第 二百八十七 章 · 第287章

Napoleon enters Moscow after the brilliant victory de la Moskowa; there

can be no doubt about the victory for the battlefield remains in the

hands of the French. The Russians retreat and abandon their ancient

capital. Moscow, abounding in provisions, arms, munitions, and

incalculable wealth, is in Napoleon’s hands. The Russian army, only half

the strength of the French, does not make a single attempt to attack for

a whole month. Napoleon’s position is most brilliant. He can either fall

on the Russian army with double its strength and destroy it; negotiate

an advantageous peace, or in case of a refusal make a menacing move on

Petersburg, or even, in the case of a reverse, return to Smolénsk or

Vílna; or remain in Moscow; in short, no special genius would seem to be

required to retain the brilliant position the French held at that time.

For that, only very simple and easy steps were necessary: not to allow

the troops to loot, to prepare winter clothing—of which there was

sufficient in Moscow for the whole army—and methodically to collect the

provisions, of which (according to the French historians) there were

enough in Moscow to supply the whole army for six months. Yet Napoleon,

that greatest of all geniuses, who the historians declare had control of

the army, took none of these steps.

He not merely did nothing of the kind, but on the contrary he used his

power to select the most foolish and ruinous of all the courses open

to him. Of all that Napoleon might have done: wintering in Moscow,

advancing on Petersburg or on Nízhni-Nóvgorod, or retiring by a more

northerly or more southerly route (say by the road Kutúzov afterwards

took), nothing more stupid or disastrous can be imagined than what he

actually did. He remained in Moscow till October, letting the troops

plunder the city; then, hesitating whether to leave a garrison behind

him, he quitted Moscow, approached Kutúzov without joining battle,

turned to the right and reached Málo-Yaroslávets, again without

attempting to break through and take the road Kutúzov took, but retiring

instead to Mozháysk along the devastated Smolénsk road. Nothing more

stupid than that could have been devised, or more disastrous for the

army, as the sequel showed. Had Napoleon’s aim been to destroy his army,

the most skillful strategist could hardly have devised any series

of actions that would so completely have accomplished that purpose,

independently of anything the Russian army might do.

Napoleon, the man of genius, did this! But to say that he destroyed his

army because he wished to, or because he was very stupid, would be as

unjust as to say that he had brought his troops to Moscow because he

wished to and because he was very clever and a genius.

In both cases his personal activity, having no more force than the

personal activity of any soldier, merely coincided with the laws that

guided the event.

The historians quite falsely represent Napoleon’s faculties as having

weakened in Moscow, and do so only because the results did not justify

his actions. He employed all his ability and strength to do the best he

could for himself and his army, as he had done previously and as he did

subsequently in 1813. His activity at that time was no less astounding

than it was in Egypt, in Italy, in Austria, and in Prussia. We do not

know for certain in how far his genius was genuine in Egypt—where forty

centuries looked down upon his grandeur—for his great exploits there are

all told us by Frenchmen. We cannot accurately estimate his genius in

Austria or Prussia, for we have to draw our information from French

or German sources, and the incomprehensible surrender of whole corps

without fighting and of fortresses without a siege must incline Germans

to recognize his genius as the only explanation of the war carried on

in Germany. But we, thank God, have no need to recognize his genius

in order to hide our shame. We have paid for the right to look at the

matter plainly and simply, and we will not abandon that right.

His activity in Moscow was as amazing and as full of genius as

elsewhere. Order after order and plan after plan were issued by him

from the time he entered Moscow till the time he left it. The absence

of citizens and of a deputation, and even the burning of Moscow, did not

disconcert him. He did not lose sight either of the welfare of his

army or of the doings of the enemy, or of the welfare of the people

of Russia, or of the direction of affairs in Paris, or of diplomatic

considerations concerning the terms of the anticipated peace.