fine, and

the judgment of the Comitia was invited. The verdict of the people was

that the fine should be remitted, but that the Flamen should obey the

pontiff.[521] As Crassus had no superior in the religious world, it was

difficult, if not impossible, for the objections against his own tenure

of the foreign command to be pressed.[522] The people, perhaps grateful

for the Gracchan sympathies of Crassus, felt no scruple about dismissing

their pontiff to a foreign land, and readily voted him the conduct

of the war.

The story of the campaign which followed is confined to a few personal

anecdotes connected with the remarkable man who led the Roman armies.

The learning of Crassus was attested by the fact that, when he held a

court in Asia, he could not only deliver his judgments in Greek, but

adapt his discourse to the dialect of the different litigants.[523] His

discipline was severe but indiscriminating; it displayed the rigour of

the erudite martinet, not the insight of the born commander. Once he

needed a piece of timber for a battering ram, and wrote to the architect

of a friendly town to send the larger of two pieces which he had seen

there. The trained eye of the expert immediately saw that the smaller

was the better suited to the purpose; and this was accordingly sent. The

intelligence of the architect was his ruin. The unhappy man was stripped

and scourged, on the ground that the exercise of judgment by a

subordinate was utterly subversive of a commander's authority.[524]

Another account represents such generalship as he possessed as having

been diverted from its true aim by the ardour with which, in spite of

his enormous wealth, he followed up the traces of the spoils of

war.[525] But his death, which took place at the beginning of the second

year of his command,[526] was not unworthy of one who had held the

consulship. He was conducting operations in the territory between Elaea

and Smyrna, probably in preparation for the siege of Leucae,[527] still

a stronghold of the pretender. Here he was suddenly surprised by the

enemy. His hastily formed ranks were shattered, and the Romans were soon

in full retreat for some friendly city of the north. But their lines

were broken by uneven ground and by the violence of the pursuit. The

general was detached from the main body of his army and overtaken by a

troop of Thracian horse. His captors were probably ignorant of the value

of their prize; and, even had they known that they held in their hands

the leader of the Roman host, the device of Crassus might still have

saved him from the triumph of a rebel prince and shameful exposure to

the insults of a servile crowd. He thrust his riding whip into the eye

of one of his captors. Frenzied with pain, the man buried his dagger in

the captive's side.[528]

The death of Crassus created hardly a pause in the conduct of the

campaign; for Marcus Perperna, the consul for the year, was soon in the

field and organising vigorous measures against Aristonicus. The details

of the campaign have not been preserved, but we are told that the first

serious encounter resulted in a decisive victory for the Roman

arms.[529] The pretender fled, and was finally hunted down to the

southern part of his dominions. His last stand was made at Stratonicea

in Caria. The town was blockaded and reduced by famine, and Aristonicus

surrendered unconditionally to the Roman power.[530] Perperna reserved

the captive for his triumph, he visited Pergamon and placed on shipboard

the treasures of Attalus for transport to Rome;[531] by these decisive

acts he was proving that the war was over, for yet a third eager consul

was straining every nerve to get his share of glory and of gain. Manius

Aquillius was hastening to Asia to assume a command which might still be

interpreted as a reality;[532] the longer he allowed his predecessor to

remain, the more unsubstantial would his own share in the enterprise

become. A triumph would be the prize of the man who had finished the

war, and perhaps even Aristonicus's capture need not be interpreted as

its close. A scene of angry recrimination might have been the result of

an encounter between the rival commanders; but this was avoided by

Perperna's sudden death at Pergamon.[533] It is possible that

Aristonicus was saved the shame of a Roman triumph, although one

tradition affirms that he was reserved for the pageant which three years

later commemorated Aquillius's success in Asia.[534] But he did not

escape the doom which the State pronounced on rebel princes, and was

strangled in the Tullianum by the orders of the senate.[535]

Aquillius found in his province sufficient material for the prolongation

of the war. Although the fall of Aristonicus had doubtless brought with

it the dissolution of the regular armies of the rebels, yet isolated

cities, probably terrorised by revolted slaves who could expect no mercy

from the conqueror, still offered a desperate resistance. In his

eagerness to end the struggle the Roman commander is said to have shed

the last vestiges of international morality, and the reduction of towns

by the poisoning of the streams which provided them with water,[536]

while it inflicted an indelible stain on Roman honour, was perhaps

defended as an inevitable accompaniment of an irregular servile war. The

work of organisation had been begun even before that of pacification had

been completed. The State had taken Perperna's success seriously enough

to send with Aquillius ten commissioners for the regulation of the

affairs of the new province,[537] and they seem to have entered on their

task from the date of their arrival.[538] There was no reason for delay,

since the kingdom of Pergamon had technically become a province with the

death of Attalus the Third.[539] The Ephesians indeed even antedated

this event, and adopted an era which commenced with the September of the

year 134,[540] the reason for this anticipation being the usual Asiatic

custom of beginning the civil year with the autumnal equinox. The real

point of departure of this new era of Ephesus was either the death of

Attalus or the victory of the city over the fleet of Aristonicus. But,

though the work of organisation could be entered on at once, its

completion was a long and laborious task, and Aquillius himself seems to

have spent three years in Asia.[541] The limits of the province, which,

like that of Africa, received the name of the continent to which it

belonged, required to be defined with reference to future possibilities

and the rights of neighbouring kingdoms; the taxation of the country had

to be adjusted; and the privileges of the different cities proportioned

to their capacity or merits. The law of Aquillius remained in essence

the charter of the province of Asia down to imperial times, although

subsequent modifications were introduced by Sulla and Pompeius. The new

inheritance of the Romans comprised almost all the portion of Asia Minor

lying north of the Taurus and west of Bithynia, Galatia and Cappadocia.

Even Caria, which had been declared free after the war with Perseus,

seems to have again fallen under the sway of the Attalid kings. The

monarchy also included the Thracian Chersonese and most of the Aegean

islands.[542] But the whole of this territory was not included in the

new province of Asia. The Chersonese was annexed to the province of

Macedonia,[543] a small district of Caria known as the Peraea and

situated opposite the island of Rhodes, became or remained the property

of the latter state; in the same neighbourhood the port and town of

Telmissus, which had been given to Eumenes after the defeat of

Antiochus, were restored to the Lycian confederation.[544] With

characteristic caution Rome did not care to retain direct dominion over

the eastern portions of her new possessions, some of which, such as

Isauria, Pisidia and perhaps the eastern portion of Cilicia, may have

rendered a very nominal obedience to the throne of the Attalids. She

kept the rich, civilised and easily governed Hellenic lands for her own,

but the barbarian interior, as too great and distant a burden for the

home government, was destined to enrich her loyal client states.

Aquillius and his commissioners must have received definite instructions

not to claim for Rome any territory lying east of Mysia, Lydia and

Caria; but they seem to have had no instructions as to how the discarded

territories were to be disposed of. The consequence was that the kings

of the East were soon begging for territory from a Roman commander and

his assistants. Lycaonia was the reward of proved service; it was given

to the sons of Ariarathes the Fifth, King of Cappadocia, who had fallen

in the war.[545] Cilicia is also said to have accompanied this gift, but

this no man's land must have been regarded both by donor and recipient

as but a nominal boon. For Phrygia proper, or the Greater Phrygia as

this country south of Bithynia and west of Galatia was called,[546]

there were two claimants.[547] The kings of Pontus and Bithynia competed

for the prize, and each supported his petition by a reference to the

history of the past. Nicomedes of Bithynia could urge that his grandsire

Prusias had maintained an attitude of friendly neutrality during Rome's

struggle with Antiochus. The Pontic king, Mithradates Euergetes,

advanced a more specious pretext of hereditary right. Phrygia, he

alleged, had been his mother's dowry, and had been given her by her

brother, Seleucus Callinicus, King of Syria.[548] We do not know what

considerations influenced the judgment of Aquillius in preferring the

claim of Mithradates. He may have considered that the Pontic kingdom, as

the more distant, was the less dangerous, and he may have sought to

attract the loyalty of its monarch by benefits such as had already been

heaped on Nicomedes of Bithynia. His political enemies and all who in

subsequent times resisted the claim of the Pontic kings, alleged that he

had put Phrygia up to auction and that Mithradates had paid the higher

price; this transaction doubtless figured in the charges of corruption,

on which he was accused and acquitted: and, doubtful as the verdict

which absolved him seemed to his contemporaries and successors, we have

no proof that the desire for gain was the sole or even the main cause of

his decision. Had he considered that the investiture of Nicomedes would

have been more acceptable to the home government, the King of Bithynia

would probably have been willing to pay an adequate sum for his

advocacy. He may have been guilty of a wilful blunder in alienating

Phrygia at all. The senate soon discovered his and its own mistake. The

disputed territory was soon seen to be worthy of Roman occupation.

Strategically it was of the utmost importance for the security of the

Asiatic coast, as commanding the heads of the river valleys which

stretched westward to the Aegean, while its thickly strewn townships,

which opened up possibilities of inland trade, placed it on a different

plane to the desolate Lycaonia and Cilicia. It is possible that the

capitalist class, on whose support the senate was now relying for the

maintenance of the political equilibrium in the capital, may have joined

in the protest against Aquillius's mistaken generosity. But, though the

government rapidly decided to rescind the decision of its commissioners,

it had not the strength to settle the matter once for all by taking

Phrygia for itself. A decree of the people was still technically

superior to a resolution of the senate; it was always possible for

dissentients to urge that the people must be consulted on these great

questions of international interest; and Phrygia became, like Pergamon a

short time before, the sport of party politics. The rival kings

transferred their claims, and possibly their pecuniary offers, from the

province to the capital, and the network of intrigue which soon shrouded

the question was brutally exhibited by Caius Gracchus when, in his first

or second tribunate, he urged the people to reject an Aufeian law, which

bore on the dispute. "You will find, citizens," he urged, "that each one

of us has his price. Even I am not disinterested, although it happens

that the particular object which I have in view is not money, but good

repute and honour. But the advocates on both sides of this question are

looking to something else. Those who urge you to reject this bill are

expecting hard cash from Nicomedes; those who urge its acceptance are

looking for the price which Mithradates will pay for what he calls his

own; this will be their reward. And, as for the members of the

government who maintain a studious reserve on this question, they are

the keenest bargainers of all; their silence simply means that they are

being paid by every one and cheating every one." This cynical

description of the political situation was pointed by a quotation of the

retort of Demades to the successful tragedian "Are you so proud of

having got a talent for speaking? why, I got ten talents from the king

for holding my peace".[549] This sketch was probably more witty than

true; condemnation, when it becomes universal, ceases to be convincing,

and cynicism, when it exceeds a certain degree, is merely the revelation

of a diseased or affected mental attitude. Gracchus was too good a

pleader to be a fair observer. But the suspicion revealed by the

diatribe may have been based on fact; the envoys of the kings may have

brought something weightier than words or documents, only to find that

the balance of their gilded arguments was so perfect that the original

objection to Phrygia being given to any Eastern potentate was the only

issue which could still be supported with conviction. Yet the government

still declined to annex. Its hesitancy was probably due to its

unwillingness to see a new Eastern province handed over to the

equestrian tax-farmers, to whom Caius Gracchus had just given the

province of Asia. The fall of Gracchus made an independent judgment by

the people impossible, and, even had it been practicable for the Comitia

to decide, their judgment must have been so perplexed by rival interests

and arguments that they would probably have acquiesced in the equivocal

decision of the senate. This decision was that Phrygia should be

free.[550] It was to be open to the Roman capitalist as a trader, but

not as a collector; it was not to be the scene of official corruption or

regal aggrandisement. It was to be an aggregate of protected states

possessing no central government of its own. Yet some central control

was essential; and this was perhaps secured by attaching Phrygia to the

province of Asia in the same loose condition of dependence in which

Achaea had been attached to Macedonia. In one other particular the

settlement of Aquillius was not final. We shall find that motives of

maritime security soon forced Rome to create a province of Cilicia, and

it seems that for this purpose a portion of the gift which had been just

made to the kings of Cappadocia was subsequently resumed by Rome. The

old Pergamene possessions in Western Cilicia were probably joined to

some towns of Pamphylia to form the kernel of the new province. When

Rome had divested herself of the superfluous accessories of her bequest,

a noble residue still remained. Mysia, Lydia and Caria with their

magnificent coast cities, rich in art, and inexhaustible in wealth,

formed, with most of the islands off the coast,[551] that "corrupting"

province which became the Favourite resort of the refined and the

desperate resource of the needy. Its treasures were to add a new word to

the Roman vocabulary of wealth;[552] its luxury was to give a new

stimulus to the art of living and to add a new craving or two to the

insatiable appetite for enjoyment; while the servility of its population

was to create a new type of Roman ruler in the man who for one glorious

year wielded the power of a Pergamene despot, without the restraint of

kingly traditions or the continence induced by an assured tenure

of rule.

The western world witnessed the beginning of an equally remarkable

change. On both sides of Italy accident was laying the foundation for a

steady advance to the North, and forcing the Romans into contact with

peoples, whose subjection would never have been sought except from

purely defensive motives. The Iapudes and Histri at the head of the

Adriatic were the objects of a campaign of the consul Tuditanus,[553]

while four years later Fulvius Flaccus commenced operations amongst the

Gauls and Ligurians beyond the Alps,[554] which were to find their

completion seventy-five years later in the conquests of Caesar. But

neither of these enterprises can be intelligently considered in

isolation; their significance lies in the necessity of their renewal,

and even the proximate results to which they led would carry us far

beyond the limits of the period which we are considering. The events

completely enclosed within these limits are of subordinate importance.

They are a war in Sardinia and the conquest of the Balearic isles. The

former engaged the attention of Lucius Aurelius Orestes as consul in 126

and as proconsul in the following year.[555] It is perhaps only the

facts that a consul was deemed necessary for the administration of the

island, and that he attained a triumph for his deeds,[556] that justify

us in calling this Sardinian enterprise a war. It was a punitive

expedition undertaken against some restless tribes, but it was rendered

arduous by the unhealthiness of the climate and the difficulty of

procuring adequate supplies for the suffering Roman troops.[557] The

annexation of the Balearic islands with their thirty thousand

inhabitants[558] may have been regarded as a geographical necessity, and

certainly resulted in a military advantage. Although the Carthaginians

had had frequent intercourse with these islands and a Port of the

smaller of the two still bears a Punic name,[559] they had done little

to civilise the native inhabitants. Perhaps the value attached to the

military gifts of the islanders contributed to preserve them in a state

of nature; for culture might have diminished that marvellous skill with

the sling,[560] which was once at the service of the Carthaginian, and

afterwards of the Roman, armies. But, in spite of their prowess, the

Baliares were not a fierce people. They would allow no gold or silver to

enter their country,[561] probably in order that no temptation might be

offered to pirates or rapacious traders.[562] Their civilisation

represented the matriarchal stage; their marriage customs expressed the

survival of polyandric union; they were tenacious of the lives of their

women, and even invested the money which they gained on military service

in the purchase of female captives.[563] They made excellent

mercenaries, but shunned either war or commerce with the neighbouring

peoples, and the only excuse for Roman aggression was that a small

proportion of the peaceful inhabitants had lent themselves to piratical

pursuits.[564] The expedition was led by the consul Quintus Caecilius

Metellus and resulted in a facile conquest. The ships of the invaders

were protected by hides stretched above the decks to guard against the

cloud of well-directed missiles;[565] but, once a landing had been

effected, the natives, clad only in skins, with small shields and light

javelins as their sole defensive weapons, could offer no effective

resistance at close quarters and were easily put to rout. For the

security of the new possessions Metellus adopted the device, still rare

in the case of transmarine dependencies, of planting colonies on the

conquered land. Palma and Pollentia were founded, as townships of Roman

citizens, on the larger island; the new settlers being drawn from Romans

who were induced to leave their homes in the south of Spain.[566] This

unusual effort in the direction of Romanisation was rendered necessary

by the wholly barbarous character of the country; and the introduction

into the Balearic isles of the Latin language and culture was a better

justification than the easy victory for Metellus's triumph and his

assumption of the surname of "Baliaricus".[567] The islands flourished

under Roman rule. They produced wine and wheat in abundance and were

famed for the excellence of their mules. But their chief value to Rome

must have lain in their excellent harbours, and in the welcome addition

to the light-armed forces of the empire which was found in their warlike

inhabitants.

CHAPTER 4

Rome had lived for nine years in a feverish atmosphere of projected

reform; yet not a single question raised by her bolder spirits had

received its final answer. The agrarian legislation had indeed run a

successful course; yet the very hindrance to its operation at a critical

moment had, in the eyes of the discontented, turned success into failure

and left behind a bitter feeling of resentment at the treacherous

dexterity of the government. The men, in whose imagined interests the

people had been defrauded of their coveted land, had by a singular irony

of fortune been driven ignominiously from Rome and were now the victims

of graver suspicions on the part of the government than on that of the

Roman mob. The effect of the late senatorial diplomacy had been to

create two hostile classes instead of one. From both these classes the

aristocrats drew their soldiers for the constant campaigns that the

needs of Empire involved: and both were equally resentful of the burdens

and abuses of military service, for which no one was officially directed

to suggest a cure. The poorest classes had been given the ballot when

they wanted food and craved a less precarious sustenance than that

afforded by the capricious benevolence of the rich. The friction between

the senatorial government and the upper middle class was probably

increasing. The equites must have been casting hungry eyes at the new

province of Asia and asking themselves whether commercial interests were

always to be at the mercy of the nobility as represented by the senate,

the provincial administrators and the courts of justice. It was believed

that governors, commissioners and senators were being bought by the gold

of kings, and that mines of wealth were being lost to the honest

capitalist through the utter corruption of the governing few. The final

threats of Tiberius Gracchus were still in the air, and a vast unworked

material lay ready to the hand of the aspiring agitator. In an ancient

monarchy or aristocracy of the feudal type, where abuses have become

sanctified by tradition, or in a modern nation or state with its

splendid capacity for inertia due to the habitual somnolence of the

majority of its electors, such questions may vaguely suggest themselves

for half a century without ever receiving an answer. But Rome could only

avoid a revolution by discarding her constitution. The sovereignty of

the people was a thesis which the senate dared not attack; and this

sovereignty had for the first time in Roman history become a stern

reality. The city in its vastness now dominated the country districts:

and the sovereign, now large, now small, now wild, now sober, but ever

the sovereign in spite of his kaleidoscopic changes, could be summoned

at any moment to the Forum. Democratic agitation was becoming habitual.

It is true that it was also becoming unsafe. But a man who could hold

the wolf by the ears for a year or two might work a revolution in Rome

and perhaps be her virtual master.

It was no difficult task to find the man, for there was one who was

marked out by birth, traditions, temperament and genius as the fittest

exponent of a cause which, in spite of its intricate complications that

baffled the analysis of the ordinary mind, could still in its essential

features be described as the cause of the people. It is indeed singular

that, in a political civilisation so unkind as the Roman to the merits

of youth, hopes should be roused and fear inspired by a man so young and

inexperienced as Caius Gracchus. But the popular fancy is often caught

by the immaturity that is as yet unhampered by caution and undimmed by

disillusion, and by the fresh young voice that has not yet been attuned

to the poor half-truths which are the stock-in-trade of the worldly

wise. And those who were about Gracchus must soon have seen that the

traces of youth were to be found only in his passion, his frankness, his

impetuous vigour; no discerning eye could fail to be aware of the cool,

calculating, intellect which unconsciously used emotion as its mask, of

a mind that could map and plan a political campaign in perfect

self-confident security, view the country as a whole and yet master

every detail, and then leave the issue of the fight to burning words and

passionate appeals. This supreme combination of emotional and artistic

gifts, which made Gracchus so irresistible as a leader, was strikingly

manifested in his oratory. We are told of the intensity of his mien, the

violence of his gestures, the restlessness that forced him to pace the

Rostra and pluck the toga from his shoulder, of the language that roused

his hearers to an almost intolerable tension of pity or

indignation.[568] Nature had made him the sublimest, because the most

unconscious of actors; eyes, tone, gesture all answered the bidding of

the magic words.[569] Sometimes the emotion was too highly strung; the

words would become coarser, the voice harsher, the faultless sentences

would grow confused, until the soft tone of a flute blown by an

attendant slave would recall his mind to reason and his voice to the

accustomed pitch.[570] Men contrasted him with his gentle and stately

brother Tiberius, endowed with all the quiet dignity of the Roman

orator, and diverging only from the pure and polished exposition of his

cause to awake a feeling of commiseration for the wrongs which he

unfolded.[571] Tiberius played but on a single chord; Caius on many.

Tiberius appealed to noble instincts, Caius appealed to all and his

Protean manifestations were a symbol of a more complex creed, a wider

knowledge of humanity, a greater recklessness as to his means, and of

that burning consciousness, which Tiberius had not, that there were

personal wrongs to be avenged as well as political ideas to be realised.

To a narrow mind the vendetta is simply an act of justice; to an

intellectual hater such as Gracchus it is also a work of reason. The

folly of crime but exaggerates its grossness, and the hatred for the

criminal is merged in an exalting and inspiring contempt. Yet the man

thus attuned to passion was, what every great orator must be, a painful

student of the most delicate of arts. The language of the successful

demagogue seldom becomes the study of the schools; yet so it was with

Gracchus. The orators of a later age, whose critical appreciation was

purer than their practice, could find no better guide to the aspirant

for forensic fame than the speeches of the turbulent tribune. Cicero

dwells on the fulness and richness of his flow of words, the grandeur

and dignity of the expression, the acuteness of the thought.[572] They

seemed to some to lack the finishing touch;[573] which is equivalent to

saying that with him oratory had not degenerated into rhetoric. The few

fragments that survive awaken our wonder, first for their marvellous

simplicity and clearness: then, for the dexterous perfection of their

form. The balance of the rhythmic clauses never obscures or overloads

the sense. Gracchus could tell a tale, like that of the cruel wrongs

inflicted on the allies, which could arouse a thrill of horror without

also awakening the reflection that the speaker was a man of great

sensibility and had a wonderful command of commiserative terminology. He

could ask the crowd where he should fly, whether to the Capitol dripping

with a brother's blood, or to the home where the widowed mother sat in

misery and tears;[574] and no one thought that this was a mere figure of

speech. It all seemed real, because Gracchus was a true artist as well

as a true man, and knew by an unerring instinct when to pause. This type

of objective oratory, with its simple and vivid pictures, its brilliant

but never laboured wit, its capacity for producing the illusion that the

man is revealed in the utterance, its suggestion of something deeper

than that which the mere words convey--a suggestion which all feel but

only the learned understand--is equally pleasing to the trained and the

unlettered mind. The polished weapon, which dazzled the eyes of the

crowd, was viewed with respect even by the cultured nobles against whom

it was directed.

Caius's qualities had been tested for some years before he attained the

tribunate, and the promise given by his name, his attitude and his

eloquence was strengthened by the fact that he had no rival in the

popular favour. Carbo was probably on his way to the Optimates, and

Flaccus's failure was too recent to make him valuable in any other

quality than that of an assistant. But Caius had risen through the

opportunities given by the agitation which these men had sustained,

although his advance to the foremost place seemed more like the work of

destiny than of design. When a youth of twenty-one, he had found himself

elevated to the rank of a land commissioner;[575] but this accidental

identification with Tiberius's policy was not immediately followed by

any action which betrayed a craving for an active political career. He

is said to have shunned the Forum, that training school and advertising

arena where the aspiring youth of Rome practised their litigious

eloquence, and to have lived a life of calm retirement which some

attributed to fear and others to resentment. It was even believed by a

few that he doubted the wisdom of his brother's career.[576] But It was

soon found that the leisure which he cultivated was not that of easy

enjoyment and did not promise prolonged repose. He was grappling with

the mysteries of language, and learning by patient study the art of

finding the words that would give to thought both form and wings. The

thought, too, must have been taking a clearer shape: for Tiberius had

left a heritage of crude ideas, and men were trying to introduce some of

these into the region of practical politics. The first call to arms was

Carbo's proposal for legalising re-election to the tribunate. It drew

from Gracchus a speech in its support, which contained a bitter

indictment of those who had been the cause of the "human sacrifice"

fulfilled in his brother's murder.[577] Five years later he was amongst

the foremost of the opponents of the alien-act of Pennus, and exposed

the dangerous folly involved in a jealous policy of exclusion. But the

courts of law are said to have given him the first great opportunity of

revealing his extraordinary powers to the world. As an advocate for a

friend called Vettius, he delivered a speech which seemed to lift him to

a plane unapproachable by the other orators of the day. The spectacle of

the crowd almost raving with joy and frantically applauding the

new-found hero, showed that a man had appeared who could really touch

the hearts of the people, and is said to have suggested to men of

affairs that every means must be used to hinder Gracchus's accession to

the tribunate.[578] The chance of the lot sent him as quaestor with the

consul Orestes to Sardinia. It was with joyful hearts that his enemies

saw him depart to that unhealthy clime,[579] and to Caius himself the

change to the active life of the camp was not unpleasing. He is said

still to have dreaded the plunge into the stormy sea of politics, and in

Sardinia he was safe from the appeals of the people and the entreaties

of his friends.[580] Yet already he had received a warning that there

was no escape. While wrestling with himself as to whether he should seek

the quaestorship, his fevered mind had conjured up a vision. The phantom

of his brother had appeared and addressed him in these words "Why dost

thou linger, Caius? It is not given thee to draw back. One life, one

death is fated for us both, as defenders of the people's rights." His

belief in the reality of this warning is amply attested;[581] but the

sense that he was predestined and foredoomed, though it may have given

an added seriousness to his life, left him as calm and vigorous as

before. Like Tiberius he was within a sphere of his father's influence,

and this memory must have stimulated his devotion to his military and

provincial duties. He won distinction in the field and a repute for

justice in his dealings with the subject tribes, while his simplicity of

life and capacity for toil suggested the veteran campaigner, not the

tyro from the most luxurious of cities.[582] The extent of the services

in Sardinia and neighbouring lands which his name and character enabled

him to render to the State, has been perhaps exaggerated, or at least

faultily stated, by our authority; but, in view of the unquestioned

confidence shown by the Numantines in his brother when as young a man,

there is no reason to doubt their reality. It is said that, when the

treacherous winter of Sardinia had shaken the troops with chills, the

commander sent to the cities asking for a supply of clothing. These

towns, which were probably federate communities and exempt by treaty

from the requisitions of Rome, appealed to the senate. They feared no

doubt the easy lapse of an act of kindness into a burden fixed by

precedent. The senate, as in duty bound, upheld their contention; and

suffering and disease would have reigned in the Roman camp, had not

Gracchus visited the cities in person and prevailed on them to send the

necessary help.[583] On another occasion envoys from Micipsa of Numidia

are said to have appeared at Rome and offered a supply of corn for the

Sardinian army. The request had perhaps been made by Gracchus. To the

Numidian king he was simply the grandson of the elder Africanus: And the

envoys in their simplicity mentioned his name as the Intermediary of the

royal bounty. The senate, we are told, rejected the Proffered help. The

curious parallelism between the present career of Caius and the early

activities of his brother must have struck many; to the senate these

proofs of energy and devotion seemed but the prelude to similar

ingenious attempts to capture public favour at home: and their fears are

said to have helped them to the decision to keep Orestes for a further

year as proconsul in Sardinia.[584] It is possible that the resolution

was partly due to military exigencies; the fact that the troops were

relieved was natural in consideration of the sufferings which they had

undergone, but the retention of the general to complete a desultory

campaign which chiefly demanded knowledge of the country, was a wise and

not unusual proceeding. It was, however, an advantage that, as custom

dictated, the quaestor must remain in the company of his commander.

Gracchus's reappearance in Rome was postponed for a year. It was a

slight grace, but much might happen in the time.

It was in this latter sense that the move was interpreted by the

quaestor. A trivial wrong inflamed the impetuous and resentful nature

which expectation and entreaty had failed to move. Stung by the belief

that he was the victim of a disgraceful subterfuge, Gracchus immediately

took ship to Rome. His appearance in the capital was something of a

shock even to his friends.[585] Public sentiment regarded a quaestor as

holding an almost filial relation to his superior; the ties produced by

their joint activity were held to be indissoluble,[586] and the

voluntary departure of the subordinate was deemed a breach of official

duty. Lapses in conduct on the part of citizens engaged in the public

service, which fell short of being criminal, might be visited with

varying degrees of ignominy by the censorship: and it happened that this

court of morals was now in existence in the persons of the censors Cn.

Servilius Caepio and L. Cassius Longinus, who had entered office in the

previous year. The censorian judgments, although arbitrary and as a rule

spontaneous, were sometimes elicited by prosecution: and an accuser was

found to bring the conduct of Gracchus formally before the notice of the

magistrates. Had the review of the knights been in progress after his

arrival, his case would have been heard during the performance of this

ceremony; for he was as yet but a member of the equestrian order, and

the slightest disability pronounced against him, had he been found

guilty, would have assumed the form of the deprivation of his public

horse and his exclusion from the eighteen centuries. But it is possible

that, at this stage of the history of the censorship, penalties could be

inflicted upon the members of all classes at any date preceding the

lustral sacrifice, that the usual examination of the citizen body had

been completed, and that Gracchus appeared alone before the tribunal of

the censors. His defence became famous;[587] its result is unknown. The

trial probably ended in his acquittal,[588] although condemnation would

have exercised little influence on his subsequent career, for the

ignominy pronounced by the censors entailed no disability for holding a

magistracy. But, whatever may have been the issue, Gracchus improved the

occasion by an harangue to the people,[589] in which he defended his

conduct as one of their representatives in Sardinia. The speech was

important for its caustic descriptions of the habits of the nobility

when freed from the moral atmosphere of Rome. With extreme ingenuity he

worked into the description of the habits of his own official life a

scathing indictment, expressed in the frankest terms, of the

self-seeking, the luxury, the unnatural vices, the rampant robbery of

the average provincial despot. His auditors learnt the details of a

commander's environment--the elaborate cooking apparatus, the throng of

handsome favourites, the jars of wine which, when emptied, returned to

Rome as receptacles of gold and silver mysteriously acquired. Gracchus

must have delighted his audience with a subject on which the masses love

to dwell, the vices of their superiors. The luridness of the picture

must have given it a false appearance of universal truth. It seemed to

be the indictment of a class, and suggested that the speaker stood aloof

from his own order and looked only to the pure judgment of the people.

His enemies tried a new device. They knew that one flaw in his armour

was his sympathy with the claims of the allies. Could he be compromised

as an agent in that dark conspiracy which had prompted the impudent

Italian claims and ended in open rebellion, his credit would be gone,

even if his career were not closed by exile. He was accordingly

threatened with an impeachment for complicity in the movement which had

issued in the outbreak at Fregellae. It is uncertain whether he was

forced to submit to the judgment of a court; but we are told that he

dissipated every suspicion, and surmounted the last and most dangerous

of the obstacles with which his path was blocked.[590] Straightway he

offered himself for the tribunate, and, as the day of the election

approached, every effort was made by the nobility to secure his defeat.

Old differences were forgotten; a common panic produced harmony amongst

the cliques; it even seems as if his opponents agreed that no man of

extreme views should be advanced against him, for Gracchus in his

tribunate had to contend with no such hostile colleague as Octavius. The

candidature of an extremist might mean votes for Gracchus: and it was

preferable to concentrate support on neutral men, or even on men of

liberal views who were known to be in favour with the crowd. The great

_clientele_ of the country districts was doubtless beaten up; and we

know that, on the other side, the hopes of the needy agriculturist, and

the gratitude of the newly established peasant farmer, brought many a

supporter to Gracchus from distant Italian homesteads. The city was so

flooded by the inrush of the country folk that many an elector found

himself without a roof to shelter him, and the place of voting could

accommodate only a portion of the crowd. The rest climbed on roofs and

tiles, and filled the air with discordant party cries until space was

given for a descent to the voting enclosures. When the poll was

declared, it was found that the electoral manoeuvres of the nobility had

been so far successful that Gracchus occupied but the fourth place on

the list.[591] But, from the moment of his entrance on office, his

predominance was assured. We hear nothing of the colleagues whom he

overshadowed. Some may have been caught in the stream of Gracchus's

eloquence; others have found it useless or dangerous to oppose the

enthusiasm which his proposals aroused, and the formidable combination

which he created by the alluring prospects that he held out to the

members of the equestrian order. The collegiate character of the

magistracy practically sank into abeyance, and his rule was that of a

single man. First he gave vent to the passions of the mob by dwelling,

as no one had yet dared to do, on the gloomy tragedy of his brother's

fall and the cruel persecution which had followed the catastrophe. The

blood of a murdered tribune was wholly unavenged in a state which had

once waged war with Falerii to punish a mere insult to the holy office,

and had condemned a citizen to death because he had not risen from his

place while a tribune walked through the Forum. "Before your very eyes,"

he said, "they beat Tiberius to death with cudgels; they dragged his

dead body from the Capitol through the midst of the city to cast it into

the river; those of his friends whom they seized, they put to death

untried. And yet think how your constitution guards the citizen's life!

If a man is accused on a capital charge and does not immediately obey

the summons, it is ordained that a trumpeter come at dawn before his

door and summon him by sound of trumpet; until this is done, no vote may

be pronounced against him. So carefully and watchfully did our ancestors

regulate the course of justice." [592] A cry for vengeance is here

merged in a great constitutional principle; and these utterances paved

the way for the measure immediately formulated that no court should be

established to try a citizen on a capital charge, unless such a court

had received the sanction of the people.[593] The power of the Comitia

to delegate its jurisdiction without appeal is here affirmed; the right

of the senate to institute an inquisition without appeal is here denied.

The measure was a development of a suggestion which had been made by

Tiberius Gracchus, who had himself probably called attention to the fact

that the establishment of capital commissions by the senate was a

violation of the principle of the _provocatio_ Caius Gracchus, however,

did not attempt to ordain that an appeal should be possible from the

judgment of the standing commissions (_quaestiones perpetuae_); for,

though the initiative in the creation of these courts had been taken by

the senate, they had long received the sanction of law, and their

self-sufficiency was perhaps covered by the principle that the people,

in creating a commission, waived its own powers of final jurisdiction.

But there were other technical as well as practical disadvantages in

instituting an appeal from these commissions. The _provocatio_ had

always been the challenge to the decision of a magistrate; but in these

standing courts the actions of the president and of the _judices_ who

sat with him were practically indistinguishable, and the sentence

pronounced was in no sense a magisterial decision. The courts had also

been instituted to avoid the clumsiness of popular jurisdiction; but

this clumsiness would be restored, if their decision was to be shaken by

a further appeal to the Comitia. Gracchus, in fact, when he proposed

this law, was not thinking of the ordinary course of jurisdiction at

all. He had before his mind the summary measures by which the senate

took on itself to visit such epidemics of crime as were held to be

beyond the strength of the regular courts, and more especially the

manner in which this body had lately dealt with alleged cases of

sedition or treason. The investigation directed against the supporters

of his brother was the crucial instance which he brought before the

people, and it is possible that, at a still later date, the inquiry

which followed the fall of Fregellae had been instituted on the sole

authority of the senate and had found a certain number of victims in the

citizen body. Practically, therefore, Gracchus in this law wholly

denied, either as the result of experience or by anticipation, the

legality of the summary jurisdiction which followed a declaration of

martial law.

In the creation of these extraordinary commissions the senate never took

upon itself the office of judge, nor was the commission itself composed

of senators appointed by the house. The jurisdiction was exercised by a

magistrate at the bidding of the senate, and the court thus constituted

selected its assessors, who formed a mere council for advice, at its own

discretion. It was plain that, if the law was to be effective, its chief

sanction must be directed, not against the corporation which appointed,

but against the judge. The responsibility of the individual is the

easiest to secure, and no precautions against martial law can be

effective if a division of authority, or even obedience to authority, is

once admitted. Gracchus, therefore, pronounced that criminal proceedings

should be possible against the magistrate who had exercised the

jurisdiction now pronounced illegal.[594] The common law of Rome went

even further, and pronounced every individual responsible for illegal

acts done at the bidding of a magistrate. The crime which the magistrate

had committed by the exercise of this forbidden jurisdiction was

probably declared to be treason: and, as there was no standing court at

Rome which took cognisance of this offence, the jurisdiction of the

Comitia was ordained. The penalty for the crime was doubtless a capital

one, and by ancient prescription such a punishment necessitated a trial

before the Assembly of the Centuries. It is, however, possible that

Gracchus rendered the plebeian assembly of the Tribes competent to

pronounce the capital sentence against the magistrate who had violated

the prescriptions of his law. But, although the magistrate was the

chief, he appears not to have been the sole offender under the

provisions of this bill. In spite of the fact that the senate as a whole

was incapable of being punished for the advice which had prompted the

magistrate to an illegal course of action, it seems that the individual

senator who moved, or perhaps supported, the decree which led to the

forbidden jurisdiction, was made liable to the penalties of the

law.[595] The operation of the enactment was made retrospective, or was

perhaps conceived by its very nature to cover the past abuses which had

called it into being; for in a sense it created no new crime, but simply

restated the principle of the appeal in a form suited to the proceedings

against which it wished to guard. It might have been argued that

customary law protected the consul who directed the proceedings of the

court which doomed the supporters of Tiberius Gracchus; but the

argument, if used, was of no avail. Popillius was to be the witness to

all men of the reality of this reassertion of the palladium of Roman

liberty. An impeachment was framed against him, and either before or

after his withdrawal from Rome, Caius Gracchus himself formulated and

carried through the Plebs the bill of interdiction which doomed him to

exile.[596] It was in vain that Popillius's young sons and numerous

relatives besought the people for mercy.[597] The memory of the outrage

was too recent, the joyful sense of the power of retaliation too novel

and too strong. All that was possible was a counter demonstration which

should emphasise the sympathy of loyalists with the illustrious victim,

and Popillius was escorted to the gates by a weeping crowd.[598] We know

that condemnation also overtook his colleague Rupilius,[599] and it is

probable that he too fell a victim to the sense of vengeance or of

justice aroused by the Gracchan law.

A less justifiable spirit of retaliation is exhibited by another

enactment with which Gracchus inaugurated his tribunate, although in

this, as in ail his other acts, the blow levelled at his enemies was not

devoid of a deep political significance. He introduced a proposal that a

magistrate who had been deposed by the people should not be allowed to

hold any further office.[600] Octavius was the obvious victim, and the

mere personal significance of the measure does not necessarily imply

that Gracchus was burning with resentment against a man, whose

opposition to his brother had rapidly been forgotten in the degradation

which he had experienced at that brother's hands. Hatred to the injured

may be a sentiment natural to the wrongdoer, but is not likely to be

imparted even to the most ardent supporter of the author of the

mischief. It were better to forget Octavius, if Octavius would allow

himself to be forgotten; but the sturdy champion of the senate, still in

the middle of his career, may have been a future danger and a present

eyesore to the people: Gracchus's invectives probably carried him and

his auditors further than he intended, and the rehabilitation of his

brother's tribunate in its integrity may have seemed to demand this

strong assertion of the justice of his act. But the legality of

deposition by the people was a still more important point. Merely to

assert it would be to imply that Tiberius had been wrong. How could it

be more emphatically proclaimed than by making its consequences

perpetual and giving it a kind of penal character? But the personal

aspect of the measure proved too invidious even for its proposer. A

voice that commanded his respect was raised against it: and Gracchus in

withdrawing the bill confessed that Octavius was spared through the

intercession of Cornelia.[601]

So far his legislation had but given an outlet to the justifiable

resentment of the people, and a guarantee for the security of their most

primitive rights. This was to be followed by an appeal to their

interests and a measure for securing their permanent comfort. The

wonderful solidarity of Gracchus and his supporters, the crowning

triumph of the demagogue which is to make each man feel that he is an

agent in his own salvation, have been traced to this constructive

legislation for the benefit of classes, which ancient authors, writing

under aristocratic prepossessions, have described by the ugly name of

bribery.[602] The poor of Rome, if we include in this designation those

who lived on the margin as well as those who were sunk in the depths of

destitution, probably included the majority of the inhabitants of the

town. The city had practically no organised industries. The retail

trader and the purveyor of luxuries doubtless flourished; but, in the

scanty manufactures which the capital still provided, the army of free

labour must have been always worsted by the cruel competition of the

cheaper and more skilful slave or freedman. But the poor of Rome did not

form the cowed and shivering class that are seen on the streets of a

northern capital. They were the merry and vivacious lazzaroni of the

pavement and the portico, composite products of many climes, with all

the lively endurance of the southerner and intellects sharpened by the

ingenious devices requisite for procuring the minimum sustenance of

life. Could they secure this by the desultory labour which alone was

provided by the economic conditions of Rome, their lot was far from

unhappy. As in most ancient civilisations, the poor were better provided

with the amenities than with the bare necessities of existence. Although

the vast provision for the pleasures of the people, by which the Caesars

maintained their popularity, was yet lacking, and even the erection of a

permanent theatre was frowned on by the senate,[603] yet the capital

provided endless excitement for the leisured mind and the observant eye.

It was for their benefit that the gladiatorial show was provided by the

rich, and the gorgeous triumph by the State; but it was the antics of

the nobility in the law courts and at the hustings that afforded the

more constant and pleasing spectacle. Attendance at the Contiones and

the Comitia not only delighted the eye and ear, but filled the heart

with pride, and sometimes the purse with money. For here the units,

inconsiderable in themselves, had become a collective power; they could

shout down the most dignified of the senators, exalt the favourite of

the moment, reward a service or revenge a slight in the perfect security

given by the secrecy of the ballot. Large numbers of the poorer class

were attached to the great houses by ancestral ties; for the descendants

of freedmen, although they could make no legal claim on the house which

represented the patron of their ancestors, were too valuable as voting

units to be neglected by its representatives, even when the sense of the

obligations of wealth, which was one of the best features of Roman

civilisation, failed to provide an occasional alleviation for the misery

of dependants. From a political point of view, this dependence was

utterly demoralising; for it made the recipients of benefits either

blind supporters of, or traitors to, the personal cause which they

professed. It was on the whole preferable that, if patronage was

essential, the State should take over this duty; the large body of the

unattached proletariate would be placed on a level with their more

fortunate brethren, and the latter would be freed from a dependence

which merely served private and selfish interests. A semi-destitute

proletariate can only be dealt with in three ways. They may be forced to

work, encouraged to emigrate, or partially supported by the State. The

first device was impossible, for it was not a submerged fraction with

which Rome had to deal, but the better part of the resident sovereign

body; the second, although discredited by the senate, had been tried in

one form by Tiberius Gracchus and was to be attempted in another shape

by Caius; but it is a remedy that can never be perfect, for it does not

touch the class, more highly strung, more intelligent, and at the same

time more capable of degradation, which the luxury of the capital

enthrals. The last device had not yet been attempted. It remained for

Gracchus to try it. We have no analysis of his motives; but many

provocatives to his modest attempt at state socialism may be suggested.

There was first the Hellenic ideal of the leisured and independent

citizen, as exemplified by the state payments and the "distributions"

which the great leaders of the old world had thought necessary for the

fulfilment of democracy. There was secondly the very obvious fact that

the government was reaping a golden harvest from the provinces and

merely scattering a few stray grains amongst its subjects. There was

thirdly the consideration that much had been done for the landed class

and nothing for the city proletariate. Other considerations of a more

immediate and economic character were doubtless present. The area of

corn production was now small. Sicily was still perhaps beggared by its

servile war, and the granary of Rome was practically to be found in

Africa. The import of corn from this quarter, dependent as it was on the

weather and controlled purely by considerations of the money-market, was

probably fitful, and the price must have been subject to great

variations. But, at this particular time, the supply must have been

diminished to an alarming extent, and the price proportionately raised,

by the swarm of locusts which had lately made havoc of the crops of

Africa.[604] Lastly, the purely personal advantage of securing a

subsidised class for the political support of the demagogue of the

moment--a consideration which is but a baser interpretation of the

Hellenic ideal--must have appealed to the practical politician in

Gracchus as the more impersonal view appealed to the statesman. He would

secure a permanent and stable constituency, and guard against the

danger, which had proved fatal to his brother, of the absence from Rome

of the majority of his supporters at some critical moment.

From the imperfect records of Gracchus's proposal we gather that a

certain amount of corn was to be sold monthly at a reduced price to any

citizen who offered himself as a purchaser.[605] The rate was fixed at

6-1/3 asses the modius, which is calculated to have been about half the

market-price.[606] The monthly distribution would practically have

excluded all but the urban proletariate, and would thus have both

limited the operation of the relief to the poor of the city and invited

an increase in its numbers. But the details of the measure, which would

be decisive as to its economic character, are unknown to us. We are not

told what proportion the monthly quantity of grain sold at this cheap

rate bore to the total amount required for the support of a family;

whether the relief was granted only to the head of a house or also to

his adult sons; whether any one who claimed the rights of citizenship

could appear at the monthly sale, or only those who had registered their

names at some given time. The fact of registration, if it existed, might

have been regarded as a stigma and might thus have limited the number of

recipients. Some of the economic objections to his scheme were not

unknown to Gracchus; indeed they were pressed home vigorously by his

opponents. It was pointed out that he was enervating the labourer and

exhausting the treasury, The validity of the first objection depends to

a large extent on the unknown "data" which we have just mentioned.

Gracchus may have maintained that a greater standard of comfort would be

secured for the same amount of work. The second objection he was so far

from admitting that he asserted that his proposal would really lighten

the burdens of the Aerarium.[607] He may have taken the view that a

moderate, steady and calculable loss on corn purchased in large

quantities, and therefore presumably at a reduced price, would be

cheaper in the end than the cost entailed by the spasmodic attempts

which the State had to make in times of crisis to put grain upon the

market; and there may have been some truth in the idea that, when the

State became for the first time a steady purchaser, competition between

the publicans of Sicily or the proprietors of Africa might greatly

reduce the normal market price. He does not seem to have been disturbed

by the consideration that the sale of corn below the market price at

Rome was hardly the best way of helping the Italian farmer. The State

would certainly buy in the cheapest market, and this was not to be found

in Italy. But it is probable that under no circumstances could Rome have

become the usual market for the produce of the recently established

proprietors, and that, except at times of unusual scarcity in the

transmarine provinces, imported corn could always have undersold that

which was grown in Italy. Under the new system the Italian husbandman

would find a purchaser in the State, if Sicily and Africa were visited

by some injury to their crops. A vulnerable point in the Gracchan system

of sale was exhibited in the fact that no inquiry was instituted as to

the means of the applicants. This blemish was vigorously brought home to

the legislator when the aged noble, Calpurnius Piso surnamed "the

Frugal," the author of the first law that gave redress to the

provincials, and a vigorous opponent of Gracchus's scheme, gravely

advanced on the occasion of the first distribution and demanded his

appropriate share.[608] The object lesson would be wasted on those who

hold that the honourable acceptance of relief implies the universality

of the gift: that the restraining influences, if they exist, should be

moral and not the result of inquisition. But neither the possibility nor

the necessity of discrimination would probably have been allowed by

Gracchus. It would have been resented by the people, and did not appeal

to the statesmanship, widely spread in the Greek and not unknown in the

Roman world, which regarded it as one of the duties of a State to

provide cheap food for its citizens. The lamentations of a later day

over a pauperised proletariate and an exhausted treasury[609] cannot

strictly be laid to the account of the original scheme, Except in so far

as it served as a precedent; they were the consequence of the action of

later demagogues who, instructed by Gracchus as to the mode in which an

easy popularity might be secured, introduced laws which sanctioned an

almost gratuitous distribution of grain. The Gracchan law contained a

provision for the building of additional store-houses for the

accumulation of the great reserve of corn, which was demanded by the new

system of regular public sales, and the Sempronian granaries thus

created remained as a witness of the originality and completeness of the

tribune's work.[610]

The Roman citizen was still frequently summoned from his work, or roused

from his lethargy, by the call of military service; and the practice of

the conscription fostered a series of grievances, one of which had

already attracted the attention of Tiberius Gracchus. Caius was bound to

deal with the question: and the two provisions of his enactment which

are known to us, show a spirit of moderation which neither justifies the

belief that the demagogue was playing to the army, nor accredits the

view that his interference relaxed the bonds of discipline amongst the

legions.[611] The most scandalous anomaly in the Roman army-system was

the miserable pittance earned by the conscript when the legal deductions

had been made from his nominal rate of pay. His daily wage was but

one-third of the denarius, or five and one-third asses a day, as it had

remained unaltered from the times of the Second Punic War, in spite of

the fact that the conditions of service were now wholly different and

that garrison duty in the provinces for long periods of years had

replaced the temporary call-to-arms which the average Italian campaign

alone demanded; and from this quota was deducted the cost of the

clothing which he wore and, as there is every reason to believe, of the

whole of the rations which he consumed. We should have expected a

radical reformer to have raised his pay or at least to have given him

free food. But Gracchus contented himself with enacting that the

soldier's clothing should be given him free of charge by the State.[612]

Another military abuse was due to the difficulty which commanders

experienced in finding efficient recruits. The young and adventurous

supplied better and more willing material than those already habituated

to the careless life of the streets, or already engaged in some settled

occupation: and, although it is scarcely credible that boys under the

age of eighteen were forced to enlist, they were certainly permitted and

perhaps encouraged to join the ranks. The law of Gracchus forbade the

enlistment of a recruit at an age earlier than the completion of the

seventeenth year.[613] These military measures, slight in themselves,

were of importance as marking the beginning of the movement by which the

whole question of army reform, utterly neglected by the government, was

taken up and carried out by independent representatives of the people.

But a Roman army was to a large extent the creation of the executive

power; and it required a military commander, not a tribune, to produce

the radical alterations which alone could make the mighty instrument,

which had won the empire, capable of defending it.

The last boon of Gracchus to the citizen body as a whole was a new

agrarian law.[614] The necessity of such a measure was chiefly due to

the suspension of the work of the agrarian commission, which had proved

an obstacle to the continued execution of his brother's scheme; and

there is every reason for believing that the new Sempronian law restored

their judicial powers to the commissioners. But experience may have

shown that the substance of Tiberius's enactment required to be

supplemented or modified; and Caius adopted the procedure usually

followed by a Roman legislator when he renewed a measure which had

already been in operation. His law was not a brief series of amendments,

but a comprehensive statute, so completely covering the ground of the

earlier Sempronian law that later legislation cites the law of Caius,

and not that of Tiberius Gracchus, as the authority for the regulations

which had revolutionised the tenure of the public land.[615] The new

provisions seem to have dealt with details rather than with principles,

and there is no indication that they aimed at the acquisition of

territory which had been exempted from the operation of the previous

measure, or even touched the hazardous question of the rights of Rome to

the land claimed by the Italian allies. We cannot attempt to define the

extent to which the executive power granted by the new agrarian law was

either necessary or effective. Certainly the returns of the census

during the next ten years show no increase in the number of registered

citizens;[616] but this circumstance may be due to the steps which were

soon to be taken by the opponents of the Gracchi to nullify the results

of their legislation. It is possible, however, that the new corn law may

have somewhat damped the ardour of the proletariate for a life of

agriculture which would have deprived them of its benefits.

The first tribunate of Caius Gracchus doubtless witnessed the completion

of these four acts of legislation, by which the debt to his supporters

was lavishly paid and their aid was enlisted for causes which could only

indirectly be interpreted as their own. But this year probably witnessed

as well the promulgation of the enactments which were to find their

fulfilment in a second tribunate.[617] Foremost amongst these was one

which dealt with the tenure of the judicial power as exercised, not by

the magistrate, but by the panels of jurors who were interpreters both

of law and fact on the standing commissions which had recently been

created by statute. The interest of the masses in this question was

remote. A permanent murder court seems indeed to have had its place

amongst the commissions; but, even though the corruption of its

president had on one occasion been clearly proved,[618] it is not likely

that senatorial judges would have troubled to expose themselves to undue

influences when pronouncing on the _caput_ of a citizen of the lower

class. The fact that this justice was administered by the nobility may

have excited a certain degree of popular interest; but the question of

the transference of the courts from the hands of the senatorial

_judices_ would probably never have been heard of, had not the largest

item in this judicial competence had a decisively political bearing. The

Roman State had been as unsuccessful as others of the ancient world in

keeping its judicial machinery free from the taint of party influences.

It had been accounted one of the surest signs of popular sovereignty

that the people alone could give judgment on the gravest crimes and

pronounce the capital penalty,[619] and recent political thought had

perhaps wholly adapted itself to the Hellenic view that the government

of a state must be swayed by the body of men that enforces criminal

responsibility in political matters. This vital power was still retained

by the Comitia when criminal justice was concerned with those elemental

facts which are the condition of the existence of a state. The people

still took cognisance of treason in all its degrees--a conception which

to the Roman mind embraced almost every possible form of official

maladministration--and the gloomy record of trials before the Comitia,

from this time onward to the close of the Republic, shows that the

weapon was exercised as the most forcible implement of political

chastisement. But chance had lately presented the opportunity of making

the interesting experiment of assimilating criminal jurisdiction in some

of its branches to that of the civil courts. The president and jurors of

one of the newly established _quaestiones_ formed as isolated a group as

the _judex_ of civil justice with his assessors, or the greater panels

of Centumvirs and Decemvirs. They possessed no authority but that of

jurisdiction within their special department; there seemed no reason why

they should be influenced by considerations arising from issues whether

legislative or administrative. But this appearance of detachment was

wholly illusory, and the well-intentioned experiment was as vain as that

of Solon, when he carefully separated the administrative and judicial

boards in the Athenian commonwealth and composed both bodies of

practically identical individuals. The new court for the trial of

extortion, constituted by the Calpurnian and renewed later by a Junian

law, was controlled by a detachment of the governing body which saw in

each impeachment a libel on its own system of administration, and in

each condemnation a new precedent for hampering the uncontrolled power

exercised in the past or coveted for the future by the individual juror.

This class spirit may have been more powerful than bribery in its

production of suspicious acquittals; and the fact that prosecution was

frankly recognised as the commonest of party weapons, and that speeches

for the prosecution and defence teemed with irrelevant political

allusions, reduced the question of the guilt of the accused to

subordinate proportions in the eyes of all the participants in this

judicial warfare. Charges of corruption were so recklessly hurled at

Rome that we can seldom estimate their validity; but the strong

suspicion of bribery is almost as bad for a government as the proved

offence; and it was certain that senatorial judges did not yield to the

evidence which would have supplied conviction to the ordinary man. Some

recent acquittals furnished an excellent text to the reformer. L.

Aurelius Cotta had emerged successfully from a trial, which had been a

mere duel between Scipio Aemilianus for the prosecution and Metellus

Macedonicus for the defence. The judges had shown their resentment of

Scipio's influence by acquitting Cotta; and few of the spectators of the

struggle seem even to have pretended to believe in the innocence of the

accused.[620] The whole settlement of Asia had been so tainted with the

suspicion of pecuniary influences that, when Manius Aquillius

successfully ran the gauntlet of the courts,[621] it was difficult to

believe that the treasures of the East had not co-operated towards the

result, especially as the senate itself by no means favoured some of the

features of Aquillius's organisation of the province. The legates of

some of the plundered dependencies were still in Rome, bemoaning the

verdict and appealing for sympathy with their helpless fellow

subjects[622] Circumstances favoured the reformer; it was possible to

bring a definite case and to produce actual sufferers before the people;

while the senate, perhaps in consequence of the attitude of some honest

dissentients, was unable to make any effectual resistance to the scandal

and its consequences.

Had Gracchus thought of restoring this jurisdiction to the Comitia, he

would have taken a step which had the theoretical justification that, of

all the powers at Rome, the people was the one which had least interest

in provincial misgovernment. But it would have been a retrograde

movement from the point of view of procedure; it would not necessarily

have abolished senatorial influence, and it would not have attained his

object of holding the government permanently in check by the political

recognition of a class which rivalled the senate in the definiteness of

its organisation and surpassed it in the homogeneity of its interests.

The body of capitalists who had assumed the titular designation of

knights, had long been chafing at the complete subjection of their

commercial interests to the caprice of the provincial governor and the

arbitrary dispositions of the home government. Tiberius Gracchus, when

he revealed the way to the promised land, had probably reflected rather

than suggested the ambition of the great business men to have a more

definite place in the administration assigned them. His appeal had come

too late, or seemed too hopeless of success, to win their support for a

reformer who had outraged their feelings as capitalists; but since his

death ten years for reflection had elapsed, and they were years which

witnessed a vast extension of their potential activity, and aroused an

agonised feeling of helplessness at the subordinate part which they

played both to senate and people when the disposal of kingdoms was in

question. The suggestions for giving them a share in the control of the

provincial world may have been numerous, and their variety is reflected

in the different plans which Caius Gracchus himself advanced. The system

at which his brother had hinted was that of a joint board composed of

the existing senators with the addition of an equal number of equites;

and we have already suggested the possibility that this House of Six

Hundred was intended to be the senate of the future, efficient for all

purposes and not exclusively devoted to the work of criminal

jurisdiction. The same significance may attach to the scheme, which

seems to have been propounded by Caius Gracchus during, or perhaps even

before, his first tenure of the tribunate, and appears at intervals in

proposals made by reformers down to the time of Sulla. Gracchus is said

to have suggested the increase of the senate by the addition of three,

or, as one authority states, six hundred members of the equestrian

order.[623] The proposal, if it was one for an enlarged senate, and not

for a joint panel of _judices_, in which a changing body of equites

would act as a check on the permanent senatorial jurors, must soon have

been seen to be utterly unsuited to its purpose. It is a scheme

characteristic of the aristocrat who is posing as a friend of the

mercantile class and hopes to deceive the vigilance of that keen-sighted

fraternity. To give the senate a permanent infusion of new blood would

be simply to strengthen its authority, while completely cutting away the

links which bound the new members to their original class. Even the

swamping of the existing body by a two-thirds majority of new members

would have been transitory in its effects. The new member of the Curia

would soon have shed his old equestrian views and assumed the outlook of

his older peers. It might indeed have been possible to devise a system

by which the senate would, at the recurring intervals of the _lustra_,

have been filled up in equal proportions from ex-magistrates and

knights: and in this way a constant supply of middle-class sentiment

might have been furnished to the governing body. But even this scheme

would have secured to the elected a life-long tenure of power, and this

was a fatal obstacle both to the intentions of the reformer and the

aspirations of the equestrian order. While the former desired a balance

of power, the latter wished that the interests of their class should be

enforced by its genuine representatives. Both knew that a participation

in the executive power was immaterial, and that all that was needed

might be gained by the possession of judicial authority alone.

Gracchus's final decision, therefore, was to create a wholly new panel

of _judices_ which should be made up exclusively from the members of the

titular class of knights.[624]

It was not necessary or desirable that the judiciary law should make any

mention of a class, or employ the courtesy title of _equites_ to

designate the new judges. The effect might be less invidiously secured

by demanding qualifications which were practically identical with the

social conditions requisite for the possession of titular knighthood.

One of the determining factors was a property qualification, and this

was possibly placed at the modest total of four hundred thousand

sesterces.[625] This was the amount of capital which seems at this

period to have given its possessor the right of serving on horseback in

the army and therefore the claim to the title of _eques_, but it was a

sum that did not convey alarming suggestions of government by

millionaires, but rather pointed to the upper middle class as the

fittest depositaries of judicial power. Not only were magistrates and

ex-magistrates excluded from the Bench, but the disqualification

extended to the fathers, brothers and sons of magistrates and of past or

present senators. The ostensible purpose of these provisions was

doubtless to ensure that the selected jurors should be bound by no tie

of kindred to the individuals who would appear before their judgment

seat; but they must have had the effect of excluding from the new panel

many of the true knights belonging to the eighteen centuries; for this

select corps was largely composed of members of the noble families. A

similar effect would have been produced by the age qualification. The

Gracchan jurors were to be over thirty and under sixty, while a large

number of the military _equites_ were under the former limit of age, in

consequence of the practice of retiring from the corps after the

attainment of the quaestorship or selection into the senate. The

aristocratic element in the equestrian order, if this latter expression

be used in its widest sense to include both the military and civilian

knights, was thus rigorously excluded: and there remained but the men

whose business interests were in no way complicated by respect for

senatorial traditions. The official list of the new jurors _(album

judicum)_ was probably to be made out annually; and there is every

reason to suppose that there was a considerable change of personnel at

each revision, since one of the conditions of membership of the

panel--residence within a mile of Rome--could hardly have been observed

by business men with world-wide interests for any extended period. The

conception which still prevailed that judicial service was a burden

_(munus)_, would alone have led the revising authority to free past

jurors from the service: and the practice must have been welcome to the

capitalists themselves, many of whom may well have desired the share of

power and perhaps of profit which jurisdiction over their superiors

conferred. We are told that the selection of the first panel was

entrusted to the legislator himself;[626] for the future the Foreign

Praetor was to draw up the annual list of four hundred and fifty who

were qualified to hear cases of extortion.[627] It is not known whether

this was the full number of the new jurors, or whether there were

additional members selected by a different authority for the trial of

other offences. It is not probable that the judiciary law of Gracchus

imposed the new class of _judices_ directly on the civil courts. The

_judex_ of private law still retained his character of an arbitrator

appointed by the consent of the parties, and it would have been improper

to restrict this choice to a class defined by statute. But the practical

monopoly of jurisdiction in important cases, which senators seem to have

acquired, was henceforth broken through, and the _judex_ in civil suits

was sometimes taken from the equestrian order.[628]

The superficial aspect of this great change seemed full of promise for

the future. The ample means of the new jurors might be taken as a

guarantee of their purity; their selection from the middle class, as a

security of the soundness and disinterestedness of their judgments.

Perhaps Gracchus himself was the victim of this hope, and believed that

the scourge of the nobility which he had placed in the hands of the

knights, might at least be decorously wielded. The judgment of the

after-world varied as to the mode in which they exercised their power.

Cicero, in advocating the claims of the order to a renewed tenure of

authority, could urge that during their possession of the courts for

nearly fifty years, their judgments had never been tainted by the least

suspicion of corruption.[629] This was a safe assertion if suspicion is

only justified by proof; for the Gracchan jurors seem to have been from

the first exempted from all prosecution for bribery.[630] This legal

exemption is all the more remarkable as Gracchus himself was the author

of a law which permitted a criminal prosecution for a corrupt

judgment.[631] It is difficult to understand the significance of this

enactment, for the magistrates, against whom it was directed, were in

few cases judges of fact, except in the military domain. It could not

have referred to the president of a standing commission who was a mere

vehicle for the judgment of the jury; but Gracchus probably contemplated

the occasional revival of special commissions sanctioned by the people,

and it is possible that even the two praetors who presided over the

civil courts may have been subject to the operation of the law, which

may not have been directed merely against corrupt sentences in criminal

matters, as was subsequently the case when the law was renewed by Sulla.

It is even possible that the law dates from a period anterior to the

creation of the equestrian _judices_; but, even on this hypothesis, the

exclusion of the latter from its operation was something of an anomaly;

for even the civil _judex_ of Rome, on whose analogy the jurors of the

standing commissions had been created, was in early times criminally,

and at a later period at least pecuniarily, liable for an unjust

sentence.[632] We shall elsewhere have occasion to dwell on the value

which the equestrian order attached to this immunity, and we shall see

that its relief at the freedom from vexatious prosecution is of itself

no sign of corruption. One of our authorities does indeed emphatically

assert the ultimate prevalence of bribery in the equestrian courts:[633]

and circumstances may be easily imagined which would have made this

resort natural, if not inevitable. A band of capitalists eager to secure

a criminal verdict, which had a purely commercial significance, would

scarcely be slow to employ commercial methods with their less wealthy

representatives on the Bench, and votes might have been purchased by

transactions in which cash payments played no part. But the corruption

of individuals was of far less moment than the solidarity of interest

and collective cupidity of the mercantile order as a whole. The verdicts

of the courts reflected the judgment of the Exchange. It was even

possible to create a prosecution[634] simply for the purpose of damning

a man who, in the exercise of his authority, had betrayed tendencies

which were interpreted as hostile to capitalism.

The future war between the senate and the equites would not have been

waged so furiously, had not Gracchus given his favoured class the chance

of asserting a positive control, in virtue of an almost official

position, over the richest domains of the Roman world. The fatal bequest

of Attalus was still the plaything of parties; but the prize which

Tiberius had destined for the people was used by Caius to seal his

compact with the knights. The concession, which could not be openly

avowed, was accomplished by means so indirect that its meaning must have

escaped the majority of the voters who sanctioned it, and its

consequences may not have been fully grasped by the legislator himself.

The masses who applauded the new law about the province of Asia, may

have seen in it but a promise of the increase of their revenues; while

the desire of swelling the public finances, which he had so heavily

burdened, of putting an end to the anomalous condition of a district

which was neither free nor governed, neither protectorate nor province,

perhaps even of meeting the wishes of some of the Asiatic provincials,

who preferred regular to irregular exactions, may have been combined in

the mind of Gracchus with the wish to see the equites confront the

senate in yet another sphere. The change which he proposed was one

concerned with the taxation of the province. It cannot be determined how

far he was responsible for the infliction of new burdens on Rome's

Asiatic subjects. The increase of the public revenue, of which he

boasted in one of his speeches to the people,[635] the new harbour dues

with which he is credited,[636] may point to certain creations of his

own; but the end at which he aimed seems to have been mainly a revival

of the system of taxation which had been current in the kingdom of the

Attalids, accompanied by a new and, as he possibly thought, better

system of collection. It could not have been he who first burdened the

taxpayer with the payment of tithes; for this method of revenue was of

immense antiquity in all Hellenised lands and is not likely to have been

unknown to the kings of Pergamon. It is a method that, from its elastic

nature, bears less heavily on the agriculturist than that of a direct

impost; for the payment is conditioned by the size of the crops and is

independent of the changing value of money. The chief objection to the

tax, considered in itself and apart from its accompanying circumstances,

was the immensity of the revenue which it yielded; the sums exacted by

an Oriental despot were unnecessary for the economical administration of

Rome; and the Roman administration of half a century earlier might have

reduced the tithe to a twentieth as it had actually cut down the taxes

of Macedonia to one-half of their original amount. Sicily, indeed,

furnished an example of the tithe system; but the expenses of a

government decrease in proportion to the area of administration, and

Sicily could not furnish the ample harbour dues and other payments in

money, which should have made the commercial wealth of Asia lighten the

burden on the holder of land. The rating of the new province was, in

fact, an admission of a change in the theory of imperial taxation. Asia

was not merely to be self-supporting; her revenues were to yield a

surplus which should supplement the deficit of other lands, or aid in

the support of the proletariate of the capital.

The realisation of this principle may not have imposed heavier burdens

than Asia had known in the time of her kings. But the fiction that the

new dependency was to be maintained in a state of "freedom," which even

after the downfall of Aristonicus seems to have exercised some influence

on Roman policy, had led to a suspension of regular taxation for the

purposes of the central government, which caused the Gracchan proposals

to be regarded by certain political circles at Rome in the light of a

novelty, and probably of a hardship.[637] They could hardly have borne

either character to the Asiatic provincials themselves. The war

indemnities and exactions which followed the great struggle, must have

been a more grievous burden than the system of taxation to which they

were inured: and it is incredible that during the six years which had

elapsed since the suppression of the revolt, or even the three years

that had passed since the completion of Aquillius's organisation, no

revenues had been raised by Rome from her new subjects for

administrative purposes. They probably had been raised, but in a manner

exasperating because irregular. What was needed was a methodical system,

which should abolish at once the fiction of "freedom" and the reality of

the exactions meted out at the caprice of the governor of the moment.

Such a system was supplied by Gracchus, and it was doubtless reached by

the application of the characteristic Roman method of maintaining,

whether for good or ill, the principles of organisation which were

already in existence in the new dependency.

The novelty of the Gracchan system lay, not in the manner of taxation,

but in the method adopted for securing the returns. The greatest

obstacle to the tithe system is the difficulty of instituting an

efficient method of collection. To gather in taxes which are paid in

kind and to dispose of them to the best advantage, is a heavy burden for

a municipality. The desire for a system of contract is sure to arise,

and in an Empire the efficient contractor is more likely to be found in

the central state than in any of its dependencies. It was of this

feeling that Gracchus took advantage when he enacted that the taxes of

Asia should be put up for auction at Rome,[638] and that the whole

province should be regarded as a single area of taxation at the great

auction which the censor held in the capital. It was certain that no

foreign competition could prevail in this sale of a kingdom's revenues.

The right to gather in the tithes could be purchased only by a powerful

company of Roman capitalists. The Decumani of Asia would represent the

heart and brain of the mercantile body; they would form a senate and a

Principate amongst the Publicani.[639] They would flood the province

with their local directors, their agents and their freedmen; and each

station would become a centre for a banking business which would involve

individuals and cities in a debt, of which the tithe was but a fraction.

Nor need their operations be confined to the dominions of Rome; they

would spread over Phrygia, rendered helpless by the gift of freedom, and

creep into the realms of the neighbouring protected kings, safe in the

knowledge that the magic name of "citizen of Rome" was a cover to the

most doubtful transaction and a safeguard against the slightest

punishment. The collectors were liable to no penalties for extortion,

for that crime could be committed only by a Roman magistrate: and their

possession of the courts enabled them to raise the spectre of conviction

on this very charge before the eyes of any governor who might attempt to

check the devastating march of the battalions of commerce.

As merchants and bankers the Knights would be sufficiently protected by

the judicial powers of their class; but their operations as speculators

in tithes needed another safeguard. The contracts made with the censor

would extend over a period of five years, and the keenness of the

competing companies would generally ensure to the State the promise of

an enormous sum for the privilege of farming the taxes. But the tithe

might be reduced in value by a bad harvest or the ravages of war, and

the successful company might overreach itself in its eagerness to secure

the contract. The power of revising such bargains had once assured to

the senate the securest hold which it possessed over the mercantile

class.[640] This complete dependence was now to be removed, and

Gracchus, while not taking the power of decision from the senate,

formulated in his law certain principles of remission which it was

expected to observe.[641]

By these indirect and seemingly innocent changes in the relations of the

mercantile order to the senate, a new balance of power had been created

in the State. The Republic, according to the reflection of a later

writer, had been given two heads,[642] and this new Janus, more ominous

than the old, was believed to be the harbinger of deadly conflict

between the rival powers. In moments of calm Gracchus may have believed

that his reforms were but a renewed illustration of that genius for

compromise out of which the Roman constitution had grown, and that he

had but created new and necessary defences against a recently developed

absolutism; but, in the heat of the conflict into which he was soon

plunged, his vindictive fancy saw but the gloomier aspect of his new

creation, and he boasted that the struggle for the courts was a dagger

which he had hurled into the Forum, an instrument which the possessor

would use to mangle the body of his opponent.[643]

But even these limitations of senatorial prerogative were not deemed

sufficient. A proposal was made which had the ingenious scope of

limiting the senate's control over the more important provinces in

favour of the magistrates, the equestrian order and the people. One of

the most valuable items of patronage which the senate possessed was the

assignment of the consular provinces. They claimed the right of deciding

which of the annual commands without the walls should be reserved for

the consuls of the year, and by their disposition in this matter could

reward a favourite with wealth or power, and condemn a political

opponent to impotence or barren exile. This power had long been employed

as a means of coercing the two chief magistrates into obedience to the

senate's will, and the equestrian order must have viewed with some alarm

the possibility of Asia becoming the prize of the candidates favoured by

the nobility. Had Gracchus declared that the direct election to

provincial commands should henceforth be in the hands of the people, the

change would have been but a slight departure from an admitted

constitutional precedent; for there is little more than a technical

difference between electing a man for an already ascertained sphere of

operations, as had been done in the cases of Terentius Varro and the two

Scipios during the Punic wars, and attaching a special command to an

individual already elected. But Gracchus preferred the traditional and

indirect method. He did not question the right of the senate to decide

what provinces should be assigned to the consuls, but he enacted that

this decision should be made before these magistrates were elected to

office.[644] The people would thus, in their annual choice of the

highest magistrates, be electing not only to a sphere of administration

at home, but to definite foreign commands as well; the prize which the

senate had hitherto bestowed would be indirectly the people's gift, and

the nominees of the Comitia would find themselves in possession of

departments which were presumably the most important that lay at the

disposal of the senate. To secure the finality of the arrangement made

by the senate, and to prevent this body subsequently reversing an

awkward assignment to which it had unwittingly committed itself,

Gracchus ordained that the tribunician veto should not be employed

against the senate's decision as to what provinces should be reserved

for the future consuls;[645] for he knew that the tribune was often the

instrument of the government, and that the suspensory veto of this

magistrate could cause the question of assignment to drag on until after

the consuls were elected, and thus restore to the senate its ancient

right of patronage. The change, although it produced the desired results

of freeing the magistrates from subservience, the mercantile order from

a reasonable fear, and the people from the pain of seeing their

favourite nominee rendered useless for the purposes for which he was

appointed, cannot be said to have added anything to the efficiency of

provincial administration. It may even be regarded as a retrograde step,

as the commencement of that system of routine in provincial

appointments, which regarded proved capacity for the government and

defence of the subjects of Rome as the last qualification necessary for

foreign command. The senate in its award may often have been swayed by

unworthy motives; but it was sometimes moved by patriotic fears. Of the

two consuls it might send the one of tried military ability to a

province threatened by war and dismiss the mere politician to a peaceful

district. But now, without any regard to present conditions or future

contingencies, it was forced to assign departments to men whose very

names were unknown. The people, in the exercise of their elective power,

were acting almost as blindly as the senate; for the issues of a Roman

election were often so ill-defined, its cross-currents, due to personal

influence and the power of the canvass, so strong and perplexing, that

it was rarely possible to predict the issue of the poll. On the other

hand, if there was a candidate so eminent that his return could be

predicted as a certainty, the senate might assign some insignificant

spheres of administration as the provinces of the future consuls; and

thus, in the one case where the decision might be influenced by

knowledge and reason, the Gracchan law was liable to defeat its own

ends. A further weakness of the enactment, from the point of view of

efficiency, was that it made no attempt to alter the mode in which the

designated provinces were to be occupied by their claimants. If the

consuls could not come to an agreement as to which _provincia_ each

should hold, the chance of the lot still decided a question on which the

future fortunes of the empire might turn.

It is a relief to turn from this work of demolition, which in spite of

its many justifications is pervaded by a vindictive suspicion, to some

great constructive efforts by which Gracchus proved himself an

enlightened and disinterested social reformer. He did not view agrarian

assignation as an alternative to colonisation, but recognised that the

industrial spirit might be awakened by new settlements on sites

favourable to commerce, as the agricultural interest had been aroused by

the planting of settlers on the desolated lands. Gracchus was, indeed,

not the first statesman to employ colonisation as a remedy for social

evils; for economic distress and the hunger for land had played their

part from the earliest times in the military settlements which Rome had

scattered over Italy. But down to his time strategic had preponderated

over industrial motives, and he was the first to suggest that

colonisation might be made a means of relief for the better classes of

the urban proletariate, whose activities were cramped and whose energies

were stifled by the crowded life and heated atmosphere of the city. His

settlers were to be carefully selected. They were actually to be men who

could stand the test of an investigation into character.[646] It seems

clear that the new opportunities were offered to men of the lower middle

class, to traders of cramped means or of broken fortunes. His other

proteges had been cared for in other ways; the urban masses who lived on

the margin of destitution had been assisted by the corn law, and the

sturdy son of toil could look for help to the agrarian commission. Of

the many settlements which he projected for Italy,[647] two which were

actually established during his second tribunate[648] occupied maritime

positions favourable for commerce. Scylacium, on the bay which lies

southward of the Iapygian promontory, was intended to revivify a decayed

Greek settlement and to reawaken the industries of the desolated

Bruttian coast; while Neptunia was seemingly the name of the new

entrepot which he founded at the head of the Tarentine Gulf. It was

apparently established on the land which Rome had wrested from Tarentum,

and may have originally formed a town distinct from this Greek city,

once the great seaport of Calabria, but retaining little of its former

greatness since its partial destruction in the Punic wars.[649] Its

Hellenism was on the wane, and this decline in its native civilisation

may account for the fact that the new and the old foundations seem

eventually to have been merged into one, and that Tarentum could receive

a purely Latin constitution after the close of the Social War.[650] Its

purple fisheries and rich wine-producing territory were worthy objects

of the enterprise of Gracchus. Capua was a still greater disgrace to the

Roman administration than Tarentum. Its fertile lands were indeed

cultivated by lessees of Rome and yielded a large annual produce to the

State. But the unredeemed site, on which had stood the pride of Southern

Italy, was still a lamentable witness to the jealousy of the conqueror.

Here Gracchus proposed to place a settlement[651] which through its

commercial promise might amply have compensated for a loss of a portion

of the State's domain. Neither he nor his brother had ever threatened

the distribution of the territory of Capua, and it is, therefore,

probable that in this case he did not contemplate a large agricultural

foundation, but rather one that might serve better than the existing

village to focus the commerce of the Campanian plain. But the revenue

from the domain, and the jealousy of Rome's old and powerful rival,

which might be awakened in all classes, were strong weapons in the hands

of his opponents, and the renewal of Capua was destined to be the work

of a later and more fortunate leader of the party of reform. The

colonising effort of Gracchus was plainly one that had the regeneration

of Italy, as well as the satisfaction of distressed burgesses, as its

object; none of the three sites, on which he proposed to establish his

communes of citizens, possessed at the time an urban centre capable of

utilising the vast possibilities of the area in which it was placed. But

this twofold object was not to be limited to Italy. He dreamed of

transmarine enterprise taking a more solid and more generally useful

form than that furnished by the vagrant trader or the local agent of the

capitalist.[652] The idea and practice of colonisation across the sea

were indeed no new ones; isolated foundations for military purposes,

such as Palma and Pollentia in the Balearic Isles, were being planted by

the direction of the government. But these were small settlements

intended to serve a narrow purpose; they doubtless spread Roman customs

and formed a basis for Roman trade; but, if these motives had entered

into their foundation, the experiment would have been tried on a far

larger scale. In truth the idea of permanent settlement beyond the seas

did not appeal either to the Roman character or to the political

theories of the governing classes. It is questionable whether an

imperial people, forming but a tiny minority amongst its subjects, and

easily reaping the fruits of its conquests, could ever take kindly to

the adventure, the initial hardships, and the lasting exclusion from the

dazzling life of the capital, which are implied in permanent residence

abroad. The Roman in pursuit of gain was a restless spirit, who would

voyage to any land that was, or was likely to be, under imperial

control, establish his banking house and villa under any clime, and be

content to spend the most active years of his life in the exploitation

of the alien; but to him it was a living truth that all roads led to

Rome. The city was the nucleus of enterprise, the heart of commerce; and

such sentiment as the trader possessed was centred on the commercial

life of the Forum and the political devices on which it fed. Such a

spirit is not, favourable to true colonisation, which implies a

detachment from the affairs of the mother city; and it was not by this

means, but rather by the spontaneous evolution of natural centres for

the teeming Italian immigrants already settled in the provinces, that

the Romanisation of the world was ultimately assisted. Consequently no

great pressure had ever been put on the government to induce it to relax

the principles which led it to look with indifference or disfavour on

the foundation of Roman settlements abroad. There was probably a fear

that the establishment of communities of Roman citizens in the provinces

might awaken the desire of the subject states to participate in Roman

rights. It was deemed better that the highest goal of the provincial's

ambition should be the freedom of his state, and that he should never

dream of that absorption into the ruling body to which the Italian alone

was permitted to aspire. Added to this maxim of statecraft was one of

those curious superstitions which play so large a part in imperial

politics and attain a show of truth from the superficial reading of

history. It was pointed out by the wise that colonies had often proved

more potent than their parent states, that Carthage had surpassed Tyre,

Massilia Phocaea, Syracuse Corinth, and Cyzicus Miletus. In the same way

a daughter of Rome might wax greater than her mother, and the city that

governed Italy might be powerless to cope with a rebellious dependency

in the provinces.[653] This was not altogether an idle fear in the

earlier days of conquest; for at any period before the war with Pyrrhus

a transmarine city of Italian blood and customs might have proved a

formidable rival. Nor at the stage which the empire had reached at the

time of Gracchus was it without its justification; for Rome was by no

means a convenient centre for a government that ruled in Asia as well as

in Europe. It is more likely that the dread of rivalry was due to the

singular defects of the aspect and environment of Rome, of which its

citizens were acutely conscious, rather than to the awkwardness of its

geographical position; but, had the latter deficiency been realised, it

would be unfair to criticise the narrowness of view which failed to see

that the change of a capital does not necessarily involve the surrender

of a government. But, whether the objections implied in this

superstition were shadowy or well defined, they could not have been

lessened by the choice which was made by Gracchus and his friends of the

site for their new transmarine settlement. It was none other than

Carthage, the city which had been destroyed because the blessings of

nature had made a mockery of conquest, the city that, if revived, would

be the centre of the granary of Rome. A proposal for the renewal of

Carthage under the name of Junonia was formulated by Rubrius, one of the

colleagues of Gracchus in his first tribunate.[654] The number of the

colonists, which was less than six thousand, was specified in the

enactment, and the proportion of the emigrants to the immense territory

at his disposal rendered it possible for the legislator to assign

unusually large allotments of land. A better and an inferior class of

settlers were apparently distinguished, the former of whom were to hold

no less than two hundred _jugera_ apiece.[655] The recipients of all

allotments were to maintain them in absolute ownership, a system of

tenure which had hitherto been confined to Italy being thus extended to

provincial soil.[656] Caius Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus were named

amongst the triumvirs who were to establish the new colony.[657] It is

probable that Roman citizens were alone considered eligible for the

colonies both in Italy and abroad, when these foundations were first

proposed, and that it was not until Gracchus had embarked on his

enterprise of enfranchising the Latins, that he allowed them to

participate in the benefits of his colonial schemes and thus indirectly

acquire full Roman citizenship.

But the commercial life of Italy might be quickened by other means than

the establishment of colonies whether at home or abroad. Gracchus saw

that the question of rapid and easy communication between the existing

towns was all important. The great roads of Rome betrayed their military

intent in the unswerving inflexibility of their course. The positions

which they skirted were of strategic, but not necessarily of industrial,

importance. To bring the hamlet into connection with the township, and

the township into touch with the capital, a series of good cross-roads

was needed; and it was probably to this object that the law of

Gracchus[658] was directed. But ease of communication may serve a

political as well as a commercial object. The representative character

of the Comitia would be increased by the provision of facilities for the

journey to Rome; and perhaps when Gracchus promulgated his measure,

there was already before his mind the possibility of the extension of

the franchise to the Latins, which would vastly increase the numbers of

the rural electorate. In any case, the measure was one which tended to

political centralisation, and Gracchus must have known that the

attainment of this object was essential to the unity and stability of a

popular government.

The great enterprise was carried through with extraordinary rapidity

during his second tribunate. But the hastiness of the construction did

not impair the beauty of the work. We are told that the roads ran

straight and fair through the country districts, showing an even surface

of quarried stone and tight-packed earth. Hollows were filled up,

ravines and torrent beds were bridged, and mounting-blocks for horsemen

lay at short and easy distances on both sides of the level course.[659]

Although the initial expense of this construction may have borne heavily

on the finances of the State, it is probable that the future maintenance

of the roads was provided for in other ways. The commerce which they

fostered may have paid its dues at toll-gates erected for the

purpose:[660] and the ancient Roman device of creating a class of

settlers on the line of a public road, for the purpose of keeping it in

repair,[661] was probably extended. Road-making was often the complement

of agrarian assignation,[662] and the two may have been employed

concurrently by Gracchus. It was the custom to assign public land on the

borders of a highway to settlers, the tenure of which was secured to

them and their heirs on condition of keeping the road in due repair.

Sometimes their own labour and that of their slaves were reckoned the

equivalent of the usual dues; at other times the dues themselves were

used by the public authorities for the purpose. Gracchus may thus have

turned his agrarian law to an end which was not contemplated by that

of Tiberius.

The execution of the law must have been a heavy blow to the power and

prestige of the senate. Its control of the purse was infringed and it

ceased to be the sole employer of public labour. For Gracchus, in

defiance of the principle that the author of a measure should not be its

executant,[663] was his own road-maker, as his brother Tiberius had been

his own land commissioner. He was the patron of the contractor and the

benefactor of the Italian artisan. The bounties which he now gave were

the reward of labour, and not subject to the criticism which had

attended his earlier efforts for the relief of poverty in Rome; but some

pretended to take the sinister view that the bands of workmen by which

he was surrounded might be employed for a less innocent purpose than the

making of roads.[664].

The proceedings of Gracchus during his first year of office had made it

inevitable that he should hold the tribunate for a second time. Enough

had been performed to win him the ardent support of the masses; enough

had been promised to make his return to office desirable, not only to

the people, but to the expectant capitalists. The legal hindrances to

re-election had been removed, or could be evaded, and the continuity of

power, which was essential to the realisation of an adequate programme

of reform, could now for the first time be secured. In the present state

of public feeling there was little probability of the veto being

employed by any one of his future colleagues, although some of these

would inevitably be moderates or members of the senatorial party. But

Gracchus was eager that his cause should be represented in another

department of the State, which presented possibilities of assistance or

of mischief, and that the spectacle of the tribunate as the sole focus

of democratic sentiment, exalting itself in opposition to the higher

magistracies of the people, should, if possible, be averted. In one of

his addresses to the commons he said he had to ask a favour of them.

Were it granted, he would value it above all things; should they think

good to refuse, he would bear no grudge against them. Here he paused;

the favour remained undisclosed; and he left popular imagination to

revel in the possibilities of his claims. It was a happy stroke; for he

had filled the minds of his auditors with a gratifying sense of their

own boundless power, and with suspicions of illegal ambitions, with

which it was well that they should become familiar, but which one

dramatic moment would for the time dispel. His words were interpreted as

a request for the consulship: and the prevalent opinion is said to have

been that he desired to hold this office in combination with the

tribunate. The time for the consular elections was approaching and

expectation was roused to its highest pitch, when Gracchus was seen

conducting Gaius Fannius into the Forum and, with the assistance of his

own friends, accosting the electors in his behalf.[665] The candidate

was a man whose political temperament Caius had had full opportunities

of studying. As a tribune he had been much under the influence of Scipio

Aemilianus,[666] and as he rose slowly through the grades of curule

rank,[667] he must still have retained his character as a moderate. He

was therefore preferable to any candidate put forward by the optimates:

and the influence of Gracchus secured Fannius the consulship almost at

the moment when, without the trouble of a canvass or even of a formal

candidature, he himself secured his second term of office. His position

was further strengthened by the return of the ex-consul Fulvius Flaccus,

as one of his colleagues in the tribunate.

It was now, when the grand programme was actually being carried through,

and the execution of the most varied measures was being pressed on by a

single hand, that the possibilities of personal government were first

revealed in Rome. The fiery orator was less to be dreaded than the

unwearied man of action, whose restless energy was controlled by a

clearness of judgment and concentration of purpose, which could

distinguish every item of his vast sphere of administration and treat

the task of the moment as though it were the one nearest to his heart.

Even those who hated and feared Gracchus were struck with amazement at

the practical genius which he revealed; while the sight of the leader in

the midst of his countless tasks, surrounded by the motley retinue which

they involved, roused the wondering admiration of the masses.[668] At

one moment he was being interviewed by a contractor for public works, at

another by an envoy from some state eager to secure his mediation; the

magistrate, the artisan, the soldier and the man of letters besieged his

presence chamber, and each was received with the appropriate word and

the kindly dignity, which kings may acquire from training, but men of

kingly nature receive from heaven as a seal of their fitness to rule.

The impression of overbearing violence which had been given by his

speeches, was immediately dispelled by contact with the man. The time of

storm and stress had been passed for the moment, and in the fruition of

his temporary power the true character of Gracchus was revealed. The

pure intellectual enjoyment which springs from the sense of efficiency

and the effective pursuit of a long-desired task, will not be shaken by

the awkward impediments of the moment. All the human instruments, which

the work demands, reflect the value of the object to which they

contribute: and Gracchus was saved from the insolent pride of the

patrician ruler and the helpless peevishness of the mere agitator whom

circumstances have thrust into power, by the fact that his emotional

nature was mastered by an intellect which had outlived prejudice and had

never known the sense of incapacity. By the very character of its

circumstances the regal nature was forced into a style of life which

resembled and foreshadowed that of the coming monarchy. The

accessibility to his friends and clients of every grade was the pride of

the Roman noble, and doubtless Gracchus would willingly have modelled

his receptions on the informal pattern which sufficed the proudest

patrician at the head of the largest _clientele_. But Gracchus's callers

were not even limited to the whole of Rome; they came from Italy and the

provinces: and it was found to be essential to adopt some rules of

precedence, which would produce a methodical approach to his presence

and secure each of his visitors an adequate hearing. He was the first

Roman, we are told, to observe certain rules of audience. Some members

of the crowd which thronged his ante-chamber, were received singly,

others in smaller or in larger groups.[669] It is improbable that the

mode of reception varied wholly with the official or social rank of

those admitted; the nature of the client's business must also have

dictated the secrecy or publicity of the interview; but the system must

have seemed to his baffled enemies a welcome confirmation of their real

or pretended fears--a symptom of the coming, if not actual, overthrow of

Republicanism, the suspicion of which might one day be driven even into

the thick heads of the gaping crowds, who stood by the portals to gaze

at the ever-shifting throng of callers and to marvel at the power and

popularity of their leader. Had Gracchus been content to live in the

present and to regard his task as completed, it is just possible that

the diverse interests which he had so dexterously welded together might

have enabled him to secure, not indeed a continuity of power (for that

would have been as strenuously resisted by the middle as by the upper

class), but immediate security from the gathering conspiracy, the

preservation of his life, and the probability of a subsequent political

career. It is, however, difficult, to conceive that the position which

Gracchus held could be either resigned or forgiven; and, although we

cannot credit him with any conscious desire for holding a position not

admitted by the laws, yet his genius unconsciously led him to identify

the commonwealth with himself, while his mind, as receptive as it was

progressive, would not have readily acquiesced in the view that a

political creation can at any moment be called complete. The

disinterested statesman will cling to power as tenaciously as one

devoured by the most sordid ambition: and even on the lowest ground of

personal security, the possession of authority is perhaps more necessary

to the one than to the other. So indissolubly blended are the power and

the projects of a leader, that it is idle to raise the question whether

personal motives played any part in the project with which Gracchus was

now about to delight his enemies and alienate his friends. He took up

anew the question of the enfranchisement of the Italians--a question

which the merest political tyro could have told him was enough to doom

the statesman who spoke even a word in its favour. But Caius's position

was no ordinary one, and he may have regarded his present influence as

sufficient to induce the people to accept the unpalatable measure, the

success of which might win for himself and his successors a wider

constituency and a more stable following. The error in judgment is

excusable in one who had never veiled his sympathy with the Italian

cause, and had hitherto found it no hindrance to his popularity; but so

clear-sighted a man as Gracchus must have felt at times that he was

staking, not only his own career, but the fate of the programme and the

party which he had built up, on the chance of securing an end, which had

ceased to be regarded as the mere removal of an obstacle and had grown

to be looked on as the coping-stone of a true reformer's work.

The scope of his proposal[670] was more moderate than that which had

been put forward by Flaccus. He suggested the grant of the full rights

of citizenship to the Latins, and of Latin rights to the other Italian

allies.[671] Italy was thus, from the point of view of private law, to

be Romanised almost up to the Alps;[672] while the cities already in

enjoyment of some or all of the private privileges of the Roman, were to

see the one anomaly removed, which created an invidious distinction

between them and the burgess towns, hampered their commerce, and

imperilled their landed possessions. The proposal had the further

advantage that it took account of the possible unwillingness of many of

the federate cities to accept the Roman franchise; such a refusal was

not likely to be made to the offer of Latin rights: for the Latin

community was itself a federate city with its own laws, magistrates and

courts, and the sense of autonomy would be satisfied while many of the

positive benefits of Roman citizenship would be gained. Grades of

privilege would still exist in Italy, and a healthy discontent might in

time be fostered, which would lead all Italian communities to seek

absorption into the great city. Past methods of incorporation might be

held to furnish a precedent; the scheme proposed by Gracchus was hardly

more revolutionary than that which had, in the third and at the

beginning of the second centuries, resulted in the conferment of full

citizenship on the municipalities of half-burgesses. It differed from it

only in extending the principle to federate towns; but the rights of the

members of the Latin cities bore a close resemblance to those of the old

_municipes_, and they might easily be regarded as already enjoying the

partial citizenship of Rome. The conferment of this partial citizenship

on the other Italians, while in no way destroying local institutions or

impairing local privileges, would lead to the possibility of a common

law for the whole of Italy, would enable every Italian to share in the

benefits of Roman business life, and appear in the court of the urban

praetor to defend such rights as he had acquired, by the use of the

forms of Roman law. The tentativeness of the character of Gracchus's

proposal, while recommending it as in harmony with the cautious spirit

of Roman development which had worked the great changes of the past, may

also have been dictated by the feeling that the more moderate scheme

stood a better chance of acceptance by the mob of Rome. All he asked was

that the grievances which had led to the revolt of Fregellae, and the

dangers revealed by that revolt, should be removed. The numbers of the

added citizens would not be overwhelming; for the majority of Italians

all that was asked was the possession of certain private rights, which

had been so ungrudgingly granted to communities in the past. Throughout

the campaign he probably laid more stress on the duty of protecting the

individual than on the right of the individual to power. And the fact

that the protection was demanded, not against the Roman State, but

against an oppressive nobility that disgraced it by a misuse of its

powers, gave a democratic colouring to the demand, and suggested a

community of suffering, and therefore of sympathy, between the donors

and recipients of the gift. Even before his franchise law was before the

world, he seems to have been engaged in educating his auditors up to

this view of the case; for it was probably in the speeches with which he

introduced his law for the better protection of the life of the Roman

citizen, that he illustrated the cruel caprice of the nobility by grisly

stories of the sufferings of the Italians. He had told of the youthful

legate who had had a cow-herd of Venusia scourged to death, as an answer

to the rustic's jesting query whether the bearers of the litter were

carrying a corpse: and of the consul who had scourged the quaestor of

Teanum Sidicinum, the man of noblest lineage in his state, because the

men's baths, in which the consul's wife had elected to bathe, were not

adequately prepared for her reception.[673] Since the objections of the

populace to the extension of the franchise were the result of prejudice

rather than of reason, they might be weakened if the sense of jealousy

and distrust could be diverted from the people's possible rivals to the

common oppressors of Rome and Italy.

The appeal to sentiment might have been successful, had not the most

sordid passions of the mob been immediately inflamed by the oratory of

the opponents of the measure. The most formidable of these opponents was

drawn from the ranks of Gracchus's own supporters; for the franchise

question had again proved a rock which could make shipwreck of the unity

of the democratic party. His _protege_, the consul Fannius, was not

ashamed to appeal to the most selfish instincts of the populace. "Do you

suppose," he said, "that, when you have given citizenship to the Latins,

there will be any room left for you at public gatherings, or that you

will find a place at the games or festivals? Will they not swamp

everything with their numbers?" [674]

Fannius, as a moderate, was an excellent exponent of senatorial views,

and it was believed that many noble hands had collaborated in the

crushing speech which inflicted one of its death-blows on the Gracchan

proposal.[675]

The opportunity for active opposition had at last arrived, and the

senate was emboldened to repeat the measure which four years earlier had

swept the aliens out of Rome. Perhaps in consequence of powers given by

the law of Pennus, the consul Fannius was empowered to issue an edict

that no Italian, who did not possess a vote in the Roman assemblies,

should be permitted within five miles of Rome at the time when the

proposal about the franchise was to be submitted to the Comitia.[676]

Caius answered this announcement with a fiery edict of his own, in which

he inveighed against the consul and promised his tribunician help to any

of the allies who chose to remain in the city.[677] The power which he

threatened to exercise was probably legal, since there is no reason to

suppose that the tribunician _auxilium_ could be interposed solely for

the assistance of members of the citizen body;[678] but he must have

known that the execution of this promise was impracticable, since the

injured party could be aided only by the personal interposition of the

tribune, and it was clear that a single magistrate, burdened with many

cares, and living a life of the most varied and strenuous activity,

could not be present in every quarter of Rome and in a considerable

portion of the surrounding territory. Even the cooperation of his ardent

colleague Flaccus could not have availed for the protection of many of

his Italian friends, and the course of events so soon taught him the

futility of this means of struggling for Italian rights that when,

somewhat later in the year, one of his Italian friends was seized by a

creature of Fannius before his eyes, he passed by without an attempt at

aid. His enemies, he knew, were at the time eager for a struggle in

which, when they had isolated him from his Italian supporters, physical

violence would decide the day: and he remarked that he did not wish to

give them the pretext for the hand-to-hand combat which they

desired.[679] One motive, indeed, of the invidious edict issued by the

consul seems to have been to leave Gracchus to face the new position

which his latest proposal had created, without any external help; but as

external help, if successfully asserted, could only have taken the form

of physical violence, there was reasonable ground for holding that the

decree excluding the Italians was the only means of preventing a serious

riot or even a civil war. The senate could scarcely have feared the

moral influence of the Italians on the voting populace of Rome, and they

knew that, in the present state of public sentiment, the constitutional

means of resistance which had failed against Tiberius Gracchus might be

successfully employed against his brother. The whole history of the

first tribunate of Caius Gracchus proves the frank recognition of the

fact that the tribunician veto could no longer be employed against a

measure which enlisted anything like the united support of the people;

but, like all other devices for suspending legislation, its employment

was still possible for opponents, and welcome even to lukewarm

supporters, when the body politic was divided on an important measure

and even the allies of its advocate felt their gratitude and their

loyalty submitted to an unwelcome strain. Resistance by means of the

intercession did not now require the stolid courage of an Octavius, and

when Livius Drusus threatened the veto,[680] there was no question of

his deposition. Some nerve might have been required, had he made this

announcement in the midst of an excited crowd of Italian postulants for

the franchise; but from this experience he was saved by the

precautionary measure taken by the senate. It is probable that Drusus's

announcement caused an entire suspension of the legal machinery

connected with the franchise bill, and that its author never ventured to

bring it to the vote.

It is possible that to this stage of Gracchus's career belongs a

proposal which he promulgated for a change in the order of voting at the

Comitia Centuriata. The alteration in the structure of this assembly,

which had taken place about the middle of the third century, had indeed

done much to equalise the voting power of the upper and lower classes;

but the first class and the knights of the eighteen centuries were still

called on to give their suffrage first, and the other classes doubtless

voted in the order determined by the property qualification at which

they were rated. As the votes of each century were separately taken and

proclaimed, the absolute majority required for the decisions of the

assembly might be attained without the inferior orders being called on

to express their judgment, and it was notorious that the opinion of

later voters was profoundly influenced by the results already announced.

Gracchus proposed that the votes of all the classes should be taken in

an order determined solely by the lot.[681] His interest in the Comitia

Centuriata was probably due to the fact that it controlled the consular

elections, and a democratic consulship, which he had vainly tried to

secure by his support of Fannius, might be rendered more attainable by

the adoption of the change which he advocated. The great danger of the

coming year was the election of a consul strongly identified with the

senatorial interest--of a man like Popillius who would be keen to seize

some moment of reaction and attempt to ruin the leaders of the reform

movement, even if he could not undo their work. It is practically

certain that this proposal of Gracchus never passed into law, it is

questionable whether it was ever brought before the Comitia. The

reformer was immediately plunged into a struggle to maintain some of his

existing enactments, and to keep the favour of the populace in the face

of insidious attempts which were being made to undermine their

confidence in himself.

The senate had struck out a new line of opposition, and they had found a

willing, because a convinced, instrument for their schemes. It is

inconceivable that a council, which reckoned within itself

representatives of all the noblest houses at Rome, should not have

possessed a considerable number of members who were influenced by the

political views of a Cato or a Scipio, or by the lessons of that

humanism which had carried the Gracchi beyond the bounds of Roman

caution, but which might suffuse a more conservative mind with just

sufficient enlightenment to see that much was wrong, and that moderate

remedies were not altogether beyond the limits of practicability. But

this section of senatorial opinion could find no voice and take no

independent action. It was crushed by the reactionary spirit of the

majority of the peers, and frightened at the results to which its

theories seem to lead, when their cautious qualifications, never likely

to find acceptance with the masses, were swept away by more

thorough-going advocates. But the voice, which the senate kept stifled

during the security of its rule, might prove valuable in a crisis. The

moderate might be put forward to outbid the extremist; for his

moderation would certainly lead him to respect the prejudices of the

mob, while any excesses, which he was encouraged or instructed to

commit, need not touch the points essential to political salvation, and

might be corrected, or left to a natural dissolution, when the crisis

had been passed and the demagogue overthrown. The instrument chosen by

the senate was Marcus Livius Drusus,[682] the tribune who had threatened

to interpose his veto on the franchise bill. There is no reason why the

historian should not treat the political attitude of this rival of

Gracchus as seriously as it seems to have been treated by Drusus's

illustrious son, who reproduced, and perhaps borrowed from his father's

career, the combination of a democratic propaganda, which threw specious

unessentials to the people, with the design of maintaining and

strengthening the rule of the nobility. The younger Drusus was, it is

true, a convert to the Italian claims which his father had resisted; but

even this advocacy shows development rather than change, for the party

represented by the elder Drusus was by no means blind to the necessity

for a better security of Italian rights. The difference between the

father and the son was that the one was an instrument and the other an

agent. But a man who is being consciously employed as an instrument, may

not only be thoroughly honest, but may reap a harvest of moral and

mental satisfaction at the opportunities of self-fulfilment which chance

has thrown in his way. The position may argue a certain lack of the

sense of humour, but is not necessarily accompanied by any conscious

sacrifice of dignity. Certainly the public of Rome was not in the secret

of the comedy that was being played. It saw only a man of high birth and

aristocratic culture, gifted with all the authority which great wealth

and a command of dignified oratory can give,[683] approaching them with

bounties greater in appearance than those which Gracchus had recently

been willing to impart, attaching no conditions to the gift and, though

speaking in the name of the senate, conveying no hint of the deprivation

of any of the privileges that had so recently been won. And the new

largess was for the Roman people alone; it was not depreciated by the

knowledge that the blessings, which it conferred or to which it was

added, would be shared by rivals from every part of Italy.

An aspirant for favour, who wished to enter on a race with the recent

type of popular leader, must inevitably think of provision for the poor;

but a mere copy or extension of the Gracchan proposals was impossible.

No measure that had been fiercely opposed by the senate could be

defended with decency by the representative, and, as Drusus came in

after time to be styled, the "advocate" of that body.[684] Such a scheme

as an extension of the system of corn distribution would besides have

shocked the political sense both of the patron and his clients, and

would not have served the political purposes of the latter, since such a

concession could not easily have been rescinded. The system of agrarian

assignation, in the form in which it had been carried through by the

hands of the Gracchi, had at the moment a complete machinery for its

execution, and there was no plausible ground for extending this measure

of benevolence. The older system of colonisation was the device which

naturally occurred to Drusus and his advisers, and the choice was the

more attractive in that it might be employed in a manner which would

accentuate certain elements in the Gracchan scheme of settlement that

had not commended themselves to public favour. The masses of Rome

desired the monopoly of every prize which the favourite of the moment

had to bestow; but Gracchus's colonies were meant for the middle class,

not for the very poor, and the preliminary to membership of the

settlements was an uncomfortable scrutiny into means, habits and

character.[685] The masses desired comfort. Capua may have pleased them,

but they had little liking for a journey across the sea to the site of

desolated Carthage. The very modesty of Gracchus's scheme, as shown in

the number of the settlements projected and of the colonists who were to

find a home in each, proved that it was not intended as a benefit to the

proletariate as a whole. Drusus came forward with a proposal for twelve

colonies, all of which were probably to be settled on Italian and

Sicilian soil;[686] each of these foundations was to provide for three

thousand settlers, and emigrants were not excluded on the ground of

poverty. An oblique reflection on the disinterestedness of Gracchus's

efforts was further given in the clause which created the commissioners

for the foundation of these new colonies, Drusus's name did not appear

in the list. He asked nothing for himself, nor would he touch the large

sums of money which must flow through the hands of the commissioners for

the execution of so vast a scheme.[687] The suspicion of self-seeking or

corruption was easily aroused at Rome, as it must have been in any state

where such large powers were possessed by the executive, and where no

control of the details of execution or expenditure had ever been

exercised by the people; and Gracchus's all-embracing energy had

betrayed him into a position, which had been accepted in a moment of

enthusiasm, but which, disallowed as it was by current sentiment and

perhaps by the law, might easily be shaken by the first suggestion of

mistrust. The scheme of Drusus, although it proved a phantom and perhaps

already possessed this elusive character when the senate pledged its

credit to the propounder of the measure, was of value as initiating a

new departure in the history of Roman colonisation. Even Gracchus had

not proposed to provide in this manner for the dregs of the city, and

the first suggestion for forming new foundations simply for the object

of depleting the plethora of Rome--the purpose real or professed of many

later advocates of colonisation--was due to the senate as an accident in

a political game, to Drusus perhaps as the result of mature reflection.

Since his proposal, which was really one for agrarian assignation on an

enormous scale, was meant to compete with Gracchus's plan for the

founding of colonies, it was felt to be impossible to burden the new

settlers with the payment of dues for the enjoyment of their land.

Gracchus's colonists were to have full ownership of the soil allotted to

them, and Drusus's could not be placed in an inferior position. But the

existence of thirty-six thousand settlers with free allotments would

immediately suggest a grievance to those citizens who, under the

Gracchan scheme of land-assignment, had received their lots subject to

the condition of the payment of annual dues to the State. If the new

allotments were to be declared free, the burden must be removed from

those which had already been distributed.[688] Drusus and the senate

thus had a logical ground for the step which seems to have been taken,

of relieving all the land which had been distributed since the tribunate

of the elder Gracchus from the payment of _vectigal_. It was a popular

move, but it is strange that the senate, which was for the most part

playing with promises, should have made up its mind to a definite step,

the taking of which must have seriously injured the revenues of the

State. But perhaps they regarded even this concession as not beyond

recall, and they may have been already revolving in their minds those

tortuous schemes of land-legislation, which in the near future were to

go far to undo the work of the reformers.

The senate also permitted Drusus to propose a law for the protection of

the Latins, which should prove that the worst abuses on which Gracchus

dwelt might be removed without the gift of the franchise. The enactment

provided that no Latin should be scourged by a Roman magistrate, even on

military service.[689] Such summary punishment must always have been

illegal when inflicted on a Latin who was not serving as a soldier under

Roman command and was within the bounds of the jurisdiction of his own

state; the only conceivable case in which he could have been legally

exposed to punishment at the hands of Roman officials in times of peace,

was that of his committing a crime when resident or domiciled in Rome.

In such circumstances the penalty may have been summarily inflicted, for

the Latins as a whole did not possess the right of appeal to the Roman

Comitia.[690] The extension of the magisterial right of coercion over

the inhabitants of Latin towns, and its application in a form from which

the Roman citizen could appeal, were mere abuses of custom, which

violated the treaties of the Latin states and were not first forbidden

by the Livian law. But the declaration that the Latin might not be

scourged by a Roman commander even on military service, was a novelty,

and must have seemed a somewhat startling concession at a time when the

Roman citizen was himself subject to the fullest rigour of martial law.

It was, however, one that would appeal readily to the legal mind of

Rome, for it was a different matter for a Roman to be subject to the

martial law of his own state, and for the member of a federate community

to be subjected to the code of this foreign power. It was intended that

henceforth the Latin should suffer at least the degrading punishment of

scourging only after the jurisdiction and on the bidding of his own

native commander; but it cannot be determined whether he was completely

exempted from the military jurisdiction of the Roman commander-in-chief

--an exemption which might under many circumstances have proved fatal to

military discipline and efficiency. There is every reason to suppose

that this law of Drusus was passed, and some reason to believe that it

continued valid until the close of the Social War destroyed the

distinctions between the rights of the Latin and the Roman. Its enactment

was one of the cleverest strokes of policy effected by Drusus and the

senate; for it must have satisfied many of the Latins, who were eager

for protection but not for incorporation, while it illustrated the

weakness, and as it may have seemed to many, the dishonesty, of

Gracchus's seeming contention that abuses could only be remedied by the

conferment of full political rights. The whole enterprise of Drusus

fully attained the immediate effect desired by the senate. The people

were too habituated to the rule of the nobility to remember grievances

when approached as friends; the advances of the senate were received in

good faith, and Drusus might congratulate himself that a representative

of the Moderates had fulfilled the appropriate task of a mediator

between opposing factions.[691]

We might have expected that Gracchus, in the face of such formidable

competition, would have stood his ground in Rome and would have

exhausted every effort of his resistless oratory in exhibiting the

dishonesty of his opponents and in seeking to reclaim the allegiance of

the people. But perhaps he held that the effective accomplishment of

another great design would be a better object-lesson of his power as a

benefactor and a surer proof of the reality of his intentions, as

contrasted with the shadowy promises of Drusus. He availed himself of

his position of triumvir for the foundation of the colony of Junonia--an

office which the senate gladly allowed him to accept--and set sail for

Africa to superintend in person the initial steps in the creation of his

great transmarine settlement.[692] His original plan was soon modified

by the opposition which it encountered; the promised number of

allotments was raised to six thousand, and Italians were now invited to

share in the foundation.[693] Both of these steps were doubtless the

result of the senate's dalliance with colonial schemes and with the

Latins, but the latter may also be interpreted as a desperate effort to

get the colony under weigh at any cost. Fulvius Flaccus, who was also

one of the colonial commissioners, either stayed at Rome during the

entire period of his colleague's absence or paid but the briefest visit

to Africa; for he is mentioned as the representative of the party's

interests in Rome during Gracchus's residence in the province. The

choice of the delegate was a bad one. Not only was Flaccus hated by the

senate, but he was suspected by the people. These in electing him to the

tribunate had forgiven his Italian leanings when the Italian cause was

held to be extinct; but now the odium of the franchise movement clung to

him afresh, and suspicion was rife that the secret dealings with the

allies, which were believed to have led to the outbreak of Fregellae,

had never been interrupted or had lately been renewed. The difficulties

of his position were aggravated by faults of manner. He possessed

immense courage and was an excellent fighter; but, like many men of

combative disposition, he was tactless and turbulent. His reckless

utterances increased the distrust with which he was regarded, and

Gracchus's popularity necessarily waned with that of his

lieutenant.[694]

Meanwhile the effort was being made to reawaken Carthage and to defy the

curse in which Scipio had declared that the soil of the fallen city

should be trodden only by the feet of beasts. No scruple could be

aroused by the division of the surrounding lands; the site where

Carthage had stood was alone under the ban,[695] and had Gracchus been

content with mere agrarian assignment or had he established Junonia at

some neighbouring spot, his opponents would have been disarmed of the

potent weapon which superstition invariably supplied at Rome. As it was,

alarming rumours soon began to spread of dreadful signs which had

accompanied the inauguration of the colony.[696] When the colonists

according to ancient custom were marching to their destined home in

military order with standards flying, the ensign which headed the column

was caught by a furious wind, torn from the grip of its resisting

bearer, and shattered on the ground. When the altars had been raised and

the victims laid upon them, a sudden storm-blast caught the offerings

and hurled them beyond the boundaries of the projected city which had

recently been cut by the share. The boundary-stones themselves were

visited by wolves, who seized them in their teeth and carried them off

in headlong flight. The reality of the last alarming phenomenon, perhaps

of all these omens, was vehemently denied by Gracchus and by

Flaccus;[697] but, even if the reports now flying abroad in Rome had any

basis in fact, the circumstances of the foundation did not deter the

leader nor frighten away his colonists. Gracchus proceeded with his work

in an orderly and methodical manner, and when he deemed his personal

supervision no longer essential, returned to Rome after an absence of

seventy days. He was recalled by the news of the unequal contest that

was being waged between the passionate Fulvius and the adroit Drusus.

Clearly the circumstances required a cooler head than that possessed by

Flaccus; and there was the threat of a still further danger which

rendered Gracchus's presence a necessity. The consulship for the

following year was likely to be gained by one of the most stalwart

champions of ultra-aristocratic views. Lucius Opimius had been defeated

when seeking that office in the preceding year, chiefly through the

support which Gracchus's advocacy had secured to Fannius. Now there was

every chance of his success;[698] for Opimius's chief claim to

distinction was the prompt action which he had shown in the conquest of

Fregellae, and the large numbers of the populace who detested the

Italian cause were likely to aid his senatorial partisans in elevating

him to the consulship. The consular elections might exercise a

reactionary influence on the tribunician; and, if Gracchus's candidature

was a failure, he might be at the mercy of a resolute opponent, who

would regard his destruction as the justifiable act of a saviour

of society.

When Caius returned, the people as a whole seemed more apathetic than

hostile. They listened with a cold ear both to appeals and promises, and

this coldness was due to satiety rather than suspicion. They had been

promised so much within the last few months that demagogism seemed to be

a normal feature of existence, and no keen emotion was stirred by any

new appeal to their vanity or to their interests. Such apathy, although

it may favour the military pretender, is more to be dreaded than actual

discontent by the man who rules merely by the force of character and

eloquence. Criticism may be met and faced, and, the keener it is, the

more it shows the interest of the critics in their leader. Pericles was

hated one moment, deified the next; but no man could profess to be

indifferent to his personality and designs. Gracchus took the lesson to

heart, and concentrated his attention on the one class of his former

supporters, whose daily life recalled a signal benefit which he had

conferred, a class which might be moved by gratitude for the past and

hope for the future. One of his first acts after his return was to

change his residence from the Palatine to a site lying below the

Forum.[699] Here he had the very poor as his neighbours, the true urban

proletariate which never dreamed of availing itself of agrarian

assignments or colonial schemes, but set a very real value on the

corn-distributions, and may have believed that their continuance would

be threatened by Gracchus's fall from power. It is probable, however,

that, even without this motive, the characteristic hatred which is felt

by the partially destitute for the middle class, may have deepened the

affection with which Gracchus was regarded by the poorer of his

followers, when they saw him abandoned by the more outwardly respectable

of his supporters. The present position of Gracchus showed clearly that

the powerful coalition on which he had built up his influence had

crumbled away. From a leader of the State he had become but the leader

of a faction, and of one which had hitherto proved itself powerless to

resist unaided a sudden attack by the government.

From this democratic stronghold he promulgated other laws, the tenor of

which is unknown, while he showed his sympathy with the lower orders in

a practical way which roused the resentment of his fellow-magistrates.

[700] A gladiatorial show was to be given in the Forum on a certain day,

and most of the magistrates had erected stands, probably in the form of

a rude wooden amphitheatre, which they intended to let on hire.[701]

Gracchus chose to consider this proceeding as an infringement of the

people's rights. It was perhaps not only the admission by payment, but

the opinion that the enclosure unduly narrowed the area of observation

and cut off all view of the performance from the surrounding crowd,[702]

that aroused Gracchus's protest, and he bade the magistrates pull down

the erection that the poorer classes might have a free view of the

spectacle. His request was disregarded, and Gracchus prepared a surprise

for the obstinate organisers. On the very night before the show he

sallied out with the workmen that his official duties still placed at his

disposal; the tiers of seats were utterly demolished, and when day dawned

the people beheld a vacant site on which they might pack themselves as

they pleased. To the lower orders it seemed the act of a courageous

champion, to the officials the wild proceeding of a headstrong

demagogue. It could not have improved Gracchus's chances with the

moneyed classes of any grade; he had merged their chances of enjoyment

with that of the crowd and violated their sense of the prerogatives

of wealth.

But, although Gracchus may have been acting violently, he was not acting

blindly. He must have known that his cause was almost lost, but he must

also have been aware that the one chance of success lay in creating a

solidarity of feeling in the poorer classes, which could only be

attained by action of a pronounced and vigorous type. To what extent he

was successful in reviving a following which furnished numerical support

superior, or even equivalent to, the classes alienated by his conduct or

won over by the intrigues of his opponents, is a fact on which we have

no certain information. Only one mention has been preserved of his

candidature for a third tribunate: and this narrative, while asserting

the near approach which Gracchus made to victory, confesses the

uncertainty of the accounts which had been handed down of the election.

The story ran that he really gained a majority of the votes, but that

the tribune who presided, with the connivance of some of his colleagues,

basely falsified the returns.[703] It is a story that cannot be tested

on account of our ignorance of the precautions taken, and therefore of

the possibilities of fraud which might be exhibited, in the elections of

this period. At a later period actual records of the voting were kept,

in case a decision should be doubted;[704] and had an appeal to a

scrutiny been possible at this time, Gracchus was not the man to let the

dubious result remain unchallenged. But the story, even if we regard it

as expressing a mere suspicion, suggests the profound disappointment of

a considerable class, which had given its favourite its united support

and received the news of his defeat with surprise and resentment. It

breathes the poor man's suspicion of the chicanery of the rich, and may

be an index that Gracchus retained the confidence of his humbler

supporters until the end.

The defeat, although a terrible blow, did not crush the spirit of

Gracchus; it only rendered it more bitter and defiant. It was now that

he exulted openly in the destructive character of his work, and he is

said to have answered the taunts of his enemies by telling them that

their laughter had a painful ring, and that they did not yet know the

great cloud of darkness which his political activity had wrapped around

their lives.[705] The dreaded danger of Opimius's election was soon

realised, and members of the newly appointed tribunician college were

willing to put themselves at the orders of the senate. The surest proof

that Gracchus had fallen would be the immediate repeal of one of his

laws, and the enactment which was most assailable was that which, though

passed under another's name, embodied his project for the refoundation

of Carthage. This Rubrian law might be attacked on the ground that it

contravened the rules of religious right, the violation of which might

render any public act invalid;[706] and the stories which had been

circulated of the evil omens that had attended the establishment of

Junonia, were likely to cause the scruples of the senate to be supported

by the superstition of the people. Gracchus still held an official

position as a commissioner for colonies, if not for land-distribution

and the making of roads, but none of these positions gave him the

authority to approach the people or the power to offer effective legal

resistance to the threatened measure; any further opposition might

easily take the form of a breach of the peace by a private individual

and give his enemies the opportunity for which they were watching; and

it was therefore with good reason that Gracchus at first determined to

adopt a passive attitude in the face of the proposal of the tribune

Minucius Rufus for the repeal of the Rubrian law.[707] Even Cornelia

seems to have counselled prudence, and it was perhaps this crisis in her

son's career which drew from her the passionate letter, in which the

mother triumphs over the patriot and she sees the ruin of the Republic

and the madness of her house in the loss which would darken her

declining years.[708] This protest is more than consistent with the

story that she sent country folk[709] to swell the following and protect

the person of her son, when she saw that he would not yield without

another effort to maintain his cause. The change of attitude is said to

have been forced on Gracchus by the exhortations of his friends and

especially of the impetuous Fulvius. The organisation of a band such as

Gracchus now gathered round him, although not in itself illegal, was a

provocation to riot; and a disastrous incident soon occurred which gave

his opponents the handle for which they had long been groping. At the

dawn of the day, on which the meeting was to be held for the discussion,

and perhaps for the voting, on the repeal of the threatened law,

Gracchus and his followers ascended to the Capitol, where the opposite

party was also gathering in strength. It seems that the consul Opimius

himself, although he could not preside at the final meeting of the

assembly, which was purely plebeian, was about to hold a Contio[710] or

to speak at one summoned by the tribunes. Gracchus himself did not

immediately enter the area in which the meeting was to be held, but

paced the portico of the temple buried in his thoughts.[711] What

immediately followed is differently told; but the leading facts are the

same in every version.[712] A certain Antullus or Antullius, spoken of

by some as a mere unit amongst the people, described by others as an

attendant or herald of Opimius, spoke some words--the Gracchans said, of

insolence: their opponents declared, of patriotic protest--to Gracchus

or to Fulvius, at the same time stretching out his arm to the speaker

whom he addressed. The gesture was misinterpreted, and the unhappy man

fell pierced with iron pens, the only weapons possessed by the unarmed

crowd. There could be no question that the first act of violence had

come from Gracchus's supporters, and the end for which Opimius had

waited had been gained. Even the eagerness with which the leader had

disclaimed the hasty action of his followers might be interpreted as a

renewed infringement of law. He had hurried from the Capitol to the

Forum to explain to all who would listen the unpremeditated nature of

the deed and his own innocence of the murder; but this very action was a

grave breach of public law, implying as it did an insult to the majesty

of the tribune in summoning away a section of the people whom he was

prepared to address.[713]

The meeting on the Capitol was soon dissolved by a shower of rain,[714]

and the tribunes adjourned the business to another day; while Gracchus

and Fulvius Flaccus, whose half-formed plans had now been shattered,

hastened to their respective homes. The weakness of their position had

been that they refused to regard themselves in their true light as the

leaders of a revolution against the government. Whatever their own

intentions may have been, it is improbable that their supporters

followed them to the Capitol simply with the design of giving peaceful

votes against the measure proposed: and, had Antullius not fallen, the

meeting on the Capitol might have been broken up by a rush of Gracchans,

as that which Tiberius once harangued had been invaded by a band of

senators. Success and even salvation could now be attained solely by the

use of force; and the question of personal safety must have appealed to

the rank and file as well as to the leaders, for who could forget the

judicial massacre which had succeeded the downfall of Tiberius? But the

security of their own lives was probably not the only motive which led

numbers of their adherents to follow the two leaders to their

homes.[715] Loyalty, and the keen activity of party spirit, which

stimulates faction into war, must also have led them to make a last

attempt to defend their patrons and their cause. The whole city was in a

state of restless anticipation of the coming day; few could sleep, and

from midnight the Forum began to be filled with a crowd excited but

depressed by the sense of some great impending evil.[716]

At daybreak the consul Opimius sent a small force of armed men to the

Capitol, evidently for the purpose of preventing the point of vantage

being seized by the hostile democrats, and then he issued notices for a

meeting of the senate. For the present he remained in the temple of

Castor and Pollux to watch events. When the fathers had obeyed his

summons, he crossed the Forum and met them in the Curia. Shortly after

their deliberations had begun, a scene, believed to have been carefully

prepared, began to be enacted in the Forum.[717] A band of mourners was

seen slowly making its way through the crowded market-place; conspicuous

on its bier was the body of Antullius, stripped so that the wound which

was the price of his loyalty might be seen by all. The bearers took the

route that led them past the senate-house, sobbing as they went and

wailing out the mourning cry. The consul was duly startled, and curious

senators hastened to the door. The bier was then laid on the ground, and

the horrified aristocrats expressed their detestation of the dreadful

crime of which it was a witness. Their indignation may have imposed on

some members of the crowd; others were inclined to mock this outburst of

oligarchic pathos, and to wonder that the men who had slain Tiberius

Gracchus and hurled his body into the Tiber, could find their hearts

thus suddenly dissolved at the death of an unfortunate but

undistinguished servant. The motive of the threnody was somewhat too

obvious, and many minds passed from the memory of Tiberius's death to

the thought of the doom which this little drama was meant to presage for

his brother.

The senators returned to the Curia, and the final resolution was taken.

Opimius was willing to venture on the step which Scaevola had declined,

and a new principle of constitutional law was tentatively admitted. A

state of siege was declared in the terms that "the consul should see

that the State took no harm," [718] and active measures were taken to

prepare the force which this decree foreshadowed. Opimius bade the

senators see to their arms, and enjoined each of the members of the

equestrian centuries to bring with him two slaves in full equipment at

the dawn of the next day.[719] But an attempt was made to avert the

immediate use of force by issuing a summons to Gracchus and Flaccus to

attend at the senate and defend their conduct there.[720] The summons

was perfectly legal, since the consul had the right to demand the

presence of any citizen or even any inferior magistrate; but the two

leaders may well be excused for their act of contumacy in disobeying the

command. They knew that they would merely be putting themselves as

prisoners into the hands of a hostile force; nor, in the light of past

events, was it probable that their surrender and punishment would save

their followers from destruction. Preparations for defence, or a

counter-demonstration which would prove the size and determination of

their following, might lead the senate to think of negotiation. Its

members had an inducement to take this view. Their legal position, with

respect to the step which they were now contemplating, was unsound; and

although they might claim that they had the government in the shape of

its chief executive officer on their side, and that their late policy

had attracted the support of the majority of the citizens, yet there was

no uncontested precedent for the legitimacy of waging war against a

faction at Rome; they had no mandate to perform this mission, and its

execution, which had lately been rendered illegal by statute law, might

subsequently be repudiated even by many of those whom they now regarded

as their supporters. Yet we cannot wonder at the uncompromising attitude

of the senate. They held themselves to be the legitimate government of

the State; they had learnt the lesson that a government must rest either

on its merits or on force; they were unwilling to repeat the scandalous

scene which, on the occasion of Tiberius Gracchus's death, had proved

their weakness, and were perhaps unable to resort to such unpremeditated

measures in the face of the larger following of Caius; they could enlist

on their side some members of the upper middle class who would share in

the guilt, if guilt there was: and lastly they had at their mercy two

men, of whom one had twice shaken the commonwealth and the other had

gloried in the prospect of its self-mutilation in the future.

The wisdom and justice of resistance appealed immediately to the mind of

Flaccus, whose combative instincts found their natural satisfaction in

the prospect of an interchange of blows. The finer and more complex

spirit of Gracchus issued in a more uncertain mood. The bane of the

thinker and the patriot was upon him. Was a man who had led the State to

fight against it, and the rule of reason to be exchanged for the base

arbitrament of the sword? None knew the emotions with which he turned

from the Forum to gaze long and steadfastly at the statue of his father

and to move away with a groan;[721] but the sight of his sorrow roused a

sympathy which the call to arms might not have stirred. Many of the

bystanders were stung from their attitude of indifference to curse

themselves for their base abandonment of the man who had sacrificed so

much, to follow him to his house, and to keep a vigil before his doors.

The night was passed in gloomy wakefulness, the spirits of the watchers

were filled with apprehension of the common sacrifice which the coming

day might demand, and the silence was only broken when the voluntary

guard was at intervals relieved by those who had already slumbered.

Meanwhile the neighbours of Flaccus were being startled by the sounds of

boisterous revelry that issued from his halls. The host was displaying

an almost boyish exuberance of spirits, while his congenial comrades

yelled and clapped as the wine and the jest went round. At daybreak

Fulvius was dragged from his heavy slumbers, and he and his companions

armed themselves with the spoils of his consulship, the Gallic weapons

that hung as trophies upon his walls.[722] They then set out with

clamorous threats to take possession of the Aventine. The home that

Icilius had won for the Plebs was to be the scene of another struggle

for freedom. It was in later times pretended that Fulvius had taken the

step, from which even Catilina shrank, of calling the slaves to arms on

a promise of freedom.[723] We have no means of disproving the

allegation, which seems to have occurred with suspicious frequency in

the records left by aristocratic writers of the popular movements which

they had assisted to crush. But it is easy to see that the devotion of

slaves to their own masters during such struggles, and the finding of

their bodies amidst the slain, would be proof enough to a government,

anxious to emphasise its merits as a saviour of society, that general

appeals had been made to the servile class. Such a deduction might

certainly have been drawn from a view of the forces mustered under

Opimius; for in these the slaves may have exceeded the citizens in

number.[724]

Gracchus's mind was still divided between resistance and resignation. He

consented to accompany his reckless friend to the Aventine, as the only

place of refuge; but he declined to don his armour, merely fastening

under his toga a tiny dagger,[725] as a means of defence in the last

resort, or perhaps of salvation, did all other measures fail. The

presage of his coming doom was shared by his wife Licinia who clung to

him at the door, and when he gently disengaged himself from her arms,

made one more effort to grasp his robe and sank senseless on the

threshold. When Gracchus reached the Aventine with his friends, he found

that Flaccus and his party had seized the temple of Diana and had made

hasty preparations for fortifying it against attack. But Gracchus,

impressed with the helplessness or the horror of the situation,

persuaded him to make an effort at accommodation, and the younger son of

Flaccus, a boy of singular beauty, was despatched to the Curia on the

mission of peace.[726] With modest mien and tears streaming from his

eyes he gave his message to the consul. Many--perhaps most--of those who

listened were not averse to accept a compromise which would relieve the

intolerable strain and avert a civil strife. But Opimius was inflexible;

the senate, he said, could not be approached by deputy; the principals

must descend from the Aventine, lay down their arms, deliver themselves

up to justice as citizens subject to the laws, and then they might

appeal to the senate's grace; he ended by forbidding the youth to

return, if he could not bring with him an acceptance of these final

terms. The more pacific members of the senate could offer no effective

objection, for it was clear that the consul was acting within his legal

rights. The coercion of a disobedient citizen was a matter for the

executive power and, though Opimius had spoken in the name of the

senate, the authority and the responsibility were his. Retirement would

have been their only mode of protest; but this would have been a

violation of the discipline which bound the Council to its head, and

would have betrayed a suspicious indifference to the cause which was

regarded as that of the constitution. It is said that, on the return of

the messenger, Gracchus expressed willingness to accept the consul's

terms and was prepared to enter the senate and there plead his own cause

and that of his followers.[727] But none of his comrades would agree,

and Flaccus again despatched his son with proposals similar to those

which had been rejected. Opimius carried out his injunction by detaining

the boy and, thirsting for battle to effect the end which delay would

have assured, advanced his armed forces against the position held by

Flaccus. He was not wholly dependent on the improvised levies of the

previous day. There were in Rome at that moment some bands of Cretan

archers,[728] which had either just returned from service with the

legions or were destined to take part in some immediate campaign. It was

to their efforts that the success of the attack was mainly due. The

barricade at the temple might have resisted the onslaught of the

heavily-armed soldier; but its defenders were pierced by the arrows, the

precinct was strewn with wounded men, and the ranks were in utter

disorder when the final assault was made. There were names of

distinction which lent a dignity to the massacre that followed. Men like

Publius Lentulus, the venerable chief of the senate, gave a perpetual

colour of respectability to the action of Opimius by appearing in their

panoplies amongst the forces that he led.[729]

When the rout was complete and the whole crowd in full flight, Flaccus

sought escape in a workshop owned by a man of his acquaintance; but the

course of his flight had been observed, the narrow court which led to

the house was soon crowded by pursuers, who, maddened by their ignorance

of the actual tenement that concealed the person of Flaccus, vowed that

they would burn the whole alley to the ground if his hiding-place were

not revealed.[730] The trembling artisan who had befriended him did not

dare to betray his suppliant, but relieved his scruples by whispering

the secret to another. The hiding place was immediately revealed, and

the great ex-consul who had laid the foundations of Rome's dominion in

farther Gaul, a man strenuous and enlightened, ardent and faithful but

perhaps not overwise, was hacked to pieces by his own citizens in an

obscure corner of the slums of Rome. His elder son fell fighting by his

side. To the younger, the fair ambassador of that day, now a prisoner of

the consul, the favour was granted of choosing his own mode of death.

Early Rome had repudiated the principle of visiting the sins of the

fathers upon the children;[731] but the cold-blooded horrors of the

Oriental and Hellenic world were now becoming accepted maxims of state

to a government trembling for its safety and implacable in its revenge.

Meanwhile Gracchus had been saved from both the stain of civil war and

the humiliation of capture by his foes. No man had seen him strike a

blow throughout the contest. In sheer disgust at the appalling scene he

had withdrawn to the shrine of Diana, and was there prepared to compass

his own death.[732] His hand was stayed by two faithful friends,

Pomponius and Laetorius,[733] who urged him to escape. Gracchus obeyed,

but it was believed by some that, before he left the temple, he

stretched forth his hand to the goddess and prayed that the Roman people

might never be quit of slavery as a reward for their ingratitude and

treachery.[734] This outburst of anger, a very natural consequence of

his own humiliating plight, is said to have been kindled by the

knowledge that the larger portion of the mob had already listened to a

promise of amnesty and had joined the forces of Opimius. Unlike most

imprecations, that of Gracchus was destined to be fulfilled.

The flight of Gracchus led him down the slope of the Aventine to the

gate called Trigemina which stood near the Tiber's bank. In hastening

down the hill he had sprained his ankle, and time for his escape was

only gained by the devotion of Pomponius,[735] who turned, and

single-handed kept the pursuing enemy at bay until trampling on his

prostrate body they rushed in the direction of the wooden bridge which

spanned the river. Here Laetorius imitated the heroism of his comrade.

Standing with drawn sword at the head of the bridge, he thrust back all

who tried to pass until Gracchus had gained the other bank. Then he too

fell, pierced with wounds. The fugitive had now but a single slave to

bear him company in his flight; it led them through frequented streets,

where the passers-by stopped on their way, cheered them on as though

they were witnessing a contest of speed, but gave no sign of help and

turned deaf ears to Gracchus's pleading for a horse; for the pursuers

were close behind, and the dulled and panic-stricken mob had no thought

but for themselves. The grove of Furrina[736] received them just before

they were overtaken by the pursuing band; and in the sacred precinct the

last act was accomplished. It was known only that master and slave had

been found lying side by side. Some believed that the faithful servant

had slain Gracchus and then pierced his own breast; others held that

they were both living when the enemy came upon them, but that the slave

clung with such frantic devotion to his master that Gracchus's body

could not be reached until the living shield had been pierced and torn

away.[737] The activity of the pursuers had been stimulated by greed,

for Opimius had put a price upon the heads of both the leaders of the

faction on the Aventine. The bearers of these trophies of victory were

to receive their weight in gold. The humble citizens who produced the

head of Flaccus are said to have been defrauded of their reward; but the

action of the man who wrested the head of Gracchus from the first

possessor of the prize and bore it on a javelin's point to Opimius, long

furnished a text to the moralist who discoursed on the madness of greed

and the thirst of gold. Its unnatural weight is said to have revealed

the fact that the brain had been extracted and the cavity filled with

molten lead.[738] The bodies of the slain were for the most part thrown

into the Tiber, but one account records that that of Gracchus was handed

over to his mother for burial.[739] The number of the victims of the

siege, the pursuit and the subsequent judicial investigation is said to

have been three thousand.[740] The resistance to authority, which was

all that could be alleged against the followers of Gracchus, was

treated, not as a riot, but as a rebellion. The Tullianum saw its daily

dole of victims, who were strangled by the executioner; the goods of the

condemned were confiscated by the State and sold at public auction. All

public signs of mourning were forbidden to their wives;[741] and the

opinion of Scaevola, the greatest legal expert of the day, was that some

property of his niece Licinia, which had been wrecked in the general

tumult, could be recovered only from the goods of her husband, to whom

the sedition was due.[742] The attitude of the government was, in fact,

based on the view that the members of the defeated party, whether slain

or executed, had been declared enemies of the State. Their action had

put them outside the pale of law, and the decree of the senate, which

had assisted Opimius in the extreme course that he had taken, was an

index that the danger, which it vaguely specified, aimed at the actual

existence of the commonwealth and undermined the very foundations of

society. Such was the theory of martial law which Opimius's bold action

gave to his successors. Its weakness lay in the circumstance that it was

unknown to the statutes and to the courts; its plausibility was due

partly to the fact that, since the desuetude of the dictatorship, no

power actually existed in Rome which could legally employ force to crush

even the most dangerous popular rising, and partly to the peculiarities

of the movement which witnessed the first exercise of this authority.

The killing of Caius Gracchus and his followers, however useless and

mischievous the act may have been, had about it an air of spurious

legality, with which no ingenuity could invest the murder of Tiberius

and his adherents. The fallen chiefs were in enjoyment of no magisterial

authority that could justify either their initial action or their

subsequent disobedience; they had fortified a position in the town, and

had certainly taken up arms, presumably for the purpose of inflicting

grievous harm on loyal fellow-citizens. As their opponents were

certainly the government, what could they be but declared foes who had

been caught red-handed in an act of treason so open and so violent that

the old identity of "traitors" and "enemies" was alone applicable to

their case? Thus legal theory itself proclaimed the existence of civil

war, and handed on to future generations of party leaders an instrument

of massacre and extirpation which reached its culminating point in the

proscription list of Sulla.

Opimius, after he had ceased to preside at his death-dealing commission,

expressed the view that he had removed the rabies of discord from the

State by the foundation of a temple to Harmony. The bitter line which

some unseen hand scribbled on the door,[743] expressed the doubt, which

must soon have crept over many minds, whether the doctor had not been

madder than the patient, and the view, which was soon destined to be

widely held, that the authors of the discord which had been professedly

healed, the teachers who were educating Rome up to a higher ideal of

civil strife, were the very men who were now in power.[744] We shall see

in the sequel with what speed Time wrought his political revenge. In the

hearts of men the Gracchi were even more speedily avenged. The Roman

people often alternated between bursts of passionate sentiment and

abject states of cowardly contentment; but through all these phases of

feeling the memory of the two reformers grew and flourished. To accept

the Gracchi was an article of faith impressed on the proudest noble and

the most bigoted optimate by the clamorous crowd which he addressed. The

man who aped them might be pronounced an impostor or a traitor; the men

he aped belonged almost to the distant world of the half-divine. Their

statues were raised in public places, the sites on which they had met

their death were accounted holy ground and were strewn with humble

offerings of the season's fruits. Many even offered to their images a

daily sacrifice and sank on their knees before them as before those of

the gods.[745] The quiet respect or ecstatic reverence with which the

names and memories of the Gracchi were treated, was partly due to a

vague sense in the mind of the common man that they were the authors of

the happier aspects of the system under which he lived, of the brighter

gleams which occasionally pierced the clouds of oppression and

discomfort; it was also due to the conviction in the mind of the

statesman, often resisted but always recurring, that their work was

unalterable. To undo it was to plunge into the dark ages, to attempt to

modify it was immediately to see the necessity of its renewal. At every

turn in the paths of political life the statesman was confronted by two

figures, whom fear or admiration raised to gigantic proportions. The

orthodox historian would angrily declare that they were but the figures

of two young men, whose intemperate action had thrown Rome into

convulsion and who had met their fate, not undeserved however

lamentable, the one in a street riot, the other while heading an armed

sedition. But the criticism contained the elements of its own

refutation. The youth, the brotherhood, the martyrdom of the men were

the very elements that gave a softening radiance to the hard contour of

their lives. The Gracchi were a stern and ever-present reality; they

were also a bright and gracious memory. In either character they must

have lived; but the combination of both presentments has secured them an

immortality which age, wisdom, experience and success have often

struggled vainly to secure. That strange feeling which a great and

beautiful life has often inspired, that it belongs to eternity rather

than to the immediate past, and that it has few points of contact with

the prosaic round of present existence, had almost banished from

Cornelia's mind the selfish instincts of her loss, and had perhaps even

dulled the tender memories which cluster round the frailer rather than

the stronger elements in the characters of those we love. Those who

visited her in her villa at Misenum, where she kept her intellectual

court, surrounded by all that was best in letters, and exchanging

greetings or gifts with the potentates of the earth, were amazed at the

composure with which she spoke of the lives and actions of her

sons.[746] The memory drew no tear, her voice conveyed no intonation of

sorrow or regret. She spoke of them as though they were historical

figures of the past, men too distant and too great to arouse the weak

emotion which darkens contemplation. Some thought that her mind had been

shaken by age, or that her sensibility had been dulled by misfortune.

"In this they proved their own utter lack of sensibility" says the

loving biographer of the Gracchi: They did not know, he adds, the signs

of that nobility of soul, which is sometimes given by birth and is

always perfected by culture, or the reasonable spirit of endurance which

mental and moral excellence supply. The calmness of Cornelia proved, as

well, that she was at one with her children after their death, and their

identity with a mind so pure is as great a tribute to their motives as

the admiration or fear of the Romans is to their intellect and their

deeds, Cornelia deserved a memorial in Rome for her own intrinsic worth;

but the demeanour of her latter days justifies the legend engraved on

the statue which was to be seen in the portico of Metellus: "To

Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi".[747]

We are now in a position to form some estimate of the political changes

which had swept over Rome during the past twelve years. The

revolutionary legislation of this period was, strictly speaking, not

itself the change, but merely the formula which marked an established

growth; nor can any profit be derived from drawing a marked contrast

between the aims and methods of the two men who were responsible for the

most decisive of these reforms. A superficial view of the facts might

lead us to suppose that Tiberius Gracchus had bent his energies solely

to social amelioration, and that it was reserved for his brother Caius

to effect vast changes in the working, though not in the structure, of

the constitution. But even a chronological survey of the actions of

these two statesmen reveals the vast union of interests that suddenly

thrust themselves forward, with a vehemence which demanded either such a

resistance as no political society is homogeneous enough to maintain, or

such concessions as may be graciously made by a government which after

the grant may still retain most of the forms and much of the substance

of its former power. So closely interwoven were social and political

questions, so necessary was it for the attempted satisfaction of one

class immediately to create the demand for the recognition or

compensation of another, that Tiberius Gracchus had no sooner formulated

his agrarian proposals than he was beset with thoughts of legislating

for the army, transferring some of the judicial power to the equestrian

order, and granting the franchise to the allies. Even the belief that

these projects were merely a device for securing his own ascendency,

does not prove that their announcement was due to a brilliant discovery

of their originator, or that he created wants which he thereupon

proposed to satisfy. The desperate statesman seizes on the grievance

which is nearest to hand; it is true that he may increase a want by

giving the first loud and clear expression to the low and confused

murmurings of discontent; but a grievance that lives and gives violent

tokens of its presence, as did that of the Italian allies in the

Fregellan revolt, must be real, not fictitious: and when it finds a

remedy, as the needs of the poor and the political claims of the knights

did under the regime of Caius Gracchus, the presumption is that the

disease has been of long standing, and that what it has for a long time

lacked was not recognition, but the opportunity and the intelligence

necessary to secure redress. Caius Gracchus was as little of a political

explorer as his brother; it did not require the intuition of genius to

see facts which formed the normal environment of every prominent

politician of the age. His claim to greatness rests, partly on the

mental and moral strength which he shared with Tiberius and which gave

him the power to counteract the force of inertia and transmute vague

thought, first into glowing words and then into vigorous action; partly

on the extraordinary ingenuity with which he balanced the interests and

claims of classes so as to form a coalition which was for the time

resistless: and partly on the finality with which he removed the

jealousies of the hour from the idle arena of daily political strife,

and gave them their place in the permanent machinery of the

constitution, there to remain as the necessary condition of the

precarious peace or the internecine war which the jarring elements of a

balance of power bring in turn to its possessors.

Since the reality of the problems with which the Gracchi dealt is

undeniable, and since few would be inclined to admit that the most

effective treatment of a problem, whether social or political, is to

refuse it a solution, any reasonable criticism of their reforms must be

based solely on a consideration of their aims and methods. The land

question, which was taken up by both these legislators, attracts our

first attention. The aim of the resumption and redistribution of the

public domain had been the revival of the class of peasant holders, whom

legend declared, perhaps with a certain element of truth, to have formed

the flower of the civic population during the years when Rome was

struggling for a place amongst the surrounding peoples and in the

subsequent period of her expansion over Italy. Such an aim may be looked

at from two points of view. It may be regarded as an end in itself,

without any reference to its political results, or it may be looked on

as an effort to increase the power and security of the State without any

peculiar consideration of the comfort and well-being of its individual

members. The Gracchan scheme, regarded from the first point of view,

can, with respect to its end as distinguished from its methods, be

criticised unfavourably only by those who hold that an urban life does

under all circumstances convey moral, mental and physical benefits which

are denied by the conditions of residence in country districts. It is

true that the objector may in turn point out that the question of the

standard of comfort to be attained in either sphere is here of supreme

importance; but such an issue brings us at once within the region of

means and not of ends, and an ideal of human life cannot be judged

solely with reference to the practicability of its realisation. It is

the second point of view from which the aim of this land legislation may

be contemplated, which first gives the critic the opportunity of denying

the validity of the end as well as the efficiency of the means. If the

new agriculturist was meant to be an element of strength to the Roman

State, to save it from the selfishness of a narrow oligarchy, the

instability of a city mob and the corruption of both, to defend the

conquests which the city had won or to push her empire further, it was

necessary to prove that he could be of utility both as a voting unit and

as a soldier in the legions. His capacity for performing the first

function efficiently was, at the very least, extremely questionable. The

reality of the farmer's vote obviously depended on the closeness of his

residence to the capital, since there is not the least trace, at this or

at any future time during the history of the Republic, of the formation

of any design for modifying the rigidly primary character of the popular

assemblies of Rome. The rights of the voter at a distance had always

been considered so purely potential, that the inland and northern

settlements which Rome established in Italy had generally been endowed

with Latin rights, while the colonies of Roman citizens clustered more

closely round their mother; and men had always been found ready to

sacrifice the active rights of Roman citizenship, on account of the

worthlessness of their possession in a remote colony. It was even

difficult to reconcile the passive rights of Roman citizenship with

residence at a distance from the capital; for all the higher

jurisdiction was centred in Rome and could not easily be sought by the

inhabitants of distant settlements.[748] But, even if we exclude the

question of relative distance from the centre of affairs, it was still

not probable that the dweller in the country would be a good citizen

according to the Hellenic comprehension of that phrase. When Aristotle

approves of a country democracy, simply because it is not strictly a

democracy at all,[749] he is thinking, not merely of the farmer's lack

of interest in city politics, but of the incompatibility of the

perpetual demands which rural pursuits make on time and energy with

attendance on public business at the centre of affairs. The son of the

soil soon learns that he owes undivided allegiance to his mother: and he

will seldom be stirred by a political emotion strong enough to overcome

the practical appeals which are made by seed-time and harvest. But the

opportunities for discarding civic obligations were far greater in Rome

than in the Greek communities. The Roman assemblies had no stated days

of meeting, laws might be promulgated and passed at any period of the

year, their tenor was explained at public gatherings which were often

announced on the very morning of the day for which they were summoned,

and could be attended only by those whom chance or leisure or the

habitual pursuit of political excitement had brought to the Capitol or

the Forum. There was not at this period a fixed date even for the

elections of the higher magistrates. An attempt was perhaps made to

arrange them for the summer, when the roads were passable, the labours

of spring were over, and the toils of harvest time had not yet

commenced.[750] But the creation of the magistrates with Imperium

depended to a large extent on the convenience of the consuls, one of

whom had sometimes to be summoned back from a campaign to preside at the

Comitia which were to elect his successors; while even the date of the

tribunician elections might have been conditioned by political

considerations. The closing events of the life of Tiberius Gracchus

prove how difficult it was to secure the attendance of the country voter

even when an election of known political import was in prospect; while

Caius realised that the best security for the popular leader, whether as

a legislator or a candidate, was to attach the urban resident to himself

by the ties of gratitude and interest. We can scarcely admit, in the

face of facts like these, that the agriculturist created by the Gracchan

reforms was likely to render any signal political assistance to his

city. It is true that the existence of a practically disfranchised

proletariate may have a modifying influence on politics. It could not in

Rome serve the purpose, which it sometimes fulfils in the modern world,

of moulding the opinion of the voter; but even in Rome it suggested a

reserve that might be brought up on emergencies. A state, however, does

not live on emergencies but on the constant and watchful activity of its

members. Such activity could be displayed at Rome only by the leisured

senator or the leaders of the city mob. The forces that had worked for

oligarchy in the past might under changed conditions produce a narrow

type of urban democracy; but they presented no hope of the realisation

of a true popular government.

It might be hoped, however, that the newly created farmer might add to

the military, if not the political, strength of the State. The hope, so

far as it rested on the agriculturist himself, was rendered something of

an anachronism by the present conditions of service. Even in the old

days a campaign prolonged beyond the ordinary duration of six months had

often effected the ruin of the peasant proprietor; and now that the

cautious policy of the protectorate had been so largely abandoned and

Rome's military efforts, no longer limited to wars of defence or

aggression, were directed to securing her ascendency in distant

dependencies by means of permanent garrisons, service in the legions was

a still more fatal impediment to industrial development. Rome had not

yet learnt the lesson that an empire cannot be garrisoned by an army of

conscripts; but she was becoming conscious of the inadequacy of her own

military system, and this consciousness led her to take the easy but

fatal step of throwing far the larger burden of foreign service on the

Latins and Italian allies. Any increase in the number and efficiency of

her own military forces would thus remove a dangerous grievance, while

it added to the strength which, in the last resort, could alone secure

the permanence of her supremacy even in Italy. Such an increase was

finally effected in the only possible manner--by the adoption of a

system of voluntary enlistment and by carrying still further the

increasing disregard for those antiquated conditions of wealth and

status, which were a part of the theory that service was a burden and

wholly inconsistent with the new requirement that it should become a

profession. Although it must be confessed that little assistance in this

direction was directly tendered by the Gracchan legislation, yet it

should be remembered that, even if we exclude from consideration the

small efforts made by Caius to render military service a more attractive

calling, the increase of the farmer class might of itself have done much

to solve the problem. Although the single occupant of a farm was clearly

incapable of taking his part in expeditions beyond the seas without

serious injury to his own interests, yet the sons of such a man might

have performed a considerable term of military service without

disastrous consequences to the estate, and where the inheritance had

remained undivided and several brothers held the land in common, the

duties of the soldier and the farmer might have been alternated without

leaving the homestead divested of its head. The recognition of the

military life as a profession must have profited still more by the

policy which encouraged the growth of the country population; for the

energy of the surplus members of the household, whose services were not

needed or could not be adequately rewarded on the farm, would find a

more salutary outlet in the stirring life of the camp than in the

enervating influences of the city. The country-side might still continue

to supply a better physique and a finer morale than were likely to be

discovered in the poorer quarters of Rome.

The objects aimed at in the Gracchan scheme of land-reform, although in

some respects difficult of realisation, have aroused less hostile

criticism than the methods which were adopted for their fulfilment. It

may be held that the scheme of practical confiscation, which, advocated

by Tiberius Gracchus, plunged him at once into a fierce political

struggle and encountered resistance which could only be overcome by

unconstitutional means, might have been avoided had the reformer seen

that an economic remedy must be ultimate to be successful, and that an

economic tendency can only be resisted by destroying the conditions

which give it the false appearance of a law. The two conditions which

were at the time fatal to the efforts of the moderate holder of land,

are generally held to have been the cheapness and, under the inhumane

circumstances of its employment, even efficiency of slave labour, and

the competition of cheap corn from the provinces. The remedial measures

which might immediately present themselves to the mind of a modern

economist, who was unfettered by a belief in free trade or in the

legitimacy of securing the cheapest labour available, are the

prohibition of, or restrictions on, the importation of slaves, and the

imposition of a duty on foreign corn. The first device might in its

extreme form have been impracticable, for it would have been difficult

to ensure such a supervision of the slave market as to discriminate

between the sale of slaves for agricultural or pastoral work and their

acquirement for domestic purposes. A tax on servile labour employed on

land, or the moderate regulation which Caesar subsequently enforced that

a certain proportion of the herdsmen employed on the pasture lands

should be of free birth,[751] would have been more practicable measures,

and perhaps, if presented as an alternative to confiscation, might not

have encountered an unconquerable resistance from the capitalists,

although their very moderation might have won them but a lukewarm

support from the people, and ensured the failure that attends on

half-measures which do not carry their meaning on their face and lack

the boldness which excites enthusiasm. But the real objection which the

Gracchi and their circle would have had to legislation of this type,

whether it had been suggested to them in its extreme shape or in some

modified form, would have been that it could not have secured the object

at which they aimed. Such measures would merely have revived the free

labourer, while their dream was to re-establish the peasant proprietor,

or at least the occupant who held his land on a perfectly secure tenure

from the State. And even the revival of the free labourer would only

have been exhibited on the most modest scale; for such legislation would

have done nothing to reclaim arable land which had degenerated into

pasturage, and to reawaken life in the great deserted tracts, whose

solitude was only broken by the rare presence of the herdsman's cabin.

To raise a cry for the restoration of free labour on this exiguous scale

might have exposed a legislator to the disappointment, if not derision,

of his friends and invited the criticism, effective because popular, of

all his secret foes. The masters of the world were not likely to give

enthusiastic support to a leader who exhibited as their goal the lonely,

barren and often dangerous life of sheep-driver to some greedy

capitalist, and who offered them the companionship, and not the service,

of the slaves that their victorious arms had won.

The alternative of protective legislation for the defence of Italian

grain may be even more summarily dismissed. It was, in the first place,

impossible from the point of view of political expediency. The Gracchi,

or any other reforming legislators, had to depend for their main support

on the voting population of the city of Rome: and such a constituency

would never have dreamed for a moment of sanctioning a measure which

would have made the price of corn dearer in the Roman market, even if

the objections of the capitalists who placed the foreign grain on that

market could have been successfully overcome. So far from dreaming of

the practicability of such a scheme, Caius Gracchus had been forced to

allow the sale of corn at Rome at a cost below the current market-price.

But, even had protection been possible, it must have come as the last,

not as the first, of the constructive measures necessary for the

settlement of the agrarian question. It might have done something to

keep the small farms standing, but these farms had to be created before

their maintenance was secured; and if adopted, apart from some scheme

aiming at a redivision of the land, such a protective measure would

merely have benefited such existing owners of the large estates as still

continued to devote a portion of their domains to agriculture. The fact,

however, which may be regarded as certain, that foreign corn could

undersell that of Italy in the Roman market, and probably in that of all

the great towns within easy access of the sea, may seem a fatal flaw in

the agrarian projects of the Gracchi. What reason was there for

supposing that the tendencies which in the past had favoured the growth

of large holdings and replaced agriculture by pasturage, should remain

inoperative in the future? Tiberius Gracchus's own regulation about the

inalienability of the lands which he assigned, seemed to reveal the

suspicion that the tendencies towards accumulation had not yet been

exhausted, and that the occupants of the newly created farms might not

find the pursuit of agriculture so profitable as to cling to them in

scorn of the enticements of the encroaching capitalist. Doubtless the

prohibition to sell revealed a weakness in the agricultural system of

the times; but the regulation was probably framed, not in despair of the

small holder securing a maintenance, but as a protection against the

money-lender, that curse of the peasant-proprietor, who might now be

less willing to approach the peasant, when the security which he

obtained could under no circumstances lead to his acquiring eventual

ownership. With respect to the future, there was reasonable hope that

the farmer, if kept in tolerable security from the strategic advances of

his wealthier neighbours, would be able to hold his own. In a modern

state, possessing a teeming population and a complex industrial

organisation, where the profits of a widely spread commercial life have

raised the standard of comfort and created a host of varied needs, the

view may reasonably be taken that, before agriculture can declare itself

successful, it must be able to point to some central market where it

will receive an adequate reward for the labour it entails. But this view

was by no means so prevalent in the simpler societies of antiquity. The

difficulties of communication, which, with reference to transport, must

have made Rome seem nearer to Africa than to Umbria, and must have

produced a similar tendency to reliance on foreign imports in many of

the great coast towns, would alone have been sufficient to weaken the

reliance of the farmer on the consumption of his products by the larger

cities. The belief that the homestead might be almost self-sufficient

probably lingered on in remote country districts even in the days of the

Gracchi; or, if absolute self-existence was unattainable, the

necessities of life, which the home could not produce, might be procured

without effort by periodical visits to the market or fair, which formed

the industrial centre of a group of hamlets. The seemingly ample size of

the Gracchan allotments, some of which were three times as great as the

larger of the colonial assignments of earlier days,[752] pointed to the

possibility of the support of a large family, if the simpler needs of

life were alone considered. The farmer's soul need not be vexed by

competition if he was content to live and not to trade, and it might

have been hoped that the devotion to the soil, which ownership inspires,

might have worked its magic even on the lands left barren through

neglect. There might even be a hope for the cultivator who aimed at the

markets of the larger towns; for, if corn returned no profit, yet oil

and wine were not yet undersold, and were both of them commodities which

would bring better returns than grain to the minute and scrupulous care

in which the smaller cultivator excels the owner of a great domain. The

failure of corn-growing as a productive industry, perhaps the

legislation of the Gracchi itself, must have given a great impetus to

the cultivation of the vine and the olive, the value attached to which

during the closing years of the Republic is, as we have seen, attested

by the fact that the extension of these products was prohibited in the

Transalpine regions in order to protect the interests of the

Roman producer.

An agricultural revival was, therefore, possible; but its success

demanded a spirit that would enter readily into the work, and submit

without a murmur to the conditions of life which the stern task

enjoined. It was here that the agrarian legislation of the Gracchi found

its obstacle. So far as it did fail--so far, that is, as it was not

sufficient to prevent the renewed accumulation of the people in the

towns and the continued depopulation of the country districts--it failed

because it offended against social ideals rather than against economic

tendencies. Many of the settlers whom it planted on the allotments, must

already have been demoralised by the feverish atmosphere of Rome; while

others of a saner and more vigorous type may have soon looked back on

the capital, not as the lounging-place of the idler, but as the exchange

of the world, or have turned their thoughts to the provinces as the

sphere where energy was best rewarded and capital gave its speediest

returns. Of the other social measures of this period, colonisation, in

so far as it had a purely agricultural object, is subject to the

criteria that have been applied to the agrarian movements of the time;

although it is possible that the formation of new or the remodelling of

old political societies, which must have followed the scheme of Drusus,

had this been ever realised, would have infused a more vigorous life in

agricultural settlements of this type than was likely to be awakened in

those which formed a mere outlying part of Rome or some existing

municipality. We have seen how the colonial plan of Drusus differed in

its intention from that of Caius Gracchus; but the latter statesman had,

in the settlement which he projected at Junonia, planned a foundation

which would proximately have lived on the wealth of its territory rather

than on its trade, and must always have been, like Carthage of old, as

much an agricultural as a commercial state. To an agrarian project such

as this no economic objection could have been offered and, had the

scheme of transmarine colonisation been fully carried out, the provinces

themselves might have been made to benefit the farming class of Italy,

whose economic foes they had become. The distance also of such

settlements from Rome would have blunted the craving for the life of the

capital, which beset the minds and paralysed the energies of the

occupants of Italian land.

But, on the whole, the Gracchan scheme of colonisation was, as we have

seen, commercial rather than agricultural, and was probably intended to

benefit a class that was not adapted to rural occupations, either by

association or training. By this enterprise Caius Gracchus showed that

he saw with perfect clearness the true reason, and the final evidence,

of the stagnation of the middle class. A nation which has abandoned

agriculture and allows itself to be fed by foreign hands, even by those

of its own subjects, is exposed to military dangers which are obvious,

and to political perils somewhat more obscure but bearing their evil

fruit from time to time; but such treason to the soil is no sign of

national decay, if the legions of workers have merely transferred their

allegiance from the country to the town, from agriculture to manufacture

and commerce. In Italy this comforting explanation was impossible.

Except perhaps in Latium and Campania, there were few industrial

centres; many of those that existed were in the hands of Greeks, many

more had sunk under the stress of war and had never been revived. The

great syndicates in which Roman capital was invested, employed slaves

and freedmen as their agents; the operations of these great houses were

directed mainly to the provinces, and the Italian seaports were employed

merely as channels for a business which was speculative and financial

and, so far as Italy was concerned, only to a very slight, if to any,

degree productive. To re-establish the producer or the trader of

moderate means, was to revive a stable element in the population, whose

existence might soften the rugged asperity with which capital confronted

power on the one hand and poverty on the other. But to revive it at Rome

would have demanded artificial measures, which, attacking as they must

have done the monopolies possessed by the Equites, would have defeated

the legislator's immediate object and probably proved impracticable,

while such a revival would also have accentuated the centralisation,

which might be useful to the politician but was deplored by the social

reformer. The debilitated class might, however, recover its elasticity

if placed in congenial surroundings and invited to the sites which had

once attracted the enterprise of the Greek trader; and Caius Gracchus's

settlements in the south of Italy were means to this end. We have no

warrant for pronouncing the experiment an utter failure. Some of these

colonies lived on, although in what guise is unknown. But even a

moderate amount of success would have demanded a continuity in the

scheme, which was rudely interrupted by the fall of its promoter, and it

is not to be imagined that the larger capitalists, whose power the

reformer had himself increased, looked with a friendly eye upon these

smaller rivals. The scheme of social reform projected by Gracchus found

its completion in his law for the sale of corn. When he had made

provision for the born agriculturist and the born tradesman, there still

remained a residuum of poorer citizens whose inclination and habits

prompted them to neither calling. It was for these men that the monthly

grant of cheapened grain was intended. Their bread was won by labour,

but by a labour so fitful and precarious that it was known to be often

insufficient to secure the minimum means of subsistence, unless some

help was furnished by the State. The healthier form of state-aid--the

employment of labour--was certainly practised by Caius Gracchus, and

perhaps the extensive public works which he initiated and supervised,

were intended to benefit the artisan who laboured in their construction

as well as the trader who would profit by their completion.

Whatever may be our judgment on the merits and results of this social

programme, the importance of the political character which it was to

assume, from the close of the career of Caius Gracchus to the downfall

of the Republic, can hardly be exaggerated. The items of reform as

embodied in his legislation became the constant factors in every

democratic programme which was to be issued in the future. In these we

see the demand for land, for colonial assignations, for transmarine

settlements, for a renewal or extension of the corn law, perpetually

recurring. It is true that this recurrence may be in part due to the

very potency of the personality of the first reformer and to the magic

of the memory which he left behind him. Party-cries tend to become

shibboleths and it is difficult to unravel the web that has been spun by

the hand of a master. Even the hated cry for the Italian franchise,

which had proved the undoing of Caius Gracchus, became acceptable to

party leaders and to an ever-growing section of their followers, largely

because it had become entwined with his programme of reform. But the

vigorous life of his great manifesto cannot be explained wholly on this

ground. It is a greater exaltation of its author to believe that its

life was due to its intrinsic utility, and that Gracchus indicated real

needs which, because they remained unsatisfied until the birth of the

Principate, were ever the occasion for the renewal of proposals so

closely modelled on his own.

When we turn from the social to the political changes of this period, we

are on far less debatable ground. Although there may be some doubt as to

the intention with which each reform was brought into existence by Caius

Gracchus, its character as illustrated by its place in the economy of

the commonwealth is so clearly stamped upon it and so potently

manifested in the immediately following years, that a comprehensive

discussion of the nature of his single measures would be merely an

unprofitable effort to recall the past or anticipate the future. But the

collective effect of his separate efforts has been subjected to very

different interpretations, and the question has been further complicated

by hazardous, and sometimes overconfident, attempts to determine how far

the legislator's intentions were fulfilled in the actual result of his

reforms. Because it can be shown that the changes introduced by

Gracchus, or, to be more strictly accurate, the symptoms which elicited

these changes, ultimately led to monarchical rule, Gracchus has been at

times regarded as the conscious author and possessor of a personal

supremacy which he deliberately intended should replace the intricate

and somewhat cumbrous mechanism which controlled the constitutional

government of Rome; because he sowed the seeds of a discord so terrible

as to be unendurable even in a state which had never known the absence

of faction and conflict, and had preserved its liberties through

carefully regulated strife, his work has been held to be that of some

avenging angel who came, not to renew, but to destroy. There is truth in

both these pictures; but the Gracchus whom they portray as the force

that annihilated centuries of crafty workmanship, as the first precursor

of the coming monarchy, is the Gracchus who rightly lives in the

historic imagination which, unfettered by conditions of space or time,

prefers the contemplation of the eternity of the work to that of the

environment of the worker; it is a presentment which would be applicable

to any man as able and as resolute as Gracchus, who attempted to meet

the evils created by a weak and irresponsible administration, partly by

the restoration of old forms, partly by the recognition of new and

pressing claims. There is a point at which reform, except it go so far

as to blot out a constitution and substitute another in its place, must

act as a weakening and dissolving force. That point is reached when an

existing government is effectually hampered from exercising the

prerogatives of sovereignty and no other power is sufficiently

strengthened to act as its unquestioned substitute. The dissolution will

be easier if reform bears the not uncommon aspect of conservatism, and a

nominal sovereign, whose strength, never very great, has been sapped by

disuse and the habit of mechanical obedience, is placed in competition

with a somewhat effete usurper. It is not, however, fair to regard

Gracchus as a radical reactionary who was the first to drag a prisoned

and incapable sovereign into the light of day. Had he done this, he

would have been the author of a revolution and the creator of a new

constitution. But this he never attempted to be, and such a view of his

work rests on the mistaken impression that, at the time of his reforms,

the senate was recognised as the true government of Rome. Such a

pretension had never been published nor accepted. We are not concerned

with its reality as a fact; but no sound analysis, whether undertaken by

lawyer or historian, would have admitted its theoretical truth. The

literary atmosphere teemed with theories of popular sovereignty of a

limited kind, and Gracchus, while recognising this sovereignty, did

little to remove its limitations. It is true that, like his brother, he

legislated without seeking the customary sanction of the senate; but

initial reforms could never have been carried through, had the

legislator waited for this sanction; and the future freedom of the

Comitia from senatorial control was at best guaranteed by the force of

the example of the Gracchi, not by any new legal ordinances which they

ordained. Earlier precedents of the same type had not been lacking, and

it was only the comprehensiveness of the Gracchan legislation which

seemed to give a new impetus to the view that in all fundamental

matters, which called for regulation by Act of Parliament, the people

was the single and uncontrolled sovereign. Thus was developed the idea

of the possibility of a new period of growth, which should refashion the

details of the structure of the State into greater correspondence with

the changed conditions of the times. As the earlier process of change

had raised the senate to power, the latter might be interpreted as

containing a promise that a new master was to be given to the Roman

world. But it is highly improbable that to Gracchus or to any of his

contemporaries was the true nature of the prophecy revealed. For the

moment a balance of power was established, and the moneyed class stood

midway between the opposing factions of senate and people. Its new

powers were intended to constrain the senate into efficiency rather than

to reduce it to impotence, and to create these powers Gracchus had

endowed the equestrian order with that right of audit which, in the

earlier theory of the constitution, had been held to be one of the

securest guarantees of the power of the people. Gracchus predicted the

strife that was likely to follow this friction between the government

and the courts; but this prediction, while it perhaps reveals the hope

that in the issues of the future the mercantile class would generally be

found on the side of the people, betrays still more clearly the belief

that the people, and their patron of the moment, were utterly incapable

of standing alone, and that no true democratic government was possible

for Rome. In spite of his Hellenism Gracchus betrayed two

characteristics of the true Roman. He believed in the advisability of

creating a political impasse, from which some mode of escape would

ultimately be devised by the wearied and lacerated combatants; and he

held firmly to the view that the people, considered strictly in itself,

had no organic existence; that it never was, and never could be, a power

in its own right. He made no effort to give the Roman Comitia an

organisation which would have placed it on something like the

independent level of a Greek Ecclesia. Such an omission was perhaps the

result of neglect rather than of deliberation; but this very neglect

proves that Gracchus had in no way emancipated himself from the typical

Roman idea that the people could find expression only through the voice

of a magistrate. This idea unquestionably made the leader of the moment

the practical head of the State during any crisis that called for

constant intervention on the part of the Comitia; but there is no reason

to suppose a belief on the part of Gracchus that such intervention would

be unremittingly demanded, would become as integral a part of the

every-day mechanism of government as the senate's direction of the

provinces or the knight's control of the courts. But even had he held

this view, the situation which it conjured up need not have borne a

close resemblance to monarchy. The natural vehicle for the expression of

the popular will would have been the tribunate--an office which by its

very nature presented such obvious hindrances to personal rule as the

existence of colleagues armed with the power of veto, the short tenure

of office, and the enjoyment of powers that were mainly negative. It is

true that the Gracchi themselves had shown how some of these

difficulties might be overcome. The attempt at re-election, the

accumulation of offices, the disregard of the veto, were innovations

forced on them by the knowledge, gained from bitter experience, that

reform could proceed only from a power that was to some extent outside

the constitution, and that the efficient execution of the contemplated

measures demanded the concentration of varied types of authority in a

single hand. Perhaps Caius faced the situation more frankly than his

brother; but his consciousness of the necessity of such an occasional

power in the State was accompanied by the belief that it would prove the

ruin of the man who grasped it, that the work might be done but that the

worker would be doomed. These gloomy anticipations were not the result

of disordered nerves, but the natural fruit of the coldly calculating

intellect which saw that supremacy either of or through the people was

an illusion, that the power of the nobility must be resisted by keener

and more durable weapons than the Comitia and its temporary leaders,

that the authority of the senate might yield to a slow process of

attrition, but would never be engulfed by any cataclysmic outburst of

popular hostility. It was no part of the statesman's task to pry into

the future and vex himself with the query whether a new and permanent

headship of the State might not be created, to play the all-pervading

part which destiny had assigned to the senate. The senate's power had

not vanished, it was not even vanishing. It was a solid fact, fully

accepted by the very masses who were howling against it. Its decadence

would be the work of time, and all the great Roman reformers of the past

had left much to time and to fortune. The materials with which the

Gracchi worked were far too composite to enable them to forecast the

shape of the structure of which they were laying the foundations. The

essential fact of the future monarchy, the growth of the military power,

must have been almost completely hidden from their eyes. It is true

that, in relation to the fall of the Republic and the growth of the

monarchical idea, the Gracchi were more than mere preparatory or

destructive forces. They furnished faint types, which were gladly

welcomed by subsequent pretenders, of what a constitutional monarch

should be. But it is ever hazardous to identify the destroyer with the

creator or the type with the prophet.

CHAPTER 5

The common destiny which had attended the Gracchi was manifested even in

the consequences of their fall. At both crises a brilliant but

disturbing element had vanished, the work of the reformer remained,

because it was the utterance of the people before whose sacred name the

nobility continued to bow, the political atmosphere was cleared, the

legitimate organs of government resumed their acknowledged sway. To

speak of a restoration of power to the nobility after the fall of Caius

Gracchus is to belie both the facts of history and the impressions of

the times. There is little probability that either the nobles or the

commons felt that the two years of successful agitation amounted to a

change of government, or that the senate ever abandoned the conviction

that the reformer, embarrassing as his proceedings might be on account

of the obvious necessity for their acceptance, must succumb to the

devices which had long formed the stock-in-trade of a successful

senatorial campaign; while the transition from the guidance of Gracchus

to that of the accredited representatives of the nobility was rendered

all the easier by the facts that the authority of the tribune had long

been waning, and that, for some months before his death, a large section

of the people had been greedily fixing its eyes on an attractive

programme which had been presented in the name of the senate. The

suppression of the final movement had, it is true, been marked by an

unexampled severity; but these stern measures had followed on an actual

appeal to arms, which had elicited a response from the passive or

quaking multitude and had made them in some sense participants in the

slaughter. If it was terrible to think that three thousand citizens had

been butchered in the streets or in the Tullianum, it was comforting to

remember that they had been officially denounced as public enemies by

the senate. There was no haunting sense of an inviolable wrong inflicted

on the tribunate, for Caius Gracchus had not been tribune when he fell;

there was no memory, half bitter, half grotesque, of indiscriminate

slaughter dealt by a mob of infuriated senators, for this latter and

greater _emeute_ had been suppressed by the regular forces of the State,

led by its highest magistrate. The position of the government was more

secure, the conscience of the people more easy than it had been after

the massacre of Tiberius Gracchus and his followers. This feeling of

security on the part of the government, and of acquiescence on that of

the people, was soon put to the test by the prosecution of the ex-consul

Lucius Opimius. His impeachment before the people by the tribune

Decius[753] raised the vital question whether the novel powers which he

had exercised in crushing Gracchus and his adherents, could be justified

on the ground that they were the necessary, and in fact the only, means

of maintaining public security. It was practically a question whether a

new form of martial law should be admitted to recognition by the highest

organ of the State, the voice of the sovereign people itself; and the

discussion was rendered all the more piquant by the fact that that very

sovereign was reminded that it had lately sanctioned an ordinance which

forbade a capital penalty to be pronounced against a Roman citizen

except by consent of the people, The arguments used on either side were

of the most abstract and far-reaching character.[754] In answer to

Decius's objection that the proceedings of Opimius were an obvious

contravention of statute law, and that the most wanton criminality did

not justify death without trial, the view, never unwelcome to the Roman

mind, that there was a higher justice than law, was advanced by the

champions of the accused. It was maintained that an ultimate right of

self-defence was as necessary to a state as to an individual. The man

who attempted to overturn the foundations of society was a public enemy

beyond the pale of law; the man who resisted his efforts by every means

that lay to hand was merely fulfilling the duty to his country which was

incumbent on a citizen and a magistrate. If this view were accepted, the

complex issue at law resolved itself into a simple question of fact. Had

the leader and the party that had been crushed shown by their actions

that they were overt enemies of the State? The majority which acquitted

Opimius practically decided that Gracchus and his adherents had been

rendered outlaws by their deeds. The sentiment of the moment had been

cleverly stirred by the nature of the issue which was put before them.

Had the voters been Gracchans at heart, they would probably have paid

but little attention to these unusual appeals to the fundamental

principles of political life, and would have shown themselves supporters

of the spirit, as well as of the letter, of the enactment whose author

they had just pronounced an outlaw. For there could be no question that

the Gracchan law, which no one dared assail, was meant to cover just the

very acts of which Opimius had been guilty after the slaughter of the

Gracchans in the streets had ended. The right to kill in an _emeute_

might be a questionable point; but the power of establishing a military

court for the trial of captured offenders was notoriously illegal, and

could under very few circumstances have been justified even on the

ground of necessity. The decision of the people also seemed to give a

kind of recognition to the utterance of the senate which had preceded

Opimius's display of force. It is quite true that no successful defence

of violence could ever be rested on the formula itself. This "ultimate

decree of the senate" was valued as a weighty and emphatic declaration

of the existence of a situation which demanded extreme measures, rather

than as a legal permit which justified the disregard of the ordinary

rights of the citizen. But formulae often have a power far in excess of

their true significance; they impose on the ignorant, and furnish both a

shield and a weapon to their cunning framers. The armoury of the senate,

or of any revolutionary who had the good fortune to overawe the senate,

was materially strengthened by the people's judgment in Opimius's

favour.[755] The favourable situation was immediately used to effect the

recall of Publius Popillius Laenas. His restoration was proposed to the

people by Lucius Bestia a tribune;[756] and the people which had just

sanctioned Opimius's judicial severities, did not betray the

inconsistency of continuing to resent the far more restricted

persecution of Popillius. Yet the step was an advance on their previous

action; for they were now actually rescinding a legal judgment of their

own, and approving of the actions of a court which had been established

by the senate on its own authority without any previous declaration of

the outlawry of its victims--a court whose proceedings were known to

have directed the tenor of that law of Caius Gracchus, the validity of

which was still unquestioned.

But even on the swell of this anti-Gracchan tide the nobility had still

to steer its course with caution and circumspection. Personal prejudices

were stronger than principles with the masses. They might sanction

outrages which already had the blessing of men who represented,

externally at least, the more respectable portion of Roman society; but

they continued to detest individuals whose characters seemed to have

grown blacker rather than cleaner by participation in, or even

justification of, the recent acts of violence. One of our authorities

would have us believe that even the aged Publius Lentulus, once chief of

the senate, was sacrificed by his peers to the fate which had attended

Scipio Nasica. He had climbed the Aventine with Opimius's troops and had

been severely wounded in the ensuing struggle.[757] But neither his age

nor his wounds sufficed to overcome the strange prejudice of the mob.

Obloquy and abuse dogged his footsteps, until at length he was forced,

in the interest of his own peace or security, to beg of the senate one

of those honorary embassies which covered the retirement of a senator

either for private business or for leisure, and to seek a home in

Sicily.[758] His last public utterance was an impassioned prayer that he

might never return to his ungrateful country: and the gods granted him

his request. If this story is true, it proves that public opinion was

stronger even than the voice of the Comitia. Lentulus, if put on his

trial, would probably have been acquitted; but the resentful minority,

which was powerless in the assembly, may have been sufficiently strong

to make life unbearable to its chosen victim by its demeanour at public

gatherings and in the streets. But even the Comitia had limits to its

endurance. During the year which followed Opimius's acquittal there

appeared before them a suppliant for their favour who had about equal

claims to the gratitude and the hatred of both sections of the people.

They were the self-destructive or corroborative claims of the statesman

who is called a convert by his friends and a renegade by his foes. No

living man of the age had stood in a stronger political light than

Carbo. An active assistant of Tiberius Gracchus, and so embittered an

opponent of Scipio Aemilianus as to be deemed the author of his death,

he had severed his connection with the party of reform, probably in

consequence of the view that the extension of the franchise which had

become embedded in their programme was either impracticable or

undesirable. He must have proved a welcome ally to the nobility in their

struggle with Caius Gracchus, and their appreciation of his value seems

proved by the fact that he was elected to the consulship in the very

year of the tribune's fall, when the influence of the senate, and

therefore in all probability their power of controlling the elections,

had been fully re-established. The debt was paid by a vigorous

championship of the cause of Opimius, which was heard during the

consulship of Carbo.[759] The chief magistrate spoke warmly in defence

of his accused predecessor in office, and declared that the action of

Opimius in succouring his country was an act incumbent on the consul as

the recognised guardian of the State.[760] No man had greater reason to

feel secure than Carbo, who had so lately tested the suffrages of the

people as electors and as judges; yet no man was in greater peril. It

seems that, while exposed on the side of his former associates to the

impotent rage which is excited by the success of the convert, who is

believed to have been rewarded for his treachery, he had not won the

confidence, or at least could not arouse the whole-hearted support, of

his new associates and their following in the assembly. Perhaps the

landlords had not forgiven the agrarian commissioner, nor the moderates

the vehement opponent of Scipio; to the senate he had served his

purpose, and they may not have thought him serviceable enough to deserve

the effort which had rescued Opimius. Carbo was, in fact, an inviting

object of attack for any young political adventurer who wished to

inaugurate his career by the overthrow of a distinguished political

victim, and to sound a note of liberalism which should not grate too

harshly in the ears of men of moderate views. The assailant was Lucius

Crassus,[761] destined to be the greatest orator of his day, and a youth

now burning to test his eloquence in the greatest field afforded by the

public life of Rome, but scrupulous enough to take no unfair advantage

of the object of his attack.[762] We do not know the nature of the

charge on which Carbo was arraigned. It probably came under the

expansive conception of treason, and was possibly connected with those

very proceedings in consequence of which Opimius had been accused and

acquitted.[763] That the charge was of a character that had reference to

recent political events, or at least that the prosecutor felt himself

bound to maintain some distinct political principle of a liberal kind,

is proved by the regret which Crassus expressed in his maturer years

that the impetus of youth had led him to take a step which limited his

freedom of action for the future.[764] Some compunction may also have

been stirred by the unexpected consequence of his attack; for Carbo,

perhaps realising the animosity of his judges and the weakness or

coldness of his friends, is said to have put an end to his life by

poison.[765] Voluntary exile always lay open to the Roman who dared not

face the final verdict; and the suicide of Carbo cannot be held to have

been the sole refuge of despair; it is rather a sign of the bitterness

greater than that of death, which may fall on the soul of a man who can

appeal for sympathy to none, who knows that he has been abandoned and

believes that he has been betrayed. The hostility of his countrymen

pursued him beyond the grave; the aristocratic historian could not

forget the seditious tribune, and the contemporary chronicles which

moulded and handed on the conception of Carbo's life, showed the usual

incapacity of such writings to appreciate the possibility of that honest

mental detachment from a suspected cause which often leads, through

growing dissension with past colleagues and increasing co-operation with

new, to a more violent advocacy of a new faith than is often shown by

its habitual possessors.

The records of the political contests which occupied the two years

succeeding the downfall of Caius Gracchus, are sufficient to prove that

political thought was not stifled, that practically any political

views--saving perhaps such as expressed active sympathy with the final

efforts of Caius Gracchus and his friends--might be pronounced, and that

the nobility could only maintain its influence by bending its ear to the

chatter of the streets and employing its best instruments to mould the

opinion of the Forum by a judicious mixture of deference and

exhortation. The senate knew itself to be as weak as ever in material

resources; government could not be maintained for ever by a series of

_coups d'etat_, and the only method of securing the interests of the

rulers was to maintain the confidence of the majority and to presume

occasionally on its apathy or blindness. This was the attitude adopted

with reference to the proposals which had lately been before the people.

Drusus's scheme of colonisation was not withdrawn, but its execution was

indefinitely postponed,[766] and the same treatment was meted out to the

similar proposals of Caius Gracchus. Two of his Italian colonies,

Neptunia near Tarentum and Scylacium, seem actually to have survived;

but this may have been due to the fact that the work of settlement had

already commenced on these sites, and that the government did not

venture to rescind any measure which had been already put into

execution. It was indeed possible to stifle the settlement on the site

of Carthage, for here the superstition of the people supported the

objections of the senate, and the question of the abrogation of this

colony had been raised to such magnitude by the circumstances of

Gracchus's fall that to withdraw would have been a sign of weakness. But

even this objectionable settlement in Africa gave proof of the scruples

of the senate in dealing with an accomplished fact. When the Rubrian law

was repealed, it was decided not to take from the _coloni_ the lands

which had already been assigned; no religious pretext could be given for

their disturbance, for the land of Carthage was not under the ban that

doomed the city to desolation; and the colonists remained in possession

of allotments, which were free from tribute, were held as private

property, and furnished one of the earliest examples of a Roman tenure

of land on provincial soil.[767] The assignment was by the nature of the

case changed from that of the colonial to that of the purely agrarian

type; the settlers were members of Rome alone and had no local

citizenship, although it is probable that some modest type of urban

settlement did grow up outside the ruined walls of Carthage to satisfy

the most necessary requirements of the surrounding residents.

The benefits conferred by the Gracchi on the poorer members of the

proletariate were also respected. The corn law may have been left

untouched for the time being[768]--a natural concession, for the senate

could only hope to rule by its influence with the urban mob, and, in the

case of so simple an institution, any modification would have been so

patent an infringement of the rights of the recipients as to have

immediately excited suspicion and anger. With the agrarian law it was

different. Its repeal was indeed impossible; but the land-hunger of the

dispossessed capitalists might to some extent be appeased by a measure

that was not only tolerable, but welcome; and modifications, so gradual

and subtle that their meaning would be unintelligible to the masses,

might subsequently be introduced to remedy observed defects, to calm the

apprehensions of the allies, and perhaps to secure the continuance of

large holdings, if economic causes should lead to their revival. The

agrarian legislation of the ten years that followed the fall of Caius

Gracchus, seems to have been guided by the wishes of the senate; but

much of it does not bear on its surface the signs which we might expect

of capitalistic influence or oligarchic neglect of the poor. Large

portions of it seem rather to reveal the desire of banishing for ever a

harrowing question which was the opportunity of the demagogue; and the

peculiar mixture of prudence, liberality, and selfishness which this

legislation reveals, can only be appreciated by an examination of its

separate stages.

Shortly after the death of Caius Gracchus--perhaps in the very year of

his fall--a law was passed permitting the alienation of the

allotments.[769] This measure must have been as welcome to the lately

established possessors as it was to the large proprietors; it removed

from the former a galling restraint which, like all such legal

prohibitions, formed a sentimental rather than an actual grievance, but

one that was none the less keenly felt on that account; while to the

latter it offered the opportunity of satisfying those expectations,

which the initial struggles of the newly created farmers must in many

cases have aroused. The natural consequence of the enactment was that

the spurious element amongst the peasant-holders, represented by those

whose tastes and capacities utterly unfitted them for agriculture,

parted with their allotments, which went once more to swell the large

domains of their wealthier neighbours.[770] We do not know the extent or

rapidity of this change, or the stage which it had reached when the

government thought fit to introduce a new agrarian law, which may have

been two or three years later than the enactment which permitted

alienation.[771] The new measure contained three important

provisions.[772] Firstly, it forbade the further distribution of public

land, and thus put an end to the agrarian commission which had never

ceased to exist, and had continued to enjoy, if not to exercise, its

full powers since the restoration of its judicial functions by Caius

Gracchus. We cannot say to what extent the commission was still

Encountering claims on its jurisdiction and powers of distribution at

the time of its disappearance; but fourteen years is a long term of

power for such an extraordinary office, whose work was necessarily one

of perpetual unsettlement; and the disappearance of the triumvirs must

have been welcome, not only to the existing Roman occupants of land

which still remained public, but to those of the Italians to whom the

commission had ever been a source of apprehension. The extinction of the

office must have been regarded with indifference by those for whom the

commission had already provided, and by the large mass of the urban

proletariate which did not desire this type of provision. The residuum

of citizens which still craved land may be conceived to have been small,

for eagerness to become an agriculturist would have suggested an earlier

claim; and the passing of the commission was probably viewed with no

regret by any large section of the community. The law then proceeded to

establish the rights of all the occupants of land in Italy that had once

been public and had been dealt with by the commission. To all existing

occupants of the land which had been assigned, perfect security of

tenure was given, and this security may have been extended now, as it

certainly was later, to many of the occupants who still remained on

public land which had not been subjected to distribution. So far as the

land which had been assigned was concerned, this law could have made no

specification as to the size of the allotments, for the law permitting

alienation had made it practically private property and given its

purchaser a perfectly secure title. Hence the accumulations which

followed the permit to alienate were secured to their existing

possessors, and a legal recognition was given to the formation of such

large estates as had come into existence during the last three years.

But the security of tenure was conditioned by the reimposition of the

dues payable to the State, which had been abolished by Drusus. We are

not informed whether these dues were to be henceforth paid only by those

who had received allotments from the land commission, or by all in whose

hands such allotments were at the moment to be found; perhaps the

intention was to impose them on all lands that had been public before

the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus; although many of the larger

proprietors, who had recently added to their holdings, might have urged

in their defence that they had acquired the land as private property and

that it was burdened by no dues at the time of its acquisition. But,

even if this burden fell mainly on the class of smaller possessors, it

could scarcely be regarded as a grievance, for it had formed part of the

Gracchan scheme, and there was no legitimate reason why the newly

established class of cultivators should be placed in a better position

than the older occupants of the public domain, who still paid dues both

on arable land and for the privilege of pasturing their flocks. The

temporary motive which had led to their abolition had now ceased to

exist, for the agricultural colonies of Drusus, who had promised land

free from all taxes, had not been established, and the chief, almost the

sole, example of a recent assignment on such liberal principles was to

be discovered in distant Africa. But, even if the cultivators grumbled,

their complaints were not dangerous to the government. They would have

found no echo at Rome, where the urban proletariate was content with the

easier provision which had been made for its support; and the new

revenues from the public land were made still more acceptable to the

eyes of the masses by the provision contained in this agrarian law that

they should be employed solely for the benefit of needier citizens. The

precise nature of the promised employment is unhappily unknown, our

authority merely informing us that "they were to be used for purposes of

distribution". We cannot understand by these words free gifts either in

money or corn; for such extreme measures never entered even into the

social ideals of Caius Gracchus, and the senate to its credit never

deigned to purchase popularity through the pauperising institutions by

which the Caesars maintained the security of their rule in Rome. The

words might imply an extension of the system of the sale of cheap corn,

or a cheapening of the rates at which it was supplied; but the Gracchan

system seems hardly to have admitted of extension, so far as the number

of recipients was concerned, and cheaper sales would hardly have been

encouraged by a government, which, anxious as it was to secure

popularity, was responsible for the financial administration of the

State and looked with an anxious eye upon the existing drain on the

resources of the treasury.[773] Perhaps the new revenues were held up to

the people as a guarantee that the sale of cheap corn would be

continued, and public confidence was increased when it was pointed out

that there was a special fund available for the purpose. If we abandon

the view that the promised employment of the revenues in the interest of

the people referred to the distribution of corn, there remains the

possibility that it had reference to the acquisition of fresh land for

assignation. This promise would indeed have rendered practicable the

partial realisation of the shadowy schemes of Drusus, which had never

been officially withdrawn; but it is doubtful whether it would have done

much to strengthen the hold of the government upon the urban voter; for

the whole scheme of this new land law seems to prove that the agrarian

question was viewed with indifference, and no pressure seems to have

been put on the government to carry their earlier promises into effect.

Apart from the welcome prospect implied in the abolition of the agrarian

commission, no positive guarantee against disturbance had yet been given

to the Latins and Italians. This was formally granted, in terms unknown

to us, at the appropriate hands of Marcus Livius Drusus during his

tenure of the consulship.[774] The senate, now that it had satisfied the

larger proprietors and the urban proletariate, and could boast that it

had at least not injured the smaller cultivators, completed its work of

pacification by holding out the hand of fellowship to the allies. It was

tacitly understood that the new friend was not to ask for more, but he

might be induced to look to the senate as his refuge against the

rapacity of the mob and the recklessness of its leaders.

Shortly afterwards the tribune Spurius Thorius[775] carried a law which

again abolished the _vectigal_ on the allotments. If we regard this

measure as an independent effort on the part of the tribune, it may have

been an answer to the protests of the smaller agriculturists still

struggling for existence; if it was dictated by the senate, it may have

been due to the absorption of the allotments by the larger proprietors

and their unwillingness to pay dues for land which they had added to

their private property. But, to whatever party we may assign it, we may

see in it also the desire to reach a final settlement of the agrarian

question by abolishing all the invidious distinctions between the

different tenures of land which had once formed part of the public

domain. It removed the injustice of burdening the small holding with a

rent which was not exacted from estates that had been partly formed by

accretions of such allotments; and by the abolition of all dues[776] it

tended to remove all land which had been assigned, from the doubtful

category to which it had hitherto belonged of possessions which, though

in a sense private, still recognised the overlordship of the State, and

to revive in all its old sharpness the simple distinction between public

and private land. This tendency makes it probable that the law of

Thorius is identical with one of which we possess considerable

fragments; for this partially preserved enactment is certainly as

sweeping a measure as could have been devised by any one eager to see

the agrarian question, so far as it affected Italian soil, finally

removed from the region of political strife.

Internal evidence makes it probable that this law was passed in the year

111 B.C.,[777] and consequently at the close of that period of

comparative quiescence which was immediately followed by the political

storm raised by the conduct of the war in Numidia. It may, therefore, be

regarded as a product of senatorial enlightenment, although its

provisions would be quite as consistent with the views of a tolerably

sober democrat. The main scope of the enactment is to give the character

of absolute private ownership, unburdened by any restrictions such as

the payment of dues to the State, to nearly all the land which had been

public at the time of the passing of the agrarian law of Tiberius

Gracchus. The first provisions refer to lands which had not been dealt

with by the agrarian commissioners. Any occupant of the public domain,

who has been allowed to preserve his allotment intact, because it does

not exceed the limit fixed by the earlier laws, and any one who has

received public land from the State in exchange for a freehold which he

has surrendered for the foundation of a colony, is henceforth to hold

such portions of the public domain as his private property. The same

provision holds for all land that has been assigned, whether by colonial

or agrarian commissioners. The first class of assignments are those

incidental to the one or two colonies of Caius Gracchus, and perhaps of

Drusus, that were actually established in Italy. Even at the time of

settlement such land must have been made the private property of its

holders; and this law, therefore, but confirms the tenure, and implies

the validity of the act of colonisation. Such land is mentioned as

having been "given and assigned in accordance with a resolution of the

people and the plebs," and all eases in which recent colonial laws had

been repealed or dropped--cases which would include Caius Gracchus's

threatened partition of the Campanian territory--are tacitly excluded.

The second class of assignments refer to those made by the

land-commissioners during the whole period of their chequered existence,

and the land whose private character is thus confirmed, must have

covered much the larger part of what had once been the State's domain

in Italy.

A certain portion of this domain still remains, however, the property of

the State and is not converted into private land. The whole of the soil

which had been given in usufruct to colonies and municipal towns, is

retained in its existing condition; the holders, whether Latin colonists

or Roman citizens, are confirmed in their possessions; but, as the land

still remains public, they are doubtless expected to continue to pay

their quit-rent to the State. Similar provision is made for a peculiar

class of land, which had been given by Rome as security for a national

debt. The debt had never been liquidated, probably because the creditors

preferred the land. This they were now to retain on condition of

continued payment of the quit-rent, which marked the fact that the State

was still its nominal owner. A public character is also maintained for

land which had been assigned for the maintenance of roads. Here we find

the only instance of an actual assignation of the Gracchan commissioners

which was not converted, into private property; the obvious reason for

this exception being that these occupants performed a specific and

necessary duty, which would disappear if their tenure was converted into

absolute ownership. Exception against ownership was also made for those

commons on which the occupants of surrounding farms had an exclusive

right of sending their flocks to pasture;[778] for the conversion of

such grazing land into private lots would have injured the collective

interests, and conferred little benefit on the individuals of the

group.[779] The remaining classes of land which still remain the

property of the State, are the roads of Italy, such public land as had

been specially exempted from distribution by the legislation of the

Gracchi, and such as had remained public on other grounds. The only

known instance of the first class is the Campanian territory, which

continued to be let on leases by the State and to bring to the treasury

a sure and considerable revenue; the second class was probably

represented by land which was not arable and had for this reason escaped

distribution. The law provides that it is not to be occupied but to

serve the purposes of grazing-land, and a limit is fixed to the number

of cattle and sheep belonging to a single owner to which it is to afford

free pasturage. For the enjoyment of grazing-rights beyond this limit

dues are to be paid to the contractors who have purchased the right of

collection from the State.

The law then quits the public domains of Italy for those of Africa and

Corinth, partly for the purpose of specifying with exactitude the rights

of the various occupiers and tenants who were settled on the

territories, but chiefly with the object of effecting the sale of some

of the public domain in the province of Africa and the dependency of

Achaea. This intention of alienation is perhaps the chief reason why the

great varieties of tenure of the African soil are marshalled before us

with such detail and precision; for it was necessary, in view of the

contemplated sale, to re-assert the stability of rights that should be

secure by their very nature or had been guaranteed by solemn compact.

But the occasion of a comprehensive settlement of the agrarian question

in Italy was no doubt gladly seized as affording the right opportunity

for surveying, revising, and establishing the claims of those who were

in enjoyment of what was, or had been, the provincial domain of Rome

across the seas. The rights of Roman citizens and subjects are

indifferently considered, and amongst the former those of the settlers

who had journeyed to Africa in accordance with the promises of the

Rubrian law are fully recognised. The degree of permanence accorded to

the manifold kinds of tenure passed in review can not be determined from

our text; but, even when all claims that deserved a permanent

recognition had been subtracted, there still remained a residuum of

land, leased at quinquennial intervals by the censors, which might be

alienated without the infliction of injury on established rights. We do

not know to what extent this sale, the mechanism for which was minutely

provided for in the law, was carried in Africa; its application to the

domain land of Corinth was either withdrawn or, if carried out, was but

slight or temporary; for Corinthian land remained to be threatened by

later agrarian legislation. It is not easy to suggest a motive for this

sale; for it would seem a short-sighted policy to part, on an extensive

scale and therefore presumably at a cheapened rate, with some of the

most productive land in the world, such as was the African domain of the

period, in order to recoup the treasury for the immediate pecuniary

injury which it was suffering in the loss of the revenues from the

public land of Italy. Perhaps the government had grown suspicious of the

operations of the middle-men, and, since they had restricted their

activity by limiting the amount of public land in Italy, deemed a

similar policy advisable in relation to some of their foreign

dependencies.

The length at which we have dwelt on this law is proportionate to its

importance in the political history of the times, and if we possessed

fuller knowledge of its effects, we should doubtless be able to add, in

their social history as well. Its economic results, however, are

exceedingly obscure, and possibly it produced none worthy of serious

consideration; for the artificial stability which it may have seemed to

give to the existing tenure of land could in no way check the play of

economic forces. If these tendencies were still in favour of large

holdings,[780] the process of accumulation must have continued, and, as

we have before remarked, the accumulator was in a securer position when

purchasing land which was admittedly the private property of its owner,

than when buying allotments which might be held to be still liable to

the public dues. On the other hand, the remission of the impost must

have relieved, and the sense of private ownership inspired, the labours

of the smaller proprietors; and the perpetuation of a considerable

proportion of the Gracchan settlers is probable on general grounds. The

reason why it is difficult to give specific reasons for this belief is

that, at the time when we next begin to get glimpses of the condition of

the Italian peasant class, the great reform had been effected which

incorporated the nations of Italy into Rome. The existence of numerous

small proprietors in the Ciceronian period is attested, but many of

these may have been citizens recently given to Rome by the Italian

stocks, amongst whom agriculture on a small scale had never

become extinct.

But the political import of this measure is considerable. By restricting

to narrow limits all the land of Italy to which the State could make a

claim, it altered the character of agrarian agitation for the future. It

did not indeed fulfil its possible object of obviating such measures;

but it rendered the vested interests of all Italian cultivators secure,

with the exception of the lessees of the leased domain, who perhaps had

no claim to permanence of tenure. This domain was represented chiefly by

the Campanian land: and the reformer who would make this territory his

prey, injured the finances of the State more than the interests of the

individual. If he desired more, he must seek it either in the foreign

domains of Rome or by the adoption of some scheme of land purchase.

Assignment of lands in particular districts of Italy or in the provinces

naturally took the form of colonisation, and this is the favourite shape

assumed by the agrarian schemes of the future. Rome was still to witness

many fierce controversies as to the merits of the policy of colonial

expansion, and as to the wisdom of employing public property and public

revenues to this end; the rights of the conqueror to the lands of his

vanquished fellow-citizens were also to be cruelly asserted, and the

civil wars also invited a species of brigandage for the attainment of

possession which too often replaced the judgments of the courts; but

never again do we find a regular political warfare waged between the

rich and the poor for the possession of territories to which each of the

disputants laid claim. The storm which had burst on the Roman world with

the land law of Tiberius Gracchus had now spent its force. It had

undoubtedly produced a great change on the face of Italy; but this was

perhaps more striking in appearance than in reality; neither the work of

demolition, nor the opportunities offered for renewal, attained the

completeness which they had presented in the reformer's dreams.

But the peace of the citizen body was not the only blessing believed to

be secured by this removal of a temptation to tamper with Italian lands.

The anxieties of the Latins and Italians were also quieted, although it

may be questioned whether the memory of past wrongs, now rendered

irrevocable by the progress of recent agrarian experiments, did not

enter into the agitation for the conferment of the franchise, which they

still continued to sustain. The last great law, following the spirit of

the enactment of Drusus which had preceded it by about a year, does

indeed show traces of an anxiety to respect Italian claims. Apart from

the fact, which we have already mentioned, that all lands which had been

granted in usufruct to colonists, were still to be public and were,

therefore, in the case of Latin colonies, to be at the disposal of the

communities to which they had been granted by treaty, the law contains a

special provision for the maintenance of the rights of Latins and

Italians, so far as they are in harmony with the rights allowed to Roman

citizens by the enactment.[781] The guarantees which had been sanctioned

by Drusus, were therefore respected; but their observance was

conditioned by the rule that all prohibitions now created for Romans

should be extended to the allies. As we do not know the purport of

Drusus's measure, or the practices current on the Roman domains occupied

by Latins, we cannot say whether this clause produced any derogation of

their rights; but it must have limited the right of free pasturage on

the public commons, if they had possessed this in a higher degree than

was now permitted, and the right to occupy public land was also

forbidden them in the future. But it was from the negative point of view

that the law might be interpreted as creating or perpetuating a

grievance; for some of the positive benefits which it conferred seem to

have been limited to Romans. The land which it makes private property,

is land which has been assigned by colonial or agrarian commissioners,

or land which has been occupied up to a certain limit. If colonial land

had really been assigned to Latins by Caius Gracchus, their rights are

retained by this law, if they had been made Roman citizens at the time

of the settlement; but if they had been admitted as participants in the

agrarian distribution throughout Italy, their rights as owners are not

confirmed with those of Roman citizens; and the Latin who merely

occupied land was not given the privilege of the Roman possessor of

becoming the owner of the soil, if his occupation were restricted within

a certain limit.[782] He still retained merely a precarious possession,

for which dues to the State were probably exacted. It was something to

have rights confirmed, but they probably appeared less valuable when

those of others were extended. A more generous treatment could hardly

have been expected from a law of Rome dealing with her own domain,

primarily in the interests of her own citizens; but the Italians were

tending to forget their civic independence, and chose rather to compare

their personal rights with those of the Roman burgesses. Such a

comparison applied to the final agrarian settlement must have done

something to emphasise their belief in the inferiority of

their position.

This review of the legislation on social questions which was initiated

or endured by the senate, shows the tentative attitude adopted by the

nobility in their dealings with the people, and proves either a

statesmanlike view of the needs of the situation or the entire lack of a

proud consciousness of their own immunity from attack. Even had they

possessed the power to dictate to the Comitia, they were hemmed in on

another side; for they had not dared to raise a protest against the law

of Gracchus which transferred criminal jurisdiction over the members of

their own order to the knights. The equestrian courts sat in judgment on

the noblest members of the aristocracy; for the political or personal

motives which urged to prosecution were stronger even than the

camaraderie of the order, and governors of provinces were still in

danger of indictment by their peers. Within two years of the

transference of the courts, Quintus Mucius Scaevola, known in later life

as "the Augur" and famed for his knowledge of the civil law, returned

from his province of Asia to meet the accusation of Titus Albucius.[783]

The knights did not begin by a vindictive exercise of their authority.

Although Asia was the most favoured sphere of their activity, Scaevola

was acquitted. Seven years later they gave a stern and perhaps righteous

example of their severity in the condemnation of Caius Porcius

Cato.[784] The accused when consul had obtained Macedonia as his

province, and had waged a frontier war with the Scordisci, which ended

in the annihilation of his forces and his own narrow escape from the

field of battle. His ill-success perhaps deepened the impression made by

his extortions in Macedonia, and he was sentenced to the payment of a

fine. Neither in the case of the acquittal nor in that of the

condemnation does political bias seem to have influenced the judgment of

the courts, and the equestrian jurors may have seemed for a time to

realise the best hopes which had inspired their creation.

The attention of the leading members of the nobility was probably too

absorbed by the problem of adapting senatorial rule to altered

circumstances to allow them the leisure or the inclination to embark on

fresh legislative projects of their own. Our record of these years is so

imperfect that it would be rash to conclude that the scanty proposals on

new subjects which it reveals exhausted the legislative activity of the

senate; but had they done so, the circumstance would be intelligible;

for the work that invited the attention of the senate in its own

interest, was one of consolidation rather than of reform; the political

feeling of the time put measures of a distinctly reactionary character,

such as might have been welcomed by the more conservative members of the

order, wholly out of the question; and the government was not likely,

except under compulsion, to undertake legislation of a progressive type.

The only important law of the period certainly proceeding from

governmental circles, and dealing with a question that was novel, in the

sense that it had not been heard of for a considerable number of years

and had played no part in the Gracchan movements, was one passed by the

consul Marcus Aemilius Scaurus. It dealt with the voting power of the

freedmen,[785] and probably confirmed its restriction to the four city

tribes. It is difficult to assign a political meaning to this law, as we

do not know the practice which prevailed at the time of Scaurus's

intervention; but it is probable that the restriction imposed by the

censors of 169, who had confined the freedmen to a single tribe,[786]

had not been observed, that great irregularity prevailed in the manner

of their registration, and that Scaurus's measure, which was a return to

the arrangement reached at the end of the fourth century, was intended

to restrict the voting privileges of the class. This interpretation of

his intention would seem to show that the increasing liberality of the

Roman master had created a class the larger portion of which was not

dependent on the wealthier and more conservative section of the citizen

body, or was at least enabled to assert its freedom from control through

the secrecy of the ballot. The interests of the class were almost

identical with those of the free proletariate, in which the descendants

of the freedmen were merged: and the law of Scaurus, which strengthened

the country vote by preventing this urban influence spreading through

all the tribes, may be an evidence that the senate distrusted the

present passivity of the urban folk, and looked forward with

apprehension to a time when they might have to rely on the more stable

element which the country districts supplied. We shall see in the sequel

that this anticipation of the freedmen's attitude was not unjustified,

and that the increase of their voting power still continued to be an

effective battle-cry for the demagogue who was eager to increase his

following in the city.

Scaurus was also the author of a sumptuary law.[787] It came

appropriately from a man who had been trained in a school of poverty,

and shows the willingness of the nobility to submit, at least in

appearance, to the discipline which would present it to the world as a

self-sacrificing administration, reaping no selfish reward for its

intense labour, and submitting to that equality of life with the average

citizen which is the best democratic concession that a powerful

oligarchy can make. The activity of the censorship was exhibited in the

same direction. Foreign and expensive dishes were prohibited by the

guardians of public morals, as they were by Scaurus's sumptuary

law:[788] and the censors of 115, Metellus and Domitius, undertook a

scrutiny of the stage which resulted in the complete exclusion from Rome

of all complex forms of the histrionic art and its reduction to the

simple Latin type of music and song.[789] Their energy was also

displayed in a destructive examination of the morals of their own order,

and as a result of the scrutiny thirty-two senators were banished from

the Curia.[790] To guard the senate-house from scandal was indeed the

necessary policy of a nobility which knew that its precarious power

rested on the opinion of the streets; and the efforts of the censors,

directed like those of their predecessors, to a regeneration which had a

national type as its goal, show that that opinion could not yet have

been considered wholly cosmopolitan or corrupt. The frequent splendour

of triumphal processions, such as those which celebrated the victories

of Domitius and Fabius over the Allobroges, of Metellus over the

Dalmatians, and of Scaurus over the Ligurians,[791] produced a

comfortable impression of the efficiency of the government in extending

or preserving the frontiers of the empire; the triumph itself was the

symbol of success, and few could have cared to question the extent and

utility of the achievement. Satisfied with the belief that they were

witnessing the average type of successful administration, the electors

pursued the course, from which they so seldom deflected, of giving their

unreserved confidence to the ancient houses; and this epoch witnessed a

striking instance of hereditary influence, if not of hereditary talent,

when Metellus Macedonicus was borne to his grave by sons, of whom four

had held curule office, three had possessed the consulship, and one had

fulfilled in addition the lofty functions of the censor and enjoyed the

honour of a triumph.[792]

Yet distinction without a certain degree of fitness was now, as at every

other time, an impossibility in Rome. The nobility, although it did not

love originality, extended a helping hand to the capacity that was

willing to support its cause and showed the likelihood of dignifying its

administration; a career was still open to talent and address, if they

were held to be wisely directed; and the man of the period who best

deserves the title of leader of the State, was one who had not even

sprung from the second strata of Roman society, but had struggled with a

poverty which would have condemned an ordinary man to devote such

leisure as he could spare for politics to swelling the babel of the

Forum and the streets. It is true that Marcus Aemilius Scaurus bore a

patrician name, and was one of those potential kings who, once in the

senate, might assume the royal foot-gear and continue the holy task,

which they had performed from the time of Romulus, of guarding and

transmitting the auspices of the Roman people. But the splendour of the

name had long been dimmed. Even in the history of the great wars of the

beginning of the century but one Aemilius Scaurus appears, and he holds

but a subordinate command as an officer of the Roman fleet. The father

of the future chief of the senate had been forced to seek a livelihood

in the humble calling of a purveyor of charcoal.[793] The son, resolute,

ambitious and conscious of great powers, long debated with himself the

question of his future walk in life.[794] He might remain in the ranks

of the business world, supply money to customers in place of coal, and

seize the golden opportunities which were being presented by the

extension of the banking industry in the provincial world. Had he chosen

this path, Scaurus might have been the chief of the knights and the most

resolute champion of equestrian claims against the government. But his

course was decided by the afterthought that the power of words was

greater than that of gold, and that eloquence might secure, not only

wealth, but the influence which wealth alone cannot attain. The fame

which he gained in the Forum led inevitably to service in the field. He

reaped distinction in the Spanish campaigns and served under Orestes in

Sardinia. His narrow means rather than his principles may have been the

reason why his aedileship was not marked by the generous shows to which

the people were accustomed and by which their favour was usually

purchased; in Scaurus's tenure of that office splendour was replaced by

a rigorous performance of judicial duties;[795] but that such an

equivalent could serve his purpose, that it should be even no hindrance

to his career, proves the respect that his strenuous character had won

from the people, and the anticipation formed by the government of the

value of his future services. Now, when he was nearing his fiftieth

year, he had secured the consulship, the bourne of most successful

careers, but not to be the last or greatest prize of a man whose stately

presence, unbending dignity, and apparent simplicity of purpose, could

generally awe the people into respect, and whose keenness of vision and

talent for intrigue impressed the senatorial mind with a sense of his

power to save, when claims were pressing and difficulties acute.[796]

His consulship, though without brilliancy, added to the respectable

laurels that he had already attained. A successful raid on some Illyrian

tribes[797] showed at least that he had retained the physical endurance

of his youth; while his legislation on sumptuary matters and the

freedman's vote showed the spirit of a milder Cato, and the moderate

conservatism, not distasteful to the Roman of pure blood, which would

preserve the preponderance in political power to the citizen untainted

by the stain of servitude. A stormy event of his period of office gave

the crowd an opportunity of seeing the severity with which a magistrate

of the older school could avenge an affront to the dignity of his

office. Publius Decius, who was believed to be a conscious imitator of

Fulvius Flaccus in the exaggerated vehemence of his oratory, and who had

already proved by his prosecution of Opimius that he was ready to defend

certain features of the Gracchan cause even when such championship was

fraught with danger, was in possession of the urban praetorship at the

time when Scaurus held the consulship. One day the consul passed the

open court of justice when the praetor was giving judgment from the

curule chair. Decius remained seated, either in feigned oblivion or in

ostentatious disregard of the presence of his superior. The politic

wrath of Scaurus was aroused; an enemy had been delivered into his

hands, and the people might be given an object-lesson of the way in

which the most vehement champion of popular rights was, even when

covered with the dignity of a magistracy, but a straw in the iron grasp

of the higher Imperium. The consul ordered Decius to rise, his official

robe to be rent, the chair of justice to be shattered in pieces, and

published a warning that no future litigant should resort to the court

of the contumacious praetor.[798] The vulgar mind is impressed, when it

is not angered, by such scenes of violence. A repute for sternness is

the best cloak for the flexibility which, if revealed, would excite

suspicion. Scaurus to the popular mind was an embodiment of stiff

patrician dignity, perhaps happily devoid of that touch of insolence

which is often the mark of a career assured without a struggle; of a

self-complacent dignity, quietly conscious of its own deserts and

demanding their due reward, of the calmness of a soul that is above

suspicion and refuses to admit even in its inmost sanctuary the thought

that its motives can be impugned. Meanwhile certain disrespectful

onlookers were expressing wonder at his mysteriously growing wealth and

marvelling as to its source. But, marvel as they might, they never drove

Scaurus to the necessity of an explanation. We shall find him as an old

man repelling all attacks by the irresistible appeal to his services and

his career. The condemnation of Scaurus appealed to the conservative as

a blow struck at the dignity of the State itself; to the man of a more

open mind it was at least the shattering of a delightful illusion.

The period which witnessed the crowning of the efforts of the poor and

struggling patrician was also sufficiently liberal, or sufficiently poor

in aristocratic talent, to admit the initial steps in the official

career of a genuine son of the people. It was now that Caius Marius was

laboriously climbing the grades of curule rank, and showing in the

pursuit of political influence at home the rugged determination which

had already distinguished him in the field. A Volscian by descent, he

belonged to Rome through the accident of birth in the old municipality

of Arpinum, which since the early part of the second century had enjoyed

full Roman citizenship and therefore gave its citizens the right of

suffrage and of honours in the capital. Born of good yeoman stock in the

village of Cereatae in the Arpinate territory,[799] he had passed a

boyhood which derived no polish from the refinements, and no taint from

the corruptions, of city life. In his case there was no puzzling

discrepancy between the outer and the inner man. His frame and visage

were the true index of a mind, somewhat unhewn and uncouth, but with a

massive reserve of strength, a persistence not blindly obstinate, a

patience that could wear out the most brilliant efforts of his rivals

and opponents. He did not court hostility, but simply shouldered his way

sturdily to the front, encouraged by Rome's better spirits, who saw in

him the excellent officer with qualities that might make the future

general, and appealing to the people, when they gradually became

familiar with his presence, as a type of that venerable myth, the rustic

statesman of the past. The poverty of his early lot was perhaps

exaggerated by historians[800] who wished to point the contrast between

his humble origin and his later glory, and to find a suitable cradle for

his rugged nature; even the initial stages of his career afford no

evidence of a struggle against pressing want, nor is there any proof

that he was supported by the bounty of his powerful friends. Even if he

entered the army as a common foot-soldier, he would merely have shared

the lot of many a well-to-do yeoman who obeyed the call of the

conscription. With Marius, however, military service was not to be an

incident, but a profession. The needs of a widening empire were calling

for special capacities such as had never been demanded in the past. The

career of Scaurus had shown the successful pleader surmounting the

obstacle of poverty; even the higher barrier of birth might be leaped

amidst the democratising influences of the camp. The nobility was not

sufficiently self-centred to be wholly blind to its own interests; and

it was easier to patronise a soldier than a pleader. In the latter case

the aspirant's political creed must be examined; in the former the last

question that would be asked was whether the officer possessed any

political creed at all. It might be a question of importance for the

future with respect to the candidature for those offices which alone

conferred high military command, even though there was as yet no dream

of the sword becoming the arbiter of political life; but the genuine

commander, engaged in the difficult task of remodelling an army, had no

eye but for the bearing and qualities of the soldier, and would not

scruple to cast aside his patrician prejudices in a despairing effort to

find the fittest instruments for the perfecting of his great design. It

was Marius's fortunate lot to enter the field at a time of trial, and to

serve his first campaign under a general, who was combating the adverse

forces of influence, licence and incompetence in the official staff

supplied by the government and represented by the young scions of the

nobility. To the camp before Numantia, where Scipio was scourging his

men into obedience, rooting out the amenities of life, and astonishing

his officers with new ideas of the meaning of a campaign, Marius brought

the very qualities on which the general had set his heart. An

unflinching courage, shown on one occasion in single combat when he

overthrew a champion of the foe, a power of physical endurance which

could submit to all changes of temperature and food, a minute precision

in the performance of the detailed duties of the camp, soon led to his

rapid advancement and to his selection as a member of the intimate

circle which surrounded the commander-in-chief. Every great specialist

has a small claim to the gift of prophecy; for he possesses an instinct

which reveals more than his reason will permit him to prove; and we need

not wonder at the story that, when once the debate grew warm round

Scipio's table as to who would succeed him as the chosen commander of

the Roman host, he lightly touched the shoulder of Marius and answered

"Perhaps we shall find him here".[801]

The higher commands in the army could be sought only through a political

career; and Marius, inspired with the highest hopes by Scipio's

commendation, was forced to breathe the uncongenial atmosphere of the

city and to fight his way upwards to the curule offices. There is no

proof that he took advantage of the current of democratic feeling which

accompanied the movements of the Gracchi. It was, perhaps, as well that

he did not; for such an association might have long delayed his higher

political career. The nobles who posed as democrats probably attached

more importance to forensic skill than to military merit; and the

support which Marius enjoyed was sought and found amongst the

representatives of the opposite party. Scipio's death removed a man who

might have been a powerful advocate on his behalf; the vague

relationship of clientship in which the family of Marius had stood to

the clan of the Herennii[802]--a relation common between Roman families

and the members of Italian townships, and in this case probably dating

from a time before Arpinum had received full Roman rights--seems never

to have led to active interference on his behalf on the part of the

representatives of that ancient Samnite house. Perhaps the Herennii were

too weak to assist the fortunes of their client; they certainly give no

names to the Fasti of this period. It is also possible that the proud

soldier was galled by the memory of the hereditary yoke, and sought

assistance where it would be given simply as a mark of merit, not as a

duty conditioned by the claim to irksome reciprocal obligations. The

all-powerful family of the Caecilii Metelli, who were at this time

vigorously fulfilling the destiny of office which heaven had prescribed

for their clan, stretched out a helping hand to the distinguished

soldier;[803] a family born to military command might consult its

interests, while it gratified its sympathies, by attaching to its

_clientele_ a warrior who had received the best training of the school

of Africanus. After he had held the military tribunate and the

quaestorship,[804] Marius attained the tribunate of the Plebs with the

assistance of Lucius Caecilius Metellus.[805] He was in his thirty-ninth

year when he entered on the first office which gave him the opportunity

of claiming the attention of the people by the initiation of legislative

measures. The slowness of his rise may have led him to believe that he

might accelerate his career by taking his fortune into his own hands;

certainly if the law which bore his name was not unwelcome to the better

portion of the nobility, the methods by which he forced it through did

not commend themselves even to his patron. His proposal was meant to

limit the exercise of undue influence at the Comitia, and although the

law doubtless referred to legislative meetings summoned for every

purpose, it was chiefly directed to securing the independence of the

voter in such public trials as still took place before the people,[806]

and was perhaps inspired by scenes that might have been witnessed at the

acquittal of Opimius one year previously. One of the clauses of the bill

provided that the exits to the galleries, through which the voters filed

to give their suffrages to the tellers, should be narrowed,[807] the

object being to exclude the political agents who were accustomed to

occupy the sides of the passages, and influence or intimidate, by their

presence if not by their words, the voting citizen at the critical

moment when he was about to record his verdict. Such methods were

probably found effective even where the ballot was used, but their

success must have been even greater in trials for treason, at which

voting by word of mouth was still employed. It was difficult for a

government, which had accepted the ballot, to offer a decent resistance

to a measure of this kind. The proposal attacked indifferently political

methods which might be, and probably were, employed by both parties;

and, although its success would no doubt inflict more injury on the

government than on the opposition, it could not be repudiated by the

senate on the ground that it was tainted by an aggressively "popular"

character. The opposition which it actually encountered was apparently

based on the formal ground that the heads of the administration had not

been sufficiently consulted. The law was not the outcome of any

senatorial decree, nor had the senate's opinion been deliberately taken

on the utility of the measure. The consul Cotta persuaded the house to

frame a resolution expressing dissatisfaction with the proposal as it

stood, and to summon Marius for an explanation. The summons was promptly

obeyed, but the expected scene of humiliation of the untried parvenu was

rudely interrupted at an early period of the debate. Marius knew that he

had the people and the tribunician college with him, and that even the

most perverse ingenuity could never construe the measure as a factious

opposition to the interests of the State. Obedience to the senate would

in this instance mean the sacrifice of a reputation for political

honesty and courage; it might be better to burn his boats and to trust

for the future to the generosity of the people for the gifts which the

nobility so grudgingly bestowed. He chose to regard the controversy as

one of those cases of hopeless conflict between the members of the

magistracy, for the solution of which the law had provided regular

though exceptional means. He fell back on the majesty of the tribunician

power, and threatened Cotta with imprisonment if he did not withdraw his

resolution.[808] It is probable that up to this point no decree

expressing wholesale condemnation of the bill had been passed, and the

senate might therefore be coerced through the magistrate, without its

authority being utterly disregarded. Cotta turned to his colleague

Metellus, known to be the friend of the obstinate tribune, and Metellus

rising gave the consul his support. Marius, undaunted by the attitude of

his patron, hurried matters to a close. He summoned his attendant to the

Curia, and bade him take Metellus himself into custody and conduct him

to a place of confinement. Metellus appealed to the other tribunes, but

none would offer his help; and the senate was forced to save the

situation by sacrificing its vote of censure. So rapid and complete a

victory, even on an issue of no great importance, delighted the popular

mind. The senate was then in good favour at Rome; but a chance for

realising their superiority over the greatest of their servants was

always welcome to the people. They also loved those exhibitions of

physical force by which the genius of Rome had solved the difficulties

of her constitution: and the violence of a tribune was as impressive now

as was that of a consul four years later. Marius had gained a character

for sturdy independence and unshaken constancy, which was to produce

unexpected results in the political world of the future, and was to be

immediately tested in a manner that must have proved profoundly

disappointing to many who acclaimed him. It seems as though this victory

over the resolution of the senate may have urged certain would-be

reformers to believe that measures of a Gracchan type might win the

favour of the people, and secure the support of a tribunician college

which seemed to be out of sympathy with the government. Some proposal

dealing with the distribution of corn,[809] perhaps an extension of the

existing scheme, was made. It found no more resolute opponent than

Marius, and his opposition helped to secure its utter defeat. In this

resistance we may perhaps see the genuinely neutral character of the

man; for the attribution of interested motives, although the historian's

favourite revenge for the difficulties of his task, endows his

characters with a foresight which is as abnormal as their lack of

principle; although it is questionable whether Marius would have gained

by identifying himself with a cause which had not yet emerged from the

ruin of its failure.

The lack of official support and the alienation of a section of the

people may perhaps be traced in the successive defeats of his

candidature for the curule and plebeian aedileships,[810] although in

the elections to these offices the attention of the people was so keenly

directed to the candidate's pecuniary means as a guarantee of their

gratification by brilliant shows, that the aedileship must have been of

all magistracies the most difficult of attainment by merit unsupported

by wealth. Even when the rejected candidate had won favour on other

grounds, the electors could salve their consciences with the reflection

that the aedileship was no obligatory step in an official career, and

that, where merit and not money was in question, they could show their

appreciation of personal qualities in the elections to the praetorship.

A year after his repulse Marius turned to the candidature for this

office, which conveyed the first opportunity of the tenure of an

independent military command. He was returned at the bottom of the poll,

and even then had to fight hard to retain his place in the praetorian

college.[811] A charge of undue influence was brought against the man

who had struggled successfully to preserve the purity of the Comitia,

and it was pretended that a slave of one of his closest political

associates had been seen within the barriers mixing with the voters.

That the charge was supported by powerful influences, or was generally

believed to be correct, is perhaps shown by the conduct of the censors

of the succeeding year who expelled this associate from the senate.[812]

The jurors[813] before whom the case was tried--representatives, as we

must suppose, of the equestrian order and therefore presumably

uninfluenced by senatorial hostility--were long perplexed by the

conflict of evidence. During the first days of the trial it seemed as

though the doom of Marius was sealed, and his unexpected acquittal was

only secured by the scrutiny of the tablets revealing an equality of

votes, a condition which, according to the rules of Roman process,

necessitated a favourable verdict.

His praetorship, in accordance with the rules which now governed this

magistracy in consequence of the multiplication of the courts of

justice, confined his energies to Rome. We do not know what department

of this office he administered; but, as the charge of no department

could make an epoch in the career of any one but a lawyer gifted with

original ideas, we are not surprised to find that Marius's tenure of

this magistracy, although creditable, did not excite any marked

attention.[814] After his praetorship he obtained his first independent

military command in Farther Spain. Such a province had always its little

problems of pacification to present to an energetic commander, and

Marius's military talents were moderately exercised by the repression of

the habitual brigandage of its inhabitants.[815] His tenure of a foreign

command may have added to his wealth, for provincial government could be

made to increase the means of the most honest administrator. It was

still more important that his tenure of the praetorship had added him to

the ranks of the official nobility. His birth was now no bar to any

social distinction to which his simple and resolute soul might think it

profitable to aspire: and a family of the patrician Julii was not

ashamed to give one of its daughters to the adventurer from

Arpinum.[816] Thus Marius remained for a while; to Roman society an

interesting specimen of the self-made man, marked by a bluntness and

directness appropriate to the type and provocative of an amused regard;

to the professed politician a man with a fairly successful but puzzling

political career, and one that perhaps needed not to be too seriously

considered. For to all who understood the existent conditions of Roman

public life, his attainment of the consulship and of a dominant position

in the councils of the State must have seemed impossible. There was but

one contingency that could make Marius a necessary man. This was war on

a grand scale. But the contingency was distant, and, even if it arose,

the government might employ his skill while keeping him in a

subordinate position.

The career of Marius is not the only proof that the tradition of

successful opposition to the senate could be easily revived. In the year

following his tribunate a new and successful effort was made in the

direction of transmarine colonisation.[817] The pretext for the measure

was the necessity for preserving command of the territory which had been

won by the great victories of Domitius and Fabius on the farther side of

the Alps; the strategic value of the foundation was undeniable, and the

opposition of the government was probably directed by the form which it

was proposed that the new settlement should take. It was not to be a

mere fort in the enemy's country, like the already-established Aquae

Sextiae,[818] but a true _colonia_ of Roman citizens,[819] the creation

of which was certain to lead to excessive complications in the foreign

policy which dealt with the frontiers of the north. Such a colony would

become the centre of an active trade with the surrounding tribes; though

professedly founded in the people's interest, it would rapidly become a

mere feeler for extending the operations of the great mercantile class;

the growth of Roman trade-interests would necessarily involve a policy

of defence and probably of expansion, which would tell heavily on the

resources of the State. The success of the government was dependent on

the restriction of its efforts, and there is nothing surprising in the

hearty opposition which it offered to the projected colony of Narbo

Martius. Even after the original measure sanctioning the settlement had

passed the Comitia, senatorial influence led to the promulgation of a

new proposal in which the people was asked to reconsider its

decision.[820] But the project had found an ardent champion in the young

Lucius Crassus, who strengthened the position which he had won in the

previous year, by a speech weighty beyond the promise of his age.[821]

In his successful advocacy of a national undertaking he was not afraid

to impugn the authority of the senate, and reaped an immediate reward in

being selected, despite his youth, as one of the commissioners for

establishing the settlement.[822]

It is probable that without the support of the equestrian order the

project for the foundation of Narbo Martius might have fallen through.

The man of popular sympathies whose measures attracted their support was

tolerably certain of success, and the man who posed as the champion of

the order was still more firmly placed. The latter position was occupied

for a considerable time by Caius Servilius Glaucia, whose tribunate

probably belongs to the close of the period which we are

describing.[823] Glaucia himself, probably one of those scions of the

nobility whom an original bent of mind had alienated from the narrow

interests of his order, was a man who, lacking in the gift of passionate

but steadfast seriousness which makes the great reformer, possessed

powers admirably adapted for holding the popular ear and inspiring his

auditors with a kind of robust confidence in himself. Ready, acute and

witty,[824] he possessed the happy faculty of taking the Comitia, under

the guise of the plain and honest man, into his confidence. The very

ignorance of his auditors became a respectable attribute, when it was

figured as ingenuous simplicity which needed protection against the

tortuous wiles of the legislator and the official draughtsman. On one

occasion he told his audience that the essence of a law was its

preamble. If, when read to them, it was found to contain the words

"dictator, consul, praetor or magister equitum," the bill was no concern

of theirs. But, if they caught the utterance "and whosoever after this

enactment," then they must wake up, for some new fetter of law was being

forged to bind their limbs.[825] A man of this unconventional type was

not likely to be popular in the senate, and the opprobrious name, which

he subsequently bore in the Curia,[826] is a proof of the liveliness

which he imparted to debate.

At the time of Glaucia's tribunate some subtle movement seems to have

been on foot for undoing the judiciary law of Caius Gracchus and ousting

the knights from their possession of the court before which senators

most frequently appeared. The law which dealt with the crime of

extortion by Roman officials had been frequently renewed, and, whenever

a proposal was made for recasting the enactment with a view to effecting

improvements in procedure, the equestrian tenure of the court was

threatened; for a new law might state qualifications for the jurors

differing from those which had given this department of jurisdiction to

the knights. The relief of the order was therefore great when the

necessary work of revision was undertaken by one who showed himself an

ardent champion of equestrian claims.[827] Glaucia's alteration in

procedure was thorough and permanent. He introduced the system of the

"second hearing "--an obligatory renewal of the trial, which rendered it

possible for counsel to discuss evidence which had been already given,

and for jurors to get a grasp of the mass of scattered data which had

been presented to their notice--[828] and he also made it possible to

recover damages, not only from the chief malefactor, but from all who

had dishonestly shared his spoils.[829] These principles continued to be

observed in trials for extortion to the close of the Republic, and may

have been the only permanent relic of Glaucia's feverish political

career. But for the moment the clauses of his law which dealt with the

qualifications of the jurors, were those most anxiously awaited and most

heartily acclaimed. He had stemmed a reaction and consolidated, beyond

hope of alteration for a long term of years, the system of dual control

established by Caius Gracchus.

The careers and successes of Marius, Crassus and Glaucia exhibit the

spirit of unrest which broke at intervals through the apathetic

tolerance displayed by the people towards the rule of the nobility.

These alternations of confidence and distrust find their counterpart in

the religious history of the times; but a panic springing from a belief

in the anger of the gods was even more difficult to control than the

alarm excited by the attitude of the government. Such a panic knew no

distinctions of station, sex or age; it seized on citizens who cared

nothing for the problems of administration, it was strong in proportion

to the weakness of its victims, and gathered from the dark thoughts and

wild words of the imbecile the poison which infected the sober mind and

assumed, from the very universality of the sickness, the guise of a

healthy effort at rooting out some deep-seated pollution from the State.

The gloomy record of the religious persecutions of the past made it

still more difficult for a government, which prided itself on the

retention of the ancient control of morals, which gloried in its

monopoly of an historic priesthood that had often set its hand to the

work of extirpation, to stifle such a cry. The demand for atonement was

the voice of the conserver of Rome's moral life, of the patriotic

devotee who was striving earnestly to reclaim the waning favour of her

tutelary gods. If it was further believed that the seat of the

corruption was to be found amidst the families of the nobility itself,

the last barrier to resistance had been broken down, for even to seem to

shield the unholy thing was to make its lurking place an object of

horror and execration.

The nerves of the people were first excited by various prodigies that

had appeared; a confirmation of their fears might have been found in the

utter destruction of the army of Porcius Cato in Thrace;[830] and a

strange calamity soon gave an index to the nature of the offence which

excited the anger of the gods. When Helvius, a Roman knight, was

journeying with his wife and daughter from Rome to Apulia, they were

enveloped in a sudden storm. The alarm of the girl urged the father to

seek shelter with all speed. The horses were loosed from the vehicle,

the maiden was placed on one, and the party was hastening along the

road, when suddenly there was a blinding flash and, when it had passed,

the young Helvia and her horse were seen prone upon the ground. The

force of the lightning had stripped every garment and ornament from her

body, and the dead steed lay a few paces off with its trappings riven

and scattered around it.[831] Death by a thunderbolt had always a

meaning, which was sometimes hard to find; but here the gods had not

left the inquiring votary utterly in doubt. The nakedness of the

stricken maiden was a riddle that the priests could read. It was a

manifest sign that a virginal vow had been broken, and that some of the

keepers of the eternal fire were tainted with the sin of unchastity. The

destruction of the horse seemed to portend that a knight would be found

to be a partner in the crime.[832] Evidence was invited and was soon

forthcoming. The slave of a certain Barrus came forward and deposed to

the corruption of three of the vestal virgins, Aemilia, Licinia and

Marcia.[833] He pretended that the incestuous intercourse had been of

long standing, and he named his own master amongst many other men whom

he declared to be the authors of the sacrilege. The maidens were

believed to have added to their lovers to screen their first offence;

the sacrifice of their honour became the price of silence; and their

first corrupters were forced to be dumb when jealousy was mastered by

fear. The knowledge of the crime is believed to have been widely spread

amongst the circles of the better class, until the conspiracy of silence

was broken down by the action of a slave,[834] and all who would not be

deemed accomplices were forced to add their share to the weight of the

accusing testimony.

A scandal of this magnitude called for a formal trial by the supreme

religious tribunal, and towards the close of the year[835] Lucius

Metellus, the chief pontiff, summoned the incriminated vestals before

the college. Aemilia was condemned, but Licinia and Marcia were

acquitted. There was an immediate outcry; the pontiff's leniency was

severely censured; and the anger and fear of the people emboldened a

tribune, Sextus Peducaeus, to propose for the first time that the

secular arm should wrest from the pontifical college the spiritual

jurisdiction that it had abused. He carried a resolution that a special

commission should be established by the people to continue the

investigation.[836] The judges were probably Roman knights after the

model of the Gracchan jurors; the president was the terrible Lucius

Cassius Longinus, already known for his severity as a censor and famed

for his penetration as a criminal judge. This fatal penetration, which

had endowed his tribunal with the nickname "the reef of the

accused," [837] was now welcomed as a surety that the inquiry would be

searching, and that the innocence which survived it would be so well

established that all doubt and fear would be dissolved. This commission

condemned, not only the two vestals whom the pontiffs had acquitted, but

many of their female intermediaries as well.[838] Some of their supposed

paramours must also have been convicted; amongst the accused was Marcus

Antonius, who was in future days to share the realm of oratory with

Lucius Crassus. He was on the eve of his departure to Asia, where he was

to exercise the duties of a quaestor, when he was summoned to appear

before the court over which Cassius presided. He might have pleaded the

benefit of his obligation to continue his official duties;[839] but he

preferred to waive his claim and face his judges. His escape was

believed to have been mainly due to the heroic conduct of a young slave,

who, presented of his own free will to the torture, bore the anguish of

the rack, the scourge and the fire without uttering a word that might

incriminate his master.[840] The free employment of such methods in

trials for incest throws a grave doubt on the value of the judgment

which they elicited; and, when a court is established for the purpose of

appeasing the popular conscience, a part at least of its conduct may be

easily suspected of being preordained. Cassius's rigour in this matter

was thought excessive;[841] but, even had he and the jurors meted out

nothing but the strictest justice, the memory of their sentence would

long have rankled in the minds of the influential families whose members

they had condemned, and thus perpetuated the tradition of their

unnecessary severity. It may be doubted, however, whether a secular

court was competent to inflict the horrible penalties of pontifical

jurisdiction, to condemn the vestal to a living grave and her paramour

to death by the scourge;[842] interdiction, and perhaps in the more

serious cases the death by strangling usually reserved for traitors, may

have been meted out to the men, while the women may have been handed

over to their relatives for execution. But even this exemplary

visitation of the vices which lurked in the heart of the State was not

deemed sufficient to appease the gods or to quiet the popular

conscience. To punish the guilty was to offer the barest satisfaction to

heaven and to conscience; a fuller atonement was demanded, and the

Sibylline oracles, when consulted on the point, were understood to

ordain the cultivation of certain strange divinities by the living

sacrifice of four strangers, two of Hellenic and two of Gallic

race.[843] The accomplishment of this act must have been a severe strain

on the reason and conscience of a government which sixteen years later

absolutely prohibited the performance of human sacrifice[844] and soon

made efforts to stamp out the barbarous ritual even in its foreign

dependencies.[845] Even this concession to the panic of the times could

not be regarded as fraught with much worldly success. The gods seemed

still to retain an unkind feeling both to the city and the government.

Two years later there was a return of dreadful prodigies, and a great

part of Rome was laid waste by a terrible fire. A few months more and

news was brought from Africa which shook to its very foundations the

fabric of senatorial rule.[846]

CHAPTER 6

The land, on which the eyes of the world were soon to be fastened, was

the neglected protectorate which had been built up to secure the

temporary purpose of the overthrow of Carthage, and had since remained

in the undisturbed possession of the peaceful descendants of Masinissa.

The fortunes of the kingdom of Numidia, so far as they affected that

kingdom itself, deserved to be neglected by its suzerain; for the power

which Masinissa had won by arms and diplomacy was more than sufficient

to protect its own interests. The Numidia of the day formed in

territorial extent one of the mightiest kingdoms of the world, and

ranked only second to Egypt amongst the client powers of Rome.[847] It

extended from Mauretania to Cyrenaica,[848] from the river Muluccha to

the greater Syrtis, thus touching on the west the Empire of the Moors,

at that time confined to Tingitana, on the east almost penetrating to

Egypt, and enjoying the best part of the fertile region which borders

the coast of the Mediterranean.[849] For the Moroccan boundary of the

kingdom--the river Muluccha or Molocath--see Goebel _Die Westkueste

Afrikas im Altertum_ pp. 79,80. From this vast tract of country Rome had

cut out for herself a small section on the north-east. In the creation

of the province of Africa her moderation and forbearance must have

astonished her Numidian client; and, if Masinissa showed signs of

hesitancy in rousing himself for the destruction of Carthage, the fears

of his sons must have been immediately dispelled when they saw the

slender profits which Rome meant to reap from the suppression of their

joint rival. The Numidian kings were even allowed to keep the territory

which had been wrested from Carthage between the Second and Third Punic

Wars. This comprised the region about the Tusca, which boasted not less

than fifty towns, the district known as the Great Plains,[850] which has

been identified with the great basin of the Dakhla of the

Oulad-bon-Salem, and probably the plateau of Vaga (Bedja) which

dominates this basin.[851] The Roman lines merely extended from the

Tusca (the Waed El-Kebir) in the North, where that river flows into the

Mediterranean opposite the island of Thabraca (Tabarka) to Thenae

(Henschir Tina) on the south-east.[852] But even the upper waters of the

Tusca belonged to Numidia, as did the towns of Vaga, Sicca Veneria and

Zama Regia. Consequently the Roman frontier must have curved eastward

until it reached the point where a rocky region separates the basin of

the Bagradas (Medjerda) from the plains of the Sahel; thence it ran to

the neighbourhood of Aquae Regiae and thence, probably following the

line of a ditch drawn between the two great depressions of Kairouan and

El-Gharra, to its ultimate bourne at Thenae.[853] It is clear that the

Romans did not look on their province as an end desirable in itself.

They had left in the hands of their Numidian friends some of the most

fertile lands, some of the richest commercial towns, situated in a

district which they might easily have claimed. Against such annexation

Masinissa could have uttered no word of legitimate protest. His kingdom

had already been almost doubled by the acquisition of the lands of his

rival Syphax, and his sons saw themselves through the aid of Rome in

possession of an artificially created kingdom, which was so entirely out

of harmony with the traditions of Numidian life that it could scarcely

have entered into the dreams of any prince of that race. But the

conquering city reposed some faith in gratitude, and reposed still more

in its habitual policy of caution. The province which it created was

simply a political and strategic necessity. It was intended to secure

the negative object of preventing the reconstitution of the great

political and commercial centre which had fallen.[854] If Carthage was

never to rise again, a fragment of the coast-line must be kept in the

hands of the possessors of its devastated site. It might have been

better for the peace of Africa had the Romans been a little more

grasping and had the Roman position been stronger than it was. The

Phoenicians scattered along the coast had become familiar objects to the

Berber inhabitants and their kings; to the enlightened monarch they were

a valuable addition to the population of any of his cities--all the more

valuable now that they were politically powerless. But with the Roman

official and the Roman trader it was different. Here was an alien and

(in spite of the restraint of the government) an encroaching

civilisation, utterly unfamiliar to the eyes of the natives, but known

to justify its lordly security by that dim background of power which

clung to the name of the paramount city of the West. The Roman

possessions were an ugly eyesore to a man who held that Africa should be

for the Africans. The wise Masinissa might tolerate the spectacle,

content (as, indeed, he should have been) with the power and security

which Rome's friendship had brought to her ally. But it remained to be

seen whether his views would always be held by his own subjects or by

some less cautious or less happily placed successor of his own line.

It was indeed possible that a hostile feeling of nationality might be

awakened beyond the limits even of the great kingdom of Numidia. The

designations which the Romans employ for the natives of North Africa

obscure the fact, which was recognised in later times by the Arab

conquerors, of the unity of the great Berber folk.[855] Roman historians

and geographers speak of the Numidians and Mauretanians as though they

were distinct peoples; but there can be little doubt that, then as

to-day, they were but two fractions of the same great race, and that

even the wild Gaetulians of the South are but representatives of the

parent stock of this indigenous people. As in the case of nearly all

races which in default of historical data we are forced to call

indigenous, two separate elements may be distinguished in this stock, an

earlier and a later, and survivals of the original distinctions between

these elements were clearly discernible in many parts of Northern

Africa; but, as the fusion between these stocks had been effected in

prehistoric times, a common Berber nationality may be held to have

extended from the Atlantic almost to Egypt, at the time when the Romans

were added to the immigrant Semites and Greeks who had already sought to

dwell amidst its borders. The basis of this nationality is thought to be

found in the aborigines of the Sahara who had gradually moved up from

the desert to the present littoral. There they were joined by a race of

another type who were wending their way from what is now the continent

of Europe. The Saharic man was of a dark-brown colour but with no traces

of the negroid type. His European comrade was a man of fair complexion

and light hair; and these curiously blended races continued to live side

by side and to form a single nation, preserving perhaps each some of its

own psychical characteristics, but speaking in common the language of

the older Saharic stock.[856] But the two races were not uniformly

distributed over the various territories of Northern Africa. The white

race was perhaps more in evidence in Mauretania, as it is in the Morocco

of to-day;[857] the dark race was probably most strongly represented

amongst the Gaetulians of the South. There were, in short, in Northern

Africa two zones, marked by differences of civilisation as well as of

ethnic descent, which were clearly distinguished in antiquity. The first

is represented by the Afri, Numidians, and Moors, who inhabited the

coast region from East to West. These were early subjected to alien

influences, the greatest of which, before the coming of the Roman, was

the advent of the Semite. The second is shown by the vast aggregate of

tribes which form a curve along the south from the ocean to the

Cyrenaica. These tribes, which were called by the common name of

Gaetuli, were almost exempt from European influences in historic, and

probably in prehistoric, times. A few intermingled with the Aethiopians

of the Sahara,[858] but, taken as a whole, they are believed to

represent the primitive race of brown Saharic dwellers in all

its purity.

Had the term Nomad or Numidian been applied to the southern races, the

designation might have been justified by the migratory character of

their life. But it is more than questionable whether the designation is

defensible as applied to the people to whom it is usually attached. The

Numidians do not seem to have possessed either the character or habits

of a genuinely nomadic people such as the Arabs.[859] They lived in huts

and not in tents. These huts (_mapalia_), which had the form of an

upturned boat, may have seemed a poor habitation to Phoenicians, Greeks

and Romans; but, as habitations, they were meant to be permanent; they

were an index of the possession of property, of a lasting attachment to

the soil. The village formed by a group of these little homes clustering

round a steep height, was a still further index of a political and

military society that intended to maintain and defend the area on which

it had settled. The pages of Sallust give ample evidence of an active

village life engrossed with the toils of agriculture, and the mass of

the population of the region of the Tell must have been for a long time

fixed to the soil which yielded it a livelihood. Elsewhere there was

indeed need of something like periodic migration. On the high plateaux

pastoral life made the usual change from summer to winter stations

necessary. But this regulated movement does not correspond strictly to

the desultory life of a truly nomadic people. Yet it is easy to see how,

in contrast to the regular and often sedentary mercantile life of the

Phoenician and the Greek, that of the Numidian might be considered wild

and migratory. He was in truth a "trekker" rather than a nomad, and he

possessed the invaluable military attributes of the man unchained by

cities and accustomed to wander far in a hard and bracing country. A

skill in horsemanship that was the wonder of the world, the eye for a

country hastily traversed, the memory for the spot once seen, the power

of rapid mobilisation and of equally rapid disappearance, the gift of

being a knight one day, a shepherd or a peasant the next--these were the

attributes that made a Roman conquest of Numidia so long impossible and

rendered diplomacy imperative as a supplement to war.

It is less easy to reconstruct the moral and political attributes of

this people from the data which we at present possess, or to reconcile

the experience of to-day with the impressions of ancient historians. But

so permanent has been the great bulk of the population of Northern

Africa that it is tempting to interpret the ancient Numidian in the

light of the modern Kabyle. One who has had experience of the latter

endows him with an intelligent head, a frank and open physiognomy and a

lively eye, describes him as active and enterprising, lively and

excitable, possessed of moral pride, eminently truthful, a stern holder

of his plighted word and a respecter of women--a respect shown by the

general practice of monogamy.[860] Even when stirred to war he is said

not to lend himself to unnecessary cruelty.[861] The activity,

liveliness and excitability of this people may be traced in the accounts

of antiquity; but Roman records would add the impression of duplicity,

treachery and cruelty as characteristics of the race. Yet as these

characteristics are exhibited in the record of a great national war

against a hated invader, and are chiefly illustrated in the persons of a

king or his ministers--individuals spoilt by power or maddened by

fear--we need not perhaps attach too much importance to the discrepancy

between the evidence of the ancient and modern world.

Much of the history of Numidia, especially during the epoch of the war

of the Romans against Jugurtha, would be illuminated if we could

interpret the political tendencies of its ancient inhabitants by those

of the Kabyle of modern times. The latter is said to be a sturdy

democrat, founding his society on the ideas of equality and

individuality. Each member of this society enjoys the same rights and is

bound down to the same duties. There is no military or religious

nobility, there are no hereditary chiefs. The affairs of the society,

about which all can speak or vote, are administered by simple

delegates.[862] There is nothing in the history of the war with Jugurtha

to belie these characteristics, there is much which confirms them. In

the narrative of that war there is no mention of a nobility. The

influential men described are simply those who have been elevated by

wealth or familiarity with the king. The monarchy itself is a great

power where the king is present, but the life of the community is not

broken when the king is a fugitive; and loyalty to the crown centres

round a great personality, who is expected to drive the hated invaders

into the sea, not merely round the name of a legitimate dynasty.

Monarchy, in fact, seems a kind of artificial product in Numidia; but,

artificial as it may have been, it had done good work. An active reign

of more than fifty years by a man who united the absolutism of the

savage potentate with the wisdom and experience of the civilised ruler,

had produced effects in Numidia that could never die, Masinissa had

proved what Numidian agriculture might become under the guidance of

scientific rules by the creation of model farms, whose fertile acres

showed that cultivated plants of every kind could be grown on native

soil;[863] while under his rule and that of his son Micipsa the life of

the city showed the same progress as that of the country. Numidia could

not become one of the granaries of the world without its capital rising

to the rank of a great commercial city. Cirta, though situated some

forty-eight Roman miles from the sea,[864] was soon sought by the

Greeks, those ubiquitous bankers of the Mediterranean world,[865] while

Roman and Italian capitalists eagerly plied their business in this new

and attractive sphere which had been presented to their efforts by the

conquests of Rome and the civilising energy of its native rulers.

The kingdom of Numidia suffered from a weakness common to monarchies

where the strong spirits of subjects and local chiefs can be controlled

only by the still stronger hand of the central potentate, and where the

practice of polygamy and concubinage in the royal house sometimes gave

rise to many pretenders but to no heir with an indefeasible claim to

rule. There was no settled principle of succession to the throne, and

the death of the sovereign for the time being threatened the peace or

unity of the kingdom, while it entailed grave responsibilities upon its

nominal protector. Masinissa himself had been excluded from the throne

by an uncle,[866] and but for his vigour and energy might have remained

the subject of succeeding pretenders.

A crisis was threatened at his own decease but was happily averted by

the prudence of the dying monarch. Loath as he probably was to

acknowledge the supremacy of Rome, he thrust on her the invidious task

of deciding the succession to the throne. He felt that Roman authority

would be more effective than paternal wishes; perhaps he saw that

amongst his sons there was not one who could be trusted alone and

unaided to continue to build up the fortunes of the state and to claim

recognition from his brothers as their undisputed lord, while the show

of submission to Rome might weaken the vigilance and disarm the jealousy

of the protecting power. Scipio was summoned to his deathbed to

apportion the kingdom between the legitimate sons who survived him,

Micipsa, Gulussa and Mastanabal.[867] To Micipsa was given the capital

Cirta, the royal palace and the general administration of the kingdom,

the warlike Gulussa was made commander-in-chief, while to Mastanabal the

youngest was assigned the task of directing the judicial affairs of the

dominion.[868] This division of authority was soon disturbed by the

death of the two younger brothers, and Micipsa was left alone to indulge

his peaceful inclinations during a long and uneventful reign of nearly

thirty years. The fall of Carthage had left him free from all irritating

external relations; for the King of Numidia was no longer required to

act the part of a constant spy on the actions, and an occasional

trespasser on the territory, of the greatest of African powers. The

nearest scene of disturbance was the opposite continent of Spain, and

here he did Rome good service by sending her assistance against

Viriathus and the Numantines.[869] Unvexed by troubles within his

borders, Micipsa devoted his life to the arts of peace. He beautified

Cirta and attracted Greek settlers to the town, amongst them men of arts

and learning, who delighted the king with their literary and philosophic

discourse.[870] The period of rest fostered the resources of the

kingdom, and in spite of a devastating pestilence which is said to have

swept off eight hundred thousand of the king's subjects,[871] the state

could boast at his death of a regular army of ten thousand cavalry and

twenty thousand foot.[872] This was but the nucleus of the host that

might be raised in the interior, and swelled by the border tribes of

Numidia; and the man who could win the confidence of the soldiers and

the attachment of the peasantry held the fortune of Numidia in his

hands. This reflection may have cast a shadow over the latter years of

Micipsa. Certainly the prospect of the succession was as dark to him as

it had been to his father, Masinissa. Like his predecessor he believed

that a dynasty was stronger than an individual, and he deliberately

imitated the work of Scipio by leaving a collegiate rule to his

successors. One of these successors, however, was not his own offspring.

His brother Mastanabal had left behind him an illegitimate son named

Jugurtha. The boy had been neglected during the lifetime of his

grandfather, Masinissa; perhaps the hope that Mastanabal might yet beget

a representative worthy of the succession caused little importance to be

attached to the concubine's son, in spite of the fact that it was the

policy of the Numidian monarchs to keep as many heirs in reserve as it

was possible for them to procure. But when Gauda, the only legitimate

son of Mastanabal, proved to be weak in body and deficient in mind,[873]

greater regard was paid to the vigorous boy who was now the sole

efficient representative of one branch of the late dynasty. Even without

this motive the kindly nature of Micipsa would probably have led him to

look with favour on the orphan child of his brother; the young Jugurtha

was reared in the palace and educated with the heirs presumptive,

Adherbal and Hiempsal, the two sons of the reigning king. It soon became

manifest that a very lion had been begotten and was growing to strength

in the precincts of the royal court. All the graces of the love-born

offspring seem to have been present at Jugurtha's birth. A mighty frame,

a handsome face, were amongst his lesser gifts. More remarkable were the

vigour and acuteness of his mind, the moral strength which yielded to no

temptation of ease or indolence, the keen zest for life which led him to

throw himself into the hardy sports of his youthful compeers, to run, to

ride, to hurl the javelin with a skill known only to the nomad, the

_bonhomie_ and bright good temper which endeared him to the comrades

whom his skill had vanquished. Much of his leisure was passed in

tracking the wild beasts of the desert; his skill as a hunter was

matchless, or was equalled only by his easy indifference to his

success.[874]

The sight of these qualities gladdened Micipsa's heart; for the military

leader, so essential to the safety of the Numidian monarchy, seemed to

be now assured. We are told that a shade of anxiety crossed his mind

when he compared the youth of his own sons with the glorious manhood of

Jugurtha, and thought of the temptations which the prospect of an

undivided monarchy might present to a mind gradually weaned from loyalty

by the very sense of its own greatness;[875] but there is no reason to

believe that the good old king allowed his imagination to embrace

visions of the dagger or the poisoned bowl, and that the mysterious

death of his nephew was only hindered by the thought of the resentment

which it would arouse amongst the Numidian chiefs and their dependents.

Certainly the mission with which Jugurtha was soon credited--the mission

which was perhaps to alter the whole tone of his mind and to concentrate

its energies on an unlawful end--was one which any Numidian king might

have destined for the most favoured of his sons. Jugurtha was to be sent

to Numantia to lead the Numidian auxiliaries of horse and foot, to be a

member of the charmed circle that surrounded Scipio, to see, as he moved

amongst the young nobility, the promise of greatness that was in store

for Rome in the field whether of politics or of war, to form perhaps

binding friendships and to lay up stores of gratitude for future use. In

dismissing his nephew, Micipsa was putting the issue into the hands of

fate. Jugurtha might never return; but, if he did, it would be with an

experience and a prestige which would render him more than ever the

certain arbiter of the destinies of the kingdom.

The advantage which Jugurtha took of this marvellous opportunity was a

product of his nature and proves no ulterior design. Had he been the

simplest and most loyal of souls, he would have been forced to act as he

did. As a man of insight he soon learnt Scipio by heart, as a born

strategist and trained hunter he soon saw through the tricks of the

enemy, as a man devoid of the physical sense of fear he was foremost in

every action. He had grasped at once the secret of Roman discipline, and

his habit of implicit obedience to the word of command was as remarkable

as his readiness in offering the right suggestion, when his opinion was

asked. Intelligence was not a striking feature in the mental equipment

of the staff which surrounded Scipio; it was grasped by the general

wherever found without respect to rank or nationality; and while Marius

was rising step by step in virtue of his proved efficiency, the Numidian

prince, who might have been merely an ornamental adjunct to the army,

was made the leader or participant in almost every enterprise which

demanded a shrewd head and a stout heart. The favour of Scipio increased

from day to day.[876] This was to be won by merit and success alone.

With Romans of a weaker mould Jugurtha's wealth and social qualities

produced a similar result. He entertained lavishly, he was clever,

good-natured and amusing. He charmed the Romans whom he excelled as in

his childish days he had charmed the Numidian boys whom he outraced.

In these rare intervals of rest from warfare there was opportunity for

converse with men of influence and rank. Jugurtha's position and the

future of Numidia were sometimes discussed, and the youthful wiseacres

who claimed his fr

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